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Taiwanese Ghosts 
~ and Tiananmen 
This study stakes out a new position on how and 
when potential resistance may be transformed 
into an actual social movement. Its three cases-
the Taiping Rebellion in the 1840s and 1850s, 
ghost worship in modern Taiwan and the 
aftermath of the 1989 demonstrations in 
Tiananmen Square--contribute to ongoing 
debates among historians, social sc ientists and 
literary theorists on the relationship between 
culture and resistance. 
Resistance, Chaos and Control in China 
compares active resistance movements with 
everyday actions that imply unspoken resistance. 
It shows how certain areas of life defuse attempts 
at cultural domination by di ssolving official 
interpretations. At the same time, these cultural 
"free spaces" nurture ambiguous and multiple 
alternatives of their own, including the possibility 
of erupting into open political resistance. The 
three cases demonstrate how attempts to push 
such ambiguous meaning into a single, explicit 
interpretation as resistance succeed or fail. 
The material on the Taiping Rebellion offers new 
views of the role of spirit possession in the 
movement, and the section on surging ghost 
worship in Taiwan addresses the reproportioning 
of religion as the island's economy and political 
structure have been transformed in the last two 
decades. The Tiananmen chapters examine the 
nature of cultural control and resistance in China 
and other socialist societies. 
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Part I 
INTERPRETING RESISTANCE 
AND RESISTING 
INTERPRETATION 
1 
Resistance 
A new literature on cultural resistance has enormously expanded 
our view of how people challenge the systems in which they live. 
While in lhe 1960s and 1970s we concentrated on armed peasant 
rebellion, recent years have turned us instead to devil worship in 
South America (Taussig, 1980), Mexican-American sexual humor 
(Limon, 1989), Chinese social networks (Yang, 1989), and safety pins 
in British ears as aspects of a subversive cultural resistance. While 
this may reflect in part the political changes of the 1980s, it also 
forces us to ask about the relation between the two kinds of 
resistance. Armed peasant rebellion and quiet cultural subversion 
seem quite different, and we tend to use different theoretical 
approaches for them. Yet each kind of resistance implies a relation 
to the other, with armed rebellion having clear cultural roots, and 
cultural resistance having at least the possibility of coming out of the 
closet as an actual political movement. 
This book explores the problem of these different kinds of 
resistance, arguing that we need a single approach, which sees the 
shared processes involved in open rebellion, in tacit cultural 
resistance, and in the cooptation of resistance. The cases I discuss 
are all Chinese, and all fairly modem, but otherwise as diverse as 
they can be. The Taiping rebellion in the middle of the nineteenth 
century was resistance by any definition. It saw massive armies, 
many millions of casualties, and a radically egalitarian ideology. The 
rebels, self-proclaimed Christians led by Jesus's younger brother, 
captured and held the economic core of China for a decade, and 
very nearly toppled the regime. 
The second case lies at the other end of the spectrum of 
resistance, if it can be called resistance at all. Ghost worship, 
especially at a few unusual temples, became extremely popular in 
Taiwan in the late 1980s. Vaguely associated with the underworld, 
gamblers, and ill-gotten gains generally, the great popularity of 
ghosts in Taiwan strongly suggests parallels with Taussig's analysis 
of devil worship in Colombia as a critique of capitalism (Taussig, 
1980). Yet if this is resistance, it appears to be very different from 
3 
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the Taiping rebellion - tacit instead of explicit, and embedded in 
everyday life instead of strongly institutionalized as a new state. 
Indeed, one could easily argue that it is not resistance at all, but just 
a kind of play with the system, or even a celebration of capitalism. 
It is the kind of situation that forces us to question what 
"resistance" really is. We tend to think of the Taiping rebels and 
the Taiwanese ghosts as quite different kinds of phenomena. Yet if 
both are resistance in any sense, we need a common explanation 
that still does justice to the differences. 
These two cases suggest new lines of analysis for a tl}ird, which I 
will address more briefly in the concluding chapters: the Tiananmen 
Square demonstrations in May and June 1989, and the aftermath of 
the tragedy as the state reasserted ideological control. Tiananmen 
deserves attention not just for the events in the square- explicitly 
political like the Taiping rebellion, but without its strong institu-
tional structure to shape the movement -but because the campaigns 
that followed force us to ask about future possibilities for resistance. 
Even as the state powerfully exerts its control over all external 
channels to express alternate views, people create new ways to 
deflect and defuse official cultural domination. 
In exploring these cases, I will argue that they illustrate important 
shared processes, in spite of their apparent diversity. As part of a 
broader theory of change, a theory of resistance needs to address 
both the cultural antecedents to a movement like the Taiping, and to 
uncover the mechanisms through which tacit, everyday cultural 
"resistance" might develop into such movements. All three move-
ments, in spite of their great differences, in fact shared important 
early features. Yet all three played out the relation between 
interpretation and institution in very different ways. 
This chapter and the next take up some of the theoretical 
problems of resistance, from the question of what actually qualifies 
as resistance, to the relation between institution and interpretation. 
We often speak too loosely of resistance and thus fail to make some 
theoretically useful distinctions. I will argue in particular that some 
occasions and actions nourish a rich surfeit of multivocalic meaning 
which opens up many interpretive possibilities. These can include a 
strong potential for resistance, but only as one possibility among 
many. Alternative interpretations are not themselves political 
resistance. Specific social processes shape the possible realizations 
of that potential, only occasionally fostering explicit and active 
resistance movements. After that I will move to the specific cases, 
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taking up the rich possibilities of their early stages, and the mutual 
relationships between specific interpretations and changing social 
institutions as active resistance developed or simply remained an 
implicit possibility. 
TWO PUZZLES 
My concern with these issues began with my first long-term 
research in Taiwan in the late 1970s, even though I was looking 
into rather different topics. Any period of fieldwork raises unex-
pected questions at the same time as it begins to answer old ones. 
Even when they do not seem to concern the topic at hand, the 
specters of these new puzzles may continue to haunt one in the 
years that follow. This book stems from two such images, both 
based in popular religious experience. 
The first puzzle has no immediate relation to resistance. It began 
with my initial systematic questioning about religion, and never 
ended. Informants who were quite voluble and friendly on most 
topics simply had nothing to say about religion. These were people 
who constructed elaborate rituals on a regular basis, and some of 
them made ritual offerings of incense every day. Yet I often felt that 
I knew the meanings of their religion, based on the secondary 
anthropological literature, better than they did. 
My first regular line of questioning concerned the Earth God (Tho 
Te Kong). Every neighborhood has its own Earth God and a temple 
to house him, and in many cases elsewhere in China there are 
reports of local worthies said to have become Earth Gods after 
death. The story of the Earth God seemed like an easy place to begin 
As it turned out, every family did indeed worship the Earth God, 
but no one had anything at all useful to say about who he was. The 
best I ever got was, "Go ask Old Ong, he likes those old stories." 
Old Ong, as it turned out, had nothing to say either, but did 
recommend a movie he had seen about the deity a few years earlier. 
The explanation, I thought (rightly), was that legends about gods 
were far less important than actual ritual dealings with them, at 
least in this community. The problem only got worse, however, 
when I moved to explanation of ritual. People who bum incense 
every day, for example, usually offer one stick to the ancestors on 
their domestic altar, another stick to the gods ensconced in the 
house, and a third stick just outside the door. This had already been 
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explicated in several important stt.dies of Chinese religion (e.g., 
Feuchtwang, 1974; Wolf, 1974) as being for the three main categories 
of beings - ancestors, gods and ghosts, seen as a kind of super-
natural parallel for kin, bureaucrats and strangers. The incense for 
ancestors and gods seemed clear enough when I spoke to people, 
but that outside stick became a problem. I began to see the look that 
anthropologists dread, the uncomfortable stare that starts when our 
questions stop making sense, and people wonder if they really have 
to answer. In this case, at least, I was able to get answers with a 
minimum of pushing, but the answers were inconsistent from one 
person to the next. Some people said "ghosts," the answer I 
expected, but others told me the other major being worshipped 
outdoors - the Emperor of Heaven, highest of all the deities and as 
far as one can get from the lowly ghosts. Still others just ducked the 
question. My uneasy feeling was that people had no ready answer, 
but looked for parallels in beings typically worshipped outside, and 
gave me the first that came to mind. 
Things only got worse when my questions moved from simple 
daily ritual to more elaborate and unusual events. To give just one 
more example, the Emperor of Heaven receives an offering of a 
whole pig at annual rituals in honor of the birthday of a major 
community deity. A great deal of ritual attention surrounds the pig, 
but one of the most striking things is the large cleaver thrust into the 
animal's skull and left standing starkly in its head throughout the 
offering. I could only get two explanations for this, neither very 
satisfying to an anthropologist in search of interpretive abundance. 
The first ran along the lines of "We're Chinese; this is how we do 
things." The second was even more frustrating: "It looks pretty that 
way," I heard over and over about this and many other ritual 
details. I took this to mean that it would not look right any other 
way, but it was hardly up to the standards of rich explication that 
one would expect from, for instance, the Zambian Ndembu whom 
Victor Turner described (Turner, 1967). 
I had come to Taiwan as a graduate student versed in interpretive 
anthropology, including Turner and especially Clifford Geertz, who 
had put the problem of meaning at the center of his influential 
definition of religion (Geertz, 1973b:98-108). In the same essay he 
defined a symbol as "any object, act, event, quality, or relation 
which serves as a vehicle for a conception" (Geertz, 1973b:91). There 
were vehicles galore in Taiwan, but the conceptions seemed hard to 
find. 
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This is not to argue that our own constructions have no value 
unless they directly echo the explicit interpretations of our infor-
mants. I was bothered simply by the lack of a good way to deal with 
people's strikingly insouciant attitude toward explicit interpreta-
tion. The relative lack of interest in such efforts constitutes an 
ethnographic fact whose significance has tended to disappear 
under our own ability to construct interpretations. 
Let me turn to the second puzzle, which relates to a specific 
incident, again involving those pigs offered on the birthday of a 
major community god. In Sanxia township, the area where I 
worked, the birthday of their god Co Su Kong is the most important 
ritual event of the year. The temple plaza only has room to display a 
dozen pigs, and the temple will display the twelve largest in the 
community. Families of the area vie to raise the most obese animals 
-pigs too fat to stand up and walk around, even too fat to roll over if 
you are very lucky. The day of the birthday is filled with offerings, 
both at home and in the temple. Onlookers, people selling goods to 
the crowd, and the occasional dragon or lion dance totally block 
traffic. The highlight comes when people promenade their pigs 
individually into the temple plaza, accompanied by bands and 
more dragon and lion dances. Each pig, slaughtered, shaved 
(except for the top of the head), neatly marked with rows of 
government meat inspection stamps, with a pineapple in its teeth, 
entrails, a duck and a live fish hanging from its mouth, and a cleaver 
in its head, straddles a kind of scaffold that makes it look even more 
enormous than it already is. The entire conglomeration sits in the 
middle of a plywood tower, gaudily painted in the brightest colors 
with historical tales and complex decorations. The scene borders on 
chaos with the pigs trying to push through the packed throng of 
happy spectators in the plaza. 
All of this had been described in some detail by Emily Martin 
[Ahem] (and published a few years later, Ahem, 1981b). Arguing 
broadly that pigs stand in for people in the ritual, she made the 
specific case that the pigs represent Taiwanese, as opposed to 
mainland Chinese, and that the ritual itself is an affirmation of 
Taiwanese ethnicity.1 I do not want to retrace the details of Ahem's 
analysis here; suffice it to say that I found (and continue to .find) her 
argument that the ritual implies a kind of quiet political resistance 
convincing. Moreover, the consistent pressure from the government 
to reduce the scale and especially the expense of such rituals seemed 
to strengthen the case. In a situation where people could not speak 
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openly about such issues, ritual provided a safe way of marking off 
Taiwanese identity and resisting mainlander control of public 
discourse. 
All of which brings me to the 1979 performance of the ritual in 
Sanxia. The birthday took place just a few weeks after the United 
States had officially broken diplomatic relations with Republic of 
China government in Taiwan in favor of the People's Republic of 
China. People worried that Taiwan's economy would collapse, or 
even that the Red Army would come pouring across the Taiwan 
Strait. The government asked for donations to buy jet fighters. While 
the temple in Sanxia rejected suggestions that their birthday ritual 
be canceled entirely, they did volunteer to cut down on expenses 
and donate the proceeds to the government. While the temple had 
paid a great deal of lip service (while giving almost no real support) 
to government economizing campaigns in the past, this time they 
made a powerful statement through the ritual itself. As a way of 
saving money, the towers housing the pigs were left completely 
undecorated, painted solid white. Far more than a simple statement 
about austerity, those white towers added a vision of death to one of 
the happiest events of the year - white is the color of mourning in 
China. 
I have argued elsewhere that people in Taiwan sometimes 
maintained their rituals in the face of government pressure through 
a kind of cynical ritual disguise (Weller, 1987b). They have some-
times claimed, for example, that raising obese pigs for the gods is in 
fact a useful agricultural competition. Yet this case was completely 
different. The dominant feeling I got was in no sense cynical; it was 
a rallying around the flag. 
The somber mood and reduced scale of the ceremony quite 
strongly supported the mainlander-dominated government that 
the ritual was supposed to be resisting. Had the interpretation as 
ethnic resistance been wrong from the beginning? If not, how had 
something apparently so central to the ritual been so suddenly 
transformed, without much changing the structure of the ritual 
itself? At the heart of the problem lay the question of whether we 
could ever argue for a kind of tacit form of everyday resistance. 
These cases imply that we can never read such a clear and unified 
intrinsic meaning into the formal elements of any ritual. 
Both of these ethnographic problems - the general lack of interest 
in religious explication and the resistance turned to patriotism -
question the relation between ritual and interpretation. While the 
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need for an adequate theory of change prompted social scientists 
and historians to look for patterns of everyday resistance, such a 
theory will also have to deal with interpretive silences and with 
apparent resistance suddenly turned to collaboration. If people do 
not speak directly of resistance, at what point can we properly 
impose such a reading? While some have claimed that we can and 
should identify such tacit resistance, others claim just as strongly 
that powerful hegemonic structures undercut apparent resistance, 
making it superficial or simply illusory. I will argue that both 
schools share problematic assumptions about meaning, and that 
an approach tying meaning more closely to socially organized 
interpretation leads to interesting new directions for analysis. 
WHAT IS RESISTANCE? 
Let me begin with the booming literature that looks for tacit 
resistance, and then tum to the opposed literature that instead sees 
only cultural domination. The two approaches together create a 
false argument, an apparent contradiction based on the over-
interpretation of inherently multiple meaning. Neither extreme 
adequately roots interpretation in actual history and social organi-
zation. The argument for a counter-hegemonic discourse has roots 
in Antonio Gramsci' s search to find and organize the voice of the 
Italian working class before World War II. Gramsci identified the 
seed of a revolutionary consciousness in the working class, even 
while recognizing the power of the dominant ideology. Speaking of 
the "man-in-the-mass," he wrote that: 
One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses 
(or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his 
activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow-
workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and 
one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from 
the past and uncritically absorbed ... Critical understanding of 
self takes place therefore through a struggle of political ''hege-
monies" and of opposing directions (Gramsci 1971:333). 
For Gramsci, daily experience thus created the seed of a counter-
hegemony, one that could grow explicit in class struggle. 
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Drawing at least in part on Gramsci's insights, '! more recent 
literature has turned to the analysis of how peasant culture or 
working-class culture differs systematically from the dominant 
ideology. One important approach identifies a shared body of 
traditional expectations within the class, which will lead to resis-
tance if violated, for instance as part of the transition to a market-
based economy. Writing about eighteenth-century English riots, for 
instance, E. P. Thompson argues that 
these grievances operated within a popular consensus as to what 
were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices in marketing, 
milling, baking, etc. This in its tum was grounded upon a 
consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of 
the proper economic functions of several parties within the 
community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the 
moral economy of the poor (Thompson, 1971:78). 
James Scott has developed a similar case for Southeast Asia in his 
influential The Moral Economy of the Peasant (Scott, 1976). Both 
authors make a somewhat stronger case than Gramsci, arguing in 
essence for a class culture in its own right, rather than the 
contradictory consciousness of Gramsci. Resistance here lies just 
below the surface - a constant class friction ready to burst into 
flames when the moral economy is violated. The existence of a 
moral economy of the poor implies a kind of permanent implicit 
resistance, an alternative view of the world already developed 
beneath the dominant ideology. 
Other authors have come at the idea of a submerged peasant 
culture from other directions. Carlo Ginzburg (1980), for example, 
has given us the story of Menocchio, a sixteenth-century miller and 
accused heretic. Idiosyncratic product of a fascinating combination 
of influences, Menocchio was good evidence of Gramsci's claim that 
everyone is in some sense a philosopher. Ginzburg pulls at the 
various threads that wove Menocchio's thought, from a world made 
of wormy cheese to a critique of Latin. The underlying warp of this 
fabric is again a hidden peasant tradition: "The crucial element is a 
common store of traditions, myths, and aspirations handed down 
orally over generations. In both cases [namely Menocchio and an 
earlier heretic named Scolio], it was contact with written culture 
through their schooling, that permitted this deeply rooted deposit of 
oral culture to emerge" (Ginzburg, 1980:117). For Ginzburg this 
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peasant alternative remained deeply hidden, emerging into the 
historical record only rarely. 
The existence of such alternatives to a dominant culture opens the 
door for the analysis of unspoken forms of resistance, and for the 
search for evidence that gives life to these alternatives even when 
they have no voice. Scott's more recent work, for example, has dealt 
with the "ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot 
dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignor-
ance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth" (Scott, 1985:29). He sees 
such implicit resistance typifying even an area without active class 
struggle, and without strongly drawn class boundaries. 
In quite another part of the world, Michael Taussig has analyzed 
the baptism of money by Colombian plantation workers (Taussig, 
1980). I have already alluded to this study for its apparent striking 
similarity to the Taiwanese ghosts, and I will take it up again later 
when I discuss that case. Taussig's informants told of people who 
substituted a peso bill for a baby during a baptismal rite. The switch 
doomed the soul of the baby, but the bill gained the property of self-
increase. Every time the bill was spent, it returned to its owner, 
taking along all the money in its vicinity. Taussig drew a strong 
parallel with capitalist commodity fetishism, where an investment 
appears to return with a profit, as if by magic. The Colombians, 
however, were not simply drawing a supernatural analogy with the 
market - they were also damning it as evil. For Taussig, a peasant 
use-value culture provided the germ of a critical consciousness of 
capitalism and exchange-value culture. Resistance again lies very 
close to the surface, even in everyday religion. 
Perhaps most influential of all in recent years has been Mikhail 
Bakhtin writing on Rabelais and peasant Carnival traditions 
(Bakhtin, 1984). Living at the juncture between the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance, Bakhtin's Rabelais helped shatter the medieval 
official language of order by drawing on the popular language of 
the marketplace and popular traditions of Carnival. Here again a 
peasant voice always existed, even while it was generally sub-
merged beneath the official language. That voice became loud in 
moments of transition, and Bakhtin saw it as an important factor in 
the origins of the Renaissance. The reversals of Carnival, where a 
fool reigns as king, have now made commonplace analyses that see 
Carnival as a fertile area for resistance. 
In fact, this entire literature on alternative cultures has encour-
aged us to see resistance in everything from rap music to ignoring a 
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stop sign. While I do not wish to oversimplify often complex and 
insightful analyses, we can at least characterize a line of argument 
justifying the use of "resistance" for many of the acts of everyday 
life: working classes maintain their own alternative views of the 
world in the face of pressure froln a hegemonic discourse. Accord-
ing to this theoretical approach, these alternatives constitute gen-
uine resistance both in their refusal to accede to the hegemony and 
in their ability to generate new social forms in the right circum-
stances. The opposition generally remains unspoken because the 
broader social forces allow it no voice. At most times it remains a 
safe resistance, which works through metaphor and irony, and 
never resists directly. 
Another View 
In spite of the great popularity of the search for resistance in 
everyday life, others have offered an alternative far more pessimis-
tic about the possibility of counter-hegemonies and daily resistance. 
The literature on Carnival provides a convenient summary of the 
arguments. For Bakhtin Carnival was an incubator for an alternative 
view of the world that played a major role in ending the official 
discourse of the Middle Ages. Others have treated it comparably as 
an expressive tool, helping to forge a unity of the working classes in 
the class struggle (Gilmore, 1984:96-125). Yet from quite a different 
theoretical angle, Carnival simply reiterates the dominant social 
structure. Umberto Eco (1984), for example, notes the systematic 
structural reversals of Carnival - the world stood on its head - and 
argues that the reversals work primarily to emphasize the structure 
itself. Turning everything upside down really changes nothing, 
except perhaps by drawing attention to the thing itself. Everyone 
involved is quite clear that after playing with the social hierarchy in 
reverse one day, all will return to live in it right side up the next day. 
More recently still, Stanley Brandes has written that "it is reasonable 
to assume that the periodic expression of chaos in [Mexican] fiestas 
reassures people about the stability of their social order. If deviant 
behavior cari. occur openly and publicly, without seriously harmful 
consequences, then society demonstrates its resilience" (Brandes, 
1988:169). Such arguments have been familiar to anthropologists at 
least since Gluckman analyzed the functions of rituals of rebellion in 
maintaining order in southeast Africa (Gluckman, 1960). 
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Far from being a focal point for resistance, Carnival thus becomes 
either a sociological safety valve or a new reiteration of the social 
hierarchy. These approaches imply a powerful unity in any society 
through an omnipotent discourse or a very basic shared structure. If 
such analysts are right that, for example, fundamental ideas about 
hierarchy are basic to Indian (Dumont, 1980) or Chinese (Sangren, 
1987) society, one would expect apparent resistance in fact to share 
notions of that hierarchy. Whatever such "resistance" appears to 
oppose, it in fact simply recreates its society. Such an analysis would 
not be at all surprised by pig offerings suddenly turned to 
patriotism; it would have questioned the ethnic resistance inter-
pretation from the beginning. Similarly, it would be less interested 
in the Taiping rebels' radical ideology, and more in how their actual 
social organization recreated much of the imperial hierarchy. 
Taiping law required monogamy, but Taiping leaders came to have 
large numbers of wives and concubines; Taiping ideology was 
radically egalitarian, but its leaders lived lives of imperial luxury. 
Rap music may at first appear to be cultural resistance, but it ends 
up as a McDonald's jingle. 
Interpretation and Resistance 
If resistance thus appears to be everywhere for some, it is nowhere 
for others, a chimerical vision that disappears under a cold stare. 
While this sound-bite summary may simplify the sophistication of 
many actual arguments, it does, I think, capture at least the ideal 
type of two approaches to the material. These two types of 
explanation appear to contradict each other; no room remains for 
a diplomatic reconciliation. How can we choose between them? 
How are we to interpret the significance of Taiwanese ghosts or 
even Tiananmen? As long as we insist on pulling a single "true" 
reading out of events and symbols - whether as clear opposition or 
clear acquiescence - we remain trapped between the Scylla of an 
inevitable but unspoken resistance and the Charybdis of an irresist-
ible hegemony. 
As a result, many authors have grown wary of the idea of 
resistance, even as they feel the need to address it. People looking 
at resistance have begun to speak with caution of the "romance of 
resistance" (Abu-Lughod, 1990), or of substituting "subversion" for 
"resistance" (Yang, 1989). They recognize the problems inherent in 
theories that see such a powerful structural or hegemonic unity that 
\ 
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internal change seems impossible and human agency irrelevant. On 
the other hand, they are uncomfortable with resistances that do not 
resist. 
Neither the resistance nor the hegemony view is subject to easy 
disproof. Both require us to look beneath the surface of what people 
say and do to find an underlying order, and both thus leave room 
for contradictory interpretations of agreed-upon facts. The two 
arguments appear impossible to reconcile and impossible to choose 
between. In fact, I will argue that the problem does not lie so much 
in these specific answers, but rather in the questions that both ask. 
Both arguments share a faulty semiotic that attempts to read a single 
meaning from a text, ritual, or action. Both fail to deal with the 
multiplicity of voices and styles in their "texts," with the possibi-
lities of varying readings in different contexts or by different people, 
or with the possibility that such multivocality simply remains 
unresolved. Meaning lies not just in the text, but in socially and 
historically grounded processes of interpretation. 
Even when these theories ground meaning in social life, they pull 
out clear interpretations only by greatly simplifying experience. 
James Scott, for example, who clearly recognizes this problem, 
argues that one can choose between the hegemonic and resistance 
explanations on empirical grounds (Scott, 1985:39-41). By making 
this argument, he quite properly places interpretation in a broader 
social context. Nevertheless, he draws a far more consistent picture 
of regular resistance than would be possible for many cases, and 
certainly for Taiwan. Scott would argue that, unlike Taiwan, class 
divisions in Sedaka are fairly dear and increasing, class struggle lies 
just below the surface, and empirical evidence for a resistance 
interpretation is thus more available than in many cases of so-
called cultural resistance. On the other hand, critics accuse such 
theories of oversimplifying class relations and ignoring other kinds 
of social solidarities.2 Hegemony theories tend just as much to a 
simple view of society as a unified entity, without effective class or 
other lines of struggle. Both downplay the real problems of cross-
cutting solidarities and changing divisions, further pushing their 
theories away from the real problems of ambiguity and shifting 
interpretation. 
Both the ethnic pigs who suddenly turned Nationalist and the 
general interpretive silence about religion in Taiwan demand a 
focus on the active, social processes of interpretation. An insistence 
that every text has its single reading will miss the point, drawing us 
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back into the same old argument. The most ironic statements, after 
all, have literal readings that subvert their own subversion, just as 
literal statements have ironic readings. The key question in asking 
about tacit resistance is how to sort these things out in relation to 
actual social and historical processes. Even the tendency to read 
political implications from all religion, which typifies all the 
literature I have discussed so far, risks pushing inherent meaning 
too far. Political meaning as both resistance and accommodation lies 
below the surface, but so do many other possible readings. This 
book thus concentrates on the social possibilities of making one line 
of interpretation explicit and broadly accepted, at the expense of all 
the other possibilities. 
Each of the cases I discuss features a central ritual or activity that 
is particularly rife with possible interpretations. Rather than trying 
to pull out an illusory single correct reading, I will concentrate on 
the interplay of possibilities, asking when and how particular 
interpretations come to dominate. Rather than decoding culture, I 
will be examining the social organization of meaning, the intimate 
ties between institution and interpretation. Rather than seeing 
resistance everywhere or nowhere, I will view it as one of many 
potential lines of interpretation. Looking at the problem in this way 
preserves the richness of the interpretive possibilities, and also 
clarifies how resistance can actually come to dominate in the 
competition to impose an interpretation. It allows us to see tacit 
everyday resistance in the same theoretical light as open struggle, 
and clarifies the successes and failures of various interest groups 
vying to dominate interpretation. 
2 
Saturation and Potentials 
Throughout this book I will be interested especially in situations 
that are overloaded with a glut of possible meanings, but where no 
single line of interpretation has yet come to dominate. This view has 
precursors in various critiques of the decodable meanings of 
structuralism, from Victor Turner's discussions of multi vocal 
symbols (1967), to the sociolinguistic turn away from structures of 
langue to the contextual meanings of parole, to post-structuralism in 
literary criticism. Each of these approaches pushes us away from 
structure alone, and toward a more complex view of indeterminate 
and ambiguous interpretation. While I will go on to argue that the 
ambiguities are resolved in certain social circumstances, comparable 
to the kinds of institutionalized rationalization that Max Weber saw 
in the Protestant sects (Weber, 1946), let me begin here with the 
argument for inherently indeterminate interpretation. 
Such a view challenges claims that a structure of symbols encodes 
a structure of meaning in a fairly straightforward way, as if a 
machine could simply read them off. Nevertheless, the master 
structuralist, Claude Levi-Strauss, evoked one of the clearest 
examples of what I mean. In his works on Amazonian myths, 
Levi-Strauss often mentioned Richard Wagner's Tristan and Isolde, 
especially when he discussed mediators - mythical themes that 
inseparably combine structural oppositions. He addressed particu-
larly two such mediators, opossums and rainbows. Just as rainbows 
bridge opposite sides of the sky and opposite ends of the spectrum, 
opossums cross categories as givers of both life and death. Both 
differ from nearly everything else he discussed by being impossible 
to reduce to one or the other binary pole of culture/nature or life/ 
death. Along the same lines, the love philter I death philter in Tristan 
also fulfills an "opossum function" (Levi-Strauss, 1970:281). 
Levi-Strauss called this phenomenon "chromaticism," music 
based on a continuous range of small intervals, rather than the 
larger intervals associated with the key signatures of tonal music 
16 
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(Levi-Strauss, 1970:256--281). Here he again referred implicitly to 
Wagner, this time to the overture to Tristan. The overture is famous 
among musicologists for the "Tristan chord" which forms its heart. 
The Tristan chord in a sense marks the culmination of tonal music, 
and by the same token its demise in the twentieth-century move to 
chromatic music. Like any good mediator, the chord constantly 
shifts its ground without ever establishing a key, creating a 
remarkable sense of unease in listeners. Over and over again it 
develops the tension that precedes a resolution into a tonic chord, 
and each time it somehow shifts into something else. Wagner never 
establishes a key for the movement, or perhaps it is better to say that 
he has written in too many keys at once. This is not the silly but 
shocking effect of leaving the last chord off a Beethoven symphony, 
where the key has long been clearly established and cutting the final 
resolution is just a kind of frustrating joke. Instead Wagner creates a 
vertigo of too many possibilities, a surplus of significations and 
signatures, constantly teasing about revealing its true nature, but in 
fact irresolvable. 
The entire idea of mediators is a critical point in structuralism, for 
it is exactly the point where a simple structuralist reduction to 
decodable meanings breaks down. Mediators occupy inherently 
ambiguous, irresolvable positions in the structure, unlike proper 
structuralist signs whose position in a set of contrasts encoded a 
clear and unitary meaning. Signs that contrast with themselves, like 
chords in too many keys, cracked open the doors through which the 
critics of structuralism would later pour, seeing all signs rever-
berating far beyond their proper set of contrasts, carrying multiple 
sets of meanings, overloading the structure until it finally shattered. 
Each of the cases of resistance I will discuss also has an overture 
based on the Tristan chord, overloaded with possible lines of 
interpretation. Such surfeits of hyperactive meaning occur over 
and over, not as exceptions to structural regularity, but as basic 
processes of interpretation. The heart of Bakhtin's discussion of 
Rabelais, in fact, concerns just this overabundance of meaning. His 
point about the language of the marketplace or Carnival does not 
simply argue for structural reversals, or for an independent peasant 
language as structured as the official discourse. At the core of such 
language, for Bakhtin, lies a permanently unresolved sense of 
becoming, where opposites unite and the possibilities are endless. 
Speaking about one of Rabelais' favorite images, for example, 
Bakhtin writes: 
18 Interpreting Resistance and Resisting Interpretation 
Thus, in the image of tripe life and death, birth, excrement, and 
food are all drawn together and tied in one grotesque knot; this is 
the center of bodily topography in which the upper and lower 
stratum penetrate each other. This grotesque image was a favorite 
expression of the ambivalence of the material bodily lower 
stratum, which destroys and generates, swallows and is swal-
lowed (Bakhtin, 1984:163). 
This great melting pot of meaning, where the possible ramifica-
tions far outweigh the neat categories of official thought, typifies 
situations that teem with too many possibilities. Bakhtin speaks of 
verbal play in the book "as if words had been released from the 
shackles of sense, to enjoy a play period of complete freedom and 
establish unusual relationships among themselves . . . The brief 
coexistence of these words, expressions, and objects outside the 
usual logical conditions discloses their inherent ambivalence" 
(Bakhtin, 1984:423). Structuralist systems of signs have left their 
meanings far behind, and we can begin to see how Chinese can 
enjoy their elaborate rituals without worrying too much about 
specific interpretations. 
Even the words "Rabelaisian" and "gargantuan" have come to 
indicate an overwhelming surfeit, an overflow of thick meanings. 
This is not the simple excess of overeating; it is a flood of super-
fluity, sizes and quantities ranging from the unmanageable to the 
impossible. The characters themselves are ludicrously large, and 
their appetites are larger still. The writing itself reinforces this, from 
Panurge's introducing himself in thirteen languages (three of them 
imaginary) (Rabelais, 1955:197-201), to his addressing Friar John as 
one hundred sixty-six different kinds of ball-bags, finally ending 
with "my waggling ball-bag, my dear friend" (Rabelais, 1955:360-
361). Friar John reciprocates a few pages later with his own equally 
long and entirely new list of ball-bags. This grotesque overabun-
dance, itself superimposed on the absurd combination of insult and 
friendly greeting, overwhelms any search for simple meanings, just 
as the language of the marketplace or Carnival holds power through 
the impossibility of reducing its excesses to any kind of official 
discourse. 
Roland Barthes makes a similar point in a very different context, 
during his essay on taking one's pleasure in texts. He asks us to 
imagine someone "who abolishes within himself all barriers, all 
classes, all exclusions ... ; who mixes every language, even those 
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said to be incompatible; who silently accepts every charge of 
illogicality, of incongruity .. . Now this anti-hero exists: he is the 
reader of the text at the moment he takes his pleasure" (Barthes, 
1975:3). Here again any neat decodings of meaning have fled in the 
face of overwhelming excess. 
While I will return to the problem of how any interpretation ever 
comes to be agreed on, all of this sheds new light on Taiwanese 
interpretive silences about ritual, their apparent overabundance of 
symbolic vehicles without the articulated conceptions to go along 
with them. A surfeit of interpretive possibilities saturates such 
rituals, and by the same token insists on no single interpretation. 
Most Chinese, after all, are neither literary critics nor anthropolo-
gists, and feel no compulsion to pull out the "true" interpretation. 
There are other reasons to participate in rituals - curing diseases, 
remembering the ancestors, impressing the neighbors, having a 
good time - and it is enough to believe that some expert somewhere 
knows what the symbols mean. 
While I was living in Sanxia, I asked my next-door neighbor about 
those pig offerings I discussed in the last chapter. He had raised a 
pig all year to offer at the god's birthday, and I had been with him 
when he presented the pig with great excitement in front of the 
temple just a few days earlier. He got into a small argument with 
another friend who had joined us; the friend was a very minor ritual 
expert who knew about proper mourning dress. My neighbor said 
the whole business with the cleaver, the guts, the fish and every-
thing else was just for aesthetics; it simply had no wider meaning. 
The ritual would be equally proper without all those things; it just 
would not look as nice. The friend, however, took issue with him, 
arguing that everything must be somehow significant. Neither one 
either knew or much cared what that significance might be. The 
argument was only over whether the whole elaborate performance 
had any significance to anyone at all. The superfluity of possible 
interpretations means that one can stop with no interpretations, just 
as the overabundance of possible key signatures in the Tristan chord 
leaves one in no key at all. 
This approach also begins to clarify the way pig sacrifices could 
speak one year to Taiwanese ethnic identity against the main-
landers, and the next year to patriotic support for the mainlander-
dominated government. Like much ritual, this one contains a 
multiplicity of possible interpretations, but insists on none. No 
reading is ever fully closed, and reinterpretation constantly remains 
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possible. Even such radically different interpretations as ethnic 
resistance and patriotic collaboration coexist easily in the ritual. 
Pierre Bourdieu wrote that "It is because subjects do not, strictly 
speaking, know what they are doing that what they do has more 
meaning than they know'' (Bourdieu, 1977:79). Explicit interpreta-
tion in fact limits significance, while leaving ritual or any other 
behavior uninterpreted keeps all the possibilities open. Bourdieu 
reminds us that the uninterpreted world extends everywhere; it is 
not just an odd feature of ludic peasant markets and Carnival. Doing 
things without interpreting them forms the broad base of exper-
ience, and the process of creating orthodox interpretations is itself 
problematic. 
Active, political resistance, for Bourdieu, lies in the transforma-
tion from "what goes without saying and what cannot be said for 
lack of an available discourse" (doxa, in his terms) into the explicit, 
authorized language of orthodoxy or heterodoxy (Bourdieu, 
1977:170). Taken for granted experiences "undergo nothing less 
than a change of state when they recognize themselves in the public 
objectivity of an already constituted discourse ... : 'Words wreck 
havoc', says Sartre, 'when they find a name for what had up to then 
been lived namelessly'" (Bourdieu 1977:170, emphasis in original). 
Such transformations, for Bourdieu, tend to occur in times of crisis, 
when changing experiences force people to question who they are. 
They create the possibility of political resistance. Each of my cases 
concerns just this interplay between indeterminate practice and 
explicit discourse, and each really spells out one of Bourdieu's 
three terms. The Taiping successfully created a heterodox dis-
course, the Taiwanese ghosts remained a taken for granted doxa 
in spite of many attempts, and the aftermath of Tiananmen concerns 
promotion of an orthodoxy. 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES AND POTENTIALS FOR 
RESISTANCE 
I have been loosely following various post-structural trends in 
literary theory to argue that many rituals contain lots of possibili-
ties, but no single core of meaning. "Texts" do not directly 
determine meaning, and there is always another reading. This 
approach overcomes the insoluble arguments between resistance 
and hegemony which I discussed in the previous chapter. Carnival 
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nourishes the seeds of both resistance, and hegemony, but reduces to 
neither. Yet this approach it also brings along its own problems: is 
every text open to any reading, with each new reader really writing 
from scratch, as more extreme post-structuralists contend? Are all 
rituals buried in an overabundance of indeterminate possibility? If 
we examine real action in real social contexts, the answer must 
clearly be no. At least in some circumstances, people agree on 
shared interpretations, no matter how fuzzy the "text'' may be in 
the abstract. The indecipherables of pure texts sometimes become 
lucidly clear in a social context. 
This is by now a standard criticism of post-structuralist literary 
theory. The critics suggest a kind of reductio ad absurdum - if 
meaning lies completely in the eye of the beholder, how can all those 
post-structuralists understand each other's texts so well? In fact, 
how can any of us communicate? If I ask my class to close the door, 
usually the door gets closed. Many other interpretations were 
available - I might have been giving an example of a particular 
syntactic structure, or imitating someone, or trying to embarrass a 
student who just walked in late. Yet in practice, in this specific 
context, both my students and I easily share a single interpretation. 
How does this reconcile with the kind of open-endedness I have 
been arguing for? 
Stanley Fish, perhaps because he is one of the most radical of the 
post-structuralists and has thus had to face this problem squarely, 
has pointed in a promising direction. He steered attention out of 
texts and into social relations by recognizing that "interpretive 
communities" limit the interpretations actually possible in any real 
context (Fish, 1980:~321). We pre-read texts, in effect, by reading 
them within a socially established context of interpretation. Having 
been socialized into particular lines of interpretation, we favor them. 
Real texts in real contexts are thus not so very flexible after all. This 
discovery, of course, echoes earlier anthropological critics of 
structural meaning, like Geertz's (1973b) insistence that thought is 
public. 
Fish has, if anything, gone too far in socializing meaning, so that it 
is difficult to see how people ever create new interpretations. Nor is 
any room left for practice that remains uninterpreted, although 
perhaps such a bias toward explicit language is understandable in 
literary studies. The idea of interpretive communities, as it stands, 
implies an unproblematic social structure, without the contradictions 
and conflicts of real life. Fish's approach leaves both the real social 
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organization of interpretive communities, and the actual relations 
between interpretation and institution, relatively undeveloped. 
Yet Fish has pointed in a very useful direction, leading us out of 
the hermeneutics of meaning and into the social organization of 
interpretation. He pushes us to ask how interpretive communities 
are structured, how they change, and how they impose or develop 
interpretations. Texts or rituals can determine meanings after all (at 
least in the etymological sense of determination as setting boundar-
ies), but only within particular social contexts and structures. Our 
attention moves from the texts and rituals themselves to the relation 
between institution and interpretation, out of literary theory and 
into anthropology and history. The post-structuralist emphasis on 
inherently open-ended interpretation offers new ways of dealing 
with interpretive complexity, but also risks becoming an ivory tower 
virtuosity that ignores the effects of social organization. 
Fish does not explicitly leave room for the kinds of interpretive 
silence I have been discussing, but the idea of interpretive commu-
nities promises to help with the problem. It allows us to suggest that 
the social relations of interpretation may be stronger or weaker, with 
some cases of very strongly developed institutions that clearly insist 
on a single interpretation, and others with little or no socialization 
into any particular interpretation. The most heavily overloaded 
situations thus occur where the social organization of interpretation 
has broken down or where no effective mechanism of interpretive 
socialization exists. 
When Barthes (1975) argued that some texts are more pleasurable 
than others, he similarly contrasted the pleasureless texts of 
ostensibly literal language with the blissful breakdown of interpre-
tive convention in which he takes his pleasure. And much the same 
is true for Bakhtin's contrast between the strongly institutionalized 
official language of the medieval elites and the peasant language of 
market and Carnival, where there is little institutional structure to 
impose an interpretation. The critical contrast is between areas 
where established institutions socialize or impose particular inter-
pretations, and those where the lack of a strong social organization 
of meaning allows interpretive silence or free play with interpretive 
possibilities. Rather than assuming a systematic structure of mean-
ing as the rule, I take such structures to be active creations that occur 
only under certain social circumstances. 
Put in these terms, the problem harks back to Max Weber's work 
on rationalization - the process of consciously systematizing all 
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aspects of life toward socially defined goals, instead of blindly 
following the shreds and patches of tradition. While Weber discus-
ses this transformation primarily in individual terms in his best-
known work on the Protestant ethic in Europe (Weber, 1958), much 
of his other work links rationalization directly to new institutions, 
both when he discusses American Protestant sects (Weber, 1946) 
and the rationalization of traditional and charismatic authority. 
Rationalization as a specific form of explicit and shared interpreta-
tion rests on particular kinds of institutional structures. The problem 
of institution and interpretation had always been at the core of 
Weber's work. 
Yet the theoretical case for the inherent instability and multiplicity 
of interpretation that I have been developing helps to resolve some 
problems in Weber's formulation, just as Weber helps supply them 
with a needed institutional base. Weber's earlier works in particular 
seemed to imply an inevitable evolution toward rationality, because 
rational systems work more efficiently. The inherent ambiguity of 
meaning, however, clarifies how rational systems may be under-
mined, as new interpretations inevitably challenge the dominant 
rationality. The evidence from all three cases I will discuss indicates 
that rationalities can be undone, and that the processes of complica-
ting, overloading and deflecting interpretation can in fact serve a 
criticalfy important function in social transformation. 
Saturation in chemistry offers a convenient metaphor for this 
process. Saturated solutions stand just on the verge of precipita-
ting.3 They are as full as they can get, having dissolved everything 
put in them, just as a ritual may dissolve all attempts at interpreta-
tion. Yet just one little push can change the entire character of the 
solution by precipitating out a solid when there was only liquid 
before. Under the right conditions saturated solutions, shifting and 
cloudy, can precipitate into new and tangible compounds. If 
saturated events are thick, overflowing with dissolved possibili-
ties, precipitated interpretations are thin and easier to analyze. We 
recognize them easily through their thoroughly worked-out inter-
pretations that we hear consistently and uniformly, and through the 
social structures that support them - all quite unlike those Taiwan-
ese pigs. Only at this point of explicit interpretation can we speak 
clearly of political resistance or accommodation. The metaphor also 
brings out the energy that must be invested to cause a precipitation: 
imposing a dominant interpretation requires work. There is nothing 
inevitable or irreversible about this process; every society contains 
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pressures both toward more explicit and institutionally grounded 
interpretation, and toward an indeterminate chaos of potential 
meanings. 
Each case I discuss begins with a high degree of saturation, but 
they vary greatly in how much a unified interpretation ever comes 
to dominate. Explaining the differences requires a close look at the 
history and social organization of meaning. While academics often 
show a Weberian preference for the rationalizing processes of 
precipitation, one of the points these Chinese cases establish is the 
tremendous power and broad appeal of leaving meaning messy, as 
well as the concrete institutional difficulties and sacrifices of 
drawing out explicit, agreed-upon interpretations. 
It should be clear by now that I do not see resistance as something 
inherent to all cases where meaning remains relatively open-ended. 
Insisting on such a reading simply recreates the arguments between 
resistance and hegemony that I have already discussed. Instead, 
politically significant resistance is only one possible line of pre-
cipitation, which lies nascent in a saturated solution along with 
many other kinds of possibilities. We need to understand when 
people realize the potential for resistance, how that one reading can 
come to triumph over all the other possibilities. This will require 
following out the various possible interpretive communities that an 
indeterminate interpretation can mobilize, and examining the 
struggle to create and institutionalize new such communities. 
Not all resistance, of course, lies either in saturated potentials or 
in major political movements. Many acts of day-to-day resistance 
have clear interpretations to all involved. Whatever its other 
connotations, sneaking cigarettes in the high school bathroom 
constitutes resistance against the school authorities. Yet here the 
social organization of interpretation has been defined by the 
authorities. It differs from the kinds of cases I explore here, where 
saturation allows a complex interplay between daily practice, 
established authority, and the germs of new interpretive institu-
tions. Unlike bathroom cigarettes, the resistance I examine here 
threatens real political change, if it is ever realized. 
The story never ends when a new and distinct interpretation 
comes to dominate as the only true meaning. There is, after all, 
always another reading. Every seizure of control over meaning 
opens itself to a new disintegration as alternative interpretations 
open up. Powerfully controlled meanings constantly threaten to 
dissolve back into solution, just as indeterminate meaning under-
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goes constant pressures toward a single interpretation. The inherent 
openness of meaning allows no closure here. Precipitation and 
dissolution are processes in constant tension, not absolute categor-
ies. 
My basic approach is thus to pull out the various potentials 
inherent in any saturated situation, identify the social and historical 
processes that sometimes allow one potential to precipitate out, and 
look again for the tensions and potentials in the new system. This 
search for potentials may seem odd. We tend to sneer, after all, at 
counterfactual arguments in history. History happened the way it 
happened, and there is little point in analyzing the imaginary. Yet 
such an argument suggests that the past somehow differs funda-
mentally from the present, with the past developing along its clear 
lines of cause and effect, while the present is filled with possibilities 
among which we actively choose. Any historical explanation in fact 
implies that events would have been different had a certain action 
not taken place (Aron, 1977:168--170).4 Bringing the same analytical 
tools to the past as to the present requires examining and differ-
entiating among potentials. 
Those Taiwanese pigs held the potential for both the ethnicity and 
the patriotic readings all along. Neither one had to be realized at any 
given time, but either could appear. By the same token, no explicit 
interpretation at all necessarily had to surface. While I will not 
squeeze those pigs any further here, the interesting questions do not 
so much involve the underlying meanings of the ritual performance 
alone, but rather the circumstances under which various explicit 
and widespread interpretations have managed to prevail. Much the 
same argument, of course, goes for Carnival. Le Roy Ladurie's 
Carnival in Romans (1979) shows clearly the various potentials 
dormant within the Romans Carnival, when several factions 
attempted to use the same Carnival performance for both repres-
sion and resistance. 
FREE SPACE AND PROBLEMS OF PRECIPITATION 
Unlike many studies of resistance, I am thus not willing to read 
resistance into every saturated ritual. Difference alone is not 
resistance, certainly not politically significant resistance. One could 
argue, of course, for a broader definition of resistance that includes 
these overloaded situations: difference resists by not fully following 
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the official line. Yet such a broad definition loses sight of other 
potential interpretations (like accommodation), and will never find 
the processes that can lead to politically important transformations. 
Rather than decoding resistance from complex and ambiguous 
ritual, I will look at the social relations and historical struggles that 
accompany the creation of actual resistance. While the best studies 
of resistance . have done this anyway (e.g., Scott, 1985; Comaroff, 
1985), making the approach theoretically explicit allows us to 
respect our informants' interpretive silences, where no particular 
interpretation is drawn out, and to understand how apparent 
resistance can suddenly take a very conservative turn. Both Taiping 
rebels and Taiwanese ghosts become open to the same theoretical 
tools. 
Resistance is not everywhere. I will argue, however, that the 
indeterminate meaning that thrives in the absence of rigorous 
institutions of interpretive control typically indicates a strong 
potential for resistance, as one among many possible readings. 
From the point of view of official discourse, the thick and slippery 
overwhelming of structured meaning is perverse, no matter how 
harmless the intent of the participants on any one occasion. Victor 
Turner developed this point more fully when he discussed commu-
nitas, a clear example of what I am calling saturation. Communitas 
offers a blend of 
lowliness and sacredness, of homogeneity and comradeship. We 
are presented, in such rites, with a "moment in and out of time," 
and in and out of secular social structure, which reveals, however 
fleetingly, some recognition .. . of a generalized social bond that 
has ceased to be and has simultaneously yet to be fragmented into 
a multiplicity of ties (Turner, 1969:96). 
Official powers always try to control communitas because it "is 
essentially opposed to structure, as antimatter is hypothetically 
opposed to matter. Thus, even when communitas becomes norma-
tive its religious expressions become cl~sely hedged about by rules 
and interdictions - which act like the lead container of a dangerous 
radioactive isotope" (Turner 1974:243). 
This is far different from arguing that all communitas or all 
indefinite interpretation is resistance, and Turner does not make 
this argument. It does help to clarify, however, why the proponents 
of official discourse and precipitated interpretations generally feel 
Saturation and Potentials 27 
uncomfortable faced with saturation. Really thick rituals accept no 
reduction to a single thin reading; they bubble with alternatives, 
even if they offer no specifics. Yet in itself this is still not resistance, 
because there are many other possibilities, and because an explicit 
interpretation as resistance may never be drawn out. In addition, 
understanding actual social movements requires the ability to focus 
theoretically on the point where a movement forms, that is, when 
the potential resistance becomes actual. 
This approach has several implications that I will develop in the 
chapters that follow. First, it suggests the tremendous difficulty of 
creating and maintaining a single, definitive interpretation. Perhaps 
because those of us who usually do these analyses are intellectuals 
ourselves - professional precipitators of meaning - we tend to think 
that agreed-upon, explicit interpretations convince through the 
power of the ideas alone (see also Worsley, 1968:xxv). The theoreti-
cal material I have drawn on so far suggests just the opposite: 
convincing interpretations require social organization, the active 
creation of new communities of interpretation. The move from 
indeterminate meaning to definitive interpretation involves a social 
transformation where one group successfully develops and pro-
motes its interpretation above all others. The empirical material that 
follows shows just how difficult this transformation can be. 
The second implication of all this is that certain areas offer a 
relatively free space for resistance, even if that resistance remains 
only one potential among many.5 The difficulty of institutionalizing 
an interpretation implies that most saturated events will simply 
remain saturated. Just as a resistance reading will be very hard to 
forge and enforce successfully, so will a reading that serves the 
official structure of power. Areas that teem with overabundant 
significance never fully socialize meaning, and their interpretive 
communities are not well established. As a result, they are very easy 
to penetrate from all angles, but very difficult to control from any 
direction. They tend to dissolve attempts at domination of meaning 
as black holes suck in all objects, but give off nothing, not even light. 
While precipitation is not impossible given an adequate social 
organization, it is difficult. I will discuss several cases where the 
state and others try to impose unified interpretations, but consist-
ently fail. That potential for resistance remains amid the kaleido-
scopic array of possible readings, making saturated areas one 
fruitful place to look for the germ of resistance movements. Chinese 
religion, with its typical use of condensed symbols and complex 
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ritual, and in the absence of any strong social institutions of 
interpretation, provides one of the free spaces for potential resist-
ance in Chinese history. 
Finally, like Turner on communitas, I will be concerned to show 
the positive functions of saturation. Unlike Turner, I will also be 
primarily concerned with how and when indefinite and multivocal 
meaning can transform into resistance. The processes of saturation 
and precipitation create a constant push and pull. New institutions 
can combine with new interpretations to create shared, definitive 
understandings. Yet this new interpretation is in turn subject to 
reinterpretations, making a general push toward a further dissolu-
tion that must be contested by controlling interpretation. The 
transitions back and forth imply important social transformations, 
and will require a close look at the relations between ideas and 
social change. 
I take up each case of resistance in roughly chronological order. 
All three begin with complex and indeterminate meaning, but each 
illustrates a very different possible development. The early period of 
the Taiping rebellion showed the great power of saturated ritual to 
attract followers and create new ideas, along with its severe 
limitations for social organization. The Taiping successfully man-
aged to create and enforce a single interpretation, enshrining its new 
interpretive community as one piece of a new state structure. Yet the 
new Taiping orthodoxy had important costs even as it solved the 
earlier organizational problems. The case addresses both the social 
organization of meaning as one interpretation comes to dominate, 
and the grave difficulties of maintaining such an interpretation. 
The Taiwanese ghosts provide an example of overloaded ritual 
that just stays saturated in spite of numerous attempts to dictate a 
single version, from a television soap opera to a fake temple. They 
again illustrate the difficulty of imposing an interpretation, along 
with the free space for potential resistance that religion offers in 
China. Most of all, they clarify the need for an analysis of potential 
instead of inherent meanings. 
Tiananmen was another event where the possibilities of inter-
pretation far outran the shared meaning. In this case, however, the 
state already possessed an extraordinarily powerful mechanism for 
imposing a thin interpretation. More than the events in the square 
itself, I will be concerned with the government's efforts to impose its 
own interpretation on the demonstrations through its massive 
apparatus of ideological control. Using the evidence from the other 
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cases on the difficulty of dictating an authoritative interpretation 
and on the inherent weaknesses of such thinned-out meaning, I will 
argue against the long-term success of efforts like this, and for the 
existence of free space for resistance under socialism as under other 
systems. 
Part II 
TAIPING REBELLION 
3 
Jesus's Brother and the 
Chinese Periphery 
The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom generated one of the most cata-
clysmic rebellions in history. It rose from a tiny upstart religious sect 
in an inaccessible backwater to capture the economic core of China 
and nearly topple the Qing Dynasty. From a few hundred adherents 
calling themselves God Worshipers (Bai Shangdi Ren) in 1845, the 
movement had thousands of followers by 1851 when it named itself 
the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and founded a new dynasty.6 It had 
an army of over a million when it captured Nanjing in 1853 and 
proclaimed the city its new Heavenly Capital, Tianjing (Michael, 
1966-71, 1:70). The dead far exceeded 10 million. 
For all its huge scale and enormous bloodshed, however, much of 
the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom's historical significance lies instead 
in its ideas, which both Nationalist and Communist revolutionaries 
in the twentieth century would see as precursors. The rebels 
proposed, for example, to communalize much of the economy. 
Early followers liquidated their wealth into a communal "holy 
treasury" (sheng leu), and the leadership later proposed (but did 
not systematically carry out) a radical land reform in which the state 
would own all land, parcelling it out in equal shares to everyone? 
Constantly proclaiming the brotherhood of all as children of God, 
Taiping ideology was radically egalitarian. 
While the land reform, radical as it was, had some antecedents in 
China, Taiping gender relations took a very new turn. During the 
early stages of the movement, adults lived in gender-segregated 
camps and the leadership strictly forbade sexual relations, even 
among married couples. Both genders had specific economic 
responsibilities. The women primarily produced things like 
clothes, but the Taiping also had detachments of women soldiers. 
Women could also expect to receive equal shares of land with their 
husbands in the land reform. In addition, Taiping law demanded 
monogamy and forbade foot binding. 
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Yet Taiping religious beliefs provided perhaps the greatest 
surprise of all in the Chinese context. Arguments about how 
"Christian" the movement was are as old as the rebellion, especi-
ally among Westerners at the time trying to decide if it merited 
support or was just blasphemy.8 Taiping ideas about the Trinity or 
the Holy Ghost, for example, were clearly quite fuzzy, and the 
leader's claim to be Jesus's younger brother won no friends among 
Western observers. Yet properly Christian or not, many of the ideas 
were very new to China. The Taiping believed in one God instead of 
many, and that Jesus had died for their sins. They performed 
baptisms, said Christian prayers, and printed Christian texts includ-
ing both testaments of the Bible (along with their own third 
testament). They destroyed huge numbers of non-Christian idols. 
In a country where intensive missionary activity throughout the 
nineteenth century had only a tiny effect, and in a region of Guangxi 
so cut off it would not see its first missionaries for several decades, 
Taiping Christianity was new and radically different. 
While the historical documents do not allow a clear and detailed 
view of the social processes that first made such ideas convincing 
and then set the rebellion off in rural Guangxi, they do provide 
some very suggestive glimpses. One of the most striking is the 
missionary Theodore Hamberg's retelling of the eyewitness account 
he got from Hong Rengan, cousin and first convert of the Taiping 
leader, Hong Xiuquan.9 As Hamberg relates it, while Hong Xiuquan 
was away from the base area in Guangxi: 
some very remarkable occurrences had taken place in the con-
gregation of God worshippers, which had brought disorder and 
dissension among the brethren. It sometimes happened that while 
they were kneeling down engaged in prayer, the one or the other 
of those present was seized by a sudden fit, so that he fell down to 
the ground, and his whole body was covered with perspiration. In 
such a state of ecstasy, moved by the spirit, he uttered words of 
exhortation, reproof, prophecy, &tc. Often the words were 
unintelligible, and generally delivered in rhythm (Hamberg, 
1854:45). 
The chaos was so great that the congregation, apparently fearing for 
its survival, asked Hong to separate the divine from the satanic 
possessions when he returned (Hamberg, 1854:46). Significantly, as I 
Jesus's Brother and the Chinese Periphery 35 
will discuss, this period also saw a massive increase in the move-
ment's following. 
Too many voices spoke at once. Each had unquestionable 
authority as God, Jesus or some other spirit, but they spoke with 
no harmony. This is a key aspect of the multiplying meaning that 
provides the focus of the next few chapters, a small window into 
how the people of Guangxi made Hong's Christianity their own and 
how cultural alternatives became armed conflagration. 
I will argue that dissolving Hong's original Christianity into local 
Guangxi culture through spirit possession and other means, over-
loading his ideas with multiple and inconsistent local interpreta-
tions, won the early God Worshipers much of their following and 
shaped much of their future. Conditions in this part of Guangxi had 
created a free space for resistance both socially and in local cultural 
practice. Hong's ideas became entangled in local specifics, briefly 
creating the extraordinarily rich and complex scenes to which 
Hamberg alludes. In the absence of strong interpretive communi-
ties, the newly saturated God Worshipers saw a burst of creative 
energy, a great surge in the size of the congregation, and a general 
breakdown of control. This was a sort of dissolution of interpretive 
authority that transformed the movement and created an enormous 
potential for resistance. I take up this transformation in Chapter 4. 
While overloading Hong's original ideas with local possibilities 
may have created the movement, Hamberg's reference to disorder 
and dissension reveals the organizational limits to saturated solu-
tions and irrational authority. Ordered political action required 
thinning meaning back out, precipitating an ideology out of the 
solution and institutionalizing the interpretive community to go 
with it. Much of the early history of the God Worshipers plays off 
indeterminate meanings and popular enthusiasm on the one hand, 
and interpretive control and state power on the other. The creation 
of a new Taiping ideology occurred simultaneously with state 
formation, and clarifies both the social difficulty of precipitating 
out ideas, and the new problems that can result, as I discuss, in 
Chapter 6. 
The rest of this chapter examines the precursors to that process of 
piling on too much meaning. I begin with Hong's development of 
his initial, idiosyncratic version of Christianity based on a dream 
vision, and then move to structural features in central Guangxi that 
weakened local interpretive communities, helping to create a 
privileged social space for the rebels. 
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HONG XIUQUAN'S VISION 
Hong Xiuquan was born into an ambitious Hakka farm family in 
Hua County, only about thirty kilometers north of Canton. As usual 
for a Chinese family at the time, their ambitions for Hong centered 
around his educational achievements and the hopes that their bright 
son could achieve the wealth and power of political office by 
passing the official examinations. He was a promising child and 
apparently breezed through the county exams, the entry level which 
conferred no degree.10 
The examination system in China created formidable competition 
at every level; only a tiny percentage of the candidates passed. Most 
Chinese intellectuals resigned themselves to repeated failures, often 
making a living as local teachers. While Hong's career as a prophet 
was to be truly extraordinary, his career as a traditional scholar was 
absolutely typical. He first travelled to Canton for the prefectural 
exams in 1827, at the remarkable age of thirteen; not so remarkably, 
he failed. By 1830 he was teaching in his native village. 
The next stab at the exams was in 1836. He failed again, but had 
an interesting adventure in the process. On the streets of Canton he 
met Liang A-fa, arguably the first Chinese Christian evangelist. 
Liang gave Hong a copy of Good Words to Admonish the Age 
(Quanshi Liangyan), a compilation he had made of selected transla-
tions from the Bible and from missionary sermons and writings (}ian 
1958:1693). Liang apparently hoped to attract just such failed 
intellectuals as Hong Xiuquan. Yet Hong did not read the book, 
and just put it on his shelf when he got home. 
Hong took another shot at the examinations the next year, with 
the usual result. This time, however, the nervous pressure and the 
agony of defeat apparently overwhelmed him, leading to an 
experience that will sound very familiar to anyone versed in the 
origins of millenia! prophets everywhere. He fell ill for several days 
during which he had a strange vision.11 In the vision he felt like he 
was dying, and a group of heavenly attendants lifted him to heaven 
with great pomp. On arrival an old woman (his Heavenly Mother in 
a later version) washed off the filth he had picked up by associating 
with earthly people, and old men slit him open and replaced his 
internal organs with fresh ones. He met various relatives, including 
an elder brother and a father, very dignified in his black dragon robe 
and huge golden beard. The old man lamented the state of the 
world: 
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What man on earth did I not cause to be born and reared? Who 
does not eat my food and wear my clothing? ... Have they not 
the slightest thought of awe or respect for me? They have been 
greatly deluded and misled by evil demons, and they waste those 
things which I have bestowed upon them as offerings to these evil 
demons, as if the demons had given birth to them and nourished 
them (Taiping Tianri in Michael, 1966--1971, II:54). 
The old man and others taught Hong many verses, whose 
meaning was mysterious at the time. Hong also fought extensive 
battles with imps and demons contesting the old man's authority, 
finally discovering the demonic leanings of Confucius himself. 
Toward the end, the old man presented Hong with a sword and a 
seal of office, sending him reluctantly down to earth to cleanse the 
world of demons and idol worship. 
Here was a saturated world indeed, which like any good dream 
offered no single line of interpretation, but instead a cornucopia of 
suggestive but confusing detail, from the color of the old man's 
beard to the details of the poetry. The condensed dream-world 
symbolism offered Hong a host of possibilities, but he chose to take 
none of them, just as many Taiwanese do not interpret cleavers in 
pigs' heads. He apparently chalked the vision up as a weird 
experience, and simply let it sit without much interpretation. 
Psychoanalysts, fortune-tellers and prophets live to draw definit-
ive interpretations out of such thick visions, but for the moment 
Hong simply remained a school teacher and failed scholar. He tried 
the exams one last time in 1843, once again reaping only disappoint-
ment. On returning home this time, for some reason, he decided to 
read Liang A-fa's tract, which had now been gathering dust on his 
bookshelf for seven years. The experience moved the dream from 
saturation to precipitation, and Hong from school teacher to prophet. 
Hong understood at last that the old man was God, and his elder 
brother was Jesus. As Jesus's younger brother, he was on earth to 
bring Christianity back to China, whose Christian beginnings and 
devotion to God were long forgotten, but now revealed to Hong in 
his vision. Following the instructions in Good Words to Admonish the 
Age he baptized himself, his cousin Hong Rengan, and his friend 
Feng Yunshan and their families in the local river. Obedient to the 
starkly iconoclastic principles they would maintain in the years to 
come, they also removed the god images from their domestic altars 
(Jian, 1958:1659). 
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Many of the early Protestant missbnaries in China were evangel-
ical fundamentalists, who shared far more with the Bible-thumping 
revivals of the Great Awakening than with the mainline Christian 
missions that came to dominate the China field by the twentieth 
century (Wagner, 1982:11-17). Uang A-fa was one of the first in 
what they hoped would be a wave of native evangelical preachers 
that would sweep over China, and his tract emphasized the 
particular Christianity of these radicals - an omnipotent, stem and 
jealous God who was more Old Testament than New, the strictest 
morality as a sign of salvation, and a quickly looming Day of 
Judgment. Jesus was important for having saved the world from 
its sins, but this Christianity put far less stress on Jesus as the apostle 
of love or God as all-forgiving mercy (Wagner, 1982:16; Jian, 
1958:1669-1695). 
Hong now set about understanding as much as he could about 
Christianity, initially through the study of Uang's text as it meshed 
with his vision and with his general knowledge as a Chinese 
intellectual. He gained a certain amount of interpretive flexibility 
through the mysterious language of some of these first attempts at 
Chinese translations. In addition to radically new concepts, the 
Chinese itself often became bizarre or even incomprehensible in 
places, perhaps allowing Hong to see it as part of the Chinese 
tradition of equally opaque prophetic texts (Jian, 1958:1667). Work-
ing with what he had, followed by his tiny handful of faithful in 
Hua County, Hong forged a new Christianity out of his saturated 
dream and Uang' s murky text. God had sent a second son to earth 
to revive the Christian message. 
Hong appeared to harbor no rebellious intent during these years. 
He may have been angry at the system that spumed him, but he 
continued to teach school, feeding a new generation into the system. 
Removing the graven images from his home surely struck the 
villagers as eccentric, but hardly revolutionary. No one is required 
to have such images, after all. Hong instead hoped to fill his 
missionary goals, replacing idolatry with Christianity.12 
Hong and his followers, however, did engage in enough 
iconoclasm to anger the village elders.13 They removed the 
Confucian tablets from school rooms in which they taught, 
unwilling to work in an idolatrous environment. As a result, they 
themselves were removed from their jobs, and Hong Rengan took 
a beating from his older brother (Hamberg, 1854:24). Without any 
real base of support - their evangelism apparently had little effect 
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and the group remained tiny - they felt compelled to leave the 
village. Perhaps their Christianity seemed too Western in Hua 
County. After all, the smoke had just cleared from the Opium 
War, and the main battles had not been far away. 
Probably more importantly, however, this was part of a regional 
core area of China, where the mechanisms of interpretive control 
functioned well. Destroying Confucian tablets may have intended 
no political rebellion, but it insulted proper orthodoxy and the local 
village authorities could not approve. Hamberg reports additional 
evidence that the local powers were ideologically queasy with 
Hong. A local xiucai, holder of the degree Hong never achieved 
and therefore a very important man locally, had offered to correct 
the errors in Hong's new religious books. Hong spurned him, of 
course (Hamberg, 1854:22). A bit later, the village elders exchanged 
argumentative verses with the two Christian Hong cousins concern-
ing their refusal to help prepare a major festival. Hamberg reports 
that afterwards the elders "never asked the assistance of the 
younger Hongs in their idolatrous practices" (Hamberg, 1854:26). 
That is, the elders apparently banned them from major religious 
festivals, which were, among other things, important signs of 
community membership and solidarity. Hong's ideas were too 
radical for Hua County. Unwelcome at home, probably with 
Biblical ideas of prophets wandering in the wilderness in mind, 
Hong Xiuquan and Feng Yunshan headed toward wild and 
peripheral Guangxi in 1844, where they would fare far better. 
Hong's new ideas were not resistance in any direct political sense. 
While his removal of Confucian tablets certainly reflected his 
frustration with the system, his continuing to teach the classics for 
the next several years shows that he had not rejected it. While he 
opposed accepted canons of religious interpretation, he had created 
no significant interpretive community of his own, beyond his very 
few followers. The village powers isolated his ideas long before they 
showed any political inclination. Theorists of cultural resistance 
would include his new ideas as a form of tacit resistance; Hong's 
Christianity certainly challenged some of the cultural underpinnings 
of the status quo. Yet Hong had no chance of building the institutions 
of interpretation that a move to direct resistance would require as 
long as he stayed in Hua County. We can thus identify a potential 
for resistance, but it was still socially insignificant before 1844. 
While Hong's idiosyncratic ideology stands unique, the general 
process typifies the experience of prophetic leaders elsewhere. Hong 
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Xiuquan fits very neatly into Anthony Wallace's description of the 
experience of leaders of revitalization movements, who almost 
always begin from a vivid vision where a supernatural being 
blames problems on a violation of rules and promises salvation 
for new behavior (Wallace, 1956). Quite typically, the vision comes 
as part of an illness after a great disappointment, and includes the 
kind of death and rebirth symbolism that Hong also experienced. 
Intellectuals with blocked ambitions also occur over and over as 
leaders of such movements. From the Zambian Watchtower move-
ment in the early twentieth century (Fields, 1982:335), to the Maori 
Hau Hau rebellion (Adas, 1979:109), to the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom, frustrated intellectuals seem especially good at precipitat-
ing new ideologies for new movements. New movements offer them 
the social mobility and leadership positions they had not achieved 
through normal channels. In turn, they offer their skills as intellec-
tuals in constructing systems of thought, galvanizing new ideas out 
of old materials, precipitating new interpretations that can form the 
seed of the new movement. 
Hong's new Christianity would provide just such a seed for the 
Taiping rebellion. Yet by themselves, these ideas explain none of the 
movement. As he left for Guangxi, Hong had built no institutions 
and had almost no following. While I have described his develop-
ment as a case of saturation and precipitation, the process took place 
at an individual level only, far from the social transformations I 
really hope to address. Hong in 1844 could easily have remained an 
eccentric with an idiosyncratic ideology, largely ignored and with-
out broader social significance. The critical process was yet to come, 
as Hong moved into the relatively free social and cultural space of 
east-central Guangxi, and quickly found his new system of thought 
dissolved and remade by the local people. 
FREE SPACE AND RURAL UNREST 
The cauldron that brewed the Taiping rebellion was Xunzhou 
Prefecture, a mountainous backwater on the periphery of the 
Cantonese-speaking part of China, known for its poverty, ignor-
ance and violence. It may have been internal to China, but 
functioned in many ways as a wild frontier. Like other such 
peripheral areas of China in the mid-nineteenth century, it had 
sizable populations of non-Han Chinese ethnic groups, poor 
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transportation, and relatively weak penetration by the state. The 
God Worshipers would develop base areas in close communication 
with each other in three of the prefecture's four counties (Gui, 
Guiping, and Pingnan). The most important of these was at Thistle 
Mountain (Zijing Shan). 
Even today Thistle Mountain remains remote, inaccessible and 
poor. The trip when I went in 1985 began in Guiping town, a quiet 
rustic town that houses the county government, as it did a century 
ago. No bridges span the rivers in the area, and the journey thus 
began with a ferry ride, followed by a drive of several hours. The 
drive ended abruptly when deep mud made the dirt road impass-
ible. The local historians and officials who accompanied me decided 
to abandon our car where it was stuck; there was no other traffic to 
worry about. We walked the rest of the way to another river, where 
the car would have been left anyway. The next ferry might have 
held a dozen people on a calm day, but certainly not a car. No large 
vehicle could be transported across that river, and there are thus still 
no cars or trucks at Thistle Mountain. About a mile walk past the 
ferry dock stood the settlement at Thistle Mountain.14 Even the feast 
they served us showed how rural the area was, featuring hill 
country delicacies like fox, mountain toad and pangolin. 
In the 1840s the area was more inaccessible by far, and as the local 
pirate population well knew, water transport held the key to 
controlling access. This was a world of silver miners, indigo work-
ers, and charcoal burners, of Yao tribesmen, sinicized Zhuangs and 
immigrant Hakkas, of pirates, bandits, and strongmen. If Hong had 
left the comforts of the Cantonese core looking for the untamed 
wilds, he must have been satisfied with his new home. 
I will save a detailed discussion of religious interpretive commu-
nities in the area for the next chapter. Here I want to sketch the 
broad outlines of the major changes transforming Xunzhou in the 
1840s, which led to a general breakdown of interpretive communi-
ties and control of all kinds. Local elders and literati had acted 
quickly and effectively in Hua County to isolate Hong's ideas, 
putting him in a kind of ideological quarantine. The changes in 
peripheral Guangxi, however, left such people in a much weaker 
position. Along with other typical sources of control, from local 
landlords to august magistrates, they found it impossible to slow the 
movement. 
Theories of rural unrest often identify two major sources for this 
kind of institutional breakdown: the economic displacements that 
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accompany the powerful entry of capitalist markets and production 
(e.g., Wolf, 1969; Paige, 1975), and the social problems that stem 
from changes in the state (e.g., Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1982). While 
east-central Guangxi in the 1840s was hardly a center of capitalist 
development, it did experience important indirect effects from the 
expanding world system. And while the state was never strong 
there, it lost even more control during this period. These processes 
helped question established interpretive communities, setting up 
free social space for an expansion of uncontrolled interpretation. 
Increased land concentration and increased demands for cash 
typically accompanied expanding world capitalism in the nine-
teenth century (Migdal, 1982), and these processes apparently 
occurred in the Xunzhou area in the 1840s. Landlords, in need of 
cash to buy new products, may have increasingly asked for rents in 
cash (Li et al., 1982:150-151). Some evidence also points toward 
increasing rents at the same time (Lu, 1982:6), and tax rates in the 
area also seem to have been disproportionately high (Li et al., 
1982:152; Liu, 1963). At the same time, quick internal population 
growth and massive immigration added to pressure on the land.15 
These are exactly the kinds of changes that theories of economic 
transformation and rebellion see threatening cultural standards and 
thus leading to rural unrest. 
Price deflation exacerbated these trends. China had a bimetallic 
currency system; peasants primarily had access to small copper 
coins, which they could exchange for silver in order to pay taxes or 
rent. China's favorable balance of trade for much of the eighteenth 
century had reversed by about 1820, due in large part to opium 
imports from the British, and silver began to flow out of the country 
(Myers, 1980:85). As a result, peasants needed more copper to buy 
the necessary silver, increasing the hardships of greater demands 
for cash. While the evidence is quite incomplete, there appears to be 
a case for increasing land concentration in Xunzhou in the 1840s, as 
peasants could not meet their debts.16 There was a major anti-rent 
movement shortly after the Taiping uprising left the area. Xunzhou 
also seemed to have an extraordinarily high number of pawn shops 
at the time (Liu, 1963). 
Peasants in rural Xunzhou prefecture relied on the market to 
supplement inadequate farm income by selling mountain crops. 
Charcoal and indigo were the most important. Charcoal could be 
made in small, low technology kilns in the villages and sold to the 
plains where wood was in short supply. They could also process 
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indigo dye locally, growing the crop on marginal mountain land 
and extracting the dye in large cauldrons still visible today. Both 
commodities required very low capital inputs, but neither one was 
very profitable. They tended to allow marginal people to squeak by, 
but little more. At Thistle Mountain, perhaps 10 percent of income 
came from charcoal and 20-30 percent from indigo (Guangxi ... , 
1962:26). 
Other changes on the eve of the Taiping stand out more dearly. 
The new shortage of silver had led to the reopening of some played-
out silver mines during the Daoguang reign (1820-1850) in northern 
Gui County, very near the God Worshipers' base areas (Liang, 1981). 
Much of the mining was done by small, independent miners after 
larger commercial miners found it unprofitable. The county gazet-
teer described the miners as 
rootless crowds that arrived in great confusion. After only a year 
or two, the deepest mountains and farthest valleys filled with 
vagrants. The men are strong and tough, without family ties ... 
They form secret societies and engage in all kinds of illegal 
activity, but investigators do not dare enter (Guixian Zhi, 1893, 
juan 1:12). 
Several thousand of these miners would join the rebellion (Guixian 
Zhi, 1893, juan 1:13). 
Indirectly, the Opium War, which ended in 1842, had weakened 
social order in the area even more. The treaty ending the Opium 
War forcibly opened new ports in distant parts of the country to 
British shipping; Canton had been the only port open to foreigners 
until then. As a result of the competition from new ports and 
continuing Chinese reluctance to allow foreign travelers good 
access to Canton city, large numbers of Chinese inland transport 
workers, who had carried trade goods between Canton and the rest 
of China, lost their jobs. At the same time, bandits and pirates of the 
Canton core area found their opportunities for plunder reduced. 
Many of these rootless people entered Guangxi in the 1840s (Xie, 
1950; Wakeman, 1966:126), joining the already troublesome silver 
miners. 
The local gazetteers record a startling increase in bandit activity at 
the time, often claiming that the area had been relatively quiet 
before then. Bandits active near the God Worshipers' bases in 
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Xunzhou in the late 1840s included Big-head Goat (aka Zhang 
Zhao), Big Carp (aka Tian Fang), Wild Boar Arrow (aka Chen 
Awu), Zhang Jiaxiang, Su Sanxiang, and many, many others 
(Xunzhou Fuzhi, 1897, juan 55; Pingnan Xianzhi, 1883, juan 18). Their 
gangs ranged from the dozens to the hundreds or more. One 
discouraged contemporary source even suggested that 30--40 per-
cent of Guangxi's population was bandits in 1854 (Yan, 1962). 
An increase in river piracy particularly weakened state control of 
Xunzhou.17 The rivers were the only viable means of communica-
tion with the area, and the very weak Qing navy lost all control over 
river traffic. Every local gazetteer and nearly every contemporary 
observer included a long section on the depredations of these 
groups, marking their clear increase in the 1840s. While the 
economy may have grown strained, the usual mechanisms of social 
control were breaking down completely. 
Big-head Goat provides a particularly useful example, especially 
because he flirted briefly with the God Worshipers. Like many of the 
pirates, he came originally from Guangdong Province, where he had 
first worked as a boat hand (Su, 1889a, juan 1). With the loss of river 
traffic, he turned his professional knowledge to piracy. He began his 
depredations in Guangdong, and worked his way up river into 
Guangxi. By 1850, when the God Worshiping rebels began to gather 
an armed force in the village of Jintian, he and several other pirates 
controlled the nearby rivers. They provided "protection" for the 
river trade, looting those who did not pay their fees. He was bold 
enough to launch several major attacks on towns around 1851, using 
dozens of boats and over a thousand pirate followers (Pingnan 
Xianzhi, 1883, juan 18:27). 
The flirtation with the God Worshipers came when he and seven 
other bandit chiefs joined the movement in 1850. Only one of them 
(Luo Dagang) would last more than a brief time. All eight were 
Triad Society leaders, as were many bandits. The Triads formed the 
major secret society network of southern China, very loosely 
organized as sworn brotherhoods with secret signs and initiation 
ceremonies.18 Their rituals and networks provided an alternative to 
above-ground social relations, and they sometimes espoused anti-
Qing Dynasty messages, as did the Taiping. They offer further 
evidence for the weakening of normal ties and the creation of 
alternatives. Yet rather than breaking with much Chinese tradition 
like the God Worshipers, they drew heavily on a current of Chinese 
values that emphasized loyalty, brotherhood and righteous resist-
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ance against illegitimate power. They wanted to restore the Ming 
Dynasty, not found a new Christian one. 
In fact, just these ideological differences made the alliance with 
the God Worshipers short-lived. Stories about why Big-head Goat 
left vary, but all imply his unwillingness to submit to the stem 
moral discipline of Hong's religion. As Hamberg tells it, the God 
Worshipers sent sixteen men to teach Christianity to the bandits. 
The bandits paid for the service, and fifteen of the teachers 
contributed their earnings quite properly to the common treasury. 
One greedy man, however, kept his money, and the God Wor-
shipers cut off his head when they found out. Big-head Goat and the 
others thought this was extreme, and left the movement (Hamberg, 
1854:55).19 Taiping official documents are rather different, saying 
that the pirate had "pretended to worship God, while along river 
banks he caused disturbances and destruction, acting very much 
without restraint." Some of the God Worshipers were led astray: 
"Going along with the current and the muck, they followed Ta-t' ou-
yao [Big-head Demon, the Taiping authors changed a character to be 
more pejorative] in seeking material wealth" (Tianqing Daolishu in 
Michael, 1966-1971:375). Fortunately, Jesus had warned the leaders 
through spirit possession, and when Big-head Goat rebelled, they 
crushed him. The particular version of the story does not matter. It 
illustrates both the prevalence of illegitimate power in the area, and 
the radical difference of the God Worshipers' ideas. 
This process of breakdown of central authority also occurred in 
the relation between local elites and the government. Normally local 
magistrates, who were always outsiders by imperial policy, relied 
heavily on cooperation from local literati and large landholders. 
While this was a source of strength for both locals and magistrates, it 
was also a source of conflict and compromise. The government 
always had to face down pressures for greater local autonomy, and 
it was clearly losing the battle in easH::entral Guangxi in the 1840s. 
Some of the local powers in Guangxi during this period deve-
loped into a new kind of strongman, known locally as rice lords 
(mifan zhu) (Zhong, 1984a; Xie, 1950:32-35). Although the term 
appears unique to Guangxi, the phenomenon represents another 
case of the strongman pattern that has developed in other frontier 
areas of China (Meskill, 1979:88-91). Usually wealthy and well-
connected to begin with, wielding their privately paid forces of 
armed braves, such strongmen were both plunderers and patrons. 
While preying fiercely on their enemies, they also contributed to 
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local shrines and managed local institutions. Urban and political 
elites may have feared these local powers, but such official leaders 
also relied on their cooperation (Meskill, 1979:90). 
Guangxi's rice lords were wealthy locals, usually from large and 
powerful families, who maintained close ties to local criminals. They 
partly protected their clients and partly profited off banditry toward 
others. References to them begin in the 1840s, exactly the period 
when economic turbulence, banditry and rapid immigration weak-
ened central authority in the area (Zhong, 1984a:4). They were 
powerful and independent enough that the authors of local 
gazetteers lamented their presence. The strongest of the rice lords 
ran their areas like satrapies - monopolizing armed force and 
controlling wealth; they effectively replaced civil government in 
some areas. Zhong (1984a) has tentatively identified fifteen rice 
lords in Guangxi between the 1840s and the 1860s. Clearly, these 
strongmen provided local threats to state power, which the state 
was unable to suppress. The God Worshipers benefited from the 
support of one of these local strongmen- Hu Yiguang, who acted as 
patron to Hong and Feng, helped them raise an armed force, and 
became one of the Taiping kings (Xunzhou Fuzhi, 1897, juan 56). 
Finally, the complex ethnic relations in the area added fuel to the 
fires of the 1840s. The specific details of the ethnic composition of 
the population remain very fuzzy. The Yao, with their distinctive 
dress, language, and slash-and-bum cultivation, were a relatively 
small minority who lived in the less accessible areas of the region. A 
much larger portion of the population was Zhuang. By the mid-
nineteenth century the Zhuang had been largely sinicized, farming 
and dressing as Chinese, and often bilingual in Zhuang and the local 
dialect of Cantonese. The local gazetteers stress that they were just 
like Chinese by this time, except for language, and for the odious (to 
the Chinese) practice of male and female Zhuangs singing paired 
songs to each other. An apparently small number of Cantonese-
speaking Chinese also lived there. These may well have been the 
descendants of earlier northern Chinese immigrants (Guangxi had 
been an anti-Qing redoubt in the seventeenth century), although 
they could also have been fully sinicized Zhuangs. The area also had 
a large population of nineteenth-century immigrant Hakkas. Hak-
kas were unusual among Chinese groups for their adaptation to 
mountain agriculture in marginal areas, and because Hakka women 
worked in the fields and did not bind their feet. As late immigrants, 
they tended to live in scattered households. 
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Local documents often speak of conflict between local (tu) and 
immigrant (lat) groups, and one of the largest of these conflicts 
netted the God Worshipers about 3,000 armed Hakkas fleeing from 
a more powerful native force. The exact ethnic significance of these 
terms, however, remains unclear. In general, the "immigrants" were 
Hakka and the "natives" were sinicized Zhuang, although they may 
also have included non-Hakka Chinese who had a long history in 
the area. 
The famous immigrant/native feuds that characterized the area 
by the 1840s have led scholars to emphasize the distinctiveness of 
the various local ethnic groups (e.g., Kuhn, 1977; Kojima, 1983). Yet 
the region clearly also saw extensive contact among the groups. 
Bilingualism was common (Hakkas and Zhuangs communicated in 
Cantonese, Xunzhou Fuzhi, 1897, juan 54:77), and intermarriage 
occurred, although we have no way to judge its frequency. Shi 
Dakai, a local miner who became one of the Taiping kings, 
apparently had a Hakka father and a Zhuang mother (Liang, 
1981:53, Guangxisheng ... , 1956:74). 
Important religious interconnections also tied the groups together 
to some extent. My interviews with current residents of Xunzhou 
about religion and ethnicity in their youth (in the 1920s and 1930s) 
revealed significant shared use of temples and some shared use of 
religious experts. This evidence comes from well after the Taiping 
period, but there is no documentary evidence that the religious 
traditions of the ethnic groups were more isolated from each other 
during the mid-nineteenth century. Ethnic feuding preceding the 
Taiping period need not imply ethnic isolation. In fact, evidence 
from other parts of China indicates the ease with which religious 
influences passed between Chinese and aboriginal ethnic groups, 
even when relations were tense and sometimes violent (e.g., Shep-
herd, 1984). 
Few of the major temples in the area, for example, had specific 
ethnic identifications. Some clearly had Yao origins. The many local 
Pangu temples, for example, originally honored a heroic dog who 
(at least according to Han Chinese stories) became the founding 
ancestor of the Yao.2° Other temples, like the Liuwu temple in Sigu, 
Gui County, had stories tied to the paired singing that the authors of 
the gazetteers so disliked. As Hamberg (1854:38) put it, the pair sang 
"licentious" couplets and "indulged in illicit intercourse" for seven 
days before dying. Yet all ethnic groups shared these and other 
temples in the early twentieth century, and probably in the mid-
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nineteenth century as well. People worshiped because a temple was 
efficacious more than because it conformed to their ethnic identifi-
cation. 
My interviews also suggested extensive sharing of religious 
experts, particularly in the use of Yao mediums by other ethnic 
groups. While there is some risk in reading these modern oral 
recollections of the early twentieth century back to the 1840s, there 
is little evidence against such contact among ethnic groups. This 
kind of contact is consistent with similar situations of ethnic 
competition elsewhere in China and in other societies. Such cultural 
exchange occurs frequently in peripheral areas, where marginalized 
ethnic groups are thought to have hidden powers.21 Ethnicity in the 
area was an uncomfortable combination of cultural exchange and 
deadly competition, undoubtedly exacerbated by the recent econo-
mic problems and the influx of many new Hakka migrants. An 
apparent earlier pax sinica in the area had faltered in the 1840s, 
along with many other aspects of social control. 
Many of the details of life in the mountains of Xunzhou Prefecture 
remain hazy, but certain basic patterns of change in the 1840s 
nevertheless emerge clearly. Marginal commercial occupations 
became an important part of the economy with the reopening of 
the silver mines and supplemental agricultural production of indigo 
and charcoal. The position of tenants may have been worsening, 
throwing them increasingly at the mercy of the market. Internal 
population growth and immigration added further pressures and 
worsened ethnic tensions. At the same time, the large influx of 
displaced Guangdong bandits and pirates weakened already flimsy 
local social control. The usual social institutions of control, from the 
political machinery of the magistrate to the informal controls of local 
landlords and literati, were disintegrating. 
All of this opened a free space for the God Worshipers, a fertile 
field where established interpretive communities of all kinds held 
less and less sway, and where Hong's new ideas could grow with 
far less interference than in his home community. Yet Hong's text-
based Christianity hardly seemed to fit with the wild frontier 
atmosphere in Guangxi when he arrived in 1844. Sternly moralistic 
in a land of strongman politics, insistently monotheistic in a cosmos 
of many gods, and egalitarian in a world at home with hierarchy, 
how did Hong's ideas thrive? I will argue that the answer lies in the 
transformation of his ideas in local hands, a new saturation of 
Hong's Christianity that would shape the rest of the movement. 
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This newly conglomerated religion gave the movement tremendous 
appeal and power, even as its inherent dissolution of authority 
created new problems. 
4 
Saturating the Movement: 
God Gets Power 
Hong Xiuquan and Feng Yunshan arrived in east-central Guangxi 
in 1844, and the fortunes of their ideas began to change very rapidly 
in the new conditions there. Hong wandered back to his home 
county in 1845; there was nothing yet to hold him in Guangxi. 
During this period he also spent a brief spell in Canton with the 
Southern Baptist missionary Issachar Roberts, who refused to 
baptize him (Hamberg, 1854:32). Feng, however, settled at Thistle 
Mountain, preaching Hong's doctrine with remarkable success. 
When Hong returned to the area in 1847, he must have been 
astonished to find a large and increasingly bold following of God 
Worshipers. The numbers of converts grew at an astonishing rate, 
clearly reaching 2,000 or 3,000 followers in 1848, and perhaps 10,000 
by the time of the first armed camp at Jintian in 1850. 
The great success in recruitment stemmed in part from a relative 
loss of control by the original movement leaders. Especially in 
Hong's absence, his neatly codified ideas merged into Guangxi 
popular culture, creating a new and explosive mix of complex 
possibilities. The localization and pulling apart of his Christian 
ideology fell into two broad stages. During the first stage, from 
about 1845 to the end of 1847, Hong's God appeared increasingly as 
a kind of primus inter pares of local gods, rather than the one and 
only God. He proved his relative power through traditional means -
curing and contests of strength with other gods. The second stage 
began in 1847, and continued to the beginnings of the armed 
movement in 1850. Attacks on other gods ended, to be replaced 
by the charismatic power of spirit possession. This change helped 
create an entirely new group of local leaders, and greatly increased 
the following. Significantly, Hong himself was absent for most of 
both stages, and Feng was gone for most of the second. 
Given the absence of the original leaders and the powerfully 
privileged place of religion in Guangxi at the time, something very 
new had developed by 1848 and 1849. Much of the clarity of Hong's 
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original vision had been lost, but a new and uniquely local mixture 
had taken it over. Both the ideas and the social relations of the new 
God Worshipers were chaotic, but filled with possibilities and 
excitement. This chapter will follow the early saturation of the 
God Worshipers, from the particular features of Guangxi religious 
space which made God sensible there, to God's claims to power 
within the local set of practices. Chapter 5 will follow the story to the 
anarchic scenes of spirit possession that preceded the final crystall-
ization of the movement into an armed rebellion with a new state 
structure. 
ODD GODS AND FREE REUGIOUS SPACE 
Just as the changes of the 1840s had made east-central Guangxi an 
especially favorable site for a new movement, the particularities of 
religion there created an even more powerfully free space. Even in 
the most developed core areas, religion in China experienced only 
loose controls, leaving it open to the kinds of interpretive silences or 
alternative interpretations I discussed in Chapter 1. With the weak 
state and rapid changes in Guangxi, local religion developed some 
marked peculiarities even by the fairly relaxed standards of Chinese 
elsewhere. 
The great majority of Chinese popular gods are said to be the 
spirits of humans whose outstanding moral worth allowed them to 
continue helping people from the spirit world. Guan Gong, for 
example, remains one of the most popular gods all across China. He 
was one of the major figures in the historical novel Romance of the 
Three Kingdoms, a warrior known as much for his righteousness and 
unshakeable loyalty to his sworn brothers, as for his martial 
prowess. Tian Hou (called Ma Co in Taiwan; Mandarin Mazu), 
one of the most popular deities in coastal areas, illustrates the same 
principles through a very different kind of life. She was an 
unmarried woman who rescued seafarers in distress through 
supernatural means. She died young, but the continued miracles 
from her spirit led to her increasing popularity (Watson, 1985:296). 
Gods act in some ways like bureaucrats and in some ways like 
parents. The bureaucratic metaphor is very powerfully developed 
(Wolf, 1974). Many informants in Taiwan today will spell it out 
quite explicitly, explaining that the lowest gods are like policemen, 
higher gods like governors, and the Emperor of Heaven like the old 
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emperor or the modem president. All the available ritual media 
reinforce the point. God images usually wear the robes of official 
earthly office, and sit augustly with their legs apart and hands on 
their knees, gazing majestically out at their supplicants. Temples 
themselves reproduce the architecture of a magistrate's official 
quarters, including especially the curved eaves, which sumptuary 
laws limited to degree holders, as all magistrates were. People say 
that when praying to the god, you have to give your exact name, 
address and birth date, otherwise the god will not be able to find 
your file. Ritual specialists further strengthen the image by filling 
out pre-printed petition forms, modeled after imperial legal docu-
ments, for even the simplest rituals. And worshipers always bum 
paper spirit money for the gods, just as any official dealings with 
bureaucrats required payments. 
Yet gods also have a parental aspect, as did magistrates in theory, 
if not always in practice. Like parents, gods will intercede for their 
children, even as they expect proper morality and respect from 
them. The goddesses in particular can be very nurturing, although 
any god feels a responsibility toward his or her charges. Quite 
unlike bureaucrats, anyone can develop a personal relationship with 
a god. Emily Martin [Ahem] writes of informants who compare 
gods to parents instead of officials. One person, for example, 
denying that offerings to the gods were like cash gifts to petty 
officials, argued that "Offering things to the gods is just like taking a 
gift to one's host. A stranger won't necessarily help you no matter 
how nice a gift you bring, and a good friend will help even if you 
bring nothing at all" (Ahern, 1981a:99). Another, making the same 
point, said "It is only necessary to do good deeds and bum three 
sticks of incense and they will be enormously happy. A god is a 
being with a very upright heart. He is fair and just, rewarding 
without favoritism" (Ahem, 1981a:99). The combination of bureau-
crat and parent is not odd in China, where magistrates were 
"father-mother officials" (fumu guan). It is simply a utopian 
idealization of how things ought to be. 
Anyone can worship any gods on their domestic altars, and 
anyone can develop a minor god temple. The important god 
temples, however, all have powerful associations with communi-
ties. Every neighborhood houses an Earth God (called She Gong in 
the Guangxi area).22 The neighborhood takes joint responsibility for 
worshiping the Earth God and keeping up his shrine. If a family 
moves, they will worship a new Earth God. At a higher level, larger 
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social communities typically share a single primary deity and 
temple. These temples can branch out over regions, or even nation-
wide, but locally the deity presides over just the one area. Major 
annual rituals take place on behalf of the community, and can be 
funded by a household tax in addition to voluntary contributions. 
Major community temples hold the greatest of such rituals, the jiao, 
at intervals of several years. These rituals renew the cosmic mandate 
of the entire community and reinforce the position of the temple as 
the symbolic center of the community. 
Loose Interpretive Communities 
None of this means that the interpretation of gods throughout China 
was clear and unambiguous, a definitive version shared by one and 
all. The boundaries of religious interpretation in China were very 
loosely guarded. While nearly everyone might share the most basic 
picture of popular gods as idealized parent-bureaucrats, specific 
gods often received radically differing interpretations. Even very 
different versions of what constituted a god were available, for 
example in Buddhism's version of popular gods as beings still 
trapped in the world of reincarnations, and thus grossly inferior 
to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (Weller, 1987c:110-117). 
A casual observer can still often see small Chinese children, sticks 
of incense thrust into their fists, learning the characteristic gestures 
of god worship at their parents' hands. This is their first introduc-
tion to the iconography and ritual treatment that shows gods as kind 
bureaucrats. They will also hear tales of famous gods like Guan 
Gong, and especially of miracles performed by their local god. If 
they become educated, they will read stories of the deification of 
various gods, and everyone would hear these stories in outdoor 
operas and from professional story tellers. 
Beyond this very loose collection of information, however, very 
little in the society fostered more specific or unified interpretations. 
At least before Christianity, no Chinese child memorized catechisms 
in order to be admitted to the Church, no priest reinforced proper 
belief through the confessional, and no church sermons demanded 
weekly attendance to doctrineP In general, Chinese clergy have no 
congregations, and Chinese popular temples have no clergy. 
Buddhist and Daoist clergy either lived in special temples of their 
own, or practiced as individuals out of their homes, doing rituals for 
a fee. Communities ran their own temples by committee, and hired 
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clergy on an ad hoc basis when a specific ritual required them. In 
great contrast to the Western religious tradition, therefore, no one 
took official responsibility to ensure orthodox religious interpreta-
tion, and enormous variations occurred frequently. The general lack 
of a priestly hierarchy and of religious institutions that could control 
interpretation meant a great latitude for overloading the gods with 
inconsistent interpretations. The meaning of a complex and colorful 
ritual was always up for grabs, as it was for those pig offerings for 
the Taiwanese god that I have already discussed. 
The lack of any strong interpretive community for Chinese 
religion did not stop various people from trying to influence 
interpretation in their favor. It just made it extraordinarily difficult 
for them to succeed. One of the most important such attempts came 
from the state, which always hoped to sort what it considered 
orthodoxy from heterodoxy. Unlike the medieval European state, 
however, Chinese officials had no direct institutional control over 
religion, and no such institutions even existed. Their manipulations 
thus took the more subtle and far less effective forms of offering an 
alternative cult and trying to coopt popular gods. 
Their alternative, the official state cult, sponsored altars in all 
capital cities from the counties to the nation as a whole, and 
required officials to perform periodic rituals there (Feuchtwang, 
1977; Weller, 1987c:130-134). In so far as it intended to influence 
popular belief, it failed in large part because dignified Confucian 
officials were so reluctant to let the rabble attend their elegant 
rituals.24 Rather more successful over the centuries was an attempt 
to coopt appropriate local gods by having the emperor grant them 
official titles. Local magistrates might then contribute to rituals at 
such temples, or build new temples to them. Both Guan Gong and 
Mazu fall into this category. Hansen documents the beginnings of 
this procedure in the twelfth century, when local elites began to 
champion the causes of their regional gods, and the government 
recognized them with titles (Hansen, 1990). 
Watson traces this process very clearly for Mazu, whose final 
official title was the Empress of Heaven (Tian Hou). Yet the constant 
lack of any institutions of interpretive control doomed this effort, 
too. If Mazu conveyed imperial pacification and "approved" culture 
to the officials who promoted her cult, she meant independence to 
Taiwanese (who avoided the officially built temples and even the 
official designation as Empress), coastal pacification to large lineage 
elites in the Canton delta, fertility to their wives, and so on (Watson, 
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1985). This possibility of state deification served many purposes: it 
allowed local elites to promote their communities, and succeeded in 
fostering broader regional cults in place of (or sometimes in addition 
to) strictly local gods. It did not particularly succeed, however, in 
changing or unifying interpretation. Local interpretation remained 
rich in possibilities, and official deification added no powerful 
interpretive community that might have left things less indeterm-
inate. 
Local elites occupied a somewhat better position to exercise 
interpretive control. Like the state officials, they controlled no 
institutions of interpretation. Unlike the state, however, they often 
could influence what temples were built and what rituals funded. 
They managed this most successfully in the powerful lineage 
villages of parts of southeast China, where an exceptionally strong 
and unified local elite controlled both kinship and economic power. 
These same people usually also managed major community tem-
ples, and collected temple "contributions" through their armed self-
defense corps (Watson, 1985:314-315). 
This relatively strong control, at least by Chinese standards, led to 
a general thinning out of otherwise thick and complex ritual 
(Watson, 1985:318). Yet even with all this power, the local elites of 
the Canton delta area had little control over interpretation, as 
Watson shows in detail- the men of the dominant lineages saw 
Mazu very differently from their wives, and members of subordi-
nate lineages had still other interpretations. With no direct control, 
and no real interpretive community, even these elites could only 
partially dampen the multiple voices of saturated gods. 
In most areas of China elites had still less influence, because they 
were a less united and often less powerful force. When I did 
fieldwork in Taiwan's Sanxia Township, for example, the temple 
management constantly tried to influence ritual performance, and 
constantly failed. As usual, the managers were members of the local 
elite, but in an area with a far less unified elite group than the 
dominant lineage villages of the New Territories, they represented 
only one of the local factions. Like Watson's case, they tried to 
simplify and thin out ritual performance and interpretation. Having 
far less real control, however, the Sanxia temple managers had very 
little success. Grass roots' opposition, for example, watered down an 
attempt to simplify offerings at the annual ghost festival, and the 
people finally ignored the attempt completely when they actually 
made their offerings (Weller, 1987c:56-59). The broad lack of 
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institutionalized interpretation allowed the coexistence of many 
interpretations of this ritual, as I have discussed at length elsewhere 
(Weller, 1987c). 
All of this suggests that interpretive communities involving gods 
and their rituals in China remained extremely loose, in spite of 
pressure from officials and local elites. Even strongly controlled 
areas like the Canton delta had only very limited interpretive 
authority. Religion everywhere in the world is broadly saturated-
the condensation and multivocality of religious symbols grant them 
power even as they make interpretive control difficult. Yet religious 
interpretive communities were particularly loose in China com-
pared to other complex societies, where a much tighter tie between 
religion and state often made for stronger institutions of interpreta-
tion. If there was vague agreement in China that gods were 
somehow moral beings tied to hierarchy and community, there 
was strikingly wide variation in how people understood particular 
gods, and even in what constituted morality, hierarchy and 
community. The powerful ability of popular religion in China to 
weather attempts at interpretive control created a relatively free 
space for resistance, even if that resistance remained only one 
possibility of many. 
Odd Gods on the Periphery 
The gods of Xunzhou Prefecture rang some remarkable changes on 
the already wide range of possibilities typical elsewhere in China. 
Religious interpretive communities may have been weak every-
where, but they waned to almost nothing in east-<:entral Guangxi 
during the 1840s. The combination of the weak state and ethnic 
mixing that characterized the Chinese periphery, along with the 
general weakening of institutions of social order in the 1840s, 
allowed religion in the area to become a potent brew of potential 
interpretations. Already thick with extraordinary possibilities by 
Chinese standards, the area could incorporate Hong's new ideas far 
more easily than his home village, located in a developed area and 
dominated by a single lineage. 
The most important community temples in the Xunzhou area 
honored the Three Generations (Sanjie), a reference to three 
members of the Feng family. Each of these Fengs had achieved 
Daoist perfection, the most recent during the seventeenth century. 
The people of Gui County built the first temple to them shortly after 
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that, and branch temples spread throughout the region (Guiping 
Xianzhi, 1920, juan 15:10). My informants at Thistle Mountain 
remembered six of these temples in the area, and many more 
existed throughout the Xunzhou region.25 The three Fengs repre-
sented that older tradition of Chinese temples dedicated to entirely 
local saints and worthies, independent of any national religious 
pantheon.26 In other ways, however, these were fairly typical 
community temples, sponsoring jiao festivals every few years and 
probably controlled by local community leaders. When the local 
elite created one of the early self-defense militias in the area to fight 
the unrest building in the 1840s, they put the headquarters in the 
Three Generations temple in Daxuanxu (also called Xinxu), a major 
market town near Thistle Mountain (Guangxi Shifan Xueyuan .. . , 
1981:272). 
If the Three Generations temples fit the pattern I have been 
discussing fairly well, all of the other important ones threatened 
instead to break the mold. The next most important t~mples in the 
Thistle Mountain area enthroned King Gan (Gan Wang), a god with 
a very different history. The King Gan cult centered in Xiangzhou, 
just to the north of Thistle Mountain. Local gazetteers listed at least 
five temples to him, including one near Sanjiang, a major river port 
for Thistle Mountain people. King Gan became a high official while 
among the living, and thus seems like proper material for deifica-
tion. Yet he achieved his position through the most immoral means. 
A geomancer identified an excellent burial site that promised high 
office, but it had to be used right away. Wasting no time, King Gan 
murdered his mother, buried her in the right spot, and became a 
successful official. 
If the core Chinese temples we know most about tacitly supported 
the secular government by reproduCing it in Heaven as a kindly 
bureaucracy, King Gan implied a tacit criticism by offering a 
reading of the government as a corrupt body of criminals. Like 
the local rice lords, King Gan kept even local officials under his 
thumb. According to legend, he once possessed a boy while a 
magistrate was passing by the temple in his sedan chair. Speaking 
through the boy, King Gan demanded that the magistrate go inside 
and worship, and that he contribute a set of official robes (an 
extremely generous gift) to the temple. The official obeyed. At least 
according to the Taiping, the temple was also guilty of inspiring 
people to sing obscene songs, probably a reference to Zhuang style 
paired singing of love songs. (The Taiping Tianri relates these stories 
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in detail, see Michael, 1966-1971:73-76; see also Hong Rengan's 
confession in Michael, 1966-1971:1519, and Hamberg, 1854:36-37.) 
The King Gan temple near Sanjiang was quite large, and lay along 
an especially dangerous mountain route, riddled with bandits 
during the 1840s. King Gan must have had very complex associa-
tions. On the one hand, the temple had been placed there to protect 
people from danger and particularly to shield travelers from the 
dangerous ghosts of the many people who died there. Yet on the 
other hand, King Gan was much like a bandit himself. Similar 
meanings must have attached to his use against epidemics by being 
carried around the area (Xum:hou Fuzhi, 1897, juan 54:87). 
The multiplicity of possible associations typifies the kind of 
indeterminate interpretation I am looking at. This temple was 
important enough to be rebuilt even after the Chinese Revolution 
of 1949. In contrast, the local Three Generaqons temple remains an 
empty shell with just three incense pots.27 King Gan temples also 
had periodic jiao festivals. The local gazetteer only mentions King 
Gan and the Three Generations as having this major community 
ritual (Xunzhou Fuzhi, 1897, juan 54:67). 
Other temples are less shockingly aberrant, but still seem odd. 
The entire area brims with temples dedicated to Pangu (also called 
Panhu or Panwang), with at least five in the Thistle Mountain 
region. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, these temples have close 
associations with Yao origin myths, but my informants claimed 
that everyone took part in rituals there. Pangu is well known 
throughout China as a legendary figure whose body parts formed 
various features of the world. Yet a different Pangu tradition exists 
in southwest China, including especially Guangxi. The Guangxi 
Pangu is actually a confusion of names with Panhu, a legendary dog 
described in the Hou Han Shu (Lii, 1982:1-7). Frustrated in his 
attempts to crush a bandit, a Han Dynasty emperor offered a 
generous reward, including the hand of his daughter in marriage, 
to anyone who could bring him the head of the bandit general. To 
everyone's amazement, the emperor's dog Panhu showed up one 
day with the head in his jaws. The daughter insisted on completing 
the bargain, and the odd couple went up to the mountains where 
they had six sons and six daughters, founding a new tribe. 
This tale sounds like typical Han Chinese aspersions on "bar-
barian" ethnic groups, but Pangu/Panhu is quite clearly a pivotal 
Yao deity. While the Yao I spoke with did not argue with the story 
when it was repeated to me by a Han informant, recorded Yao 
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stories about Panhu emphasize instead the god's helping the tribe 
on its migrations through southern China, and they told me such 
stories on Thistle Mountain. They also showed me several ritual 
texts with references to Pangu/Panhu.28 Pangu temples throughout 
the area thus spoke to very different kinds of traditions from most 
gods in core areas of China, even though Han Chinese worshiped 
there alongside Yao and Zhuang. They further thickened the 
saturated soup of Guangxi religion with dog worship, totemic 
ancestors, and the confusion with the more officially acceptable 
Pangu tradition. 
Many other major temples also tied to strictly local legends and 
often to minority ethnic traditions. The important Qiansa temple in 
Caicun, Guiping County, for instance, commemorated a vagrant 
who created a walkway over a river by throwing in cow dung that 
magically became rocks.29 This was another case of a strictly local 
legendary figure whose morality was vague at best, and certainly 
not any reflection of officially sanctioned cultural values. 
I have already mentioned how the Liuwu temple at Sigu provided 
a popular site for Zhuang-style paired singing. It honored illicit 
lovers who may have been suicides. According to local oral history, 
one was a failed degree-holder, and the other a woman singing on 
Liuwu Mountain. They sang together for seven days and nights, and 
then died. Ants covered their bodies with earth, and the local people 
said they had become immortals. Like King Gan, this temple could 
demand worship, and people said anything from stomach ailments 
to snake attacks could come from ignoring it (Guangxi ... , 1962:49). 
Here again a number of different strands interweave with the usual 
idea of gods, from local Zhuang traditions to a kind of menace that 
typical gods elsewhere never threaten. 
Similar but smaller temples included the Lang (or Langguang) 
temple and the Grandaunt Liu (Liu Dagupuo) temple, both at 
Thistle Mountain. The Lang temple stood at Sanjiang, on the river 
toward the main market, where many people had drowned. A little 
like the local King Gan temple, this temple appeased nearby ghosts. 
Grandaunt Liu represented the spirit of a girl who had died young, 
but did many good works both before and after death.30 This temple 
resembled guniang temples in Taiwan that honor girls who died 
young, or for that matter the origin story of Mazu (Wolf, 1974:49-
50). Unlike the Taiwan temples, however, this one had a major 
local following, and unlike Mazu, it had absolutely no state 
recognition. 
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Indeed, odd gods existed throughout late imperial China (like 
temples to accidentally disinterred bones, or to prematurely dead 
girls in Taiwan, or to fox fairies in north China), but in the core areas 
that are ethnographically best described, such temples rarely 
developed into the major community temples they were in more 
peripheral Guangxi. Just as rice lords competed successfully for 
secular power with proper Confucian bureaucrats, King Gan and 
the others competed successfully for divine power with more 
standard gods. 
The potential for odd gods existed everywhere in Chinese 
religion, but even the weakly institutionalized interpretive commu-
nities of more developed areas managed to limit them to hidden 
comers. The conditions in Guangxi, however, with their ethnic 
interactions, weak state, economic upsets, rice lords, bandits and 
all the rest, allowed this undercurrent to rise boldly to the surface. 
The relative saturation of Chinese gods everywhere grew extreme in 
Guangxi in the 1840s, with all kinds of potential readings that ran 
the gamut from officially approved values (King Gan as an official, 
Pangu as the legendary world creator), to metaphors for local 
independence from the state (nearly every deity had strictly local 
roots), to representations of banditry (the threat of the Liuwu 
temple, the murderous tale of King Gan), to references to ethnicity 
(Pangu, the various associations with paired singing). Here was an 
especially free space for resistance, even if that resistance still 
remained only one potential on the eve of the Taiping uprising. A 
wild array of possible precipitations lay waiting in those god 
temples, and the social deterioration of the 1840s kept everything 
in motion, decreasing the institutional ability to impose any 
authoritative reading on the situation. The Taiping's God would 
finally unify the multivocalic possibilities of Guangxi's gods, but not 
before God Himself underwent some transformations. 
GOD MEETS THE GODS 
In an area used to worshiping mother killers, dung tossers and illicit 
lovers, God did not seem as odd as he must have in Hong's home 
village in Hua County. This openness to odd gods was one of the 
reasons behind the local acceptance of Hong's new God. Chinese 
gods remain popular as long as they grant people's wishes, and 
even an efficacious stone may soon gather a large clientele. Hong's 
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God became popular in Xunzhou in part because His oddness did 
not upset the local people, but also because He soon proved to be 
especially efficacious and powerful. This proof did not reside within 
Hong's original ideology, but grew from God's ability to cure illness 
and to humiliate other gods without retaliation. In other words, 
God's power came to be defined within the highly charged terms of 
the local popular religion, rather than in Hong's terms. 
This process of hijacking Hong's Christianity began in the mid- ' 
1840s, as the movement claimed conventional religious power by 
humiliating other gods. They typically destroyed popular temples 
and desecrated the god images, often by tearing off their beards. 
While Hong and Feng may well have seen this as a bold blow at the 
heart of popular idolatry and superstition, god destruction was in 
fact always a perfectly plausible option within popular religious 
practice. Like family relationships or bureaucratic power in China, 
ties to gods required a mutual responsibility. A worshiper owed the 
father-bureaucrat respect and obedience, but rightfully expected 
protection and benevolence in return. Gods could lose their man-
date in the same way that dynasties could lose their right to rule -
by evading their responsibilities. The very weak institutions of 
control made gods, of course, far easier to overthrow than 
dynasties. Impotent deities might be broken to bits, burnt, or set 
floating down the river by angry crowds. Such carnage did not 
occur very often, but everyone knew it was a possibility. Gods can 
also defeat other gods, as when the Empress of Heaven "ate" a more 
strictly local deity in the New Territories (Watson, 1985:310). 
Hong Xiuquan and Feng Yunshan had already attacked tablets to 
Confucius in the schools of Hua County. They apparently kept this 
up after they began teaching in Xunzhou. Yet they often covered up 
their own attacks, sometimes rewriting tablets they had just 
destroyed. One of the oral histories also speaks of Feng secretly 
destroying Earth God images at night (Guangxi ... , 1962:53-54). 
Such attacks may have reflected their personal anger over educa-
tional failures, the anti-Confucian element of Hong's dream, and the 
hope for a more systematic attack on idolatry. Yet the efforts 
remained personal and secret, avoiding any popular reinterpreta-
tion but by the same token useless for recruitment. 
The first more public attack apparently began in 1844, when Hong 
wrote a poem denouncing the immoral couple deified in the Liuwu 
temple, and wrote how "the lasciviousness in Kwangsi [Guangxi], 
men and women making proposals to each other and conduct worse 
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than that of animals, all came from such evil demons" (Taiping Tianri 
in Michael, 1966-1971:67). From Hong's point of view, the poem 
probably attacked only this specific case of immorality; it was 
another isolated case. In addition, a poem falls far short of a 
physical attack. Yet the God Worshipers had a stroke of luck: 
Because of these verses the people were irritated against Siu-
tshuen [Hong Xiuquan], and wished that the idols might display 
their power in killing him, but after some time the white ants 
came into the temple ... and destroyed the building as well as the 
wooden images (Hamberg, 1854:38). 
Suddenly the die was cast, and God was competing directly with the 
gods. Rather than allowing the idols to kill Hong, the new God won 
the battle, greatly enhancing His reputation and the size of the 
following. By taking advantage of this situation, however, the God 
Worshipers had put their deity squarely in the context of Guangxi's 
unusual popular gods, just one more competitor in a dog-eat-dog 
world.31 
Direct attacks on temples became an open part of the God 
Worshiper strategy in 1846, when Feng led at least two attacks 
against his usual targets - an Earth God temple and a Confucian 
Wenchang temple (Xunzhou Fuzhi, 1897, juan 56:13). The attacks 
became far more common in 1847, the year that Hong returned to 
the area. Earth God temples provided common and easy victims at 
first (Guangxisheng .. . , 1956:35-36, 48; Wuxuan xianzhi, 1914:23-
24), These shrines were small, physically vulnerable with no one 
usually attending them, and based only in small communities. The 
numbers of offended people at any attack would be small. 
Yet they soon expanded to attack a King Gan temple, Pangu 
temples, a Thunder God (Leigong) temple, the Lang temple, and the 
Nine Demons temple (Xunzhou Fuzhi, 1897, juan 27:55, Guangxish-
eng ... , 1956:35-36; Guangxi .. . , 1962:62-63). The Three Gen-
erations temple is notable by its absence from this list, which 
includes instead nearly every temple that did not fit the more 
broadly and officially sanctioned version of a god. Hong and Feng 
may have been anti-Confucian, but they still harbored many 
Confucian values. In every case they described, the movement's 
motives were not an all-embracing Christian iconoclasm, but a 
specific attack on what they saw as immorality. The God Wor-
shipers attacked these gods because they were real, powerful, and 
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corrupting. Their God was better, more upright and more powerful, 
but still part of the same system. 
The most important attack from this list was their destruction of 
the central King Gan temple in Xiangzhou (Taiping Tillnri in Michael, 
1966--1971:73-76; Hamberg, 1854:36--37). After telling how King Gan 
had humiliated a magistrate, the Taiping version of the event 
celebrates their retaliation, as Hong ordered four followers to "dig 
out the eyes of the demon, cut off its beard, trample its hat, tear its 
embroidered dragon gown to shreds, turn its body upside down, 
and break off its arms" (Taiping Tillnri in Michael, 1966--1971:73). 
Hamberg describes the consequences of this first attack on a 
genuinely major temple: 
As soon as this deed was known in the neighborhood, the people 
of the district offered a reward of one hundred dollars for the 
apprehension of the perpetrators. The demon, however, again 
possessed a young boy and said, ''These men are sincere, you are 
not able to hurt them, you must only repair my image again, and 
then it will be all right." After this the people withdrew their 
proclamation. This event served to advance the reputation of Siu-
tshuen [Hong Xiuquan], and the number of his followers rapidly 
increased (Hamberg, 1854:37-38). 
This passage reveals what must have been a common dynamic 
during this period. Followers of the destroyed deities were dis-
mayed and unhappy, yet the clear success of the attacks also 
impressed some of them greatly. The entire episode left King Gan 
intact and rebuilt. God had by no means proved to these people that 
King Gan was a fake and the He was the only God; they kept King 
Gan while recognizing that God was even more powerful. Hong 
and Feng may have seen all this as an affirmation of Christianity in 
opposition to popular religion, or of morality instead of depravity, 
but to the local people it was an affirmation of God's power within 
their own religious traditions. 
This process of transforming Hong's God into an especially 
powerful spirit, but one not too radically different from the local 
tradition, also occurred in some ritual procedures that were dearly 
borrowed directly from Chinese popular tradition. These included 
use of a standard Chinese altar with candles, incense, three glasses 
of wine, meat offerings, and so on (Jian, 1958:1720; Hamberg, 
1854:40). At least by Hong's return to Xunzhou in 1847, after he 
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had spent some months with the missionary Roberts in Canton, he 
was aware that this was not standard procedure for Christians. Yet 
he was unable to affect any reform, just as he was unable to stop any 
of the other changes that the local followers were working in his 
movement. Recruiting success had encouraged the leadership to 
allow God to join the uncontrolled mix of interpretations that 
percolated in Guangxi, but having begun the process they could 
no longer control it. 
The results were mixed. Clearly, proving God's power had gained 
many followers for the movement, yet it also alienated some of the 
people whose gods provided the victims. In addition, the increasing 
size of the movement began to make the local elite nervous, and the 
rampage of temple destruction in 1847 gave them an excuse to arrest 
Feng at the end of the year. Although Feng later gained his freedom, 
the arrest seems clearly to have caused the God Worshipers to move 
away from this strategy, either out of fear of politicizing the 
movement at that time, or because they felt they were undermining 
their own popular support. There are no further reports of temple 
destruction until 1850, almost three years later. 
CURING AND POWER 
While God was proving himself against the local deities, several 
leaders of the movement established their own power and prestige 
through magical curing. Curing very often forms a core part of 
religious movements, from Christian Pentecostal sects to Japanese 
New Religions (Martin, 1990:1~171; Davis, 1980). Curing works, at 
least in some sense. I have watched tears of gratitude from patients 
cured by possessed healers at a cult in Taiwan, along with the 
emotional thrill that runs through bystanders?2 Sunday morning 
television evangelists in the West often offer the same thing. It is 
difficult to imagine a more immediate and effective demonstration 
of real power. 
China has a number of traditions of curing, many of which the 
God Worshipers borrowed. Most respectable was traditional Chi-
nese medicine's combination of theoretical analysis of the forces 
acting in and on the body with long practical experience of 
particular herbal and other therapies. That system required an 
educated understanding of the basic forces of the universe, their 
interactions, and the ways to manipulate them. It was scientific in 
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the sense that it involved a predictable manipulation of natural \ 
energies; it needed neither spirits nor a charismatic healer. 
As an educated man, Hong Xiuquan may have had some know-
ledge of traditional Chinese medicine, but in practice the more 
magical systems of curing were far more important to the God 
Worshipers. After all, mastery of medical technique came from 
learning the system, which anyone might do; other forms of 
curing, however, could demonstrate the genuine power of God in 
terms both powerful and familiar to the people of Guangxi. All of 
these more religious curing systems in China involve rhetorical 
control over spirits rather than mechanical control over nature. 
Daoist priests, for example, can write curing or protective charms 
that ward off evil influences. For larger problems, they perform 
elaborate exorcisms. In either case, they use the authority vested in 
them by very high gods to oust more lowly demons. Other kinds of 
more minor cures could come directly from gods in temples. For 
example, a god might allow use of incense ash from a temple as a 
protective amulet, or to be brewed into a curing infusion. For more 
important problems, the gods may show up in person, possessing a , 
medium, diagnosing the problem and prescribing the solution to the 
participants in charismatic performances. All of these techniques 
imply a proof of spiritual power in the ability to see invisible causes 
of illness and to root out the perpetrators. 
While such curing techniques occurred all over China, rural 
Guangxi apparently had them to excess, or at least so it seemed to 
the elite authors of local gazetteers. Every gazetteer lamented the 
local people's preference for religious curers over traditional 
Chinese doctors (e.g., Pingnan Xianzhi, 1883, juan 8:3, 7; Guangxi 
Tongzhi, 1891, juan 87:7): 
When people are sick they do not take medicine but instead invite 
Daoists to worship the peck measure and pray to the stars [a 
Daoist ritual], or they call in a sorcerer who wears flowers, waves 
a sword and dances with plates. They call this jumping demons 
(tiao gut). There are also sorceresses locally called devil-women 
(guipuo) (Xunzhou Fuzhi, 1897, juan 54:67). 
The gazetteers seem baffled by people's disregard for medical 
healing.33 
The God Worshipers placed themselves squarely within this 
tradition. Curing had not been part of Hong's original vision, or 
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part of what Christianity he had picked up. Instead the movement 
again found itself becoming part of a powerful local tradition in a 
way that greatly enhanced their leaders' power and authority, while 
compromising their ideological independence. 
One observer who was in Xunzhou at the time later described 
Hong's mastery of the sorcerer's arts: ''The rebel Hong regularly 
forecast rain or clear weather, and drew magic charms to cure 
disease. He had some real efficacy, and the country people called 
him Master Hong, honoring him like a god" (Banwo, 1874). More 
recent oral traditions in Xunzhou also recall Hong as a curer who 
made important converts by writing charms in God's name, and 
often showing God's superior ability to local gods. In one case 
Hong's landlady had made offerings to her local Earth God to cure 
her disease, but to no avail. Hong threw the image in the water, 
curing the disease and winning new friends (Guangxisheng ... , 
1956:35-36). Another case involved Shi Dakai, who would become 
one of the movement's leading generals: 
Shi Dakai' s mother fell gravely ill, and Dakai sent someone to get 
a Maoshan Daoist to exorcize the demon ... This person ran into 
Hong Xiuquan on the way, who asked what he was doing. The 
man told Xiuquan, and Xiuquan replied, ''Do not get some Daoist. 
I will write some efficacious charms for you to take back and put 
on the wall, and all will be well" (Guangxisheng ... , 1956:45). 
The mother was cured, and Shi was won over. 
Hong Rengan's confession provides similar evidence, saying that 
his cousin had "the power of causing the dumb to speak, and when 
people who were afflicted with leprosy and strange illnesses were 
cured by reason of the faith that they had in him, it caused a still 
greater number of people to come to him" (in Michael, 1966-
1971:1520). While these sources are not strictly reliable - none 
involve eyewitnesses - they do indicate the popular image that 
the God Worshipers created. People saw them as tremendously 
powerful in standard religious terms, whether or not Hong actually 
performed such cures. 
While Hong personally established some reputation as a curer, a 
new and local leader eclipsed him in this area as he would in others. 
Yang Xiuqing rose to dominance during this period of religious 
adaptation and became one of the crucial shapers of the developing 
ideology. One reason for the vigor of healing in religious move-
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ments is its ability to prove real successes, and thus to empower 
individuals who are otherwise powerless. Yang Xiuqing was just 
such a case- a local poor farmer, charcoal burner, and sometime 
transport worker, typical of many of the young men who shaped 
local life at the time (Michael, 1966-1971:35-36; Zhong, 1984b:115-
118). The evidence for his cures is clear and unambiguous Qian, 
1958:1880): 
Many sick persons had been cured in a wonderful manner by 
prayer to God, and Yang was said to possess the gift to cure 
sicknesses by intercession for the sick. From the description it 
would almost seem as if Yang had willingly submitted and 
prayed to have the sickness of the other conferred upon him-
self, and that he for a short while had borne his sufferings, 
whereby he redeemed the disease of the other, and was after-
wards himself released from the consequences of his own 
intercession (Hamberg, 1854:46). 
A later Taiping document told a similar tale, and appeared to 
associate Yang's curing with spirit possession by God, beginning in 
1848 (Tianqing Daoli Shu in Michael, 1966-1971:374-375). An anti-
Taiping source described the same thing: "Thus he hopes to fool the 
masses, and indeed the masses are fooled. Alas!" ("Yueni Jiliie", 
n.d.:34-35). The final result was the valorization of Yang as the 
Redeemer of Sickness, who saved others by taking on their diseases, 
just as Christ had saved them by taking on their sins. 
Hong and Feng had entered the Xunzhou region with a radical 
religious alternative, but soon found themselves claiming power 
squarely within the terms of local popular religious practice. 
Whether these original leaders liked it or not, many local people 
saw God as another claimant on local spiritual authority, Who stood 
out from the crowd because of His great successes, rather than 
because He promised a radically new religion. 
With the very weak institutional control over religious interpreta-
tion in the area, and the thick and multivocalic mix of interpreta-
tions that already existed, the God Worshipers chose not to maintain 
their ideological purity, in contrast to the Western missionaries. 
Instead, they soon found themselves thrown into the vat along with 
everything else, adding further to the complexity of the local brew, 
but losing some of their original identity. The result by 1848 was a 
highly charged mixture of potential interpretations, within which 
I I 
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the God Worshipers had successfully shown their own power. At 
the same time, however, their heavy-handed techniques had made 
enemies and ended in the arrest of Feng. With Feng off the scene for 
a while, and Hong only recently returned (and soon to leave again 
to try to rescue Feng), the original leadership continued to lose 
ideological control of the movement. 1848 brought a new step in the 
fermentation of the movement, as local traditions of spirit posses-
sion added to the multiplicity of voices and further expanded the 
possibilities. 
5 
Too Many Voices 
By allowing God to become just one more god, the new movement 
brought all the inherently complex possibilities of local popular 
religion into play. God became enmeshed in the ethnic, localist, and 
above all political (both pro- and anti-government) potentials of the 
local religious mixture. When the first God Worshiper became 
possessed, the movement took another gigantic step into its own 
dissolution into local popular practice, even as it transformed that 
practice. The first possessions probably began in late 1847, just as the 
temple destruction movement was losing its power, and as Feng 
Yunshan was removed from the scene. The first medium may have 
been someone called Yang Qingxiu.34 As Hong Rengan later 
described the episode: 
Yang Ch'ing-hsiu [Qingxiu] was able to ascend to heaven, and in 
the sky there was the sound of drums and music. An angelic boy 
also descended to announce Hung's [Hong's] name and say: 
"Three eight two one; grain is food of jade; a man sits over all 
the land to be the guide of the people." Each time when there was 
a proclamation, an angelic boy would come down and speak (in 
Michael, 1966-1971 :4-5). 
The "angelic boy" undoubtedly described a possessed medium. 
Chinese terms for mediums often include the term ''boy" (e.g., 
jitong, luotong), no matter what the age of the medium. 
The text of the medium's message also illustrates the high 
"coefficient of weirdness" (Malinowski, 1935:218-233) that com-
munications with gods often show; it makes no more immediate 
sense in Chinese than it does in English. The apparent impenetr-
ability of the message added to the general sense of overwhelming 
possibilities that I have been discussing, and strengthened the 
feeling that the Lord had blessed the movement with these special 
messages that went beyond the limitations of everyday language. As 
always, however, other readings waited beneath the surface. In this 
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case, the Chinese characters can be read for their shapes rather than 
their meanings. The combination of the characters for "three," 
"eight," "two," and "one" makes Hong, "grain" and "is" make 
Xiu, and "man" written over "one" ("all" in Michael's translation) 
and "land" makes Quan, thus spelling out the leader's name. 
This kind of language game recalls Bakhtin again on language 
play in Rabelais, but also resonates with numerous connotations in 
Chinese tradition. One form of fortune telling, for instance, dis-
sected characters into their component parts. In addition, the Triad 
societies liked to use such secret encodings for various characters 
important in their rituals and beliefs. Here was a message, therefore, 
that indicated heavenly mystery to some, secret affirmation of 
Hong's authority to others, and recognition of strong Triad links 
(at a time when the God Worshipers had ties to various Triad bandit 
groups) to still others. 
Whatever the date and details of the first possession, by 1848 the 
God Worshipers had entered a period dominated by spirit posses-
sion. Taiping documents indicate about two hundred cases of spirit 
possession, and these surely represent only a small part of what 
actually occurred.35 The published Taiping sources described only 
the incidents that the leaders later approved; we know the others 
primarily through Hamberg and especially through denunciations 
of other mediums in surviving documents. The passage from 
Hamberg I quoted earlier clearly shows the importance of multiple 
possessions to the movement in 1848 and 1849, as various members 
of the congregation entered a "state of ecstasy" and exhorted, 
reprimanded and prophesied to the group (Hamberg, 1854:45). 
LOCAL TRADffiONS 
This immersion in spirit possession pushed the God Worshipers 
even deeper into local religious practice. Spirit mediumship through 
possession occurred commonly throughout south China, but it 
seemed unusual in both quantity and quality in the Xunzhou 
region, at least compared to better studied parts of China. Even 
today, possessed spirit mediums continue to play an important role 
in the area, patronized by people at all levels of society. Twice when 
I was in Guiping town, local cadres pulled me aside, knowing I was 
interested in spirit possession, to tell me their personal experiences. 
In both cases, they made sure no one else was in earshot, and began 
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by explaining how they were good Communists and educated men, 
and did not believe any of this. 
Nevertheless, one of them explained how he could no longer 
identify his mother's grave, because he had not been able to worship 
there during the Cultural Revolution. The medium he consulted 
described the exact location of the grave, even down to details like a 
tree root that had grown through the coffin. The other cadre had 
been to a medium who correctly predicted several details of his 
future. Both proclaimed their disbelief, but both wanted to be sure 
that I understood how accurate this knowledge was, and how 
impossible to obtain through secular means. This part of Guangxi 
clearly maintains spirit medium traditions much more powerfully 
than many other areas of China, due partly to its very peripheral 
position and partly to the strength of the local tradition. 
The Xunzhou region was as much a relative hotbed of possession 
in the 1840s as it appears to be now. Those gazetteers that bewailed 
the local fondness for religious curing instead of traditional Chinese 
medicine usually cited spirit mediums as the heart of the problem. 
The Guangxi area shared with Taiwan and many other parts of 
China possession in which a spirit spoke through the body of a 
medium. By entering such an altered state of consciousness, 
professional mediums performed divination, cured patients, and 
so on. The medium would usually take on the personality char-
acteristics of the possessing god, solemn and intimidating in some 
cases, brandishing martial weapons in others, or jumping impishly 
about in still others. The medium's voice would also change, often 
becoming harder to understand as the power and difference of the 
god manifested itself through the medium. In some cases, the god 
would not speak, but instead wrote characters with a brush. Such 
characters were highly saturated - a wild scribble with many 
possible readings, as far from ordinary writing as the god was 
from the ordinary being he or she possessed. 
A second form of mediumship apparently also thrived in the area, 
although it is rarely reported in other parts of China. In this form the 
medium, again in an altered state of consciousness, journeys to the 
supernatural world where he or she can examine objects and speak 
to the spirits. In one common variation, the medium can examine a 
tree that represents every person, diagnosing health from the health 
of the plant, divining numbers of children from the number of buds, 
and so on (Xunzhou Fuzhi, 1897, juan 54:67).36 In other cases, 
mediums might speak directly with spirits. Experts can induce this 
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kind of trance in their clients, sending regular people on spirit 
journeys. 
This form of possession may have been so common in the 
Xunzhou area because of its relation to Yao spirit journeys that 
still form part of their initiation ritual. The Yao informants I 
interviewed in Guangxi described how Yao masters lead all 
initiates on elaborate first journeys to the spirit world, introducing 
them to what they will need to know there. Afterwards the initiates 
may be able to undertake their own journeys.37 One of the Yao I 
spoke with agreed to act out a possession episode in spite of the 
presence of various local officials. He seemed clearly able to perform 
as a medium on his own. 
The imperial government had to tolerate possession, especially 
given its powerlessness in Xunzhou in the 1840s. Yet like the current 
government, it discouraged the practice whenever possible. It could 
not approve a practice that allowed for divinely sanctioned mes-
sages completely beyond its control. As direct messages from the 
gods, inherently uncontrollable by any interpretive institution, 
possessions were potentially subversive. As I have argued else-
where, it was this potential for subversion, rather than any 
necessarily subversive content, that led to government suppression 
of possession cults in many cases (Weller, 1984). 
THE POWER OF POSSESSION 
The very local tradition of spirit journeys must have made Hong's 
vision easier to accept in Xunzhou than it had been in his native 
county, which apparently lacked such a strong tradition. Hong's 
dream, after all, must have sounded exactly like one of those 
medium-led trips to the supernatural world that characterized the 
area. Hong's divine revelation may well have been simply a bizarre 
dream to the inhabitants of relatively sophisticated Hua County, but 
it was quite plausibly a real spirit trip to Heaven for the people of 
Xunzhou. 
This initial reinterpretation of Hong's vision became far more 
powerful when the God Worshipers entered deeply into local 
possession traditions. Adherents of the movement made massive 
use of both the local possession traditions. Hamberg seems to 
describe the form most common in south China, where the spirit 
descends into the body of a medium and speaks directly through 
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him or her. Most of the officially recorded possessions in Taiping 
documents also follow this pattern. Yet the God Worshipers clearly 
also drew heavily on the much less commonly described tradition of 
sending souls on spirit journeys to the underworld. Taiping sources, 
for example, describe several cases where the medium Xiao Chaogui 
(soon to be one of the top leaders), as Jesus, led his audience one at a 
time up into Heaven. Late in 1849, for instance, "the Heavenly Elder 
Brother [Xiao as Jesus] called together the mass of little ones, 
choosing each one and admonishing cautious speech, and individu-
ally raised them up, lofting each to Heaven" (Tianxiong Shengzhi in 
Wang, 1985:209). He even led his human self up to Heaven at least 
once, when Jesus suggested that Xiao Chaogui return with Him for 
an hour or so when he ascended (Tianxiong Shengzhi in Wang, 
1985:209) 
Hong Xiuquan must have had mixed feelings about all of this. In 
earlier, simpler days, he had clearly opposed many practices of 
popular religion. In a poem written around 1845, he had warned 
that: 
The fifth kind of wrong is witchcraft; 
By the evil arts of deceiving the multitude, Heaven's 
penalty is incurred. 
Death and life, calamity and sickness, all are determined 
by Heaven; 
Why then deceive the people by the useless manufacture 
of charms? 
Incantations to procure luck, vows to the demons, services 
to the devils, 
Fastings and processions, all are of no avail 
(Yuandao Jiushi Ge in Michael, 1966-1971:29). 
Yet now Hong found that the immersion of his original ideology in 
just these practices was creating the enormous following he had . 
dreamed about. 
The ebbing of Hong's staunch monotheism in favor of a God who 
competed as an equal with other gods, which had begun with the 
temple destructions a few years earlier, had reached an extreme by 
the time of the spirit possession in 1848. The new opening quickly 
created new local leaders. The mediums Yang Xiuqing (possessed 
by God; also a curer as I discussed in Chapter 4) and Xiao Chaogui 
(possessed by Jesus), nearly unknown until this time, soon joined 
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the very highest leadership of the movement. At the same time, the 
new dominance of local leaders and local customs brought thou-
sands of people into the fold. 
Spirit possession by the mass of followers threatened to remove 
interpretive authority within the God Worshiping community 
completely away from the control of the original leaders. Hong 
himself, of course, did not need to be possessed to occupy a special 
position- he was already God's son. Yet any possessed adherent 
immediately earned equal authority, just by being believably 
possessed by a spirit of equal stature to Hong. A medium could 
even overrule Hong by speaking the words of Jesus or God directly, 
both of whom outranked Hong as his older brother or father. Both 
Yang Xiuqing and Xiao Chaogui posed just this dilemma for Hong, 
and both took Jains to assert their privileged authority from the 
very first day. Both entered the fray in 1848, Yang/God in the 
spring and Xiao/Jesus later in the fall. 
At His first visit, we only know that God displayed "innumerable 
miracles and powers" (Michael, 1966-1971:98). Jesus, however, 
immediately spoke to dissension within the ranks: "I have descen-
ded into the golden mouth of the Western King [Xiao Chaogui] in 
order to explain in detail to the Heavenly King [Hong], because Xiao 
Chaolong [probably a lineage cousin of Xiao Chaogui] has offended 
me: I am Jesus" (Tianxiong Shengzhi in Wang, 1985:192). Medium-
ship had clearly joined the struggle for control in 1848. Jesus often 
also took pains to stress his superiority to his little brother Hong. 
Just a month later, for instance, ''The Heavenly Elder Brother Christ 
addressed the Heavenly King, saying 'Hong Xiuquan, Younger 
Brother, do you recognize me?' The Heavenly King responded 
'Your small little brother does recognize you'" (Tianxiong Shengzhi 
in Wang, 1985:192). Both Yang and Xiao would often demand that 
Hong acknowledge their higher status while they were possessed. 
To make matters worse, all kinds of other spirits also appeared, 
from local star spirits to various beings the later Taiping would 
describe as imps and devils. In addition to Hamberg's description of 
many people getting possessed and causing enormous dissension, 
we also have records of God and Jesus attacking other mediums. 
Hamberg records a sort of excommunication that resulted in one 
case: "One of the Wang clan had spoken against the doctrine of 
Jesus, and led many astray, but he was excluded from the con-
gregation, and his words declared false, being spoken under the 
influence of a corrupt spirit" (Hamberg, 1854:46). Such demons 
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plagued the movement all the way up to its transformation into an 
armed rebellion in 1850. Leaders asked Jesus for help controlling 
star spirits in 1849, imp constellations later that year, and devils in 
early 1850. As late as the summer of 1850, Jesus demanded the 
investigation and arrest of a rival medium within the movement, a 
man named Li who was threatened with execution if he ever spoke 
again (Wang, 1985:201). I will save the leaders' attempts to create 
order out of this chaos for Chapter 6. Here I want only to establish 
that the voices of many other mediums still echo between the lines 
determined much later by the established Taiping leadership, which 
validated only the voices of Yang and Xiao. 
Possession could thus offer a kind of epitome of saturation, where 
every voice had equal authority, and no interpretive institution 
could stand against the direct instructions of the gods. This ulti-
mate overload of meaning, however, constantly pushed toward a 
single interpretation. Indeed, every possessed proclamation consti-
tuted a mini-precipitate, since it required an explicit statement that 
often contradicted others. Many of the God Worshipers' possessions 
of 1848 and 1849 seemed to address the growth of mutually 
incompatible interpretations, especially in the challenges to the 
authority of other mediums and the constant worry about a lack 
of unity in the movement. Interpretive silence no longer remained 
possible, but the mediums fought over whose meaning would 
finally dominate. 
The records reveal frustratingly little detail about how all of this 
actually took place. They are thin descriptions that highlight only 
those voices that finally won the fight. Mass possession movements 
elsewhere in the world, however, show regular enough features that 
we can get a good idea of what that period of rich multivocality and 
endless possibility might have been like for the God Worshipers. 
The sections that follow will cite comparative material in some 
detail, as a way of suggesting how the dynamics of that early 
community of God Worshipers might have worked. 
The Emotional and Aesthetic Power of Trance 
Uncontrolled possession cults are saturated by their very nature, as 
the inherent authority of each medium allows new interpretations to 
thrive without effective interference. This plethora of possible 
meanings itself contains a tremendous appeal to new followers. It 
typically offers the excitement and charisma of personal experience 
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with powers beyond the normal world, along with the heady 
experience of constantly innovative and responsive interpretations 
with irreproachable claims to supernatural validity. 
Institutional control of interpretation is much easier for some 
forms of religious action than for others. Control is easiest when 
the leaders can lay claim to more orthodox interpretations through 
their greater knowledge, and enforce those claims through estab-
lished interpretive communities, as with the tremendous erudition 
and institutions controlled by the medieval Catholic Church. Yet it 
can be very difficult when anyone at all has direct access to divine 
knowledge, as in the case of uncontrolled spirit possession. 
The option for anyone to speak with divine authority, for the 
masses to overload the field with their own unassailable interpreta-
tions, makes any kind of control difficult because people direct their 
own interpretations. There is a continuum from more to less self-
interpreting religious practice, which generally creates_ a continuum 
of thicker to thinner religion. At one extreme, mass spirit possession 
is almost impossible to control. The spirit will tell you exactly what 
it means, and if you get it wrong, the spirit can come back again to 
correct you. This is direct communication with the divine world, 
and it leaves little room for the state or any other religious 
intermediary. Possession can break through even accepted canons 
of interpretation with relative impunity. Visions and visionary 
dreams are a little easier to control. They may seem to contain 
clear messages, but they are private (unlike most possession) and 
can be subject to reinterpretation by authorities as mere metaphors. 
Signs and omens offer the potential for still more control, as they 
often require religious experts to interpret their apparently opaque 
messages. Finally, texts and rituals often form the lifeblood of thin 
interpretation, especially where people are illiterate. Institutiona-
lized religion thrives on texts and rituals, whose correct interpreta-
tion only the leaders themselves can determine. While any religious 
form can end up saturated if the interpretive community fails - after 
all, texts do have multiple readings - the reverse is not true. The 
very nature of mass possession makes institutional control and the 
dominance of a single precipitated interpretation almost impossible. 
Weak as it may be for developing strong institutions, uncontrolled 
possession offers a powerful charisma that greatly benefits recruit-
ment. Such cults owe a great deal of their mass appeal to the 
emotional and aesthetic power of trance performances (Thrupp, 
1962:26-27). No one sleeps through the service when possessed 
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Holy Ghost people in the West Virginia mountains begin to pass 
rattlesnakes around. 
Other forms of communication with the gods in China are cold 
and dull by comparison - the god speaks only haltingly through the 
fall of divination sticks, through the inscrutable verses tied to Yijing 
hexagrams, or at best through a muddled dream subject to many 
interpretations. Possession, in contrast, brings the spirit directly to 
the people. Taking over its human medium, the spirit actually 
speaks, answers questions, preaches and exhorts. The mediums' 
voices may become shrill, fast, and strangely accented with the 
gods' voices, much as Hamberg described for the possessed God 
Worshipers speaking in rhythm and often unintelligibly. Their 
human personalities disappear, transformed into the particular 
presence of the god. Indeed, the whole arena seems transformed 
out of ordinary life with the thrill of the arrival of extraordinary 
beings. 
This is especially true of cults that feature mass possession, 
including Haitian voodoo, some American Pentecostalism, or the 
Taiwanese Religion of Compassion (Cihui Tang), whose possessions 
may have resembled the God Worshipers. I witnessed a local sect of 
the Religion of Compassion celebrating the birthday of their chief 
goddess, the Golden Mother of the Jasper Pool (Yaochi Jinmu) in 
1976.39 This cult is the largest of a set of pietistic sects that are very 
popular in Taiwan; many of them center on mediumship through 
spirit writing (see Jordan and Overmyer, 1986). The Religion of 
Compassion stands out from the others, however, through its 
practice of "jumping" (tiao). Any member of the cult is liable to 
experience jumping, that is, direct possession by the cult gods. 
Such uncontrolled possession occupied the gathered faithful as I 
arrived to watch their festival. Possessed believers filled a field in 
front of their temple, some shaking, some falling to the ground, and 
some bra~dishing swords in the style of Chinese martial arts. They 
sometimes wandered into the surrounding crowd, occasionally 
infecting others with their trance. Especially in contrast to most 
ordinary Taiwanese religion, where trance is largely limited to 
professional mediums, the excitement and sense of altered context 
pervaded the crowd. The power of the occasion further increased a 
little later, as possessed cult members began to cure other members 
on the temple veranda. Still quivering with trance, they would tap 
on their patients' chests, speak spells, and draw smoke charms with 
sticks of incense. The experience clearly thrilled and compelled the 
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patients. Many went into trance themselves, further enhancing the 
thrill of the event. The immediate power and excitement of such an 
occasion (even to a non-believing anthropologist), and the visible 
ability of the gods to transform human personality made the cult 
strongly appealing. The aesthetic and religious thrills of possession 
trance are part of the powerful ability of possession cults to attract 
followers. 
All of this suggests that the God Worshipers might also have 
gained in both the unity of the group and the number of followers 
through the power of God's direct presence in their midst, along 
with many other spirits. Certainly the local traditions of possession 
on which these God Worshiping mediums drew were as colorful 
and dramatic as any. The spate of trance episodes during this 
period, accompanied by their effective cures ,and rival claims of 
religious authority, could easily have created an atmosphere of 
excitement that greatly increased popular interest in God Wor-
ship, just as occurred in possession trance movements in other 
parts of the world. 
The surviving records unfortunately show far more concern with 
what God and Jesus said than with the quality of the performance 
itself. Yet while direct evidence is brief, we know that numerous 
individuals were possessed - we have at least surnames for five 
mediums in the material I have already mentioned, and many 
others are implied. We also know that many trance performances 
took place in front of large gatherings of followers, and that at least 
some of them were dramatically powerful. In the early moments of 
the rebellion itself, for example, Jesus spoke to the combined troops: 
Suddenly he called out to the Southern King [Feng Yunshan]: 
''Bring Snow in the Clouds [the sword God had given to Hong]." 
The Southern King presented Snow in the Clouds, and the 
Heavenly Elder Brother began a great battle against devils. The 
Heavenly Elder Brother said: ''If they come on the left I stop them 
on the left! If they come on the right I stop them on the right! They 
can come where they like, I will stop them as I like!" He also said: 
"No matter where you devils run, you cannot escape my net on 
Heaven or earth" (Tianxiong Shengzhi in Wang, 1985:210). 
This performance strongly recalled Daoist exorcism, but must also 
have been commandingly charismatic. It could easily have helped to 
cement a group of followers already familiar with such perform-
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ance. At the very least, evidence on the God Worshipers is plausibly 
consistent with what we know about how comparable cults worked. 
Transcending Boundaries 
Spirit possession, because it allows free and innovative new 
revelations beyond the power of the usual institutions, can provide 
a powerful validation for breaking accepted social boundaries. 
Possession movements thus often spread beyond conventional 
groups by appealing to both genders, to dissatisfied intellectuals, 
and to diverse social groups. Crossing the boundary between 
human and spirit makes more secular boundaries easier to cross 
as well. Interpretive communities, and conventions of all kinds, 
cannot stand against the multiple voices of mass possession. 
Possession cults often cross ethnic boundaries and form new 
kinds of coalitions, facilitating recruitment and leading to the 
possible development of a large-scale movement. The New Guinea 
Taro Cult, for example, united several groups around a prophet 
who had been "struck down" by the Spirit of Taro (Worsley, 
1968:59-67). In 1914 the cult began to spread through several 
villages as the Spirit possessed new people. In trembling trances, 
followers received messages about the planting of taro and other 
crops. They also cured and performed magic to ensure a good crop. 
One of their most important tenets was "good fellowship" toward 
each other. This, added to the infectious character of their trances 
and a tendency to proselytize, allowed the cult to spread very 
rapidly among neighboring groups, crossing both ethnic and 
linguistic boundaries. In fact, the reliance on trance made it very 
easy for the cult to spread, and to adapt itself to new areas and new 
leaders. Many other cults offered similar innovations. 
In much the same way, the God Worshipers appealed across 
ethnic boundaries, in spite of a recent history of massive conflict 
between ethnic groups in the area. While the ethnic composition of 
the early God Worshipers is not fully clear, the Hakka undoubtedly 
found the movement especially attractive, and joined in large 
numbers. The main founders of the sect, Hong Xiuquan and Feng 
Yunshan, were Hakkas and originally settled with Hakka families. 
The arrival of perhaps 3,000 Hakkas fleeing a losing ethnic feud 
with natives in Gui County gave the God Worshipers a crucial edge 
in the local balance of power. The God Worshipers offered them a 
way of uniting in the face of their enemies. Kuhn (1977) and 
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especially Kojima (1983) have argued that the God Worshipers' 
religious ideology peculiarly suited the needs of Hakkas newly 
arrived in a peripheral area, offering a religious unity to people 
with no geographical unity or local tradition of their own. In the 
absence of their own religious structures, the movement offered 
them both a unifying ideology and social organization. 
Yet the God Worshipers by no means simply expressed Hakka 
ethnicity. They had included Zhuangs and some Yaos from the 
beginning, and their egalitarian ideology promised to erase stan-
dard ethnic divisions (Guangxisheng ... , 1956:75-77). The move-
ment's leaders consistently wrote of the brotherhood of all people: 
"Since our Heavenly Father gave us birth and nourishment, we are 
of one form though of separate bodies, and we breathe the same air 
though in different places. This is why we say all are brothers within 
the four seas ... When there is clothing, let all wear it; when there is 
food, let all eat of it" (Tianqing Daoli Shu in Michael, 1966-
1971:388).40 Denying equality meant denying humanity itself, and 
the term "imps" thus came to mean the ruling Manchus in addition 
to its earlier use to condemn gods like King Gan. The God 
Worshipers' egalitarianism had strong Christian roots for Hong. 
Locally, however, evidence from possession movements elsewhere 
suggests that God's and Jesus's (and perhaps other mediums') 
presence on earth may have been one of the factors that promoted 
the movement's openness to various ethnic groups, even in the face 
of deep-seated conflicts. God and Jesus regularly spoke to the group 
about the need for harmony and cooperation, even if they did not 
address ethnicity directly (e.g., Tianming Zhaozhishu in Michael, 
1966--1971:99, 100). 
Among the top leadership, the newly powerful locals used cross-
ethnic ties, like the religious interpenetration I have already dis-
cussed, to bridge the gaps among the groups. Shi Dakai, for 
example, apparently had a Zhuang mother and Hakka father, and 
Wei Changhui may possibly have been Yao. In any case, both were 
bilingual and could thus help appeal across standard ethnic lines 
(Guangxisheng ... , 1956:74). In addition, Xiao Chaogui showed 
great familiarity with Yao spirit possession, often using the more 
1 Yao form of leading people up to Heaven.
41 The opening up of set 
i social structures through the immediate presence of spirits on earth 
surely gave a power to Hong's egalitarian message that he could 
never have achieved on his own. The process further deteriorated 
conventional community boundaries in the area, weak as they 
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already were in the 1840s. At the same time, it added still more 
complexities to the brew of ideas available to the movement. 
New Roles and New Rituals 
Possession cults appeal so widely as the basis of social movements 
because the direct presence of a god can facilitate political and 
cultural innovation, breaking both cultural convention and social 
boundaries in an outburst of charismatic enthusiasm. In the Taro 
Cult this first took the form of new gardening ritual, which featured 
songs filled with "foreign" words (Worsley, 1968:60-61). They also 
introduced new large feasts that differed from traditional feasts by 
including curing ceremonies, singing new songs, and introducing 
new ways of cutting and cooking taro. New greetings and cries 
appeared, and many new vocabulary words began to replace old 
words. The converted took these symbols of new life to their 
extreme by adopting new names (Worsley, 1968:63). Their doctrine 
of amity among all the tribes was a critical cultural innovation that 
helped the movement spread; a fad of shaking hands accompanied 
the new doctrine. 
Several years later, the people of Palau (in the Western Carolines) 
similarly used possession cults to create an innovative religious 
movement (Leonard, 1973:159-163). A precursor of the movement 
had begun in 1905, when a low-:ranking man named Rdiall broke 
with Palauan tradition by building a non-traditional house, erecting 
a flagpole, and, most shocking of all, doing women's work- tilling 
the soil. The cult built around the trances of this prophet had died 
out by the time the Japanese arrived to occupy the islands in 1914, 
but a similar group called Modekngei ("Get Together" ) soon arose, 
apparently inspired by Japanese repression of traditional religion. 
The leader was first possessed in 1916, and like Rdiall, began 
breaking taboos. In his case, he ate bananas without suffering any 
evil consequences. This proof of his power established his reputa-
tion. Later leaders represented Modekngei as the only true Palauan 
way - they forbade foreign songs and foods, and took a number of 
Christian beliefs for their own. In both cases, innovations that 
challenged local tradition proved critical in gaining a following. 
Possession cults often further transcend normal social lines by 
allowing a relatively powerless person to rise to authority as a 
possessed leader, or by allowing women a more active role than 
other organizations. Possession can dissolve conventional political 
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boundaries by allowing people who are normally cut off from 
political power to occupy places of significant respect and author-
ity. Lewis, for example, writes that women's possession cults 
become especially important "in traditional societies and cultures 
where women lack more obvious and direct means of forwarding 
their aims" (1971:31). Women also play important roles in posses-
sion cults in Taiwan, including the Religion of Compassion. They 
may comprise a major proportion of the membership, and often 
occupy major positions within these cults. 
Like these possession cults elsewhere, the early God Worshipers 
gave opportunities to people who might not have had them 
otherwise, including dissatisfied intellectuals like Hong Xiuquan 
and Feng Yunshan, a river pirate like Luo Dagang, a poor mountain 
farmer like Xiao Chaogui, and a charcoal burner like Yang Xiuqing. 
Xiao and Yang in particular used possession to build their places 
within the movement, but some women apparently used similar 
techniques. Xiao Chaogui's wife, for example, told in 1847 of her 
spirit journey to Heaven a decade earlier: 
during a very severe sickness, when she lay as dead upon her bed, 
her soul ascended to heaven, and she heard an old man say to her, 
"After ten years a man will come from the east and teach thee to 
worship God; obey him willingly." She was eminent among the 
female God-worshippers, who used to say as a proverb, "Men 
ought to study Fung-Yun-san [Feng Yunshan], and women the 
conduct of Yang-Yun-kiao [Xiao's wife]'' (Hamberg, 1854:34). 
At least by the time the movement had organized as a rebellion, it 
allowed women a powerful role, including women's military units 
with their own officers and independent women's production units. 
The specific role of possession in this is not clear, but the similarity 
with the innovative appeal of the Religion of Compassion and other 
possession cults to women is striking. A few cases of God Worshiper 
possession, at least, suggest an active role for women. For example, 
one conversation between Hong and Jesus in 1848 implied that 
Guanyin, one of the most important goddesses in China, had been 
possessing people, probably women: 
The Heavenly King [Hong Xiuquan] asked, "Is Guanyin a good 
person?" The Heavenly Elder Brother [Xiao as Jesus] replied "She 
is a good person. She now enjoys good fortune in the highest 
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heavens, but is also not allowed to descend to earth." The 
Heavenly King asked, ''While Guanyin enjoys the highest hea-
vens, how do you address her?" The Heavenly Elder Brother said, 
"I call her younger sister." The Heavenly King asked, "How 
should I address her?" The Heavenly Elder Brother answered, 
''You also call her younger sister'' (in Mao, 1989:36). 
"Descent to earth" was the standard Taiping reference to spirit 
possession, and the passage appears to indicate that further posses-
sions by Guanyin are inappropriate. Quite clearly, Hong and Xiao 
put themselves in a higher position by making her their younger 
sister. Just as important, here was another case of a local medium 
accepting a popular deity into the hierarchy, and of Hong accepting 
the polytheism. 
Finally, just as in other possession cults around the world, the 
early period of God Worshiper possessions saw innovation and 
creative movement-building, as the innovations announced by a 
medium had immediate divine sanction. As usual, we have very 
few concrete details, but the period of widespread possession saw 
the beginnings of congregational worship at flag-raising ceremonies 
and an increase in followers due to the trance cures performed by 
Yang Xiuqing.42 
Hong had entered Guangxi with a fairly tidy ideology, but by 
1849 his ideas had been thoroughly dissolved and transformed in 
the cauldron of local traditions. Neither the local religion nor the 
God Worshipers would emerge the same. The dynamics of spirit 
possession elsewhere suggest that mediumship often empowers 
these movements, attracting followers through the aesthetic excite-
ment of trance performances, creating new political opportunities 
while transcending old ethnic boundaries, and innovating cultural 
and political ideals through direct divine inspiration. The available 
evidence about the God Worshipers remains too scanty to assert 
confidently that all the same processes also took place there, but the 
evidence at least never contradicts such an inference. At the very 
least, early God Worshiper possession helped break old social 
boundaries and expand the potential base of support. 
The thick mixture of 1849 teemed with possible interpretations, 
many of them incompatible but coexisting. Their connotations 
ramified through territory as diverse as local ethnicity, strongmen, 
gender, bandits, curing, and state power. While the situation was 
chaotic, it was also tremendously powerful and creative, quickly 
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attracting an enormous and diverse following. Spirit mediums 
added to both the chaos and the power, further dissolving the 
movement in a new local brew. 
At the same time, these developments further disassembled 
Guangxi's already very weak interpretive communities. Uncon-
trolled spirit possession, more easily than other forms of religious 
communication, undercuts authority of all kinds. No mere mortal 
can impose an authoritative interpretation when the gods them-
selves speak directly and through many mouths. The situation in 
Guangxi at the time, with its weak lines of authority and relatively 
uncontrolled and open-ended religious interpretation, encouraged 
the kind of Carnivalesque overflow of meaning I have been 
discussing. 
By 1849, the God Worshipers had pushed local saturation to its 
limits. They had moved far away from any kind of Weberian 
rationalization, undercutting both the authority of the new move-
ment leaders and the power of earlier structures of control. 
Especially with the long absences of their original leaders, and 
with the immediate power vested in any possessed medium, 
neither the God Worshipers nor the communities they sank their 
roots in could maintain established mechanisms of authority. Two 
very closely interrelated processes thus occurred during these years: 
the further complication and thickening of religious meaning and 
the further breakdown of interpretive communities. 
Truly powerful symbols, from the cross to the flag, tend to be rich 
with meaningful possibilities. The evidence from Guangxi may 
never be conclusive, but it certainly suggests that the dissolution 
and enrichment of Hong's ideas had given the God Worshipers 
enormous power and appeal in Xunzhou. Much of their recruiting 
success stemmed from the dismemberment of Hong's ideas into the 
local mix, and then the potent addition of charismatic possession. 
Possession provided a maximum of saturation. Just as the Tristan 
chord constantly hinted at a resolution into a key but instead 
slipped into something different, so the God Worshipers also 
constantly suggested new interpretations but settled on none as a 
new medium would be possessed. Even as the movement gained in 
popularity, however, its very organization threatened to collapse. 
The process of multiplying interpretation that lent it strength also 
sapped the leaders' ability to control interpretation. The excitement 
and free reign of all those divine voices plausibly helped rouse the 
masses, but also threatened cacophonous chaos. The next chapter 
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examines how the God Worshipers orchestrated those voices by 
establishing powerful interpretive communities as they built the 
institutions of their new state, and again concentrated and enforced 
a thinner ideology under their control. 
6 
Precipitation and 
Institution: The 
Taiping Rises Up 
The late 1840s utterly transformed the God Worshipers' movement, 
from the arrival of its two founders with their odd religious ideas in 
1844, to the proofs of God's power in temple destruction and curing 
a few years later, and finally to the charismatic chaos at the end of 
the decade. In 1850 the movement suddenly crystallized into a 
rebellion waiting to rebel, with both new social patterns and a 
new self-identification as rebels settling out from the multiple 
possibilities that had flooded them the year before. Calling their 
scattered following together in the town of Jintian, the group 
encamped in the gender-segregated units that would characterize 
them for the next several years; they realized their communal 
economy through the creation of a Celestial Treasury; they created 
a full range of military and political titles; they developed official 
dress and ceremonies, including a yellow imperial robe for Hong 
Xiuquan; and by no means least important, they put a forceful end 
to uncontrolled possessions and recaptured control over interpreta-
tion. Only at this point did they dub themselves the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom (Taiping Tianguo), a political entity for the 
first time. Within a year they were occupying their first city, 
publishing texts and .perfecting their new state apparatus. 
The transition from uncontrolled spirit possession, with all its 
creativity and all its fragmentation, required constructing new 
interpretive communities - an enterprise that is just as much 
institutional as ideological. Pulling a single dominant interpretation 
from such a powerfully complex and mixed set of possibilities 
challenged the movement leaders with the extraordinary task of 
quickly building the social means to control meaning. They 
succeeded by drastically limiting spirit possession, creating clearer 
institutions of political and military authority, and by agreeing on a 
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single master interpretation of the movement as a rebellion. They 
forged their cannons and their canons at the same time. 
While Taiping records on the early competing voices I discussed 
in Chapter 5 are hazy, much clearer evidence shows how the 
eventual leaders took control of the movement. As usual for the 
victors, they documented their own accomplishments better than 
they remembered their rivals'. Before I turn to that evidence, 
however, I want to return again to a comparative analysis of similar 
movements elsewhere in the world. The God Worshipers resembled 
many other possession movements, both in the probleltls that too 
many divine voices created and in the possible solutions. A general 
understanding of the dynamics of such movements suggests useful 
ways of looking at the Taiping transformation. At the same time, the 
Taiping case adds an important instance to the general theory, as 
one of the few where the movement retained and controlled spirit 
possession over the long term. The complex and indeterminate 
nature of such movements everywhere typically spawns very 
similar crises, and allows for only a few potential resolutions. 
POTENTIAL PRECIPITATIONS 
The qualities that give uncontrolled possession trance cults such a 
powerful potential to become social movements - the aesthetic 
appeal, the transcendence of conventional social boundaries, and 
the creation of new cultural and political ideas through direct divine 
inspiration- gravely endanger the consolidation and organization 
of the movements. In fact the great majority of possession cults 
never attempt any wide political organization. 
A few manage to continue as apolitical, unofficial cults often 
centered around curing; they are what Lewis (1971) calls amoral 
marginal cults. Horton (1969) gives a clear example of such a group 
among the Kalahari of Nigeria, who had a female-centered curing 
cult based on worship of amoral water spirits. This sect existed 
alongside, and sometimes challenged, a generally male and politic-
ally central cult based on ancestral and community heroes. The early 
Greek Dionysian cult may have been a similar institution. It was a 
popular movement that even slaves could join, in contrast to the 
state-controlled Apollonian cult (including the Delphic oracle) 
(Dodds, 1951:76-71). 
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From the very beginning, however, the God Worshipers deman-
ded a greater role than these cults played. Amoral marginal cults 
cede the political and religious center to others. The God Worshipers 
ceded nothing, but instead put their God directly up against the 
most powerful popular gods, and thus up against the definition of 
community itself. Their mediums spoke with the voices of the most 
powerful beings, and their statements thus carried more serious 
consequences. 
Collapse and Repression 
Possession cults that do develop into social movements usually 
collapse in fairly short order; long-lived movements like the Taiping 
rebellion arise only rarely. The frequent collapses stem from the 
impossibility of maintaining political discipline when anyone can 
speak with the authority of the gods. Attempts to create central 
political organization out of mass possession thus frequently shatter 
into a number of small sects. Even when the natural divisiveness of 
these movements does not cause their direct internal collapse, it 
makes them easy prey to outside repression. 
Just a small twitch of colonial military muscle, for example, 
crushed the millenia! Watchtower movement in Northern Rhodesia 
(now Zambia) after World War I before it could develop any very 
large political organization (Fields 1982). Based on the American 
Watchtower movement (now Jehovah's Witnesses), the sect taught 
that when the End came, only those baptized in the movement 
would survive, and whites (including the deceitful, not-Watch-
tower missionaries) would be enslaved or driven away. Until the 
great cataclysm, however, adherents were to offer only passive 
resistance - they had no immediate political agenda. 
The movement shared many of the features I have been discuss-
ing. Converts held nightly prayer meetings with a pow.erful 
aesthetic appeal: pr~achers proselytized loud and long, while 
drumming, hymn-singing and speaking in tongues lasted well into 
the night. The real political threat, at least as the local chiefs and 
colonial authorities saw it, lay partly in the movement's passive 
resistance; they refused, for example, to take part in wage labor. Yet 
the danger also lay equally in possession by the Holy Ghost; 
possession had been a tool of traditional political authority (just as 
it had been for the community hero cult among the Kalahari), and 
the Watchtower followers had usurped this critical symbol of the 
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chiefs' authority. Their mediums thus resembled the God Worship-
ers in speaking directly in the voice of the highest authorities. The 
movement peaked in 1919 with the forcible suppression by fully 
armed police of a New Jerusalem built on a hill. 
In suffering an early demise, the Zambian Watchtower movement 
typified many possession cults whose cultural innovation and 
crossing of conventional boundaries themselves created enough of 
a threat that the extant powers took steps to repress them. At the 
same time, the constant creation of new leaders through possession 
discouraged Watchtower organization on a scale large enough to 
stand up against any kind of organized repression. Marginal cults 
survive only because their political and social innovations are 
limited, and they stick to an established, marginal position in their 
societies. The Zambian Watchtower overstepped these lines in the 
turmoil after World War I, but could not overcome the weakness of 
its organizational base in mass possession. 
Internal collapse is as common as successful repression among 
possession groups attempting their own new social organization. 
Another group of Christian millenialists, this time the Apostolics of 
the Yucatan, provide a clear example. The Apostolics had grown 
dramatically under the charismatic leadership of their village 
preacher in 1970 (Goodman, 1973). A wave of speaking in tongues 
overtook the group, and they saw clear signs of the Second Coming 
in the immediate future - the Devil had appeared to a local prisoner, 
the Holy Spirit had given a vision of dirty churches that had to be 
cleaned before Christ arrived, and so on. Many people fell into 
trances, often not recovering for several days. 
The movement included the charismatic power and aesthetic 
appeal of mass possessions, cultural creativity as possessed follow-
ers prescribed new forms of dress and ritual, and social innovation 
as many followers moved into the church. Yet the Apostolics fell 
into a total shambles when different individuals began to give 
apparently equally holy, but contradictory ritual commands -
exactly ;the pressure point that also threatened the God Worshipers 
with disintegration. Followers of the movement began to accuse 
each other's trances of being Satanic. They finally collapsed into 
chaos, claiming in retrospect that the entire event had been a test 
from Satan. Here, the inherently indeterminate and multivocalic 
nature of mass possession prevented the movement from develop-
ing very far, quickly undercut the leadership position of the preach-
er, and blocked the development of any effective organization. Like 
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most such movements, they never reached the necessary activation 
energy to create new social institutions of interpretation that would 
have allowed the movement to consolidate the gains from its period 
of mass possession.43 
The chaos that overtook the God Worshipers by 1849 thus closely 
resembled similar movements. I will discuss later the numerous 
attempts to silence competing voices within the movement. The 
situation grew so bad that the followers asked Hong to differentiate 
true and false possessions, and to judge "the spirits according to the 
truth of the doctrine" (Hamberg, 1854:46). Only he could see 
through the conflicting claims to divine truth. The really remark-
able thing was their ability to overcome the dissension without 
falling completely apart. Possession cults that attain any long-term 
political organization must always eliminate the dangers of too 
many voices. They desaturate mass possession by creating and 
controlling new interpretive communities. Yet while overcoming 
the disadvantages of free possession, they often also lose the 
advantages. 
Gaining Control 
One possibility is to ban possession entirely, controlling interpreta-
tion instead through a priesthood or other institution that can keep 
religion under the control of the movement leadership. For example, 
the Palau Modekngei leaders - a case I have already cited for the 
success of their mass possession - stopped acting as spirit mediums 
after the initial organizational period (Leonard, 1973). Instead they 
interpreted whistling sounds made by their dead founder. With a 
monopoly on access to the sounds, the leaders could freely interpret 
these whistles however they preferred. The new form of communi-
cation with the founder immediately gave the leadership an 
effective means to control interpretation, even if it lost the excite-
ment of spirit possession. 
The Catholic Church of the fifth century apparently went through 
a similar process. By this time, the Church was the prosperous and 
official religion of the Holy Roman Empire. Its theologians reinter-
preted their chiliastic texts as spiritual allegory, saw the Millennium 
already realized in the Church itself, and discouraged any further 
direct.divine inspiration (Cohn, 1957:13--14). 
The Taborite heresy experienced a comparable transformation in 
the early fifteenth century. Inspired by possession, prophets 
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preached the imminence of the millennium, leading to the usual 
cultural innovations and transcended social boundaries. Their 
followers abandoned their home communities for a new life where 
traditional norms and laws would no longer govern their behavior, 
and all goods were held in common. Yet as soon as this new society 
began to take concrete form at Tabor, inspired prophecy began to 
give way to institutionalized control over religious interpretation: 
The ideology of the movement - chiliasm - could not become the 
ideology of a society, and when Tabor began to come to terms 
with the facts of ordinary life in the world, she began to move 
away from the chiliast inspiration. Thus, almost as soon as the 
Taborites returned to South Bohemia, after the defense of Prague 
in the summer of 1420, we find evidence of what may be called a 
party of order, which promoted ideas and institutions of stability 
against the chiliast insistence on tension, enthusiasm, and total 
dynamism (Kaminsky, 1962:171). 
Like the Palauans, the Taborites settled the divisive problems of 
multiple voices by ending spirit possession. And like the Taiping, 
they accomplished it hand in hand with a radical transformation of 
their social organization. 
Each of these movements gave up the powerful appeal of 
possession as a means to recruit and retain the enthusiasm of 
followers. They substituted conventional means of political control 
over a civil population for the inspired enthusiasm of a prophet-led 
following. Other movements have instead restrained and controlled 
possession rather than eliminating it entirely. They hoped to 
channel its powerful appeal, while not falling victim to its dangers 
of collapsing under the weight of too many alternate prophets. 
Many African and Pacific societies have controlled possession 
cults with direct political influence, where the mediums' power ties 
directly to the chiefs.44 Some ancient states also helped maintain 
legitimacy with the help of possessed mediums. The best known 
case is the Delphic oracle. Here, the masters of the cult controlled 
interpretation by keeping people from direct access to the medium. 
People communicated with the oracle and received interpreted 
responses only through the intercession of the Prophetes and 
Hosioi (Dodds, 1951:72-73). Limited and controlled as it was, the 
Delphic oracle could not have held the broad appeal of cults 
featuring mass festivals of possession and prophecy, but it must 
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have retained some of the charisma of possession for those privi-
leged to address it. 
The ancient Chinese state also relied on apparently possessed 
mediums. Direct access to heaven was an important proof of 
legitimacy, and the Shang Dynasty king was the chief medium 
(Chang, 1983:45). Shang oracles existed primarily at the court, and 
relied on the use of bronze ritual objects. Bronze was a crucial form 
of wealth monopolized by the court, and the king thus held tight 
control over mediumistic contact with spirits (Chang, 1983:97). The 
Guoyu, a fourth-century BC text, has a possible reference to the 
concentration of the right to communicate with the spirits in the 
hands of the kings, at a time (supposedly the twenty-sixth century 
BC) when "virtue was in disorder'': 
Men and spirits became intermingled, with each household 
indiscriminately performing for itself the religious observances 
which had hitherto been conducted by the shamans. As a 
consequence, men lost their reverence for the spirits, the spirits 
violated the rules of men, and natural calamities arose. Hence the 
successor of [the current emperor] charged Ch'ung, Governor of 
the South, to handle the affairs of heaven in order to determine 
the proper place of the spirits, and Li, Governor of Fire, to handle 
the affairs of Earth in order to determine the proper places of men. 
And such is what is meant by cutting the communication between 
heaven and earth (Bodde, 1961, quoted in Chang, 1983:44-45). 
From this point on, only the imperial court controlled access to 
heaven. Here again, central political control required limiting the 
independent power of mediums, sacrificing the enthusiastic support 
that possession cults can create for the stability that state control 
required. Much like the Taiping several millennia later, the social 
transformations of state formation accompanied a new kind of 
control over possession - thinning and defanging the dangers of 
too many possessed voices. 
The American Shakers offer one of the few cases where we can see 
in action the political consolidation of the right to interpret by 
blunting the dangers of spirit possession. While still in England, 
Ann Lee rose to the leadership of a small millenia! sect called 
Shakers because of their frequent trances. Her claim to authority 
rested on powerful visions she had received while in prison for 
"profaning the Sabbath;" she had realized that only souls who had 
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freed themselves from "the works of natural generation" and the 
"gratifications of lust'' could follow Christ in the world to come 
(Desroche, 1971:29). Another vision in 1774 (and probably conflicts 
within the movement over her new direction) led to Mother Ann's 
emigration to the colonies with eight followers, where they created a 
radically new social life. 
The trances of Mother Ann and her followers helped form the 
distinctive social and cultural patterns of this celibate and commu-
nal sect. Not surprisingly, each period of Shaker revival saw an 
increase in possession trance alongside an increase in followers. Yet 
the Shaker leadership already frowned on trance by the end of the 
eighteenth century. They replaced their thickly saturated and 
charismatic trance dancing with far thinner dancing in formal 
patterns. This occurred just over a decade after the sect had 
gathered into its communal form, again showing the close ties 
between interpretive control and social transformation (Desroche, 
1971:117). By 1794, the Shakers felt that the period of inspiration had 
ended, and that they had entered a new phase (Desroche, 1971:115). 
One reason for the reaction against possession trance must have 
been the competing divinely sanctioned claims to inherit Shaker 
leadership (Desroche, 1971:218); the new leadership moved to 
prevent this problem of too many authoritative voices from recur-
ring. Some possession did continue through this time, however, and 
threatened the central leadership again in the Great Revival of 1837-
1847. Revelations supported various sides in internal disputes, 
including an especially bitter one over vegetarianism. Yet the 
central leadership already had enough control that they held the 
potential threat within bounds. Conveniently enough, the leaders 
took control by validating "a revelation from Mother Ann in which 
the founder declared that she would have no 'gift' for any of her 
children except those who lived in perfect union with the ministry 
and the elders. The clever trick was, of course, to draw out of 
prophecy itself a means of neutralizing its own effect on the 
believers" (Desroche, 1971:106). Finally, "gifts" of revelations 
ceased entirely in the group. 
Possession cults thus have an internal dynamic that leads them 
into new forms, which in turn have new dynamics. The very 
qualities that give them a powerful potential to become social 
movements make the consolidation and organization of these 
movements truly precarious. As they move to resolve their pro-
blems by institutionalizing or prohibiting possession, they create 
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new kinds of limits on their organizational prospects and political 
structures. In every case, social transformation, political consolida-
tion and religious interpretation are inseparable. Each case also 
makes clear just how difficult the transition to new interpretive 
communities always is. The few movements that did not simply 
collapse underwent drastic changes in organization as they sacri-
ficed the excitement of mass possession. Hammering a dominant 
interpretation out of multivocalic enthusiasm poses a major politi-
cal, social, and cultural challenge. Let me return now to the God 
Worshipers, who had to face these problems squarely by the end of 
1849. The God Worshipers were unusual both because they 
succeeded in building a strong political movement out of such a 
shifting base, and because they continued to use spirit possession, 
but in an entirely new way. 
BUILDING A STATE AND PRECIPITATING AN 
INTERPRETATION 
The God Worshipers' spirit possessions, for all their thick appeal, 
threatened to tear the movement apart in 1849 through the 
"disorder and dissension" that Hamberg described (1854:45). 
Hong's return to the area in 1849 and the local request to cull the 
true from the false gods, at last began to resolve the internal 
dissension. At this point Hong made one of the most crucial steps 
in the movement's development- he limited all future possessions 
only to Yang Xiuqing as God and Xiao Chaogui as Jesus. Only their 
possessions had been genuinely divine; all the others were false or 
inspired by imps and devils. From this time on, the leadership 
assumed increasing political control over possession, continuing to 
affirm Yang as the only true vehicle for possessions from God, and 
Xiao as the only one for Jesus. 
In some ways, Hong Xiuquan's (and presumably Feng Yunshan's) 
affirmation of possession seems surprising. Spirit possession, after 
all, had no part in Hong's initial ideology. When he returned in 
1849, he had recently spent several months with Issachar Roberts in 
Canton. While Roberts himself, with his revivalist background, 
surely accepted possession by the Holy Ghost, such performances 
apparently had no part in his Canton mission (Wagner, 1982:11-17). 
Furthermore, Hong was embracing a very local form of possession 
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that must have been rather foreign to someone with his background, 
and embracing as well two local leaders with little education from 
poor families - men very different from hopeful scholars like Hong, 
Feng and the other original converts. Most important of all, he was 
acceding to the particular reading of the God Worshipers that Yang 
and Xiao had promoted, a reading that explicitly pushed the 
movement toward rebellion. Out of the saturated mess that the 
local people had made of his original Christianity, Hong now 
accepted a new line of precipitation that redirected the movement 
from his initial concern with religion alone to political change and 
the overthrow of the dynasty. Why did Hong choose this course that 
cast the die of revolt? 
For several years the concrete events involving the God Wor-
shipers had made their self-interpretation as rebellion increasingly 
reasonable, even though rebellion had not yet become the dominant 
interpretation. In part, the early successes of nearby rebels must 
have emphasized the weakness of the state and made revolt look 
plausible to the followers. Beginning in 1847, just after Feng's arrest 
and the first mass possessions, major uprisings shook several parts 
of east-central Guangxi. Chen Agui took control over the area 
between the Xun and Qian rivers, and Zhang Jiaxiang had united 
numerous Triad groups in a major uprising in Hengzhou (Li, 
1981:139). 
At the same time, the God Worshipers increasingly discovered 
that purely religious acts nevertheless brought political conse-
quences. Their destruction of popular temples in 1846-1847 had 
angered a number of people, including some members of the local 
elite, particularly a local degree-holder named Wang Zuoxin. After 
the God Worshipers foiled his attempt to arrest Feng with the local 
militia in 1847, Wang petitioned the district officials early the next 
year, asking them to charge Feng with planning a rebellion. There is 
no evidence for actual plans to rebel at this stage; instead Wang 
used a standard technique for bringing the state in on his side - he 
accused his enemies of political heterodoxy. The magistrate refused 
to act at the time, but Feng was finally imprisoned for a while later 
that year with the help of Wang's militia. Wang Zuoxin continued to 
harass the God Worshipers from that point on. Thus even from 1847, 
outside forces had begun to define the God Worshipers as a political 
movement. This external definition of the group as an opposition 
helped shape them into one, especially as they found one of their 
top leaders in jail. In spite of themselves, they had little option but to 
96 Taiping Rebellion 
respond politically by opposing the local militia and its elite 
leadership. 
At some point in 1848, the idea of Hong assuming the imperial 
throne began to float in the movement, receiving a kind of support 
from the possessions of Yang and Xiao. Late in 1848 three followers 
petitioned Jesus (possessing Xiao) for permission for Hong to 
assume the Golden Dragon Throne. The idea apparently took Jesus 
by surprise, because he stalled and told the three to return later and 
ask God (Yang). Unfortunately, we have no record of God's 
response, but in numerous possessions afterwards, Jesus clearly 
said that Hong could not yet assume imperial trappings (Wang, 
1985:202-203). Jesus certainly promoted the idea that Hong would 
be an emperor; the timing of the claim was the only question. At 
roughly the same time, Jesus began to talk about who the generals 
would be when the Taiping era began (Wang, 1985:193). These were 
among Xiao's earliest possessions, and Jesus thus interpreted the 
movement as a nascent rebellion right from the beginning. At the 
time, however, his voice remained only one among many in the 
jumble of possessed interpretations. 
This particular line of interpretation must have appealed to Hong 
in several ways, in spite of the departures from his original 
expectations for the movement. First, the move to politics could 
still be consistent with Hong's original Christianity. Both the 
millenia! streak in Christianity and Hong's vision could support 
the idea that a new Kingdom of God on earth would have to 
accompany the religious transformation of China. The re-reading 
of imps and devils from false icons and false gods to the Manchu 
government required only a small step. Imps and devils, whether 
human or supernatural, stood in the way of a Christian China. 
Second, Hong apparently enjoyed the idea of being a real king. In 
1849 he often asked Jesus if the time had yet come when he could 
wear the dragon robe (Wang, 1985:203). Finally, both Yang and Xiao 
had created sizable personal followings within the movement by 
using their local ties and their charismatic possessions. As Hong 
moved to end the chaos threatening the movement by the end of 
1849, he could not afford to alienate such large factions. 
The most important key to Hong's settling on a single interpreta-
tion was the dissension and chaos that threaten all such possession 
movements. By the end of 1849, Hong either had to force a 
precipitation or accept the collapse of the movement. Faced with 
such a decision, Hong bowed to the many influences that combined 
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to make rebellion the most plausible potential line of interpretation, 
and asserted a radically new kind of control over meaning. As 
uncontrolled possession lost its mandate, and as Yang and Xiao 
gained their monopoly on divine interpretation, the entire move-
ment underwent a complete metamorphosis as it created a new 
interpretive community. 
Consolidating Interpretive Control 
Merely announcing new lines of interpretation did not automatic-
ally create control: that would also require a new social organiza-
tion. The reorganization of the God Worshipers into the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom required working through a newly forged 
ideology, creating new social structures, and silencing alternative 
interpretations by force. Spirit possession records from late 1849 and 
1850 show a sudden surge in attacks on alternative mediums. The 
leaders forced the first alternate medium out of the congregation 
shortly after Hong ganted interpretive control to Yang and Xiao 
(Hamberg, 1854:46). They could act on such a condemnation only 
after Hong had sorted the divine possessions from the impish ones. 
Jesus, speaking through Xiao, exposed many cases of evil posses-
sions. Late in 1849, Jesus descended to earth because "the following 
did not share a single heart." Hong said to him, "Various celestial 
spirits are descending, and always aid the imps with their false 
hearts. Those who aid imps are themselves imps. Heavenly Elder 
Brother, the Heavenly Father sent you as the Savior Lord of all 
nations, and you are also my own blood brother. Please forward this 
petition to my Heavenly Father: do not let the celestial spirits 
speak." The same day, Wei Changhui (another top leader) again 
asked Jesus to intercede to stop celestial imps in one of the local 
villages. Jesus agreed to both requests (Wang, 1985:201). A similar 
case from the same period involved a woman named Huang Ermei, 
who came into Xiao's presence followed by a demon whom Xiao 
vanquished in a fight (Wang, 1985:200-201). 
In 1850, Jesus also acted several times to control "lies" (luanyen) 
spread by some of the followers. The "lies" could well have been 
alternative possessed voices like the celestial spirits, but were in any 
case competing interpretations of the movement. In some cases the 
perpetrators suffered beatings of a thousand strokes and other fatal 
punishments (Wang, 1985:218). In other cases a threat sufficed, as 
when Jesus promised the death sentence to a medium if the 
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"demon" who possessed him ever returned (Wang, 1985:201). 
Interpretive control meant silencing other voices by any means 
necessary. 
Yang and Xiao consolidated their personal positions at the same 
time as they solidified control over interpretation. A number of their 
early possessions seemed quite transparently self-serving. For 
example, when Xiao demanded that Hong Xiuquan recognize him 
as Jesus during one of his earliest possessions, he was already 
creating the grounds for Hong's final valorization of Xiao and 
Yang a year later (Wang, 1985:192). In addition, when Xiao/Jesus 
first spoke of rebellion in late 1848, he named only himself, Yang, 
and Feng Yunshan as top generals, clearly serving his own 
possession faction at the expense of other leaders like Wei 
Changhui or Shi Dakai (Wang, 1985:193).46 
God acted much like Jesus in this, although we have many fewer 
records of Yang's earliest possessions. In early 1851, for example, 
God again demanded recognition of his genuine presence through 
Yang's body, and reaffirmed the new Taiping authority structure: 
The Heavenly Father instructed the multitude, saying, "Do you 
all truly recognize your Heavenly Father and your Heavenly 
Elder Brother?" The multitude replied, ''We truly recognize the 
Heavenly Father and the Heavenly Elder Brother." The Heavenly 
Father again said, ''Do you all truly recognize your Sovereign 
[Hong Xiuquan]?" The multitude replied, ''We truly recognize 
our Sovereign." The Heavenly Father said, '1 have sent your 
Sovereign down into the world to become the T'ien Wang 
[Heavenly King], and every word he utters is a heavenly 
command. You must be obedient" (Tianming Zhaozhishu, in 
Michael, 1966-1971:99). 
Yang and Xiao did not hesitate to consolidate their own positions, 
and simultaneously the new institutions of interpretation, by 
criticizing even other recognized leaders. In 1850, Jesus had pre-
vented Feng Yunshan and Wei Changhui from carrying out one of 
their plans, scolding them for making Him bother with things no 
more important than fingernails (Wang 1985:195). 
The ability to expose criminals and traitors further reinforced the 
divine authority of the two mediums and strengthened the new 
interpretive institutions. These miraculous exposures also began 
around 1850, just as the movement transformed itself. I have 
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already mentioned God's exposure of the Triad bandit and faithless 
ally Big-head Goat (Tianqing Daoli Shu, in Michael, 1966-1971:375). 
The best documented case occurred in late 1851, when God 
suddenly exposed a follower named Zhou Xineng as a traitorous 
demon (Tianfu Xiafan Zhaoshu, in Michael, 1966-1971:87-97). The 
Taiping leaders were on the verge of promoting Zhou to office when 
God dramatically appeared to order his arrest. Zhou had brought a 
group of 190 followers to join the main Taiping camp, but had to 
enroll all but three in the enemy camp as a subterfuge. God exposed 
him instead as a turncoat and spy, first suggesting that the loss of 
the followers to the enemy was surrender not subterfuge, and then 
revealing details of spying that only an omniscient being could 
know. God knew all, from secret meetings to reconnaissance of 
Taiping defenses and assassination plans. The Taiping executed 
Zhou, his wife and son, and his demon accomplices. 
Jesus had performed a similar coup a few months earlier, 
exposing a friend of Luo Dagang who had stolen some jewelry 
from Luo's wife after she died. He also received a death sentence, 
although Jesus allowed him to appeal the sentence to God (Wang, 
1985:218-219). The dynastic camp reported another case from late in 
1851, when the Taiping occupied its first city, Yongan, and was 
besieged by the Qing armies. Yao Ying, who was Judicial Commis-
sioner of Guangxi (but would be demoted to hardship duty in 
Taiwan for failing to stop the Taiping), wrote in a letter that 
Commander Wu sent the bandit leaders a letter that concealed an 
explosive charge. The bandits realized that the letter was rather 
heavy, saw through the plot, and threw the letter far off, where it 
exploded. The bandits cunningly claimed that the Heavenly 
Father had descended, warning of the explosive. Otherwise how 
could they have known? The followers believe this deeply, taking 
it as truth (Yao, 1867, juan 1:23-24). 
These powerful reaffirmations of God's and Jesus's power conti-
nued on occasion as long as the two mediums lived (e.g., Tianqing 
Daoli Shu, in Michael, 1966-1971:385). 
In concert with the new Taiping transformation of the social 
world after 1849, God and Jesus also interceded directly in family 
life. In late 1849, Jesus had sentenced an adulterous couple to 140 
strokes for the man and 100 strokes for the ''lascivious wife" (Wang, 
1985:219). Jesus also gave frequent lectures to various people on 
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proper family behavior. In 1850 He grilled someone named Li Dali 
about why he did not look after his wife better. When Hong's family 
arrived from Guangdong later that year, Jesus individually instruc-
ted all the women on proper and obedient behavior (Wang, 
1985:220--221). 
Within a very short period of time the Taiping had consolidated 
powerful control over religious interpretation, precipitating new 
social relations of interpretation along with new dogma. The 
transformation had created order from chaos. Yet the change also 
went far beyond the personal positions of Yang and Xiao. While the 
dangers of uncontrolled possession provided a key catalyst, once 
the new interpretive control began it cascaded into all aspects of the 
movement, creating a newly detailed ideology and drawing clear 
lines of social power that would strive to keep the new ideas in 
control while it pursued a rebellion. 
State-Building and Institutional Control 
Once the Taiping created itself as a rebellion, some earlier acts lost 
their complex ambiguity, just as spirit possession had lost its 
multiple possibilities. For example, the Taiping resumed destroying 
temples in 1850, after a hiatus of over two years. The earlier attacks 
had concentrated on morally questionable temples, at least from 
Hong's point of view, and had been satisfied when the defeated god 
recognized God's greater power. Now, however, the group attacked 
the core community temples - the Three Generations temples - that 
they had carefully avoided in the past, and then began utterly 
destroying every temple they found (Guangxi Shifan Xueyuan . . . , 
1981:273). The destruction of major Three Generations temples in 
Xinxu and Caicun in 1850 made unambiguously political claims. 
The earlier attacks had allowed multiple interpretations: Christian 
iconoclasm for some, a test of God's might for others, an attack on 
immorality for still others, and a political act for only a few. Yet now 
they attacked a clearly moral god in the most important community 
temple, which housed the local militia; this was a religious rebellion. 
From then on, local witnesses would lament the Taiping's appar-
ently blind destruction of all temples they encountered. 
At the same time, the Taiping solidified its newly unified 
interpretations with a massive publishing program. They con-
trolled the dissemination of knowledge by publishing only care-
fully selected and edited texts, just as they controlled divine 
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inspiration by commandeering possession for the top leaders. 
Although handwritten copies of Hong's writings apparently circu-
lated in Xunzhou (Jian, 1958:1744), the first printing of Taiping texts 
occurred only with the capture of Yongan in 1851 and the official 
organization of a Taiping state. Yang and Xiao, often speaking with 
their divine voices, played a crucial role in editing even the most key 
texts, including Hong's own description and interpretation of his 
original dream vision. Indeed, Taiping descriptions of this seminal 
event seem to have changed several times. Wang Qingcheng 
(1985:213-214) describes several sessions in 1848 where the posses-
sed Xiao supplied details of the dream that Hong had supposedly 
forgotten. 
The new publishing program began to chisel Taiping religious 
ideas in stone (or at least to carve them in woodblocks). In 1852, for 
example, they published a set of fill-in-the-blank official prayer 
forms. Communication with Heaven had thus thinned by this time 
from the uncontrolled enthusiasms of mass possession to formalized 
repetition of standardized prayer. By publishing everything from 
educational texts to travel passes to the Bible (complete with Hong's 
annotations) in the next few years, the Taiping attempted to exercise 
full control over information and interpretation, ending the inter-
pretive free-for-all of the late 1840s. 
This rationalizing ordering of the movement covered all areas. In 
1850, as part of the ongoing transformation, the leaders announced 
and began to use an elaborate structure of official titles, flags, robes 
and offices (Jian, 1973:45; Mao et al., 1980:43-44). Hong Xiuquan 
already had a yellow imperial robe in 1850, although Jesus would 
still not let him wear it in public (Mao, 1989:33-34). His robe was 
just the tip of a vast bureaucratic iceberg, however. The elaborate 
military system that suddenly crystallized in 1850 spelled out every 
detail. For example: "A corps general commands five colonels; 
altogether he commands 13,125 men. His flag is four and one-half 
feet in length and width" (Taiping Junmu, in Michael, 1966-
1971:133). The system got its final polish during the long occupa-
tion of Yongan in 1851-1852, when the major leaders (including 
Yang and Xiao) received their official ranks as kings. The elaborate 
system of titles published in 1852 included details like: 
From colonel to sergeant, all are commanders of troops; therefore 
their sons shall be addressed as Sons of the Commanders; they are 
also clean and undefiled; therefore their daughters shall be 
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addressed as Snow, for snow is cle3.n, white in color, and lovely to 
look upon. 
Chancelloresses, women senior secretaries, women commanders, 
and women generals shall be addressed as Chaste Person, 
because chastity in a woman is most honorable ... 
When one royal father-in-law addresses another royal father-in-
law, they shall address each other according to their precedence 
of birth, and call each other Royally Related Elder Brother, or 
Royally Related Younger Brother (Taiping Lizhi, slightly revised 
from Michael, 1966--1971:126--127). 
The detail goes on and on, as pompous bureaucracy replaced 
uncontrolled possession. All of this systematizing formed part of a 
total social reorganization in 1850. The Taiping actually began to use 
these ranks and titles at the same time as they resettled their 
followers in sex-segregated camps in the town of Jintian. 
This chapter began with the God Worshipers facing an interpre-
tive problem - the great multiplicity of competing voices formed an 
irresolvable mass of indeterminate meanings, and threatened to tear 
the movement apart. The answer could not lie simply in coming up 
with the right interpretation, or in convincing through the power of 
logical reasoning. The very nature of such overloaded situations 
undercuts such answers. Instead, the Taiping had to erect an 
entirely new social system, creating institutions of interpretation, 
from controlled spirit possession to military hierarchy, that could 
allow them to impose a single dominant interpretation. Unlike 
many comparable movements, the Taiping actually succeeded. 
The result was a transformation in 1850 every bit as radical as the 
real chemical change from saturation to precipitation. Spirit posses-
sion had made the new social organization possible, and the new 
social organization in turn utterly transformed spirit possession. 
The change happened quickly, but not easily. It required an 
enormous range of action, from creating a monopoly over critical 
knowledge (by publishing texts and controlling communication 
with Heaven), to a complete social redefinition (in the creation of 
new ranks and titles, and in physical resettlement on the ground), to 
a full range of punishment of dissenting voices (where God and 
Jesus met alternative interpretations with humiliation, beatings, or 
executions). In the middle of 1849, the Taiping had been a wild 
hodge-podge of possessed voices. Just over a year later, they were a 
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powerful rebellion with clear leaders, a new religious orthodoxy, 
and a sharply defined social and military organization. This new 
unification could only occur with the social transformations that 
created new interpretive communities and institutions. 
NEW POWERS AND NEW PROBLEMS 
Part of the power of the new system lay in its local roots. In contrast 
to the ideas Hong had brought to Guangxi in 1844, the new Taiping 
of 1850 had become sensible in local terms. God now.spoke to local 
issues of power, ethnicity, curing and spirit possession. Even more 
importantly, the new control over interpretation itself brought major 
benefits to the Taiping movement. Above all, the change removed 
the immediate danger of internal collapse, even as it added the 
eventual dangers of rebellion. In doing so, the movement developed 
a structure of authority that would allow it to make decisions and 
undertake actions effectively. 
Yang's ability to speak for God, and to determine correct 
interpretations of those speeches, helped the Taiping to make 
strategic decisions quickly and confidently. The possessed Yang, 
for example, exhorted the troops to break out of the siege of Yongan, 
and led to the stunningly successful drive through central China to 
Nanjing (Tianming Zhaozhi Shu, in Michael, 1966-1971:109). God, 
speaking through Yang, often issued direct military orders, provi-
ding an unquestionable line of authority that did not exist before 
Yang and Xiao monopolized possession. Just as the early mass 
possession episodes had helped build a popular following for the 
God Worshipers in Guangxi, centralized control over possession 
gave the Taiping stronger possibilities for coordinated action and 
ended the dissension that typifies movements based on broader 
opportunities for possession. 
Yet even though they had created the essential prerequisites for 
political action, the transformed movement also experienced a new 
dynamic, whose problems would prove just as serious as the earlier 
chaos. The continued use of spirit possession itself posed one of the 
greatest difficulties, even though the early possessions had given the 
God Worshipers enormous advantages in recruiting, and the new 
monopoly on possession had created a strong structure of authority. 
As the movement expanded out of its backwater base in Guangxi, its 
heavy reliance on very local possession traditions became a fetter. 
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Spirit possession itself probably found a more skeptical audience in 
the sophisticated population of the lower Yangzi valley core around 
Nanjing. Strongly local traditions like leading other souls up to 
Heaven would have had even less appeal. In so far as people 
outside the leadership had contact with Taiping possession in the 
later years (and they did not have much), the practice could have 
provided very little legitimacy for the movement. The loss of 
possession as a popular organizing tool, and the inability of the 
movement to adopt and adapt local traditions the way it had in 
Guangxi, help explain the general lack of a true mass base after the 
Taiping left Guangxi. The Taiping borrowing of aboriginal techni-
ques of possession, and its plausibility in an area used to very odd 
deities, doomed its potential religious appeal outside Guangxi. 
As the movement developed over the next decade, dominating 
central areas of China under Yang's de facto leadership, the nature 
of possession continued to change. Xiao had died in battle in 1852, 
silencing Jesus's voice forever. Yang, however, continued to speak 
for God up until his murder by other Taiping leaders in 1856. With 
his monopoly on the voice of God, Yang's possessions gradually lost 
many of the radical ideals of the early God Worshipers while their 
Confucian content increased. Even though the earlier Taiping had 
banned Confucian texts, God in 1854 affirmed that the classics had 
many positive points, expounding on "the True Way of filial piety 
toward relatives and loyalty toward rulers" (Wang, 1985:215-216). 
The more Yang institutionalized his power, the more the Taiping 
began to resemble just another dynasty. 
Yang also began to communicate with God in ways that totally 
sacrificed the charisma of possession, but that left interpretation 
even more firmly in his own hands. In particular, he began to have 
dream visions in Nanjing, which he could interpret at his leisure 
and according to his own whims. Yang thus came to dominate 
communication with Heaven through techniques that no longer 
involved large numbers of followers or any of the enthusiasm of 
possession, but that allowed him to claim final authority on any 
issue (Xing, 1981; Wang, 1985:222-223). 
At the same time, Yang's possessed pronouncements grew more 
and more obviously self-serving. In an infamous case in 1853, after 
the Taiping capital had already been established at Nanjing, God 
publicly berated Hong for mistreating women officials and being 
· too lenient with his son. He sentenced Hong to forty blows, 
although Hong was so contrite that God agreed not to carry out 
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the punishment (Tianfu Xiafan Zhaoshu, in Michael, 1966--1971:198--
220). 
Yang's final act of possessed hubris came in 1856, when God 
announced that Yang should be addressed as wansui (Ten Thousand 
Years), a term that had been reserved for Hong and that tradition-
ally had honored the Emperor alone. When asked how Hong should 
now be addressed, God lightly suggested a ludicrous neologism, 
One Hundred Million Years Qian, 1973:290). The subordinate 
Taiping kings, quite possibly in consultation with Hong, saw this 
as the beginning of a coup. They killed Yang, his household and his 
bodyguard, leaving thousands of corpses and a badly tom move-
ment. Although the Taiping hung on in Nanjing for eight more 
years after this slaughter, it never really recovered from the internal 
decimation. Just as the early movement could not tolerate too many 
voices of God, the later movement found that it could not tolerate 
the structural split in its leadership - between Hong, who was 
himself God's son, and Yang, who spoke with God's voice and 
authority. While Yang as man remained subordinate to Hong, Yang 
as God stood supreme. 
By centralizing and controlling communication with Heaven, the 
Taiping sacrificed popular participation in the ecstatic charisma of 
the large trance episodes that had characterized the early years of 
the movement. The immediate reality of the spirits for followers, 
and the convincing legitimacy offered by actually witnessing such 
ceremonies, had been lost to the movement, even as_ possession 
became a powerful (and eventually self-destructive) political tool for 
Yang Xiuqing. By the time the Taiping settled in Nanjing, spirit 
possession had become Yang's personal tool for consolidating 
power among the leadership. His increasing reliance on dreams 
and his monopoly on possession opened him to the accusation that 
tends to accompany professional mediums anywhere - faking. His 
murder resulted in part from the loss of legitimacy of his spirit 
possessions, which had become a problem from the moment the 
Taiping centralized control over possession. The very act of institu-
tionalizing control over possessed interpretation created the poss-
ibility that the possessions were mere artifice. While even believers 
agree that some possessions can be faked, the public possession of 
many people carries a kind of convincing charisma that Yang 
Xiuqing's monopoly sacrificed. Accusing Yang of faking under-
mined the entire movement, while accusing a single medium 
among many makes little difference. 
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The routinization of other aspects of the early movement similarly 
diluted their power. The concentration of all the early miraculous 
cures onto Yang as the Redeemer of Sickness, for instance, simply 
removed such cures from the daily repertoire of the movement. 
While the title appeared over and over again after the movement left 
Guangxi, no evidence points to any actual curing. A direct proof of 
God's power had devolved into a mere formalism. 
The other major early proof of God's power- temple destruction-
continued unabated throughout the movement, but it also lost its 
original potency. What once appeared as God's challenge to the 
local gods simply became an act of military destruction. Attacks on 
temples no longer formed part of an effort to make a positive claim 
for Christianity; they were just attacks on temples. The new religion 
itself saw very little propagation on the ground after the Guangxi 
period (Li and Liu, 1989:1-36). The failure of the Taiping as a 
religious movement outside of Guangxi also helps to explain why 
no trace of the religion remained after the military destruction of the 
rebellion, in great contrast to the White Lotus ideology that no 
military victory ever managed to stamp out. 
CONCLUSION 
In some ways, the Taiping pursued a Weberian path of rationalizing 
authority, at least from a situation with very little established 
authority to a clear case of charismatic authority. Any form of 
authority had largely broken down during the period of the 
uncontrolled spirit possessions. By the 1850s, however, they had 
imposed a new order. Like Weber's ideal type, the Taiping had 
charismatic leadership with supernatural properties, followers who 
lived in a communal order under the leader, and an economy based 
on gifts and booty more than pursuit of a regular income (Weber, 
1978:242-245). They had the succession problems that Weber would 
have expected in the struggle with Yang Xiuqing. While a few areas 
grew more routinized, especially military and official ranks, the 
system remained primarily charismatic. Weber did not directly 
discuss this kind of transformation from no authority to charismatic 
authority, but it seems broadly consistent with his general push 
from less to more "rational" authority. 
Yet for all Weber's insights, a focus only on an evolution toward 
more rational authority bypasses some of the most critical dynamics 
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of the early God Worshipers. In fact, one of the movement's most 
crucial prerequisites was the initial move away from rational 
authority as the people of Xunzhou made Hong's ideas their own, 
changing them fundamentally in the process. Running Weber in 
reverse, they took over Hong's original religion, overwhelming it 
with new interpretive directions based on their own lives. By its 
nature, such overloading also undercut existing authority by leaving 
meaning up for grabs. The possessions of 1849 reached the zenith of 
anti-rationalization, where each new voice suggested a new ultimate 
meaning, but the multitude of competing voices thwarted any single 
unification by undercutting all authoritative institutions of inter-
pretation. 
While reading Weber quite properly suggests the organizational 
disadvantages of such a situation, it also leads us to underplay the 
advantages of saturation, which had been at the core of the God 
Worshipers' success. That initial hijacking of Hong's Christianity 
built the movement through legitimizing and emotionally powerful 
trance performances, by transcending conventional social and 
cultural boundaries in direct speech from the gods, and in the 
ability to make God sensible locally through curing and competi-
tion with other gods. The surfeit of meaning and inevitable break-
down of authority that accompanied it made the Taiping rebellion 
possible; the effervescent energy of overflowing meanings pulled 
followers to the movement. At the same time, of course, the 
situation planted the seeds of its own destruction in divisiveness 
and resistance to any new structures of authority. 
More than just a push toward greater rationalization, a constant 
tension between overloading meaning and rationalizing simplifica-
tion drove the system. As meaning became more heavily loaded and 
social relations of interpretation weakened throughout the 1840s, 
the threat to the survival of the movement created a powerful 
incentive for imposing a single dominant view, even as new 
followers flocked in. The Taiping surmounted this first level of 
difficulty by channeling interpretation through the mouths of two 
top leaders. Yet this thinned-out resolution soon showed its own 
new limitations, shackling the movement to a religious ideology 
with little appeal outside of its base area, and finally contributing to 
insoluble dissension among the Taiping leaders. 
Perhaps most important of all, the Taiping experience suggests 
that the very process of centralizing interpretive authority creates 
new free space for alternative interpretations.47 As interpretation 
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united around a single voice, systematically impoverishing the rich 
and noisy mixture of possible interpretations in order to establish 
control, it also threw away the power and conviction of the earlier 
situation. Personal experience made the possessions and cures of the 
early God Worshipers convincingly legitimate. As soon as those 
wild early scenes paled into Yang's distant interpretations of his 
own dreams and formal enfeoffment as Redeemer of Sickness, 
official Taiping interpretation became open to doubt. 
Centralization of meaning inevitably accompanied centralization 
of authority as it created new social relations of interpretation. Yet 
that process itself created twin problems: thin and formalized 
interpretations lost their inherent power to convince, and the clear 
ties between political institution and official interpretation opened 
the possibility that leaders simply acted for their own benefit. These 
two problems killed Yang Xiuqing, as his speaking for God no 
longer convinced anyone, even among the original leaders, and his 
motives thus appeared cavalierly self-serving. New followers con-
tinued to join in great numbers after the movement was formalized, 
but we no longer see any evidence of religious enthusiasm, or even 
much basic understanding of Taiping religious principle among 
these newcomers. The complete disappearance of Taiping beliefs 
after their military defeat confirmed their inability to make imposed 
interpretations into the powerful recruiting tool that saturation had 
been. 
The Taiping movement thus suggests that the chaotic meaning 
and the move away from rational authority in the 1840s had 
important benefits as well as causing organizational problems, 
and that the later unification caused new problems even as it 
rationalized authority. The Taiping did not progress simply to 
better forms of organization. Instead it pushed and pulled against 
competing pressures to complicate and simplify interpretation. Each 
new phase created the conditions for the next transformation, and 
each transformation brought its own history that differentiated it 
from any earlier phase. Hong's original ideology of 1844 differed 
dramatically from the new one in 1850, in ways that tied in detail to 
the very local experience of the movement. Yet each saturation 
contained the seeds of a new precipitation and 'each precipitation 
opened new free spaces for saturation. 
The Taiping also suggests that overloading and simplifying 
meaning may occur through different processes. The multiplication 
of meanings can occur through a slow dissolution, much as Hong's 
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original Christianity gradually merged with local ideas in several 
steps over a number of years. The inevitable free space, where 
interpretive communities are weak, allows the continuous addition 
of new lines of interpretation and the possibility of leaving things 
uninterpreted. Unification around a single dominant interpretation, 
however, requires a massive investment of energy and may take 
place as a sudden transformation. Taiping metamorphosis into an 
elaborate ideology clearly articulated as rebellion was no simple 
cultural reinterpretation. Reinterpretation by enforcing a single 
reading required thorough social transformation as the new leader-
ship forcefully silenced opposition and forged new social relations 
of interpretive (and social) control. 
The Taiping rebellion fits anyone's definition of resistance. Yet 
this conclusion, which is so obvious in the clear vision of hindsight, 
should not mislead us into reading resistance into its earliest roots. 
The early God Worshipers in fact bring us directly back to the 
arguments about accommodation and resistance, to the complex 
realities of interpretation and institution, with which 1 began. From 
Hong's original vision through most of the 1840s, the God Wor-
shipers may have exemplified cultural difference, but resistance was 
only one of many potential readings. The Xunzhou region of 
Guangxi offered an extraordinarily free space for alternative inter-
pretations in the 1840s, with a weak state, plentiful bandits, ethnic 
strife, a strong tradition of spirit possession, and generally weak 
religious interpretive communities. Such massively free space 
created interpretive opportunities of all kinds, deluging the local 
world with a flood of possibilities by no means limited to active 
resistance. Even though Taiping claims about God and the brother-
hood of all questioned social boundaries, and therefore made a 
political interpretation plausible, it still remained only one pos-
sibility. 
That single reading as resistance became louder as Yang and Xiao 
expanded their influence in the late 1840s, but it could not dominate 
the movement until the multiple voices of spirit possession were 
silenced. The key transformations occurred very quickly in late 1849 
and 1850 with a massive mobilization of interpretive authority and 
social reorganization under the influence of looming internal chaos 
and external pressure. With the new interpretive authority, real 
resistance could begin. 
The early God Worshiper movement did not simply presage 
massive rural unrest. Its beginnings quite fundamentally resembled 
110 Taiping Rebellion 
other centers of complexly indeterminate meaning around the 
world, whose so-<:alled cultural resistance never erupted into a 
movement of any kind. The Taiping movement's differences from 
other such cases lay less in the content of that early mixture than in 
its ability to resolve the competing voices into a single chorus by 
forging new social relations of interpretation. 
As I now tum from the Taiping to a contemporary Taiwanese 
ghost temple, I will again begin with free space, multiple meanings, 
and centers of possible alternative interpretations. The apparently 
enormous differences between the two cases - one a shattering 
rebellion and the other a politically quiescent religious oddity -
should not disguise the fundamental similarity of the processes in 
both cases. For Taiwan, however, hindsight provides no benefits. In 
spite of many attempts to force a unified interpretation there, the 
solution still remains saturated, and any potential political resis-
tance remains unrealized. If the similarities help to reveal the nature 
of indeterminate meanings, the contrasts clarify the great difficulties 
of achieving interpretive control. 
Part III 
TAIWANESE GHOSTS 
7 
Hot and .Noisy Religion 
Overloaded cultural space that weathers any .push toward total 
control inevitably seems less important than a conflagration like the 
Taiping rebellion. Yet the lack of official decrees and bloodied 
spears should not disguise the importance of mundane life. The 
religious developments I will be discussing from Taiwan have 
issued no grand pronouncements, raised no political hopes, and 
forged no cannons. Resisting nothing, however, need not imply 
accepting everything. The early Taiping, after all, also resisted 
nothing. These chapters will concentrate on some apparently minor 
comers of Taiwanese culture, which nevertheless have much broad-
er implications for resistance, acquiescence, and the nature of 
indeterminate meaning. 
I leave aside the many daily acts of petty opposition that are not 
overloaded with meaning yet clearly resist. Feigned incompetence 
or stupidity is open to multiple interpretations if well performed, 
but stealing toilet paper or driving through a red light is not. Such 
mischief is important, but tends to be either idiosyncratic or 
routinized into minor acts over tangential issues, avoiding real 
confrontation. I concentrate instead on situations where interpreta-
tion and lines of opposition are far less clear, but the potential for 
large-scale organization may be much greater, as the Taiping 
rebellion showed. 
The origins of the Taiping movement showed the great import-
ance of free religious and social space in Guangxi in the 1840s, along 
with the inherent weakness of attempts at cultural domination 
under such circumstances. Taiwan's early history in some ways 
strongly resembles east-central Guangxi on the eve of the Taiping. 
Both were wild frontiers of China, with large aboriginal popula-
tions, endemic feuding among various Chinese ethnic groups and 
between Chinese and aborigines, local strongmen, and only a 
tenuous political hold by the central authorities. They even shared 
some economic features, like the production of charcoal, indigo and 
other mountain forest products. 
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Like peripheral Guangxi, Taiwan also fostered more than its share 
of revolt, and much of the violence was organized through religious 
channels. Taiwan averaged one rebellion every other year in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, nearly always organized through 
religious sworn brotherhoods (Hsu, 1980:84). In 1786-1788, Lin 
Shuangwen led thousands of rebels in the first known revolt led 
by the Triad Society (Tiandi Hui). They gained control over most of 
the settled part of the island within a few months, and the Qing had 
to send more than 100,000 troops to quell the rebellion (Cai, 1987:66-
122). Dai Wansheng led another rebellion, almost as large, in 1862-
1863, just as the Taiping rebellion was in its final throes. This one 
also had secret society and Triad leadership. 
As the nineteenth century wore on, however, Taiwan began to 
lose a little of its frontier turbulence. The island finally achieved 
provincial status in 1885, and the new governor attempted a host of 
modernizing reforms in administration, finance, transport and the 
military (Speidel, 1976). The really overpowering change, however, 
happened in 1895 when Japan forced China to cede the island. Local 
Taiwanese fought the Japanese up and down the island, often 
organizing through major community temples. Yet the resistance 
was patchy and disorganized. The Japanese crushed it, and often 
took retribution by burning temples. The occupying troops left no 
doubt that the era of rebellion and communal feuding, of organized 
violence in any hands but the government's, had now ended 
forever. Open resistance under the fifty years of Japanese occupa-
tion nearly always remained spontaneous, unorganized and small-
scale (Wang, 1980:6(}-138). 
China's Guomindang (Nationalist Party) government reclaimed 
Taiwan after World War D. In 1947 they powerfully reiterated the 
old Japanese message from 1895- the government would leave no 
room for local political ambition, and would tolerate no resistance. 
Popular unrest in 1947, which had its strongest origins in the 
domineering but incompetent new state, claimed perhaps 10,000-
20,000 Taiwanese lives. As in 1895, the government showed its 
intention to muzzle dissent with much authority and little mercy. 
The Communist military victories in 1949 caused the flight of the 
top state officials, the best of the Nationalist armed forces, and a 
good portion of the mainland economic elite to Taiwan. This 
marked the beginning of Taiwan's new economic path, but brought 
no change at all to the political straitjacket. Explicit resistance, as 
under the Japanese, remained a piecemeal and very dangerous 
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affair for decades. Only in the last few years has Taiwan again 
allowed space for significant political action from below, as Pre-
sident Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Ching-kuo] initiated a remarkable 
period of democratic reform shortly before his death. 
Under such circumstances, the relative political quiescence in 
Taiwan (until recently) need not necessarily imply happy accep-
tance of shared hegemonic politics and culture. The literature on 
cultural resistance implies that apparent cultural hegemonies are 
challenged everywhere, and the lack of open political space in 
twentieth-century Taiwan further suggests that such passive cultur-
al resistance may be especially vivid and resourceful. The more 
powerful the pressure, such views suggest, the more creative the 
response. 
Just as much of Taiwan's unrest took religious forms in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, religion in the twentieth 
century offers one of the most promising areas to look for such 
expressions of cultural difference. The remarkable resurgence of 
Taiwanese popular religion in the last few decades has many 
explanations, including especially the nature of recent economic 
changes. Yet cultural resistance theorists might also easily take it as 
evidence for their views. The inherently decentralized structure of 
Chinese religion, combined with its complex multivocality, created 
a resilient free space. Political control over religion grew even more 
difficult with the secular states and constitutional guarantees of 
religious freedom in modem times. As the explicitly political arena 
closed down in Taiwan, religion potentially offered a space for 
cultural alternatives and safe expressions of resistance. 
Taiwan, like much of the world now, challenges the early 
modernization theorists' expectation that economic development 
would necessarily walk hand in hand with the replacement of 
traditional customs by new civil ideologies. Statistically the water-
shed for Taiwanese popular religion occurred in the early 1970s, 
after which the steady increase is unmistakable. This time also 
marked the beginning of Taiwan's stunning period of independent 
economic development, when the base developed over the past two 
decades began to support rapid increases in standard of living. 
Government figures on numbers of popular temples are very 
unreliable - many temples do not register legally, and many others, 
especially small shrines to neighborhood Earth Gods or unwor-
shiped ghosts, are too small to be picked up consistently by even a 
more determined census. Nevertheless, the statistical bias should be 
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roughly consistent from one year to the next, and government 
figures show trends over time that should be reliable. After having 
decreased slowly over the years since the end of the Japanese 
occupation in 1945, both the absolute number of temples and the 
number of temples per capita increased significantly after about 
1970. The numbers of registered temples went from 2,930 in 1956 to 
6,251 by 1980, an increase of 113 percent. Temples per capita 
increased 18 percent over the same period, with a steep rise 
beginning around 1972 (Qu and Yao, 1986:657).48 The growth in 
popular temples easily outpaced even Taiwan's high population 
growth rate. 
A walk down the street (nearly any street) quickly confirms the 
statistical impression. Major temples are booming, and old Earth 
God shrines have been rebuilt in high style everywhere. In the large 
cities, every few blocks seem to offer a sign advertising a new 
shrine, usually in someone's apartment. The owners often do not 
register legally, and the government has found these shrines very 
difficult to control, in spite of increasingly loud complaints from 
neighbors kept awake by the divine racket. In the countryside, 
empty hilltops also often sport new temple construction. Consumer 
demand drives much of this temple boom, as worshipers contribute 
enough in return for spiritual favors to turn a profit for the owners. 
Hill Gates [Rohsenow] was one of the first Western scholars to 
note the increase in religious activity in Taiwan, and to see it as a 
kind of resistance (Rohsenow, 1973:84-87). She argued that partici-
pation in popular rituals "serves to mark off the majority of 
traditionally-minded Taiwanese from Mainlanders," and that gov-
ernment attempts to control worship further strengthened religion's 
role as an ethnic and social marker (Rohsenow, 1973:18). Emily 
Martin [Ahem] developed similar ideas in her much more detailed 
symbolic analysis of the large pig offerings that I discussed briefly at 
the beginning of this book (Ahem, 1981b). Comparable arguments 
have also been made for gender, for instance in the religious 
societies in parts of Guangdong, which provided havens for 
marriage resistance (Topley, 1975). Similarly, Emily Martin wrote 
about Taiwanese funeral ritual that "women as a subordinated 
gender frequently use contradictions in the total ideological field 
against the system and for themselves" (Martin, 1988:176).49 
Yet as with all cases of routinized cultural "resistance," no clear 
line separates resistance from accommodation. This creates the 
possibility of drawing quite different kinds of conclusions from 
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similar data. Steven Sangren, for example, argues that broader 
structures of meaning transcend the apparent resistance of hetero-
doxies, just as yang (the principle of light, male gender, etc.) opposes 
but also encompasses yin (the principle of darkness, female gender, 
etc.). 
Heterodoxy and orthodoxy are not sociologically polarized. 
Depending on context, nearly all Chinese have access to both. 
It is always useful to have an idiom capable of questioning 
particular hierarchical orderings, but few can convert this idiom 
into a sustainable and encompassing worldview. Thus the 
"minor" heterodoxies . . . are best viewed as being encomp-
assed within the orthodox orderings that define them as 
heterodox (Sangren, 1987:185-186). 
The power and efficacy of gods (ling) for Sangren lies in their ability 
to incorporate chaos, heterodoxy and yin into order, orthodoxy and 
yang. Such an analysis sees far less scope for real cultural opposition 
in religion than cultural resistance theories. 
Any argument between these views disappears, however, if we 
see political interpretations as potentials rather than givens in ritual 
scripts. As I have already discussed, many Chinese simply leave 
religion relatively uninterpreted, and rituals themselves are struc-
turally open to multiple interpretations. Analysis as resistance or 
accommodation often offers insightful and accurate readings of 
potentials, but also tends to lose sight of the surface play of 
kaleidoscopic possibilities that characterizes Chinese religion just 
as much as any simple underlying order. That messy exuberance 1 
itself, which separates successful rituals from mere bores, guaran- 1 
tees a diversity of possible interpretations. In this chapter I will thus 1 
focus more on the luxuriant overgrowth of much Taiwanese ritual, 
in order to reveal the various potentials for interpretation as they are 
grounded in concrete social contexts. After all, people do not simply 
choose their favorite interpretation as if they were blank slates; they 
interpret (or not) only within sets of social relations. 
Such social relations of interpretation are changing rapidly with 
Taiwan's recent economic and political transformation. Chapters S-
10 will concern innovations in ghost worship, a relatively minor 
area of Chinese religion that has suddenly boomed in Taiwan. The 
ghost cults remain very thick with possible meanings, and no one 
has been able to impose a single dominant interpretation, although 
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many have tried. Yet in spite of the lack of explicit interpretation, the 
cults clearly provide a lively and robust arena for people. They 
included some of the most popular temples in Taiwan in the 1980s, 
and launched successful movies and television soap operas. 
Chapters 8-10 explore this new fad in Taiwanese worship in some 
detail, again looking for the interplay of saturation, precipitation 
and resistance. I will begin with a look at indeterminate interpreta-
tion in Taiwanese religion in general, and at one of these ghost 
temples in particular. Chapter 8 takes up the potential interpreta-
tions of the ghosts as they relate to social and cultural change in 
Taiwan, and concentrates especially on the plausibility of seeing the 
cults as resistance. Finally, in Chapters 9-10, I will look at the many 
efforts to precipitate an agreed-upon interpretation out of these 
cults. The greatest difference from the Taiping movement lies in the 
failure of all these attempted precipitations of ghosts, in great 
contrast to the successful transformation of the God Worshipers 
into the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. 
SATURATED RITUAL IN TAIWAN 
Beginning with several seminal essays on Chinese religion in 
Taiwan (Jordan, 1972; Wolf, 1974), anthropologists have been 
unraveling the broad structures of Chinese religious practice, 
where gods form a rough parallel for secular hierarchy, ancestors 
define the family, and ghosts fill in the marginal space. While this 
line of analysis has been very revealing, and indeed forms the base 
for any study of Chinese religion, it also tends to abstract away from 
the irresolvable complexity of actual ritual experience. In this 
section I will instead concentrate on the ambiguous and multiple 
interpretations inherent in all major Taiwanese rituals. 
This analysis builds on my earlier discussion of how free religious 
space encourages variable interpretations of gods (Chapter 4). 
Bearing in mind how a single deity like Tian Hou/Mazu can 
receive markedly varied interpretations (Watson, 1985), I turn here 
more directly to temples and their rituals. In a broad sense, this is an 
analysis of the aesthetics of "heat and noise" (lauziat, Mandarin: 
renau). Any successful large event in Taiwan, from a market to a 
ritual, provides plenty of heat and noise - it should be packed with 
people, chaotically boisterous, loud with different voices, and 
clashingly colorful. The word for "heat" also occurs in the medical 
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hot/ cold distinction that most people use to think about food. Hot 
foods are more yang, the active, moving principle. Chocolate, coffee, 
and meat are hot. Hot foods give you diarrhea, while cold foods 
constipate. The word for "noise" can also mean to make mischief, 
and the combination strongly recalls Bakhtin's description of ludic 
medieval marketplaces. Temples, both as social spaces and archi-
tectural creations, provide a good example of the dynamics of lauziat 
and its various interpretive possibilities. 
Architecture 
Temple plazas, even when no ritual animates them, are among the 
hotter and noisier parts of a town. They are usually crowded with 
conversing people, and with hawkers selling souvenirS, incense and 
snacks. In Sanxia, the town I know best, the shops surrounding the 
plaza also include several tea houses, known as haunts for the less 
respectable side of town life, where young ladies will join you for a 
price. On weekends, when religious tourism surges, the plaza brims 
over with cars, people, and buses bearing tourist-pilgrims. The heat 
and noise peak during major rituals, when the plaza simply over-
flows until traffic throughout the town reaches gridlock. Major 
temples everywhere attract a kind of hustle and bustle that 
enhances their aesthetic appeal, even if it has little to do with more 
apparently "religious" feelings. Temples with no heat and noise are 
on their way to disappearing. 
Temple architecture gradually controls the mild chaos on its 
outskirts through its broad structure. Yet at the same time, temple 
decoration reproduces the heat and noise. Taiwanese temple 
construction directly recalls the yamens of imperial times - the 
combined offices and residences of magistrates. Both consist of 
concentric courtyards, leading by stages to the magistrate or god 
himself. The ultimate in such architecture was the Forbidden City in 
Beijing, where visitors gradually approached the Emperor through a 
series of small buildings leading further in toward the center. No 
visitor ever reached the center, however, which the Emperor ruled 
alone. The architecture, like the ideology, made the Emperor the 
moral exemplar for a world that extended down in concentric circles 
from his palace, even as it pulled people centripetally toward a 
center they could never reach. 
Major temples in Taiwan make the same statement, though on a 
far more modest scale. Visitors enter past the doors and their door 
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gods, into a front hall where most of the worship takes place. After 
an open courtyard just ahead lies the central hall, which houses the 
primary god. Side and rear halls may also house images of various 
secondary deities. Temples may sport more or fewer concentric 
rings of courtyards and halls, but the main deity always holds the 
center. The broad strokes of temple architecture thus reinforce 
Sangren's (1987) image of ever more inclusive hierarchy. 
Yet many of the details of worship and of construction blur the 
hierarchy and confuse the center. Except on rare occasions, for 
example, people worship as individual representatives of their 
families, and never as congregations. Most worship thus occurs 
with no explicit social organization, as a constant and uncoordin-
ated flow of people suit their own needs. The resulting clamor is one 
of the important ingredients that make a hot and noisy temple. 
Even space does not divide into as neat a hierarchy as the 
architecture suggests. While most people do not approach the 
central hall very closely, there is no reason not to. In fact, the inner 
courtyard is often full of running children, and anyone can walk up 
to the central altar.50 Similarly, temporary altars set up for ritual 
purposes tend not to be treated as sacred spaces. People can and do 
walk all around such altars, carrying on their own conversations 
quite freely. I have even seen unruly crowds reach directly onto 
altar tables in front of priests. 
Multiple temples to the same deity, which occur in the case of 
every major god, further blur the center. Such temples usually have 
a historical hierarchy, based on when they branched from the 
original temple on the mainland or from another branch temple in 
Taiwan. In practice, though, many temples will claim to be the top 
of the hierarchy in Taiwan. At least four Taiwanese Co Su Kong 
temples make that claim, and all of Taiwan knows the hot and noisy 
rivalry among Ma Co (Mazu) temples jostling for recognition as the 
true center of their cult. Central altars often also recall this confusion 
in hierarchy by seating multiple images of their primary god. 
Temples keep multiple images so that villages or families can 
borrow them, but each image also forms the seed that could plant 
a new and competing temple. The idea of an ultimate and over-
arching hierarchy remains strong - after all, everyone agrees that 
some temple must be the ultimate one. Yet the potential challenge is 
always there. 
Temple decoration fosters still more disordered heat and noise. 
All major temples swarm with decoration - every spot has dragons 
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writhing, phoenixes flying, lions sitting, or people fighting. Sanxia's 
temple to Co Su Kong epitomizes rather than typifies this style. It 
has been undergoing a total reconstruction for over forty years, and 
the end is still not in sight. U Meishu, a well known artist in Taiwan 
who was also politically active in Sanxia, designed and supervised 
the new construction. He hoped to create a masterwork of Taiwa-
nese temple architecture, faithful to both traditional style and 
technique. 
Huge, hand-carved stone pillars support the central hall, some 
entwined with dragons and others with dozens of birds fluttering 
among plum branches, and all carved in such high relief that the 
animals seem almost separate from the stone itself. Near the 
ceilings, even more detailed gilt wood carving covers every sur-
face. Each piece is small, with individual characters only a few 
inches high. Each shows a separate scene, usually from a famous 
popular novel like the Romance of the Three Kingdoms. 
As I have watched the reconstruction at intervals over the last 
fifteen years, the carving grows both more extensive and more 
intensive. There is a kind of centripetal involution of detail, as the 
eye moves from the facade of the temple as a whole, with its 
complex pattern of multiple roofs and doors, to the intertwined 
carvings of the pillars, and finally to the detailed intricacies of the 
wood. The wood carving has even deeper involutions, with moving 
chains cut from single pieces of wood and balls that rattle inside 
lions' mouths, all high up under the eaves. 
Just as the halls and courtyards pull toward a center they never 
reach, the decoration draws viewers into ever greater detail, beyond 
their capacity to see. Most of the wood carving, in fact, is too high to 
identify clearly, and details like a ball carved free inside a lion's 
mouth are simply invisible from the ground. In addition, the 
decoration does not particularly draw the eye toward the central 
altar. Any spot in the temple offers the same possibilities for 
involution, as any fragment of a hologram retains the entire 
image. At the same time, every spot also offers new stories with 
no particular relation to each other or to the temple as a whole. The 
heat and noise are everywhere. 
Temples thus have two faces. One offers a sort of official 
orthodoxy - an image of successively encompassing hierarchy. 
The other complicates that hierarchy at each level, from the surfeit 
of teeming decoration to the multiple claims over hierarchical 
ranking. Everyone believes that a center exists, but no one can 
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quite find it for sure. Unlike the Forbidden City, where a sufficiently 
august visitor would finally meet the Emperor at some point on his 
journey to the center, in temples the center recedes forever. An old 
adage in Chinese holds that behind every heaven lies another 
(tianwai you tum), and the same is true for temples and their gods: 
it is heavens all the way down, leaving people without an ultimately 
authoritative interpretation, but with an involuted surface of 
saturated possibilities. 
Ritual and Impenetrable Experts 
Temples hire priests to perform their major rituals, and the rituals 
again provide laymen with a multitude of rich images, most of 
which people find quite impossible to interpret. While they are 
confident that all the detail means something to some expert, they 
happily accept the confusing complexity, the heat and noise, with-
out much concern for proper interpretation. Daoist ritual dress, for 
example, sparkles with arcane signs like trigrams and star patterns, 
embroidered in gold thread. Priests may also move in mysterious 
ways, from Daoist ritual dance patterns to esoteric Buddhist hand 
mudras. Even their speech usually evades interpretation, as it 
involves peculiar pronunciations of difficult texts. Ritual music 
furthers the effect by drowning out most speech and song, and 
through the polyrhythmic complexities of the drums. 
Major rituals also offer music in the form of outdoor opera in the 
temple plaza. An especially large and successful ritual might have 
three operas taking place at once, all amplified and all in the same 
temple plaza. Typically, the extra heat and noise more than 
compensate for the loss of comprehension. On such an occasion, 
hundreds or even thousands of people may be milling about, 
watching one opera or another, offering incense, watching the 
priests, checking out the offerings, or just talking to their friends. 
The general chaos of the scene marks its success, with the cacopho-
nous surplus of sound, movement, color and symbol themselves 
creating one of the main goals of the ritual. 
Even minor rituals and priestly services offer a profusion 
uninterpreted symbols. Daoists performing simple curing rituals 
in their homes may use forms of paper spirit money not known to 
most people, and often speak quite mysterious spells. The minimum 
ritual service usually consists of writing a small paper charm (hu-a) 
whose checks, curlicues, zig-zags and totally illegible characters 
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render them completely enigmatic to the people who will use them. 
In fact, much of the message may be very simple, something like 
'1et the evil spirits depart," but the priest will carefully write one 
character on top of the other to guarantee the proper mystery.51 
When I once asked a Daoist why he did that, he gave the same 
answer I heard when I had asked about that other uninterpretable, 
the cleaver in the pig's head: it just looks better that way. The 
opacity of such ritual to interpretation provides a major part of its 
appeal, with the proviso that some expert somewhere can really 
explain it. There is a final truth, but no one ever gets to it: the center 
recedes forever. 
The priests themselves have a far greater fund of interpretation. 
Unlike their clients, the ability to interpret is important to priests 
professionally, and often personally as well. Yet even for them, a 
fuller interpretation always seems one step away. Daoist priests in 
Taiwan, especially if they are serious, search out various masters in 
an attempt to increase their knowledge. Daoist gossip often turns to 
who stole what secret knowledge and how they did it, as people 
strive to come closer to full knowledge. This idea that truer and 
better knowledge always lies just out of reach recurs in many areas 
in China, especially where master I disciple ties form the primary 
means of organization. From martial arts to religion, folklore has it 
that masters always withhold some vital piece of knowledge, dying 
before they can pass it along to their favorite child or student. The 
classic example in martial arts is the ability to destroy the balance of 
a victim's vital forces with a mere touch, or even with justa point of 
the finger, causing inevitable death (dian xue). I have often heard 
that this most powerful of techniques was lost, only to have 
someone else suggest that his friend had a friend who knew a 
mountain recluse who could do it. Even for experts, the true center 
is always just out of reach. 
Interpretation 
The general lack of popular interest in interpretation ties closely to 
the existence of experts. It is enough to feel confident that an 
explanation exists somewhere, even if expert knowledge follows 
the same kind of infinite recession into unresolved detail as temple 
decoration. Such confidence allows people to revel in the relative 
chaos of hot and noisy religion, without having to worry much 
about orthodox interpretation. The social organization of religion 
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furthers the effect, with experts who make a living off their know-
ledge and thus prefer to keep it secret. The result is very different 
from Christian churches, which strain toward explicit interpretation 
through Sunday schools and sermons, catechisms and confessions. 
With no formal congregations and no ministers, Taiwanese popular 
temples could not pursue such a path even if they wanted to. 
For most people, interpretation is far secondary to ritual practice, 
which should ideally be complex, busy and eritertaining.52 By 
turning the infinitely receding center over to the experts, people 
are free to celebrate the aesthetics of heat and noise as they pursue 
the more mundane goals of worship - peace, profit and happiness. 
Temples and their rituals provide an extraordinary wealth of 
saturated material. In spite of people's belief that a correct inter-
pretation of everything exists in principle, in practice the possibili-
ties leave them with enormous (but usually unrealized) interpretive 
potential. 
One of the most crucial questions about resistance centers on how 
a movement can make the transformation from so many indetermi-
nate possibilities to an explicit interpretation as resistance. When, in 
other words, do people begin to realize interpretive potentials and 
to rationalize religion or other forms of "cultural resistance"? Spirit 
possession catalyzed this transformation in Guangxi. No such 
transformation has occurred in Taiwan, and that difference offers 
a telling point of comparison. 
This emphasis on the saturation of hot and noisy religion does not 
make all worship an unrestrained celebration of chaos, a cultural 
challenge to authority and hierarchy. Such an analysis would 
overinterpret much of what really goes on, while also ignoring the 
reiteration of hierarchy and confidence in expertise that parallels the 
heat and noise. Yet the pleasure of saturated ritual in China 
nevertheless creates a plethora of interpretive potentials, which 
cannot be drained into a simple reproduction of structural hierar-
chy. Overinterpretation as either resistance or accommodation saps 
the life from vivid and vivacious ritual. 
THE EIGHTEEN LORDS 
Let me turn now to the temple that will form the core for most of the 
material that follows. The Eighteen Lords temple at the northern tip 
of Taiwan often astonishes people familiar with Chinese popular 
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religion, as it amazes and sometimes scandalizes Taiwanese them-
selves. Two decades ago the temple was a simple roadside shrine 
for unidentified bones - the sort that sits unattended and almost 
unnoticed all over the countryside, quite appropriate to marginal 
beings like the dog and seventeen anonymous corpses buried there. 
Ghosts like these deserve no better and should not be treated like 
gods, who are known spirits of generosity and morality. People 
build shrines to ghosts more out of pity for their unworshiped 
spirits than out of devotion. Yet Taiwan in the 1980s experienced a 
sudden burst of ghost worship, and the Eighteen Lords became one 
of the hottest and noisiest temples anywhere, along with a few 
similar shrines. 
The Eighteen Lords temple backed up traffic on the northern 
coastal highway for several kilometers at its peak in the late 1980s, 
and still attracts thousands of worshipers each week. While clearly 
within the traditions of popular worship, the temple turns much 
standard ritual procedure on its head. Worshipers normally do not 
touch images of deities, but here they caress two large bronze dogs. 
Most typical worship takes place during the day, but here peaks in 
the small hours of the morning. Nearly all deities are honored with 
sticks of incense, but the Eighteen Lords prefer burning cigarettes 
instead. Other temples stand above the ground, but the heart of this 
one is in a basement. The scale of its popularity alone is odd; such 
temples to unworshiped ghosts never grow to a large size. 
I first heard about the temple in 1986, when a Taiwanese friend 
who knew I was interested in religion told me I had to visit ~ 
bizarre new twist in Chinese ghosts. In fact, many people shared his 
opinion that the temple offered something both new and weird, and 
I frequently heard it mentioned along with current fads in social 
deviance like gambling or "motorcycle gales" (biao che), the occa-
sionally suicidal races down Taiwan's expressway that erupted into 
a brief craze in the mid-1980s. In spite of its unconventional features, 
though, this is clearly not a new religion. It is instead a new 
proportioning of everyday religion, a kind of spirited play that 
has magnified previously lowly and unworshiped ghosts to rival the 
gods themselves. 
The shrine's origins will always be murky, but everyone agrees on 
certain basic features of its story. The temple sits at the northern-
most tip of Taiwan, a coastal fishing area. At some point, probably 
about a century ago (but in the seventeenth century according to one 
version), a fishing boat washed ashore. The boat itself was badly 
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battered, suggesting storm and disaster in the Taiwan Strait. It held 
the dead bodies of seventeen men, along with a dog who had 
somehow remained alive. The local fishermen who found the boat 
had no way of identifying the bodies; the wreck may have blown 
over from the mainland. The fishermen proceeded as one normally 
proceeds in such cases in Taiwan - they buried the bodies in a 
common grave on a cliff overlooking the shore, thus creating a new 
and quite typical ghost temple. Only the dog makes this story a little 
different from most others. This was a dog of outstanding steadfast-
ness and loyalty to its masters. According to some versions, it 
insisted on jumping into the grave with the bodies, until the people 
finally buried it alive. According to others, it starved itself to death 
in front of the new grave, and was finally buried along with the 
men. The dog is thus the eighteenth of the Eighteen Lords. 
Informants in the area remember the shrine from the 1950s and 
1960s as a simple gravestone and incense pot; the grave itself was so 
old and unkempt that it had lost its characteristic rounded form and 
was just a bit of flattened earth. Soldiers on coast guard duty 
occasionally worshipped there, and an old woman (now rumored 
to have made a fortune off the temple) swept up once in a while. 
Even by the low standards of a ghost shrine, the Eighteen Lords 
temple was not very important or active. 
The transformation of the temple began in the early 1970s, when 
Taiwan broke ground for the construction of a nuclear power plant 
just a stone's throw away from the grave. Construction of the plant 
required shoring up the cliff overlooking the sea, and in the process 
the Eighteen Lords shrine was to be buried. Construction sites in 
Taiwan are known to suffer from problems caused by ghosts - they 
frequently turn up old bones - and construction workers regularly 
make offerings to appease them. This construction site was no 
exception. According to informants now, there were an unusually 
high number of "accidental" injuries and even a few deaths. The 
most alarming event in current versions of the story happened when 
the crane suddenly stopped dead as it was poised just over the 
shrine, on the verge of destroying it. No one could explain this crane 
suddenly frozen, looming over the shrine. The large number of 
accidents and the crane problem finally brought construction to a 
halt.53 Both workers and local inhabitants wanted the temple saved; 
the government wanted its power plant finished quickly. 
In the end the government and project managers decided to 
"respect local customs" by rebuilding the temple. They fixed up 
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and preserved the original grave in a small underground chamber, 
and built a large temple overhead, on the new higher ground level. 
The rebuilt temple contains an exact ·replica of the underground 
grave, directly above it, plus a further wing with wooden images of 
the Eighteen Lords. Rebuilding the temple marked the transform-
ation of the Eighteen Lords - both a physical transformation into an 
inordinately large ghost temple, and a spiritual transformation into 
a group of beings with unusual efficacy. They had, after all, brought 
the government itself to do their bidding. Just as important, they 
accomplished this in front of thousands of workers who came from 
all over the island, and thus set the stage for an unprecedented 
expansion in popularity for such a temple. 
The result is an extraordinary lode of saturated ritual in a temple 
that carries heat and noise to a Carnivalesque extreme. A night-time 
trip to the temple, after a long fight with the traffic jam that the 
temple itself creates, begins in the parking lot that stretches along 
the side of the cliff, just below the level of the road and the temple. 
The boldest hawkers swoop down immediately, usually old ladies 
trying to sell packets of incense, paper spirit money, and amulets 
with dogs on them. The long approach to the temple forces visitors 
through a shanty town of rickety shacks that house completely 
secular Carnival attractions - rings to toss over posts, balls to throw 
at bottles, and appropriately seedy hawkers to take the money. This 
is also the point where visitors start nervously checking their wallets 
and purses: the temple is famous for its pickpockets. 
After running the Carnival gauntlet, visitors go up a few steps to 
the road and the chaos of the temple itself. The crowds can be huge 
and intimidating, especially late at night when most people come. 
Distinctly earthly elbows help worshipers get their burning sticks of 
incense to the crowded incense pots, and the sheer quantity of 
burning incense often causes the pots to burst into roaring flames. 
The largest mass squeezes toward the right side of the temple, 
where the artificial grave stands flanked by two life-size dogs.54 
Here people offer incense and burning cigarettes at the grave and 
then fervently rub their hands (or one of the amulets the hawkers 
sell) over one of the dogs, reciting a bit of doggerel about the good 
luck that will flow from different parts of the dog's body. 
People come because the Eighteen Lords really grant wishes. 
Even better, these spirits will grant any wishes at all, as long as 
they are properly repaid. As ghosts, they have none of the moral 
prudishness of proper gods. Their laissez-faire attitude gives the 
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temple a reputation as a haunt for gamblers, prostitutes, and 
gangsters. For the hundreds or thousands of relatively honest 
citizens who also came every night during the temple's peak of 
popularity, that reputation added a sense of titillating danger to the 
real efficacy of the spirits and to the consummate pleasure of all the 
heat and noise. Like the nuclear power plant that sparked its fame 
and now glows quietly in the dark behind the temple, the Eighteen 
Lords combine power and danger. Vaguely immoral without being 
illegal, frequented by dangerous people but not really dangerous, 
and powerful in areas that respectable gods spumed, Taiwan found 
the Eighteen Lords temple irresistible. 
The temple grew out of popular religious practice, and resonates 
with much traditional religion. Yet the new magnification of ghosts 
in Taiwan, and the consequent reproportioning of religion, also 
speaks to much that has changed in the last two decades. Typically 
for Chinese religion, there is no worked out interpretation of the 
phenomenon; people go for the heat and noise and to get favors 
granted, not for the quality of the theology. In Chinese popular 
religion, with its already weak social relations of interpretation and 
resulting surplus in possible interpretations, this temple offers the 
very acme of overloaded religious indeterminacy. In Chapter 8, I 
will explore worship at this temple in more detail, spelling out some 
of the rich detail and its potential lines of interpretation, and finally 
offering an interpretation of my own. 
8 
Saturated Ghosts and 
Social Change in Taiwan 
The Eighteen Lords (Shiba Wanggong) temple innovates, but only 
as bricolage- a creative recombination of elements already at hand. 
A trip to the temple offers a disorienting reformulation of old ideas, 
but no new worlds. Even though every ritual offering and every 
architectural detail can conjure up a wealth of old associations for 
people, the combination is fresh and complexly evocative, a view of 
the world through a kaleidoscope. I begin by tracing out some of the 
lines of evocation to suggest plausible potentials for explicit 
interpretation, while illustrating the rich surplus of meaning at the 
temple. The chapter concludes with an examination of the intimate 
ties between these cultural changes and Taiwan's economic growth. 
The Eighteen Lords delineate a world of individualistic, utilitarian 
and amoral competition, easily adapting to changing social relations 
of interpretation. The rich evocations of the temple stir up a host of 
possible interpretations, but as we shall see, none has come to 
dominate thinking about the temple. Certainly the implied critique 
of Taiwen's economy and polity, comparable to what other authors 
have seen in some ritual elsewhere in the world, has never been 
brought to the surface. 
INTERPRETIVE POTENTIAlS 
While Taiwanese recognize that the Eighteen Lords resemble gods 
in some ways (the eighteen wooden images and the sheer scale of 
the temple imply gods), and are just strange in others (the cigarette 
offerings, the underground chamber), everyone also knows that 
above all, they are just a gang of ghosts. Ghosts are marginal 
beings, the unincorporated dead who have no proper place as 
either gods or ancestors. As we have seen, gods protect community 
interests, from neighborhood Earth Gods to the patron gods of 
whole districts, and the community takes responsibility for their 
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temples and major rituals. Ancestors define the world of family and 
lineage. That leaves ghosts- the residual category, with no legiti-
mate political, geographical or family position. 
Ghosts most broadly are simply dead souls (as are gods and 
ancestors), but the term refers especially to the dead who are left 
lonely and starving because no one worships them. This happens 
particularly to people who die before marriage, by suicide or other 
violence, or unknown to their relatives. Ghosts can sometimes 
become gods (through promotion) or ancestors (through spirit 
marriage with the living), but generally remain a good Mary 
Douglas (1978) sort of liminal category - ill-defined and dangerous 
(see Weller, 1987c:65-66; Yu, 1990). In the Durkheimian terms that 
characterize most of the anthropological literature, gods are bureau-
crats, ancestors are kinsmen, and ghosts are beggars, bandits and 
strangers, who fall into no proper social category: they are asocial 
and individual. 
Ghosts receive offerings in several contexts. Unidentified, indi-
vidual ghosts sometimes command worship because they make 
someone ill. Occasionally, people even see ghosts. More usually, 
though, people worship ghosts as a generic and anonymous group 
in rituals conducted by large temples during the seventh lunar 
month (see Weller, 1987c). In these rituals, the temple hires priests to 
provide spiritual alms on behalf of the community for these pitiful 
beings; it is a form of ghost welfare. Offerings on these occasions 
further individualize ghosts. People thrust individual sticks of 
incense into their food offerings; ghosts do not get the communal 
incense pots that honor gods and ancestors55• Finally, ghosts often 
have tiny temples of their own, at which they receive offerings 
during the annual ghost ritual or when supplicants have specific 
requests to make. Such temples typically begin when people build a 
small shrine to house unidentified bones or bodies, discovered 
during road construction or on a battlefield, for example. Except 
for the seventh-month festival, people worship ghosts as individ-
uals, for their own personal benefit. Ghosts have none of the 
community ties of gods. 
As a rule these shrines are comparatively tiny; the largest might 
hold half a dozen adults, and many more are too small to enter. In 
general, no committee or individual takes responsibility for them 
(unlike the elaborate arrangements that run god temples), although 
communities or individuals may repair a deteriorated ghost temple 
on an ad hoc basis. The temples contain no images of ghosts, but 
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usually just a gravestone and an incense pot. Many often also invoke 
the Earth God (Tho Te Kong), whose responsibilities include 
protecting the living from the dead. They never have the decorated 
roofs and nested buildings of god temples, nor do they rate door 
gods, or even doors, or even front walls for that matter. People often 
call them "three-wall temples." 
Ghosts are much weaker beings than gods, and most people thus 
prefer to make important requests at temples to gods. Yet gods 
generally behave as upright and moral beings, in spite of the spirit 
money offerings they require. They refuse to consider entire 
categories of requests. For example, most gods will not help 
gamblers or people with illegitimate business requests like prosti-
tutes and gangsters. Ghosts, on the other hand, are desperate. They 
will grant any request at all, and their temples typically sport 
banners reading "iu kiu pit ieng" (all requests shall be answered). 
People usually call them Iu Ieng Kong temples, a shortened form of 
the slogan, meaning Lord Who Grants All Requests. While many 
people might in fact occasionally worship at these temples, they are 
considered the special arena of the lower strata of society, whom the 
ghosts are especially willing to help, and whose lives the ghosts also 
reflect most closely. Taiwan probably has thousands of such 
temples, although their small size and lack of organization makes 
a census impossible. They rarely develop beyond the level at which 
they begin - small roadside shrines that see only an occasional 
supplicant. 
In spite of its incongruously large scale and huge popularity, the 
Eighteen Lords temple leaves no question about its origin as just 
such a minor shrine. All informants describe it before the nuclear 
power plant was built exactly as a Lord Who Grants All Requests 
temple, and a rather minor one even by those lowly standards. More 
importantly, the new temple makes no attempt at all to disguise its 
ghostly nature. Not only did they preserve the original grave 
underground, but they built a new one on top. The temple does 
not sport the curved eaves of a god temple, nor does it have a front 
wall. Even the number eighteen can spark images of ghosts. Dead 
souls pass through eighteen hells, and Taiwan has at least three 
other temples to eighteen unknown ghosts (Qiu, 1979:588-589).56 
The alleged constituency of the temple again reflects its funda-
mentally ghostly nature. People describing the Eighteen Lords 
invariably point out how popular they are with gangsters, prosti-
tutes, gamblers, and similar people - the standard patrons of lowly 
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spirits who will do anything for a reward. These are the sorts of 
people whose requests proper gods would ignore. The pickpockets 
who frequent the temple are thus not just taking advantage of the 
big crowds; they are there to worship as well. 
While this popular image fits the general atmosphere of the 
temple, it cannot be true in practice. Far too many people worship 
at the temple for the constituency to be limited to these underworld 
types. In addition, images and amulets from the temple adorn the 
altars and cars of a great many people in Taipei. Taxi drivers and 
other small businessmen with perfectly legal sources of income 
clearly frequent the temple. When I asked the temple management 
about this, they also insisted that people who come to ask questions 
of the gods are a fair cross-section of the entire population. The 
temple is thus less a haunt of gangsters and gamblers, than a lure 
for ordinary people who find some thrill in the sort of temple 
appropriate to the underworld. They like the idea of a temple not 
too punctilious about issues of morality, and clearly have needs that 
the Eighteen Lords can fill better than any proper god. 
Yet for all its obvious roots in little ghost shrines, the temple also 
harbors a wealth of anomalous features and an unorganized bounty 
of evocative connotations, even more than most other temples. 
Many of these features stem from the peculiarities of the temple's 
reconstruction and the worshipers' creative promotion of the weird. 
Together, they make up the temple's richly indeterminate interpre-
tive complex, and weave a tangled web of potential interpretations. 
Oppositions and Inversions 
The architect who designed the rebuilt temple must have been a folk 
post-modernist: it contains bits and pieces from various different 
traditions, with nothing quite in its right place. The most discordant 
aspect is the awkward juxtaposition of a ghost temple and a god 
temple. The reconstructed temple has expropriated one of the most 
important elements of god worship - the use of wooden images of 
the spirits on a raised altar. The stage-left (and higher ranking) side 
of the temple strongly resembles a god temple. The god images sit 
against the far wall, fronted with an altar table and two incense pots. 
The only reminder of their ghostly nature in this section of the 
temple is an extra god. The sharp-eyed (but probably no one else) 
notice that one extra image accompanies the expected images of 
seventeen men and one dog. This is Tho Te Kong, the Earth God, 
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who sits there to keep the ghosts in line. The broader temple 
architecture itself, with no front wall and no curved eaves, also 
clashes with the implication that these are gods. 
The god imagery emphasizes that these are extraordinarily 
powerful spirits, but the temple stresses its ghostly origins just as 
much as its godly claims. In addition to the ghostly temple 
construction, the grave itself (actually the artificial grave built over 
the original site) dominates the stage-right side of the temple, which 
functions more like an overgrown Lord Who Grants All Requests 
temple. Everyone worships at both sides of the temple, but judging 
from their enthusiasm, this artificial grave is even more important a 
center of worship than the god altar. The incongruous architecture 
clashes most strongly in the direct center of the temple. The center 
should always house the main locus of power in a temple, usually a 
gravestone for ghosts and statues for gods. Here, however, the 
center offers only the amorphous no-man' s-land between the ghost 
half and the god half, containing nothing but the crowded chaos of 
visitors trying to shove their way from one side to the other. 
The oddly overlapping structure of the temple contains a further 
opposition on the ghost side, which inverts space itself. Real 
enthusiasts of the temple will explain that the most powerful bit is 
neither the god altar nor the reconstructed grave, but the original 
grave, now hidden in a basement room. The original grave lies 
directly below the fake grave, and looks just like its copy; both were 
rebuilt with the same mosaic-covered mound. Supplicants enter the 
room by a dark staircase at the back of the right side of the building. 
Although most people seem to know about it, there is a happy 
fiction that the underground chamber remains something of a 
secret, and that only the real insiders know this esoteric place of 
power. In the eyes of its patrons, the chamber is in fact a bizarre and 
unique feature of this temple - a case where the necessities of 
reconstruction have reinforced the liminal weirdness of ghosts. In 
other god or ghost temples, power concentrates in the center; here it 
lies underground and off to the right. This reverses all the usual 
hierarchy, where higher is superior to lower and left is superior to 
right. 
What passes for an incense pot sits in what was once the normal 
position just in front of the gravestone. Yet because of the peculiar 
construction of this temple - the gravestone was originally at the 
edge of the cliff, and thus now closely abuts a wall- the incense pot 
is crammed between wall and grave. Worshipers can only approach 
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it by squatting or crawling in the dirt and leaning over the grave. 
This is by no means a respectful posture, the way pilgrims may 
sometimes approach a god temple on their knees. The contrast with 
typical offerings - even to ghosts - is striking; ghosts normally 
receive offerings above ground from standing supplicants. The 
inversion of space, which moves power into the lowest possible 
position, thus extends to the reversed orientation of the grave, 
reducing the normally respectful approach with incense to a kind 
of awkward clowning. 
Not content with space, the temple also inverts time. The Eighteen 
Lords are especially efficacious at night, and worship peaks in the 
small hours of the morning. Like worshiping on one's knees 
underground, this is also an inversion of normal practice that 
particularly emphasizes the contrast between the ghostly nature of 
the Eighteen Lords and the gods. Night is the period when ghosts 
are strongest, and their perceived amorality fits with the general 
image of night-time activities - sex, crime, gambling, and illicit 
endeavors of various sorts. Most ghost worship elsewhere, however, 
takes place during the day. This is partly for convenience and partly 
for safety; people usually prefer to avoid strong ghosts, who can be 
capriciously violent. Yet the danger is part of the appeal . of this 
temple, as is the inversion where power peaks in the usually inferior 
per;_od. The more mundane danger of pickpockets and purse 
snatchers also characterizes the place at night and reinforces the 
entire image of the temple. In classic Carnivalesque style, the 
Eighteen Lords reverse everything, emptying the usual seat of 
power in the temple's center, and moving it to the lowest possible 
position in space and time. The receding center of most temples has 
been overturned. 
Righteous Dogs and Sex 
With its architectural oddities, its inversions of space and time, and 
its celebration of power at the bottom of the hierarchy, the Eighteen 
Lords temple both parodies and partakes of more standard religious 
traditions. This is the sort of "resistance" by inversion that analysts 
of Carnival favor. Yet even the clashing overlap of gods and ghosts 
and the removal of the center only begin to suggest the many thick 
possibilities available here. The suicidally faithful dog who became 
the eighteenth Lord offers one of the temple's most striking features, 
and opens up a new range of associations. 
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Although the dog is just one of many images on the altar, and the 
two life-sized bronze dogs that flank the fake grave do not have 
their own incense pots, dogs nevertheless command much of the 
ritual attention. The table in front of the altar brims over with 
images that people place there (as in other temples), but they are 
almost invariably little ceramic or metal dogs, not images of the 
human ghosts. The office at the side of the temple, which sells 
paraphernalia of all sorts - charms, banners, books, even an 
Eighteen Lords movie sound track tape - specializes in dogs, from 
little cast replicas of the dogs in the temple to fluffy poodles. Many 
of the banners for sale also feature dogs. Most conspicuous, even 
shocking by the standards of most Chinese worship, is the treatment 
of the two bronze dogs by the grave, where avid worshipers rub 
various parts of the dogs' bodies to bring good fortune. Late at 
night, during the temple's peak hours, the dogs seem covered in a 
swarm of fondling hands as bodies crowd to get at the images. 
People occasionally worship animal images in Taiwan, and at 
least two other small temples also enshrine a dog along with 
unidentified ghosts, much like the Eighteen Lords before their 
reconstruction (Qiu, 1979:323; Shahar, 1991:69). They are usually 
called Righteous Dog (Yiquan) temples, and arise when dead dogs 
appear with unidentified bodies, usually on battlefields. Yet the 
very physical, almost sexual stroking of the dogs at the Eighteen 
Lords temple is unusual. While this particular dog claims to be a 
simple allegory for loyalty, dogs generally in Taiwan are associated 
with unclean sexuality as much as with higher virtues. Seaman 
describes a story of a woman using a black dog fetus to poison a 
man, the use of "black dog bloo4" as a euphemism for menstrual 
blood (also an ingredient in magic charms), reference to ladies' men 
as black dogs, and destruction of a supposedly evil Black Dog 
Demon cult (Seaman, 1981:392-394). People also sometimes eat 
dog meat in Taiwan. They only eat it in winter, though, because 
dog meat is very hot in the medical sense - proper for sexual action 
and for a hot and noisy temple. The highlighted dogs thus add a 
peculiar combination of loyalty, sex and danger to the overloaded 
mix of the temple. 
Offerings 
The act of worship itself closely follows standard ghost worship, 
with incense sticks offered first on the god side and then on the 
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ghost side, followed by burning paper spirit money appropriate to 
ghosts. Two additional offerings, however, make this temple stand 
out from all others, and again increase the range of potential 
associations- sesame oil chicken (mayou jr) and cigarettes. Unlike 
the incense and spirit money, these offerings are optional, but still 
very frequent. People usually bring the sesame oil chicken when 
they choose to offer food, because they know the Eighteen Lords 
relish it above other dishes. 
Sesame oil chicken has one major connotation in Taiwan: it 
restores strength to women who have just given birth. All new 
mothers must eat this soup made of chicken, wine, and sesame oil. 
In Chinese folk medical terms, sesame oil chicken is restorative (bu) 
and hot (the hot of ''hot and noisy"). The pollution and general 
blood loss of labor leaves women weak and cold. They must 
therefore scrupulously avoid cold foods (again referring to medical 
properties, not temperature), eating only restorative foods like 
chicken, and warming ones like sesame oil and wine (Gould-
Martin, 1976:128). 
I asked several people what sense it made to offer such a dish to 
seventeen dead men and a dog. The answers invariably drew 
parallels between these ghosts and new mothers. Most people 
explained that, as drowning victims, the Eighteen Lords were cold 
and weak, with a great need for restorative and warming foods. Like 
new mothers, ghosts are also polluted beings (Ahem, 1975). Child-
birth and menstrual blood pollute women so badly that the eighteen 
hells reserve a special Bloody Pond of bodily fluids to punish them. 
Funeral experts hang scrolls showing the hells at funerals, illustra-
ting how the women suffer up to their necks in blood and birth 
fluids, and of course also encoura~g their sons to pay for special 
funeral services to save them.5 Menstruation alone prevents 
women from worshiping gods. 
The cold and pollution of new mothers and the Eighteen Lords is 
one side of their great power- the mothers' power to reproduce and 
the ghosts' power to grant wishes. Like ghosts, female sexuality 
provides a combined power and threat. No family continues with-
out it, yet sex is also a major danger. Chinese express this in social 
terms when they accuse sisters-in-law of forcing families to divide 
by breaking the brothers apart. They express it in folklore with 
stories about ghosts and fox fairies who appear as beautiful women 
to seduce men to death by draining all their semen. In some ways, 
the offering of sesame oil chicken thus reinforces the celebration of 
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yin in the Eighteen Lords temple by drawing a comparison between 
the ghosts and the most yin of humans, new mothers. Yet the 
message also contradicts the reversals that put the Eighteen Lords 
in the most yin positions in space and time - the bottom right in the 
middle of the night. Sesame oil chicken, after all, makes the ghosts 
more yang. Like any good chicken soup, it cures a "cold" -the pun 
works in Taiwanese as it does in English. Even as the offering marks 
the yin nature of these ghosts, it attempts to ameliorate their 
condition instead of just celebrating its power. The food offerings 
thus do not mesh neatly with the architecture, and further muddle 
the possible meanings. If the architectural inversions seemed to 
promote an interpretation as resistance, the sesame oil chicken 
instead suggests accommodation. 
Cigarettes, the other unusual offering, open up quite a different 
range of associations. Below ground in the temple, as supplicants 
crawl around to reach the awkwardly placed "incense" pot, they do 
not place sticks of incense, but instead erect burning cigarettes by 
thrusting them into holes drilled in the concrete pot. Most people 
offer only incense at the above-ground grave, but some also impale 
cigarettes on a small bed of nails just in front of the incense pot. This 
is a very unusual use of cigarettes in Taiwan, which I had never seen 
before. People sometimes offer whole packs of cigarettes at the 
annual ghost festival, but not as a substitute for incense. Cigarette 
smoking is widespread, especially among men in Taiwan. Yet it is 
also viewed as it once was in the United States - just a little bit 
wrong, and not really appropriate for women, children, or religious 
people. It would be very disrespectful to offer a cigarette to a god. 58 
The contrast between cigarette and incense highlights the under-
world associations of ghosts and of this temple in particular. 
People at the temple could not explain where the custom of using 
cigarettes came from, but it seems to be spreading. A similarly 
overblown ghost temple, this one to a Japanese period robber 
named Liao Tianding, also gets offerings of single, lit cigarettes.59 
Several people told me how burning cigarettes stood on end can 
bring ghostly spirits down to die xian (''bowl spirit''), a sort of Ouiji 
Board in which three players hold a bowl that moves across a sheet 
of paper printed with characters and spells out messages. Ghosts 
typically motivate the bowl, and behave generally like weak 
versions of ghost temples, granting requests for information about 
anything at all. Single cigarettes also show up in the New Territories 
as offerings on the graves of village toughs, the enforcers who 
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guaranteed the power of lineage strongmen.60 All three of these 
cases fit the slightly unsavory character of cigarettes in Taiwan. 
Each case also recalls the social functions of cigarettes, especially 
in male gatherings. Nearly any friendly encounter begins with 
someone offering cigarettes around; others will reciprocate as time 
goes by. While whole packs or cartons of cigarettes may often serve 
as minor gifts to superiors in the hope of encouraging a favor, the 
offering of single cigarettes to smoke instead immediately marks ties 
between equals. Such an offering thus goes beyond just reinforcing 
the lowly status of ghosts compared to gods. It differs fundament-
ally from offerings to gods (or even to ghosts at the annual ghost 
festival), which reinforce the hierarchy of supplicant to superior. 
Instead, it emphasizes an exchange among equals, a relationship 
based on contractual ties rather than fixed political and social 
hierarchy. 
Each transaction with the Eighteen Lords indeed resembles a 
contract far more than a petition to a superior like offerings to gods. 
If the Eighteen Lords grant a request, the worshiper must repay 
them or face sickness and misfortune, perhaps even death. Just like 
contracts with mobsters, broken deals with the Eighteen Lords need 
not await the slow turning of the wheel of law; justice is swift and 
merciless. Gods also appreciate repayments, but do not require 
them so cold-bloodedly. In a sense, gods expect a thanks of 
tribute, but the Eighteen Lords must be paid in full by giving gold 
medallions, sponsoring an opera or puppet show for their entertain-
ment, or contributing money to the temple. This strict calculation of 
contractual repayment is one of the most discussed features of the 
Eighteen Lords. 
One further use of cigarettes offers still further interpretive 
possibilities. In the summer of 1988, at a small restaurant in 
northern Taiwan, I glanced up at the small altar near the cash 
register. This altar resembled the altars in many small businesses, 
and held a statue of the Cloth-bag Monk (Budai Heshang) as one of 
its images. The Ooth-bag Monk is a fat, jolly character with a big 
bag draped over his shoulder; he is a minor figure on many family 
and small business altars. The cloth bag is stuffed with presents and 
cash that, like Santa Claus, he hands out to little children. He 
strongly resembles popular images of Maitreya, the Buddha of the 
next age, and many people say he is an incarnation of Maitreya. He 
is not normally an important object of worship in his own right, but 
he is the sort of symbol of easy wealth falling into your lap that 
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small businesses in Taiwan like. Such symbolism is usually fairly 
crude. Many people simply glue the character fu (wealth) to their 
cash register at every lunar new year, and stylized images of old 
coins are also very popular. 
This particular image, however, with its chubby cheeks and big 
grin, had a burning cigarette hanging out of its mouth. Somehow the 
cigarette transformed the smiling, fat monk into a typically stereo-
typed sneering, overweight hoodlum. I have also heard of people 
who bring dog statues back from the Eighteen Lords temple, and 
who worship them by placing burning cigarettes in their mouths. 
The tie between eighteen dead bodies and the Buddha of the future 
is the idea of easy money and the amorality of earning it. The temple 
itself strengthens the association: the most popular items the temple 
sells after little dogs are statues of the chubby monk. Both the 
Eighteen Lords and the Cloth-bag Monk act as sources of unearned 
wealth, and the cigarettes are a reminder first that unearned wealth 
tends not to be very moral wealth, and second that wealth comes 
from a kind of tit-for-tat reciprocity rather than the hierarchy that 
gods personify. The Cloth-bag Monk suggest resistance again, but 
this time through the subversive irony of the cigarette, rather than 
the inversions of the architecture. 
Goals of Worship 
The Eighteen Lords and similar temples owe much of their rise to 
fame to their ability to meet the needs of their worshipers. Like all 
ghost temples, they have a particular comparative advantage over 
gods when people have needs irrelevant to the orthodox morality of 
the gods. In the last two decades, when such places suddenly got so 
hot and noisy, many people looked to them for help dealing with 
capricious, dangerous, and not especially moral financial situations. 
Most important of these was an illegal lottery that swept Taiwan in 
the 1980s, followed closely by the stock market craze and the general 
uncertainty of small business. 
The lottery came in various versions, but people refer to it 
generically as ''Everybody's Happy" (dlljia le). Everybody's Happy 
depended originally on Taiwan's national lottery, which chose three 
numbers to share the seventh (and last) prize. The odds of winning 
any of the prizes in the national lottery, as usual for such lotteries, 
were astronomical. In the original form of Everybody's Happy, 
people bet on the last two digits of the seventh-place prizes, and 
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the odds of winning on a single bet could thus be as high as three in 
one hundred. Anyone could organize a betting pool by photocopy-
ing sheets of paper with boxes numbered 00 to 99, and taking one 
bet on each number. The amount of the bet varied with the pool, and 
could range from a few dollars to very large sums. When enough 
bets were down (usually when at least fifty of the numbers had been 
taken) the pool was closed. If not enough people made bets or if 
none of the numbers won, the organizer would return all the money; 
if one or more people bet on winners, the organizer would take a 10 
percent cut and divide the rest among the winners.61 Bettors could 
join any number of pools and bet on more than one number within a 
pool. Organizers (zutou) could organize any number of pools. This 
led to the development of some betting specialists - the largest 
caught was said to have over 17 million NT dollars on hand (over 
half a million US dollars). 
The ease of organization of a pool, and the lack of any centralized 
organization running it made Everybody's Happy almost impos-
sible for the government to control. They tried altering the national 
lottery and finally canceled it, but people always found new ways to 
play. Many games became tied to the Hong Kong lottery, but even 
tour buses played off the last two digits of the license plate of a 
passing car. A 1987 police report (Jiang, 1987:1) estimated that 3 
million people were betting on the lottery. 
Bets were often very high, and one of the reasons for the interest 
was the excess of capital in Taiwan in the last few years with very 
few routes for productive investment. As labor costs have gone up, 
many people have been afraid to invest in new labor-intensive 
enterprises, yet have not had the resources for capital-intensive 
industry nor the opportunity and knowledge to invest abroad. 
Combined with the great success of Taiwan's export economy, the 
result by the mid-1980s was unproductive uses of capital- passive 
investments in land or stock for people who saw no plausible 
alternatives. The illegal lottery provided a similar form of invest-
ment, riskier but with a much greater profit for winners, and far 
more fun than other investments. 
Like any good investors, many players of Everybody's Happy 
tried to reduce their risk, in this case by getting an idea of the 
winning numbers in advance. Religion provided one of the most 
popular means for learning numbers. Numbers came from two 
types of sources: deities could give indirect hints about numbers 
(through patterns in incense smoke, for example), or they could 
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communicate the numbers directly, often through spirit possession. 
As a rule, however, temples to more respectable deities would have 
nothing to do with such activities. Instead, people would ask ghosts 
or marginal deities who do not really fit the standard bureaucratic 
model, like the lowly Earth God, Taizi Ye (a small child turned god), 
Sun Wukong (popularized in the West as the mischievous Monkey), 
or Ji Gong (the inebriated Buddhist monk) (Hu, 1986). 
Small and large ghost shrines were even more involved in this, 
and there were close ties with ghostly death. People would spend 
the night in graveyards hoping to be inspired with dreams. 
According to widespread rumor, people would also come to traffic 
accidents to see what number the bodies resembled, or to get the 
numbers of the license plates. High community gods, on the other 
hand, would refuse to give such information, or would give false 
numbers to punish people who asked. Only gods known for 
bucking the system, and especially ghosts, would cooperate with 
these requests for help in an illegal activity. 
One result of this has been a further increase in privately run 
possession cults, and a real economic boom for larger ghost temples. 
In her important study of such cults in the Taichung area, Hu T'ai-li 
(1986) cites evidence that the numbers of temples seeking to enter 
the Daoist Association almost tripled in 1986 compared to the 
annual rate for the previous six years, and that the number of 
spirit medium altars applying for such registration quadrupled at 
the same time. Similarly, the number of officially registered Ji Gong 
temples increased from 12 to 120 between 1981 and 1986. She also 
gives many examples of ghost shrines that have become extremely 
popular, sometimes seeing up to 10,000 worshipers at a time. One 
such shrine commemorates convicts put to death during the 
Japanese occupation. Reminiscent of the Eighteen Lords temple, 
they are worshiped with dog meat, cigarettes and betel nut - all 
''hot" and all considered less than fully respectable vices. 
Temples suggesting numbers would usually be ambiguous, 
offering up three or four digits that could be combined into five-
ten two-digit numbers. With each number having three chances to 
win, and more numbers generated by people watching incense 
smoke or candle drips, the odds of a temple coming up with a 
winning number were very high. A temple that helped the winner 
would see more and more business come its way. In addition, the 
iron-clad rule that all ghostly favors must be repaid in full meant 
that winners had to present the temple with donations of cash or 
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gold medals, or arrange for outdoor opera performances, puppet 
shows, striptease shows or movie showings in front of the temple. 
Some ghost temples had a ten- to twenty-day waiting list for puppet 
show performances (Hu, 1986). Unsuccessful temples, on the other 
hand, suffered serious consequences. For instance, newspaper 
reports described smashed Earth God images that washed ashore 
at a river bend - apparently the result of angry revenge from 
disappointed worshipers (Hu, 1986). As in the capitalist market-
place, there is the possibility for great gain or loss for both parties, 
and successful performance counts for more than traditional values 
or social ties. 
Summary 
The Eighteen Lords offer a cornucopia of inconsistent interpretive 
possibilities: the celebration of unorthodox power in the reversals of 
space and time, the combined loyalty and sexual overflow of the 
dogs, the healing warmth of chicken soup for new mothers, the 
seamy reciprocity of the cigarettes, the contracts enforced by threat 
of violence, and the amoral caprices of making money. As a set, 
these possibilities offer no obvious and consistent message, nor are 
they meant to. Reducing this simply to resistance or accommodation 
would badly oversimplify; the two possibilties are hopelessly 
interwined along with many others. The healing power of sesame 
oil chicken, for example, contradicts the celebration of yin power 
elsewhere, and has no connection to unearned wealth. The satura-
tion results from the accretion of history and creative play with 
ghosts. At the risk of losing some of the exuberance of possible 
connotations, however, we can pull out a few major themes that run 
through most of this discussion and help to explain the greatest 
anomaly about the Eighteen Lords temple: how it could have 
achieved its huge scale, and why the temple blossomed exactly 
when it did. Ordinary ghost temples never even have regular traffic 
- days or weeks may go by with no offerings. No other ghost temple 
has achieved such a scale, where hundreds or thousands of 
supplicant/tourists come day after day. Only a handful of Tai-
wan's most popular god temples operate at a comparable level. 
The first general theme is that the cult serves only the needs of 
individuals. The very definition of ghosts rests on their existence 
apart from any normal social ties. Requests to this cult are thus 
uniformly individualistic: for profit in the lottery, stock market or 
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gambling tables, or for success in (not necessarily legal) business 
enterprises. Second, the Eighteen Lords work on a contract basis, 
creating the sort of marketplace ties that exchange cash for services 
and leave no lasting personal ties. Both the use of cigarettes and the 
threats about repayment reinforce this image. Third, the temple has 
no concern at all about orthodox morality. The physical association 
of the Eighteen Lords temple with pickpockets, the rumored appeal 
of its ritual netherworld to the secular underworld, the dogs and 
their associations with black magic and sexuality, and even a fat 
Buddha with a cigarette hanging out of his mouth continually 
reemphasize the disreputable implications of the cult. The Eighteen 
Lords offer none of the appropriation of official state morality which 
provides the mainstay of ordinary community god temples. They 
contrast even with other unorthodox spirits like Guangxi's King 
Gan or the Taiping God, both of whom served communities, even as 
they challenged other kinds of values. Nevertheless, arguing for the 
cultural difference of the Eighteen Lords is not the same as claiming 
they are resistance. 
WHY NOW? 
Dealings with ghosts need not be immoral in Chinese terms; one can 
make the same requests to ghosts as to gods. The difference is that 
the ghosts grant requests just for the economic reward, while the 
gods require accepted morality and are less mercenary about 
· payment. By the same token, one visits ghosts in the hopes of 
individual profit, and not on behalf of a community. If gods 
reinforce the idea of hierarchy, ghosts scoff at it. Spirits like the 
Eighteen Lords are by no means unique in China, or even in 
complex societies anywhere. For example, ghosts among the Edo 
of the West African Benin Kingdom could have come from a 
description of China: "While relations between the living and the 
incorporated dead have a strong, positive, moral component, ghosts 
are dealt with almost entirely in terms of expediency . . . The 
incorporated dead are the recipients not only of expiatory offerings 
but also of acts of thanksgiving and commell\oration. Ghosts can 
only be bought off'' (Bradbury, 1966:131). 
Our own unincorporated dead work much the same way in the 
West, coming out on Halloween and demanding payment while 
threatening tricks. In Thailand, to cite just one more independent 
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case, the unincorporated dead consist especially of young men who 
died violently and women who died in childbirth, "precisely the 
persons whom the elders have been unable to initiate and install 
into the ordered sequence of community statuses" (Tambiah, 
1970:315). Expert mediums can exploit these spirits to achieve 
either good or bad, and cults to them tend to be peripheral, 
ecstatic, and dangerous (Tambiah, 1970:316). The idea of amoral 
spirits with no community ties thus frequently fills the cracks in an 
otherwise hierarchical system. 
These systems for imagining the unincorporated dead, with their 
emphasis on payment and individuals, also seem well adapted to 
commodity economies, especially where they exist in tension with 
more politically incorporated economies under the control of the 
state. Just such an adaptation occurred in Colombia, where the Devil 
became a trope for the relations of capitalist wage labor (Taussig, 
1980:13-38). Late imperial Chinese ghosts were similarly marginal, 
but in a way that matched the commoditized side of the economy. 
Their individualizing function contrasted with the community base 
of gods, and their faceless anonymity and insistence on keeping the 
terms of a bargain recalled the market in ways that political 
petitions and tribute payments to gods did not. 
There is thus nothing startlingly new for China in the profit-
oriented and self-serving motives that appear in the Eighteen Lords 
temple. A commodity- and individual-oriented undercurrent, rela-
tively unconcerned with problems of morality, has always flowed 
below the surface. While ghosts typically did not reach the glories of 
the Eighteen Lords, they clearly formed part of this undercurrent -
asocial beings willing to enter into any bargain to improve their own 
position. The annual ghost festival repeated the same message when 
the priests threw coins out to the greedy ghosts, and to the 
spectators struggling for them below. The same thing recurred at 
the annual grave-cleaning festival when parents scattered coins over 
the graveyard for their covetous children to gather up. The single 
sticks of incense in ghost offerings also emphasized their indivi-
duality and lack of community ties, recalling those single cigarettes 
for the Eighteen Lords, and contrasting strongly with the massive 
piles of incense and combined clouds of smoke in more standard 
shared incense pots for gods or ancestors. 
In addition, Chinese funerals include a reimbursement of the 
celestial treasury to repay the loan of life with interest by burning 
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piles of spirit money. As Gates argues, this simulates the circulation 
of profit-making capital, treating life itself as a commodity (Gates, 
1987:266-274). Maurice Freedman provides a different kind of 
example: in the specialist system of geomancy, which includes 
siting graves for the benefit of the offspring, one brother may 
manipulate the burial for his own benefit, even to the detriment of 
his other brothers. In this kind of geomancy "the accent is put upon 
the paramountcy of selfish interest, the subordination of forebears, 
and private action," while in ancestor worship it rests "on the 
supremacy of the common good, the dominance of ancestors, and 
collective behavior" (Freedman, 1966:143). 
The very existence of an avowedly amoral, individualistic and 
grasping cult like the Eighteen Lords emphasizes a commercial and 
competitive side to Chinese religion, which is paired against the 
more bureaucratic and Confucian model that occurs in many other 
contexts. Although this seamy side of late imperial religion has 
seen much less scholarly attention, it should come as no surprise in 
a place where the commodity economy was developed as strongly 
as China's by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Ming 
and Qing dynasties saw a rapid increase in petty commodity 
production (especially in silk and cotton), and an enormous 
volume of market trade, especially in grain and cloth (Huang, 
1990:90-91). This trade did not particularly fit into the political 
hierarchy, and spirits like ghosts represented its new tensions 
better than the bureaucratic gods. Late imperial China's uncomfort-
'able connections between bureaucracy and commerce existed just 
as strongly in religion. 
In some ways, then, the Eighteen Lords seem aberrant only 
because we have paid too much attention to precipitated versions 
of religious hierarchy, and too little to the full range of religious 
practice. The new proportioning of religion today is less a structural 
break than a repositioning of values that had always been implied 
by some aspects of Chinese religious practice, even as they were 
being denied by others. Yet this sudden magnification in the 1980s 
itself has great significance. The Eighteen Lords do not shock 
Taiwanese because they are greedy ghosts, but because spirits 
who should be marginal have suddenly become the center of a 
huge cult. Ghosts who should typically be kept at a great distance, 
unseen and unheard, suddenly occupied one of the hottest and 
noisiest temples in Taiwan. 
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Religious Change in the 19808 
The Eighteen Lords temple is only one part of a general repropor-
tioning of popular religion in Taiwan in the 1980s. The primary 
growth areas in all popular religion since about 1970 have been in its 
most individualistic aspects, rather than in those that most empha-
size family or community. The ancestor cult and major community 
god temples are holding their own, even increasing, but the striking 
growth has been in worship through private spirit mediums or 
involving ghosts. Both these areas have especially weak institutions 
of interpretation compared to ancestors or gods in community 
temples. Their interpretive looseness let them adapt easily to 
changing social relations of interpretation in Taiwan . 
. Even with China's relatively weak control over religious inter-
pretation, marginal ghosts fell beyond the scope of most interpretive 
institutions. In addition, possessed mediums are fundamentally 
resistant to control, as I argued for the Taiping. China never had 
strong mechanisms to control the meaning even of ancestors and 
gods, but at least those spirits had written genealogies, experts and 
their texts, and expensive temples. All these things attempted to 
freeze interpretation in ways simply not possible for ghosts or 
mediums. By remaining more thickly indeterminate, these aspects 
of popular religion responded most easily to rapid social change. 
Spirit mediums (tang-b) who provide advice and perform cures 
while possessed by various gods have long been popular in Taiwan. 
Some major community temples have spirit mediums attached to 
them, but most mediums work out of private, unregistered altars, 
usually in their homes. Most of their work is very utilitarian - they 
cure the sick, find lost objects, pronounce on the probable success of 
a business venture, and so on. Most have no ties to the communal 
interests of major temples dedicated to gods and they serve 
individual clients rather than communities. The potential for 
lucrative rewards from the great popular demand for spirit posses-
sion has led a number of mediums to leave community temples in 
order to open up their own altars, as well as creating the great 
increase in the number of the privately owned cults (Li, 1988:7-8). 
At the same time, more and more different gods are appearing on 
these private altars. Community temples usually feature one 
primary deity, often captured in many images. Other gods may 
appear on secondary altars, or in minor positions on the main altar. 
The horde of different gods on private spirit medium altars - as 
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many as forty or fifty different images- reinforces the utilitarian 
functions of such cults. With each deity having its own specialty, 
these temples can meet the needs of a wider variety of clients, just 
like a shop that expands its selection of wares (Li, 1988:11-13). While 
the possessing spirits are not ghosts, much of the message is the 
same, concentrating on utilitarian functions for individuals rather 
than communities. Not coincidentally, spirit medium shrines them-
selves are profit-oriented petty capitalist enterprises. 
Ghosts (kul) in general represent the other major growth sector, 
and they relate even more clearly to utilitarian and individualistic 
needs (Li, 1988). The Eighteen Lords temple itself is just the most 
fashionable of a series of similar cults. At least three similar ghost 
temples rose to unprecedented popularity during the last twenty 
years. The others tended not to share the systematic inversions of 
the Eighteen Lords temple, but they all centered around the graves 
of ghosts and their willingness to grant disreputable requests. 
One temple honors a general named Li Yong who was killed 
fighting aborigines during the nineteenth century. He is perhaps the 
least ghostly of the group, but still his violent death far from home 
marks a basic similarity to other ghosts. The second temple 
commemorates a sort of Robin Hood figure named Liao Tianding. 
Liao was a thief during the Japanese occupation who was very 
generous with the poor. The authorities could never find him, but he 
was finally murdered in his sleep by a brother-in-law who wanted 
the reward. His shrine sits in the middle of a graveyard, and he also 
receives offerings of cigarettes. The third temple houses the remains 
of a mainland soldier who robbed banks with great success, and 
supposedly used the profits to support a friend's child. He was shot 
by firing squad. All of these temples share two important features: 
they honor figures who are beyond official control, and they are 
willing to help people at the bottom of society. As ghosts, they are 
far more flexible about honoring requests than proper gods. 
The growth and transformation of ghost shrines is not new in the 
last decade or so. A number of temples that now appear as ordinary 
god temples began as ghost shrines, whose transformation stemmed 
from their reputations for great efficacy (Harrell, 1974). Even an 
eminent goddess like Mazu began life as a ghostly spirit, a girl who 
died violently and without descendants. As such temples succeed, 
their ghostly origins recede. The new development in ghost temples 
in recent years, however, differs in retaining, and even celebrating 
strong ties to the world of ghosts. The graves stand out conspic-
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uously in all cases, offerings are appropriate to ghosts, temple 
structure resembles overgrown ghost shrines (no curving eaves, 
no door gods), and the beings worshiped happily honor the sorts of 
requests that gods would refuse to recognize. The critical change is 
thus that these temples insistently retain their ghostly appeal, not 
acceding to orthodox morality the way they must to become god 
temples. 
Taiwan has thus fostered the increasing prominence of a set of 
ideas and ritual acts that encompass ghosts, dogs, cigarettes, private 
spirit mediums, and an illegal lottery. Certain potential lines of 
interpretation come up repeatedly within this set: a general percep-
tion of amorality, at most a kind of utilitarianism, and a narrowing 
of focus from family and community down to the individual and his 
or her private needs and desires. While my pulling out these general 
features sacrifices some of the temple's thick evocation, it also points 
to a close relation with Taiwan's economic pyrotechnics of the same 
period. It suggests in particular a close look at the rapid develop-
ment of small-scale entrepreneurial capitalism and of a kind of 
"gambling mentality'' in Taiwan in the 1980s. The new proportion-
ing of religion has both reflected and affected the questioning of 
identity that has accompanied Taiwan's dramatic transformations of 
the last decade. Ghosts and mediums- the most saturated aspects of 
Taiwanese religion - have responded most effectively to those 
changes in social relations. 
Profits and Religion 
It should be no great surprise that this religious embodiment of 
individualism has grown most at exactly the same time as Taiwan's 
small enterprise-based capitalism has thrived. The relation of the 
individual to the marketplace in capitalism, along with the asso-
ciated breakdown of many communal and particularistic ties, has 
been recognized since Marx on commodity fetishism and Durkheim 
on anomie. The new version of the ghost cult also implies that 
success in wealth is capricious and a little corrupt. Several infor-
mants described this as a new respect for piancai. Piancai literally 
means "biased wealth," and is originally a term from divination. It 
refers especially to unearned wealth, and sums up the attitudes in 
gambling, playing the illegal lottery or the stock market, or offering 
cigarettes to the Cloth-bag Buddha (whom one informant described 
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as the God of Biased Wealth). Its special popularity in recent years 
stems in part from real economic experience of the market. 
Any market is to an extent capricious and unpredictable, especi-
ally for the small entrepreneurs and investors who have created 
much of Taiwan's growth. The situation was especially bad, 
however, in the late 1980s, when many people felt that small, 
labor-intensive enterprise would no longer be profitable in Tai-
wan, yet saw no plausible alternatives. The result was a huge 
increase in relatively unproductive investment - an exploding stock 
market, skyrocketing land prices, the thriving illegal lottery. One of 
the most powerful symptoms was a booming underground futures 
market that held perhaps 6 billion US dollars in deposits and offered 
returns of over 50 percent annually (Friedland and Kaye, 1990:54). 
Essentially pyramid schemes built on quicksand, these companies 
collapsed in early 1990. Unregulated margin loans led to an equally 
wild stock market frenzy, moving the market index from 1,000 to 
over 12,000 between 1986 and 1990 (Winn, 1991:10). The craze 
extended to all levels of society, as housewives lined up to buy 
shares and the news began broadcasting prices of the entire market. 
As the Financilll Times put it, "casino-style gambling on the stock 
market had replaced the work ethic" (Elliott, 1990). The inevitable 
crash occurred in early 1990, when the market lost 75 percent of its 
value. 
Profit appeared less as a product of hard work and smart 
decisions, and more as a result of luck, greed and insider connec-
tions. At the same time, the crisis of economic confidence accen-
tuated the tooth-and-claw image of the economy always implied as 
one side of petty entrepreneurial competition. While the stock 
market and gambling dens raged on, high labor costs were tight-
ening the reins on small business. Success appeared increasingly as 
the result of self-serving utilitarianism rather than community 
morality, that is, more ghostly and less godly. 
The capitalist market presents itself as an amoral phenomenon 
where commodities are qualitatively equated through money, and 
have no ties to systems of social relations. Polanyi (1944:163) 
described this as the subjection of labor to the laws of the market, 
which was "to annihilate all organic forms of existence and to 
replace them by a different type of organization, an atomistic and 
individualistic one." More recently, Taussig (1980:26) has described 
similar changes in Colombia, where "communality and mutuality 
give way to personal self-interest, and commodities, not persons, 
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dominate social being." These critics of capitalism emphasize only 
one aspect of the capitalist transformation, and to an extent idealize 
the communal harmonies of pre-capitalist social life. Nevertheless, 
they grasp an important aspect of the growth of capitalism, which 
Taiwan's religious development has emphasized. 
Cultural developments based on a perceived loss of morality have 
turned up frequently in the history of capitalism. The Romantics 
sought to fight it with values beyond an impoverished capitalist 
rationality, and conservatives from Matthew Arnold on resisted it 
with Culture itself. Much of the world-wide religious resurgence, 
especially in Islam and Protestantism, also attempts to re-introduce 
lost values. Taiwan has had similar reactions. They range from some 
intellectuals' reworking of the relationship between Confucianism 
and capitalism, to an esoteric Buddhism fad mostly among college 
students, to a Taiwan culture movement. The most startling growth 
has been in new religions whose spirit possession sessions offer to 
reclaim an earlier set of Confucian or Buddhist values (see Jordan 
and Overmyer, 1986). Yet while all these reactions attempt to 
combat a perceived loss of morals, the Eighteen Lords celebrate 
and utilize the loss, even as they imply a criticism of the market's 
lack of morals. 
The Eighteen Lords' catering to individual and utilitarian needs 
fits this view of the economy as a place where success has less to do 
with morality and good social relations than with self-interest and 
competition against other members of the community. One of the 
episodes in the movie, The Eighteen Lords (which I take up in more 
detail in Chapter 9), describes a gambling incident that illustrates 
this well. A young gambler needs to make a lot of cash to help his 
friend buy off the contract of a prostitute he likes. He and the friend 
ask the Eighteen Lords for help. The spirits respond by leading him 
to a book that describes how to use the umbilical cord of a newborn 
infant as a gambling talisman. It warns, however, that such a use of 
the umbilical cord will permanently damage the fate of the baby. 
The man's wife has conveniently just given birth to a daughter, 
whose umbilicus he yanks off to the protests of the mother and 
wails of the daughter. The tactic proves a great success (except, 
perhaps, for the baby, who is not followed further in the film). Even 
family morality is sacrificed for profit. The film clearly celebrates the 
wonderful power of the ghosts, but their action also shocks in just 
the same way as the temple itself. 
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The increasing commodification of religion itself, especially of 
these newly popular cults, further emphasizes profit over commu-
nity or family morality. Commodification is nothing new in Chinese 
religion, in which temples have asked for donations, specialists have 
sold their services, and people burn paper "money'' to spirits of all 
descriptions. These cults, however, have pushed the profit motive to 
new heights. Tremendous fortunes have been made from the 
Eighteen Lords temple over just a few years. While the main source 
of income is donations in thanks for requests granted, the temple 
also charges for parking, and even for the toilets - a level of petty 
greed that other temples have yet to match. 
The modern media have also added a new dimension to temple 
profitability, as the extensive news, soap opera and film treatments 
of the temple have been as rewarding for the temple as for the 
media. The temple sells the movie soundtrack alongside its little 
ceramic dogs, for example. People consider the Eighteen Lords 
powerfully efficacious, but that need not imply that the temple 
management is motivated by anything other than profit. The spirit 
mediums who are growing just as fast in popularity are open to the 
same kinds of criticism. Even believers know that trance can be 
faked, and that spirit medium altars are businesses like any other. 
Again, their profit motivation is not new; the tremendous popularity 
of such activities is. 
By tying the popularity of ghost temples to the specifics of the 
"gambling economy'' of the late 1980s, I have also implied that such 
cults should decline with further economic change. The stock 
market crash of 1990 brought just such a change. While people still 
play the market, they are considerably chastened, and other forms of 
gambling like Everybody's Happy no longer constitute major 
sensations. At the same time, the Eighteen Lords temple has lost a 
great deal of its former popularity. The change reflects both a 
decline in the more ghostly side of capitalism, and the obvious 
decline in the efficacy of spirit-world stock tips - as you might 
expect, the Eighteen Lords picked winning investments much better 
in a booming market than in a collapsing one. 
The economic experiences of the last two decades have bent 
traditional religious practice in new directions. At the same time, 
however, those practices have given Taiwanese a partial way of 
making sense of their new experiences. The development of the 
ghost cult has played up a theme of individualism and greed that 
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had previously been just a religious undercurrent. Peter Berger 
(1988:8-9) has suggested that popular images of gods provided a 
model of loyalty and cooperation that was pre-adapted to modem 
capitalism. There is a great deal of sense to this, but it is equally true 
that Taiwan's small-scale capitalism has also promoted an image of 
all against all, without any shared moral community. This is the 
image that the rise in the ghost cult played up: the nineteenth-
century image of the free market, red in tooth and claw. The increase 
in ghost worship has responded to the economic e~rience of the 
last two decades, but has also helped shape that experience, 
providing a model of individualistic and amoral competition that 
is part of living in a society of small capitalists. 
I began this chapter by discussing the rich and inconsistent 
complexity of the Eighteen Lords, and have finished with a single 
interpretation that represents my own analysis. That single thread 
inevitably thins the temple's exuberant possibilities, following 
certain lines of potential interpretation over others. Such a reduc-
tion is unavoidable when translating ritual to prose, but is even 
more inseparable from any academic argument. Academic ortho-
doxies, like political ones, are precipitates, and change similarly 
when new ones challenge them. Explicit academic analysis thus 
relates closely to the more political processes I have been discussing. 
I will address intellectual versions of the Eighteen Lords (including 
my own) more fully in Chapter 9, as one of many kinds of 
precipitation of the temple, none of which have had much success 
in altering the original mass of potential meanings. 
The temple and its followers certainly agree on no such unified 
interpretation. The loose commentary on capitalism I have been 
discussing represents only one clear potential to emerge, rendered 
plausible by the social relations of interpretation of the late 1980s. 
Even that commentary, however, offers no systematic message, nor 
does it exhaust the potentials. On the one hand, it condemns 
capitalism as a greedy challenge to proper morality and a reversal 
of proper order. Yet on the other hand, it exuberantly celebrates 
markets, profit and competition. Pulling out only the critique or the 
praise, the resistance or the accommodation, drains the cult of its 
energy and loses sight of the full range of potentials. 
Just like Taiping religion, interpretation here lies as much in the 
society as in the religious practice itself. For all its quirks, after all, 
the Eighteen Lords clearly remain an overblown ghost temple not 
fundamentally different from temples that have existed for centu-
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ries. The critical change was in the broader social relations of the 
1980s. The ease with which ghosts have readjusted themselves to 
changing times results in large part from their saturation: a clear 
interpretation with clerical or elite enforcement could not react 
nearly so flexibly to the changing economy. 
9 
Failed Precipitations 
I have argued that an exuberant and messy multivocality charac-
terized the beginnings of both Taiping religion and the Eighteen 
Lords temple. The early Taiping nearly collapsed from the overload 
of meaning, as the melting of Hong's ideology into local practice 
-foreshadowed the cacophony and chaos that followed during the 
period of mass possessions. Although its roots were very different, 
the Eighteen Lords also offered a surfeit of possibilities rather than 
any single message. Both celebrating and condemning utilitarian 
greed, these spirits evoked a range of images from new mothers to 
merciless gangsters. Despite their diverse origins, the two cases thus 
shared an extreme saturation. Each case also included a potential 
reading as resitance among its complex possibilities. The crux of the 
comparison between the Taiping and the Eighteen Lords lies in how 
the one managed to realize that potential, forging a unified 
interpretation as resistance, while the other defeated all attempts, 
remaining a thick brew of unrealized and inconsistent possibilities. 
This chapter will look in detail at the various attempts to forge a 
unified version of the Eighteen Lords, and at how the temple 
managed to soak up each one, just stirring it into the mix instead 
of being transformed by it. 
Attempts to thin out the overgrown meanings of the Eighteen 
Lords temple were quite consistent and thorough in some cases, and 
more cursory in others. At the very least, however, every attempt 
froze some aspect of the many possibilities that the temple con-
tained, and thus sought to limit the interpretive range. The least 
systematic efforts (including a competing temple to the same spirits 
and the Eighteen Lords movie) retained some of the multivocal 
enthusiasm of the temple, while only partially limiting the interpre-
tive possibilities. More sweeping efforts (including a television soap 
opera and a claim on the Eighteen Lords as lineage ancestors) 
forcefully promoted a single version of the temple. While some of 
these efforts were profitable, and some probably further increased 
the temple's popularity, all fell flat as efforts to determine meaning. 
Each attempt succeeded, at least to a certain extent, in thinning out 
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possible readings of the temple, but each failed to convince the 
broader public that it controlled the single true meaning. I take them 
up here, roughly from the most superficial attempts to unify a single 
meaning to the most thorough. 
THE OTHER EIGHTEEN LORDS 
In 1986, I began to hear about a "fake" Eighteen Lords temple, 
located on the same highway as the original one, but a few 
kilometers closer to Tanshui, the nearest city. Several people told 
me that the new temple was a crude attempt to siphon off traffi~ 
from the real one, since the usual route took most travelers to the 
new one first. The story seemed confirmed one night when I was 
taking a taxi to the original temple. The driver stopped at the new 
one, claiming it was the genuine article. We had agreed on a fixed 
fare, and the driver was trying to shorten his trip. Motivated by 
illegitimate profit, he acted quite in the spirit of both temples, and 
indeed worshiped the Eighteen Lords when we got to the real 
temple. 
Like many new temples, this one began essentially as a business 
venture, founded by ten partners from the local area. It sits on a 
roomier site than the original temple, and is a little larger. Other 
than that, the new temple is a close copy of the old one: it has no 
curved eaves or front wall, the same oversized and brightly lit 
"Eighteen Lords" sign on top, and a god altar on the left with a tiled 
grave on the right. The new temple even copied the underground 
chamber, although the builders arranged the basement room so 
access to the cigarette/incense pot would be easy. The only thing it 
lacked was a following. 
When I interviewed the temple manager and two of the owners, 
they vociferously and repeatedly denounced the charge of fakery. 
That false accusation, they said, stemmed from the original temple, 
which bought ninety minutes of television time to run an extended 
commercial attacking their temple. Their justification for the new 
temple involved a small but crucial rereading of the Eighteen Lords, 
an explicit interpretation that gave them equal claims to authenti-
city. Their claim also began with seventeen unknown fisherman and 
a dog, perhaps in the nineteenth century. In this version, though, the 
bodies were never found and never buried. Instead, the local 
fishermen decided that the ghosts were ruining the fishing in the 
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area, and hired a religious specialist (hoat-su) to perform a ritual 
called "collecting the souls" (siu hun). Collecting the souls, they told 
me, allowed the spirits to rest peacefully in a grave, instead of 
roaming around bothering the fishermen. Other than this one clear 
detail, the owners of the new temple constantly insisted on how 
little anyone knew of the history of the temple or its spirits. This 
claim attempted to undermine alternative versions of the temple. 
In 1985, the Eighteen Lords allegedly inspired a dream, complain-
ing that the original temple was crowded, unpleasant, and possibly 
radioactive. The new owners responded with a new temple, and so 
hired another religious specialist to collect the souls again at the new 
site. Their claim to authenticity thus lay in having performed the 
same ritual act as the original temple, and in the implication that the 
original temple grave housed no bones. The result, they argued, is 
just like having two Mazu temples - both are equally authentic. 
Indeed, they argue for a kind of moral superiority, not just with 
comparisons to an eminent goddess like Mazu, but by pointing out 
that they do not charge for the toilets or for parking. Truly a pot 
calling the kettle black, they said the original temple only wanted to 
make money. They tried to back their claims further by registering 
as an official temple with the Daoist Association, which the original 
temple had never done. The Daoist Association responded that they 
could not register, because the Eighteen Lords were not known 
gods. Not to be stopped so easily, the new temple built a small altar 
to the major deity Guan Gong on the second floor, and registered as 
a Guan Gong temple. 
The new temple appropriated much of the overloaded symbolism 
of the original, including the reversals of time and space, the 
combined god and ghost altars, and the offerings of cigarettes and 
sesame oil chicken. It insisted on explicit and consistent interpreta-
tion only in the origin story, because only that story supports its 
claims to legitimacy. Yet even that one small interpretive claim has 
been a failure, along with the temple as a whole. I visited the new 
temple twice during the day and once at night, and found it nearly 
empty on every occasion. The obvious financial opportunism of the 
new temple certainly made people suspicious, but in itself need not 
undercut the temple. After all, everyone knows the original temple 
makes huge profits. 
Instead, the problem lay in their explicit interpretation, which 
convinced no one. The story simply struck most people as implaus-
ible. The idea of graves without bones is very unusual; but even 
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worse, the claim about collecting the souls appeared false to 
everyone I asked. Collecting the souls is one of the most common 
curing rituals in Taiwan, performed by specialists for babies who 
have lost their souls, which are still loosely attached at first. People 
found any other use implausible, and the claim about doing the 
ritual for the Eighteen Lords just accentuated suspicions that this 
was really a fake temple that could not accomplish anything. In 
addition, and most crucially, the temple had no social mechanism 
for promoting its version of things; they could not afford lengthy 
television commercials. Even a more plausible precipitation would 
fail without the construction of a social structure of interpretation. 
THE MOVIE 
While the fake temple captured the shape of the original without its 
heat and noise, the movie came closest to the real spirit of the 
Eighteen Lords (Shibtl Wanggong, 1985). Like the temple architecture, 
the structure of the movie offered a kind of parody on post-
modernism. The disjointed plot slapped together a set of unrelated 
anecdotes, and its moral implications ran a chaotic range from the 
importance of loyalty and respect to the pleasures of sex and money. 
Even the language ran riot, with an unpredictable mix of Japanese, 
Mandarin, Hokkien, and Hakka. The movie pushed at the moral 
limits of Taiwanese society, with partial nudity and profanity right 
at the border of censorship. The film came off as a cheap attempt to 
capitalize on the commercial success of the temple. As such, it made 
an excellent mirror for the greedy and amoral temple it celebrated. 
Yet even the movie inevitably froze the heat and noise of the temple 
into a limited set of anecdotes, and thus lost much of the richness of 
the original. 
After a short prologue of sexual punning between a prostitute and 
a Japanese tourist at the temple, the first major plot began with 
another prostitute, on the verge of leaping from a cliff to her death. 
A large dog saw her, and indirectly saved her life by running a 
motorcycle off the road. The.two men riding the motorcycle saw the 
woman, and talked her into worshipping the Eighteen Lords instead 
of killing herself. These two young men were the handsome hero, A-
kai, and his faithful sidekick, Ban-ji. Both gambled compulsively. At 
the temple, the prostitute realized that the dog must be the 
incarnation of the one worshipped there. She also learned from 
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the Eighteen Lords that she would soon meet a "gentleman." With 
its sexual beginning and the focus on prostitution and gambling. the 
film already placed itself squarely within the dominant theme of the 
temple. 
Viewers soon learned the cause of the heroine's depression. In her 
country ignorance, she had been tricked into debt bondage to her 
pimp. She no longer wanted to work for him, and he had taken her 
to court over the debt. The plot was transparent: handsome A-kai 
was the gentleman of her fate, and he would win enough money 
gambling to buy her from the pimp. In the middle of the sexual 
intercourse that followed A-kai's announcement of his intentions, 
the heroine quietly crooned, "Thank you, Eighteen Lords." The film 
worked its way to its climax through a series of episodes that 
showed the power of the Eighteen Lords, but that also painted the 
spirits as a wildly inconsistent mix of loyalty and perfidy, respect 
and mischief. First came a run-in with an exorcist and healer (hoat-
su) named A-cui. In the process of trying to divine who the 
"gentleman" was, A-cui insulted the Eighteen Lords and pawed 
the prostitute. The Eighteen Lords responded by humiliating him. 
The next day, A-cui set up a large outdoor altar to take magical 
revenge on the Eighteen Lords. This time, the response came on a 
much larger scale, wreaking mischievous havoc on a number of 
bystanders. First, the eighteen ghosts attacked the possessed 
medium assisting A-cui; from the steady shaking of his trance, the 
medium suddenly began involuntarily break dancing and moon-
walking until he finally passed out. A-cui found himself sitting in a 
burning incense pot, and then chased through town in mid-air. 
During the chase, the Eighteen Lords also caused a concussion, a 
motorcycle crash, the destruction of a vendor's cart, and the 
humiliation of a young woman who found ' herself inexplicably 
stripped to her skimpy underwear, to the pleasure of the bystan-
ders, the movie audience, and presumably the Eighteen Lords. All 
the mischief had no result though- A-cui fled to the temple of a 
higher god (the Dragon King), and the Eighteen Lords respectfully 
stopped at the door. 
From A-cui's humiliation, the film switched to examples of the 
amoral power of the temple. At one point, for example, the evil 
pimp bemoaned his poor business, and commanded his workers to 
worship at the dog temple. Even though this man was the worst 
enemy of the heroine, the Eighteen Lords cannot resist any request, 
and business boomed for the pimp right away. In another such 
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episode, Ban-ji, the sidekick, wanted help with his bad gambling 
luck. The Eighteen Lords told him the only cure was "spirit money 
under the ass." Ban-ji tried this by stealing celestial treasury money 
from a funeral he passed. This is the money repaying the original 
debt of the deceased, and stealing it will presumably harm the soul. 
Neither Ban-ji nor the Eighteen Lords seemed to care, though. He 
sprinkled ashes from the money under the chairs of other gamblers, 
whose luck suddenly turned sour. 
This scene reproduced the dynamics of the biggest gambling coup 
in the film, which I have already mentioned - Ban-ji tore the 
• umbilical cord from his newborn daughter, destroying her fate, 
but winning enough money to allow A-kai to buy the prostitute. The 
happy heroes repaid the temple, as they had to, with a large gold 
medal. The entire story painted an insouciantly inconsistent picture 
of the temple. While the Eighteen Lords saved the prostitute and 
punished the disrespectful exorcist, they also helped the evil pimp, 
celebrated gambling and prostitution, cost the fate of both a baby 
and a dead soul and thoroughly upset a throng of innocent 
bystanders. The contradictory moral dynamics of the film thus 
stayed close to the spirit of the temple. The possible reading as 
resistance lies close to the surface here. 
An unrelated interlude followed, where a doctor and a coffin-
maker got kicked out of the temple. People feared that they would 
pray for good business, that is, sicknesses to cure or deaths to bury. 
The Eighteen Lords will do anything, after all. The rest of the movie 
bore no relation to the earlier plot, except that some of the characters 
reappeared in new roles. Most of the new developments centered on 
A-cui, who had now given up the exorcism business. The ghost of a 
beautiful young woman was haunting him and his family. In an 
effort to find out who she was, A-cui and two friends tried the Ouiji-
like ''bowl spirit'' that I have already mentioned. Unfortunately for 
him, however, the bowl attracted the very ghost he was trying to 
avoid. Once again, A-cui found himself terrorized and humiliated, 
and ran off to his daughter's house. 
Meanwhile, his son came home on leave from the army. He ran 
straight into the beautiful ghost, who began a deadly seduction in 
the classic style of Chinese spirit femmes fatales. Just as the clothes 
were about to come off, though, a shining ray of light blasted from 
the sun (a Nationalist symbol) on his army hat, hurling the ghost 
back against the wall. "Take off your hat," she moaned, and 
foolishly, he did. A-cui interrupted them a few minutes later, and 
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she fled, baH-naked and leaving the unconscious soldier behind. 
Her rout was quite temporary, though, and she returned to terrorize 
A-cui and his family still further. 
The daughter finally asked the Eighteen Lords for help, but they 
refused. They even appeared in a dream to A-kai, the hero of the 
first part of the film who now worked as a volunteer in the temple. 
They told A-kai that they were helping the ghost, and that he should 
not intercede on behaH of her victims. Nevertheless, when A-cui and 
his entire family showed up in a wild panic the next day, everyone 
asked the Eighteen Lords to help him, and the spirits felt compelled 
to accede. Suddenly the seventeen Lords (the dog did not help) 
turned on the ghostly woman. As ghosts themselves, they were 
having a hard time defeating her, when Guanyin, the Goddess of 
Mercy, finally intervened. A truly eminent deity, she commanded 
the instant respect of all the combatant ghosts. At last, the audience 
learned from the divine arbitration that A-cui had killed the young 
woman in a hit-and-run accident. She agreed to stop her haunting if 
reparations were paid and A-cui was arrested. With peace restored, 
the movie ended. While this final part of the film dropped the 
pleasures of prostitution and gambling (though it still has plenty of 
sex and profanity), it again showed the Eighteen Lords blissfully 
switching sides, from their defense of the wronged spirit to their 
attack on behalf of her murderer. Hardly a powerful moral voice, 
the temple just serves its customers, an equal-opportunity vendor of 
fee-for-service miracles. 
I had not seen a Taiwanese film since the late 1970s, and this one 
amazed me. It simply could not have been made a few years earlier. 
The sex and profanity would have been censored out, and the 
happy prostitutes and gamblers would have been excluded as 
immoral. Even the linguistic range showed the extent to which 
official control over film had been relaxed - only Mandarin had 
been peril' 11"lier. The new freedom in film allowed this movie 
i.o respond to atarket opportunities quickly, and to reflect fairly well 
the spirit of the temple itself. Like the temple, the movie had plenty 
of standard moral bits thrown in, including the powerful role of the 
upright goddess Guanyin, the ridicule of exorcists and spirit 
po.ss~ion (which reflected educated and often official attitudes), 
the importance of being respectful, and even a nod toward patriot-
ism in the magical powers of the soldier's hat. Here it suggests 
accommodation much more than resistance. Yet the mischievous 
trickery and general antics of the Eighteen Lords stood alongside 
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those moralistic bits, as did their willingness to serve anyone who 
promised a reward: they helped an unhappy prostitute against her 
pimp, but also helped the pimp make more money; they helped the 
ghost against A-cui, but turned against her when A-cui himself 
asked for help. 
One might argue that such gross inconsistencies reflect the speed 
and greed that marked the making of the film at the expense of any 
kind of integrity, but much the same process went on in the temple, 
too. Like the temple, the film remained relatively free of unifying 
interpretation because no one created a more explicit and integrated 
message for it - neither the film nor the temple really cared about 
such precipitation. Yet compared to the temple, the film still looks 
thin and silly. Frozen into a hundred minutes, the movie necessarily 
lost much of the thickness of the temple. For example, cigarettes, 
sesame oil chicken, and the underground chamber played essenti-
ally no role in the movie, even though they add much to the 
evocations of the temple. The film was popular, but failed to focus 
any integrated interpretation of the temple because it neither offered 
a convincing single version of things nor fully caught the rich range 
of possibilities in the temple. The film was less of a failure than the 
other cases I discuss here only because it had much lower ambitions 
to impose a unfied interpretation. To the extent that it inevitably 
thinned out the possibilities of the original temple, however, it had 
no effect on consiousness. Its influence (like most films) was 
ephemeral, lasting a few weeks and then gathering dust in video 
stores. 
TELEVISION: THE EIGHTEEN LORDS GO STRAIGHT 
The changes of the 1980s brought a great deal of commercial and 
artistic freedom to the Taiwanese film industry, but had much less 
influence in television. Taiwan still has only three television 
stations, all of them very conservative and well-behaved toward 
the government, in contrast to the press or cinema. 62 Quite unlike 
both the original and copy-cat temples and the film, a clear plot and 
a clear interpretation permeated the television soap., opera, The 
Strange Tale of the Eighteen Lords (Shiba Wanggong Chuanqi, 1985). 
Although the soap opera appeared within a few months of the 
movie, the two media illustrated enormously different views of the 
temple, from the chaotic antics of society's margins in the movie, to 
162 Taiwanese Ghosts 
heroism, patriotism and loyalty on television. In fact, the soap opera 
fit a broad pattern of politically safe historical tales in Taiwan, where 
patriotic Chinese loyalists fight off foreign conquerors and their 
dangerous ideas. The favorite example is the mass of Ming loyalists 
who fled to Taiwan to fight the invading Manchus and their new 
Qing Dynasty. The parallels to the Guomindang flight to Taiwan in 
1949 are obvious to everyone. 
The writers at the Chinese Television System network (CTS) 
squeezed the Eighteen Lords into this mold by inventing a history 
for the inhabitants of the grave.63 Sometime in the 1850s, our 
seventeen human heroes formed a secret religious brotherhood, 
swearing a blood oath of loyalty in a Guan Gong temple. Typical 
for such oaths and such societies in southern China at the time, they 
swore to oppose the Manchu Qing Dynasty and restore the Ming, 
and to die on the same day even though they were born on different 
ones. Unfortunately, the Qing troops heard about the ritual and 
surrounded the temple. Just in time, though, the dog Blackie 
(actually acted by a borrowed police dog named lisa, dyed black 
for the occasion) showed up to warn the plotters. The eighteen fled 
to the coast, with the army in hot pursuit. The heroes then fought an 
"explosive life-and-death battle for nationalist loyalty and righ-
teousness, alarming heaven and earth, moving even the ghosts 
and gods to tears" (Chen, 1985:~31). The seventeen humans all 
died in the end, fighting on the boat they were using to flee. The 
Qing troops were so awed by the heroes that they failed to burn the 
bodies, and the boat floated miraculously to Taiwan, where the soap 
opera no longer followed the story. This was a story of patriotism 
and heroism, with no sex or profanity, no gamblers or prostitutes, 
no mischief or miracles beyond a very clever dog. The interpretive 
complexity of the temple had been reduced to a simple story. 
In the summer of 1991, another soap opera wrought the same 
transformation on the liao Tianding grave-temple, whose popular-
ity had boomed along with the Eighteen Lords. like The Strange 
Tale of the Eighteen Lords, the Uao Tianding story dropped any 
reference to efficacious ghosts or to the kinds of requests related to 
the temple. In fact, the two stories clearly fit a single genre: the Uao 
Tianding soap just substituted one robber for seventeen young 
fighters, and Japanese colonial oppressors for Manchu conqueror 
overlords. Both cases featured brave but hopeless struggles against 
foreign exploiters of the Chinese people. liao, of course, was still a 
robber in the television version of his life, but all his crimes aimed 
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at correcting colonial injustice. He plundered only Japanese rulers 
and rich collaborators. Both stories bowdlerized their heroes, 
excising the very features that made them such powerful and 
popular ghosts. Both also claimed the temples as memorials to 
loyal patriots, ignoring their actual function as marketplaces for 
miracles. The official crs viewers' magazine even imitated the fake 
temple's comparison of the Eighteen Lords to Mazu, Taiwan's most 
popular goddess, claiming that their worthy achievements made 
them gods in the popular mind, spirits worthy of respect (Chen, 
1985:31). 
In spite of the relatively clear, politically approved and morally 
upright intent of these serials, the single message they pulled out of 
their sources was neither as pure nor as thin as may at first appear. 
The efficacy of the temple itself, for example, frequently came up in 
publicity for the soap opera, although it had been carefully removed 
from the story. The official viewers' magazine reported that the 
Eighteen Lords themselves chose the names for their characters, 
when the director went to the temple for a divination session. The 
magazine also told how one of the stars went to worship there while 
waiting to hear if he got the role. As usual, the Eighteen Lords did 
their best, and he got the part the next day (Cai and Xiao, 1985:35). 
The lyricist also claimed to be a fervent devotee of the temple, and 
alleged that the idea for the story came to him in a dream inspired 
by the ghosts (Zhang, 1985:16-20). Thus while the front-stage 
performance itself attempted a consistent message enforcing a 
single version of the temple, some of the Eighteen Lords' actual 
complexity snuck in the back door, especially in attempts to drum 
up public interest. 
The Eighteen Lords soap opera had some influence as entertain-
ment, and partially succeeded in wresting a unified interpretation 
out of the temple. Yet it failed as an attempt to propagate a new 
interpretation. No one I met ever told the soap opera version as the 
real story of the temple. The producers, of course, intended only to 
entertain, not propagandize. Yet the consistent pattern of their 
productions also indicated the pressure to toe a certain political 
and moral line. Whatever their intention, the result proclaimed a 
certain vision of the temple, and provided a potential seed to 
crystallize a new interpretation. The seed failed to grow less 
because the story lacked any real evidence, than because the soap 
opera refused to capture most of what made the temple so 
appealing - the amoral power of the ghosts. 
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Worse still, the television show had no social mechanism to 
promote its version. Rather than achieving a unified vision of the 
temple, the serial found itself irresistibly sucked into the general 
mix, just another element of overloaded significance. The effect 
occurred both in the back-stage reports of the actual role of temple 
miracles in making the soap opera, and in the way people would 
include the television version as just one of many possibilities for 
the temple's origins. Any other result would have required a social 
organization of interpretation on a scale comparable to what the 
Taiping did in 1850. Like film, television freezes a certain version of 
things, but is finally ephemeral, disappearing back into the general 
babble of interpretations. If the Eighteen Lords someday evolve into 
a more standard god temple and attempt to lose their ghostly 
trappings, the soap opera version might come back to life as a 
justification. For now, however, with no social mechanism to 
overcome the black hole effect of the temple, the soap opera will 
create no unified interpretation. 
A GHOSTLY LINEAGE 
The final twist on the Eighteen Lords appeared in a little booklet 
available free in the temple. Written in response to the supposed 
misinformation in the movie and television series, the book gave the 
"true" origins of the spirits, most of whom turned out to be 
ancestors of the local Lian family (two of whom wrote the book, 
Lian and Lian, 1985). The book named each of the spirits, and 
provided quick biographies of each, even the dog (called Black 
Dragon in this version). The biographical sketches characterized 
each person by virtue: filial piety, bravery, repaying past kindness, 
providing education for the poor, and wisdom. Each showed a 
worthy person, not at all ghostly. Sometime during the Tongzhi 
reign (1862-1874), twelve Lians, five others and the dog set out from 
their home village in Fujian to join relatives who had already settled 
in northern Taiwan. They died in transit, but the boat somehow 
washed ashore at just the village they had hoped to reach. Not 
knowing who they were, the local Lians buried the bodies. Some 
decades later, one of the Taiwan branch visited family back in 
Fujian, heard the tale of the lost relatives, and realized that the 
bodies were lineage relatives. 
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The rest of the booklet detailed specific evidence for the efficacy of 
the temple. Most of the stories, but not all, concerned the Uan 
family. All of them, however, typified the kinds of tales commonly 
told about community gods. A flying dog, for example, chased off 
an Allied bomber during World War ll. When the local Japanese 
colonial office extracted too much tax on grain, the dog allowed the 
_ office to be bombed, first warning a Uan relative to escape. They 
also brought fishing boats safely to shore, saved maidens in distress, 
and mended broken families. Nothing ghostly remained of these 
ghosts; they had become protectors of community and family, not 
marginal challenges. Only one of the nineteen stories in the booklet 
even touched on the sort of ghostly figure that made the temple 
famous. Strongly reminiscent of the film version, the story told of a 
suicidal prostitute, saved by the Eighteen Lords and told she would 
soon meet and marry her savior. All this came to pass, and she 
became an upright mother of three. Yet unlike the film, this little tale 
disliked the prostitution and had no gambling. It was a moral fable 
of a woman saved from disgrace, not a celebration of illicit pleasure 
and profit. 
This story is no more implausible than the story of the soap opera 
or the "fake" temple, nor is it any more effective. By no coincidence, 
the chairman of the temple committee is a member of this Uan 
family. In making a kinship claim on the Eighteen Lords, the book 
also claimed the temple's finances. Thus like the fake temple, 
financial motives immediately undercut the appeal of this attempt 
at a unified interpretation. Even more important, the booklet had a 
very limited circulation. Even temple employees largely ignored it, 
and told the more standard version of the temple as anonymous 
ghosts. Like the other attempts at interpretive control, the temple 
simply swallowed up and digested this one. With no social control 
over interpretation, each attempt to impose a clear meaning on the 
Eighteen Lords failed. 
ACADEMIC VERSIONS 
Academic readings of the temple necessarily differ from these other 
interpretations in their intellectual context, goals, style and means of 
transmission. Yet like all the others, academic versions also impose a 
single interpretation, molding a single order on a saturated original 
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that remains overstocked with latent orders but reducible to none. 
While academic analyses of this specific temple are rare, it neverthe-
less provides a good example for theories about cultural resistance 
or acquiescence. By taking up both possibilities here, I want to show 
how either of these possible academic readings - as resistance or as 
accommodation - captures real potentials of the Eighteen Lords. 
Yet, like the other versions I have been discussing, they also lose 
sight of the great allure inherent in the temple's interpretive chaos, 
and fail to capture most people's real experience. In fundamental 
ways, then, academic theories (including this one) resemble folk 
precipitations of the temple. 
Much about the Eighteen Lords resembles other cases where no 
organized or open resistance takes place, but the argument for 
cultural resistance looks strong. In some ways, the temple and 
associated ghost cults in Taiwan bear a striking resemblance to 
Devil worship by the miners and rural proletarians in Colombia and 
Bolivia that Michael Taussig discussed (1980). In both cases, rapidly 
changing social conditions promoted elements of traditional reli-
gious practice that resonated with the amoral and competitive 
aspects of capitalism. For example, Colombian claims about huge 
profits from bedeviled money that had been baptized instead of a 
baby have a striking affinity with the stolen umbilical cord as 
gambling talisman in the Eighteen Lords movie. Both empowered 
their masters to make easy, unearned profits, and both doomed 
babies as a result. Taussig saw this as a metaphor for (and a 
damnation of) interest-bearing money under capitalism, and ana-
lyzed his Latin American cases primarily as a protest against the 
capitalist exchange-value economy pushing out earlier values of 
reciprocity based on a use-value economy. 
This explanation will not work in Taiwan; Taiwan before 1970 
was in no sense a use-value economy.64 Yet Taussig's analysis helps 
clarify one facet of capitalist economic experience in Taiwan, and 
brings out some of the strong potentials for resistance in the temple 
that the movie especially emphasized. The Latin American cases 
help focus on the competition, greed, and lack of community values 
inherent as one aspect of capitalism. This seamy side of develop-
ment came to the fore in the 1980s in Taiwan, where ghosts 
provided the natural carrier for such meanings. The temple offers 
plenty of evidence for such a reading as a critique of economic 
change: the anomie and individualized nature of ghosts themselves, 
the emphasis on the social underworld, the ties to illegitimate 
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wealth, and the reversals of space and time with their valorization 
of yin, darkness, and danger. 
I have argued from the beginning, however, that when meaning 
remains overwhelmingly multivocal, the claim for cultural resis-
tance nearly always has a plausible twin reading as accommodation. 
The Eighteen Lords are no exception. Parts of the cult pick up on 
values that shed a very different light on economy and society. The 
cigarettes, for example, underscore reciprocity, and the dogs 
emphasize loyalty. When the soap opera made the seventeen 
humans a religious brotherhood sworn to mutual support, it was 
picking up on a possibility already inherent in the temple. Even 
more importantly, the very features that suggest the resistance 
reading also seem to celebrate capitalism. Ghosts are not really the 
Devil: they are not evil embodied, and worshipping them is no sin. 
Ghosts are just the unincorporated dead, pitiful and desperate. 
Unlike the Devil stories, worshipping the Eighteen Lords need not 
harm anyone, and in fact offered mostly fun and profit. Rather than 
condemning capitalist profit, this temple reveled in it. 
The same twin readings show up if we focus on politics instead of 
economics, just as they did for the pig offerings on the community 
god's birthday. If god worship affirms the political hierarchy and 
community structure, the recent fad for ghost worship can be seen 
as a challenge to that structure. On the other hand, as Eco argued 
about Carnival, one could read all those reversals just as reminders 
of the structure itself. Every one of these academic readings robs the 
temple of its thick and complex meanings, just like the non-
academic versions of the temple. It should come as no surprise 
that, in the absence of any institutions of interpretive control, no 
precipitation comes to dominate the field of possibilities, as each is 
engulfed by the deluge of meanings in the temple itself. Each of the 
attempts to control interpretation that I have discussed had self-
serving goals (profit, propaganda, promotion)~ but could only 
realize these goals by successfully imposing their reading on 
people. None has managed this. 
The benefits of hindsight make it easy to classify the Taiping 
rebellion as resistance. The Eighteen Lords offer no such luxury. On 
the contrary, even asking whether such a loosely interpreted cult 
resists anything forces a problematic reduction of its full range of 
meaning. The God Worshipers themselves were just as saturated in 
the late 1840s, but underwent a critical transformation that has 
never occurred for the Eighteen Lords. The difference between the 
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two cases thus does not lie in some fundamental meaning of their 
ideas as resistance in one case and acquiescence in the other; the 
difference lies instead primarily in their very different social 
organizations of interpretation. Both had potential readings as 
resistance. The comparison allows us to focus on the cultural and 
social conditions that allow one potential to be realized while others 
are lost. What allowed the Taiping to forge a unified interpretation, 
but not the Eighteen Lords? Given the many attempts to control the 
meaning of the Taiwanese ghosts, both academic and popular, why 
have none of them made much difference? The following chapter 
takes up various broader attempts to control interpretation in 
Chinese religion, nearly all of which fail. Indeterminate meaning 
creates a free space that places powerful limits on any form of 
cultural domination. I will argue in addition that the particular 
nature of this ghost cult and its social relations make a unified 
interpretation as resistance- to either Taiwan's economic or political 
order - unlikely. 
10 
The Limits to 
Cultural Domination 
Attempts to forge a single, shared meaning fail when no strong 
social relations of interpretation support them. Only the enormous 
and difficult social transformation of the Taiping movement bol-
stered and energized the creation of their new ideology. In the 
absence of any comparable organization for most of Chinese 
popular religion, the maintenance of its free space against the 
propagation of explicit, unified interpretations should be no sur-
prise. The one social organization large and powerful enough to 
exert an effective influence was the state. While Guangxi in the 
1840s had a feeble and faltering state, Taiwan since World War II 
has had a powerful and intrusive one, especially concerned with 
control over ideas. That state has often tried to influence religious 
interpretation, yet it never succeeded, even at its most authoritarian. 
The power of indeterminate free space like the Eighteen Lords 
temple allowed it to digest attempts at control, and placed strict 
limits on the possibility of cultural domination. The temple illumi-
nates the weakness of even a strong state, which cannot construct 
tight organizations of interpretive control everywhere at once. 
HEAT, NOISE, AND CHAOS 
Chinese governments, including the imperial bureaucracy, Taiwan 
and the People's Republic, have always struggled against "chaos" 
(lwm). Chaos describes the breakdown of the natural order of things, 
from revolutions and natural disasters to premarital sex and messily 
arranged furniture. Chaos, in other words, describes the very values 
of overwhelming sight, sound, action, and meaning celebrated in 
the popular concept of heat and noise, where neat structures 
collapse and order is unclear. Overmyer (1989) documents how 
the state consistently deplored this side of popular religion, hoping 
to detoxify it through official ritual regulations. The Collected 
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Imporlllnt Documents of the Song Dynasty, for example, described the 
destruction of over a thousand spirit medium shrines in the year 
1111. The point was to protect the world from those who "do weird 
and immoral things and damage popular customs," and who '1ead 
astray the sons and daughters of good families to transmit their 
teachings and weird rituals" (Overmyer, 1989:40). As I have argued, 
spirit mediums imply an inherent threat to order, whatever they 
actually say. By their nature, the divinely inspired statements of 
mediums were chaos, challenging the authority of the state by 
providing a new and unquestionable voice outside official control. 
Controlling Chaos 
In an unenforced attempt to control all the chaos of popular religion, 
the Collected Statutes of the Great Ming Dynasty banned most worship: 
''The common people are to make offerings to uncared for ghosts of 
the village and district and to the spirits of their grandparents and 
parents. They may also sacrifice to the god of the stove. All other 
[sacrifices] are prohibited" (Overmyer, 1989:23). These attempts to 
control chaos existed mostly on paper, more as self-proclamations of 
ideals than actual policies. Yet there were also regular state attempts 
to have a real influence on popular religious practice. 
As I have documented elsewhere for the annual ghost festival in 
Taiwan, these attempts had very little effect (Weller 1987b). That 
festival had become a large, raucous affair in nineteenth-century 
Taiwan, when tens of thousands might gather for the rowdy ritual. 
Yao Ying (whom we met earlier as an official trying to stop the early 
Taiping) also spent time in Taiwan, where he attempted to manip-
ulate the festival by writirig a special ritual text to be read, urging 
peace in the fractious populace (Yao, 1957:85--87). Taiwan's first 
governor took the stronger step of banning the ritual entirely in 1889 
(Taiwansheng Tongzhi, 1980:18). Neither attempt left signs of any 
effect at all in the historical record. 
The Nationalists brought a much stronger state to Taiwan with 
some very different foundations. Yet almost immediately, they took 
similar steps to control the festival. Newspapers reported in 1948 
that police would disperse any performance of the ritual in certain 
parts of Taiwan, as part of the general policy of "suppressing chaos 
and being frugal" (kanluan jieyue) (Xinsheng Bao, 9 August 1948:6). 
While they lightened their touch considerably in the years that 
followed, they continued to discourage large ritual performances 
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as wasteful extravagance. In 1960, for example, the government held 
meetings to discourage large meat offerings and feasts during the 
festival (Xinsheng Bao, 3 September 1960:3). They offered prizes to 
communities that saved the most. Data on the number of pigs 
slaughtered, however, again showed that the campaign had no 
success (Weller, 1985:58). 
The more indirect effects of the government's efforts appeared 
when I was living in Sanxia in 1978. The major community temple 
held a planning meeting, where the influential leaders of the temple 
called together all the village heads to plan for the ghost festival. 
Constantly appealing to the government for approval of various 
aspects of their ongoing reconstruction, the leadership urged a 
token gesture toward government desires by asking people to 
bring only vegetarian offerings to the festival. The village heads 
opposed the idea immediately, and as usual, the attempt to 
manipulate the festival failed. 
Like most large temples, Sanxia's also made other relatively 
inconsequential nods toward official preferences. The temple man-
agement wrote a formal introduction to the temple, which is 
translated into English and offered only to occasional tourists. It 
suggests a version of the deity that neatly fits the pattern from the 
Eighteen Lords and Liao Tianding soap operas. Co Su Kong, we 
learn, tried unsuccessfully "to rally patriots to preserve the Sung 
[Song] Dynasty from invasion by Genghis Khan, who, in 1206, 
founded the Yuan or Mongol Dynasty. Inspired by his example, 
[the god's] descendants helped greatly in the overthrow of the Yuan 
Dynasty and the establishment in 1368 of the [ethnically Chinese] 
Ming Dynasty" ("Brief Introduction ... ", 1990). Once again a 
Chinese hero fights the good fight against the invading hordes. 
The description neatly ignores other aspects of the legend that fit the 
official line less well, like the hero's retirement to the mountains as a 
Buddhist hermit, or the locally far more salient stories of the 
miraculous help he has given not to the nation, but only to 
residents of his own turf around Sanxia. Except for the temple 
management and a very occasional tourist who picks up the 
information sheet, this is another interpretation without an audi-
ence. 
Another very similar instance of this pattern occurs in ''Moun-
tainstreet'' village (Feuchtwang, 1992:182-183). They have many 
versions of their god, Ang Gong, including the usual very local 
miracle stories. An official school version, however, associated the 
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deity with two Song Dynasty patriots. In fact, these men actually 
existed in the Tang, several centuries earlier, but the transformation 
to the Song makes a more officially welcome tale of fights against 
barbarian occupiers. 
Creating Alternatives 
A secular state like Taiwan no longer has the option of trying to 
control popular religion by offering a wholesale alternative, as the 
imperial state had done in the official state cult. The current 
government does, however, retain a small echo of the old rituals 
in an annual celebration honoring Confucius on his birthday. The 
ritual takes place at Taipei's Confucian temple, and claims to 
reconstruct traditional practice. Confucius' birthday differs radi-
cally from popular ritual. It is literally a performance, acted in 
front of an invited audience of seated notables, and quite different 
in character from the chaotic comings and goings and broad 
participation in popular ritual. It is strictly lineal in organization, 
with the name of each stage droned out by a celebrant, unlike the 
complex and multiple action of everyday religion. Even the music is 
simple and straightforward, in contrast to the polyrhythmic drums 
and wailing reeds in popular ritual. The Confucian ritual comes off 
as a thin and frozen anachronism, completely lacking heat and 
noise. In the spirit of Confucius himself, they have rooted out all 
chaos from the ritual. The advantage of a thin performance in front 
of a select audience lies in the ability to control interpretation, just as 
it did when the state cult really existed. Quite unlike popular ritual, 
everything is neatly boxed up here. 
Unknown to most of Sanxia's people, the Co Su Kong temple 
performs a very similar ritual at the lunar new year. When I saw it in 
1978, it began at 11:30 on the last night of the old year. The ritual had 
been organized by Li Meishu, the head of the reconstruction and a 
powerful figure in the town. The participants included some of his 
personal followers and much of the elite of the older generation, 
especially those politically allied with Li - people like the son of 
Sanxia's last official xiucai degree holder. There were no spectators 
at all, except for a few people who wandered in by accident. Li 
explained that when the temple reconstruction was finished, they 
would do the ritual with the doors closed, keeping the masses out. 
Li had designed the ritual on the model of the ceremony in the 
Confucian temple. It began with an announcer who gravely intoned 
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each stage: three sets of solemn single beats on a drum, a procession 
of the participants, a hand washing, and three presentations of 
offerings and incense, interspersed with bows and musical inter-
ludes. The music resembled the Confucian performance, although 
they substituted elite instruments like the guqin for the archaic 
instruments in the official ritual. In both cases, though, the music 
was simple, quiet, and very different from popular religious music. 
The celebrant described the offerings with archaic terms (like 
"burying the hair and blood"), but in fact they resembled standard 
meat offerings, paper spirit money, plus some wine in an archaic 
vessel. 
By keeping the public away, and by keeping the ritual simple, 
linear and tied to Confucian texts, U managed to eliminate most of 
the surfeit of meaning in popular ritual. By the same token, he also 
eliminated all the excitement and interest for most people. A 
marked contrast occurred just a few minutes after the Confucian 
ritual ended, when hundreds of people gathered in front of the 
temple, all struggling to be the first to offer incense in the new year. 
The stroke of midnight brought a wild flailing of burning incense 
sticks and waving arms as people pushed to be the first at the 
incense pot. The occasion had apparently led to violence in the past, 
and the temple management now collected all the incense and put it 
in the pot together. Quite appropriately for all the heat and noise, 
the huge pile of incense immediately burst into a roaring bonfire. 
The juxtaposition of the two rituals marked the contrast powerfully 
- the cool and thin Confucian ritual preceding the hot and thick 
popular affray, verging on the edge of social chaos. 
Similar thinning occurs wherever elites take firm control over 
ritual, trying to make sure that neither interpretation nor social 
action get out of hand. Watson describes how a powerful New 
Territories lineage elite, which legitimates some of its power 
through a local Tian Hou (Mazu) temple, runs temple festivals that 
are "remarkable for their utter lack of religious fervor," and whose 
religious content "is understated in the extreme" (Watson, 
1985:318). Typically, their effort to promote their own interpretation 
of Tian Hou as a symbol of lineage territorial hegemony has little 
effect, as other groups maintain very different interpretations. Even 
the use of the elite-controlled self-defense force to guarantee 
religious orthodoxy by "encouraging'' attendance at temple festi-
vals failed to control interpretation itself (Watson, 1985:315). This 
tension between lively saturation and thin precipitation creates a 
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dilemma for anyone hoping to dominate interpretation: successfully 
limiting the possibilities undercuts much of the popular appeal, 
while retaining thick ritual risks losing control over interpretation. 
Sects 
I have been arguing that attempts to unify religious interpretation in 
China typically fail, unable to construct the social institutions of 
interpretation that might overcome the necessary watering down of 
vivid ritual. Pietistic sects in Taiwan, however, offer an interesting 
and important exception. Like the Taiping, they succeeded through 
new kinds of social organization, although they have absolutely no 
interest in violent resistance. These sects have grown rapidly over 
the last few years in Taiwan, and now have millions of followers. 
While they come in many variants, they typically create focussed 
congregations of believers centered on spirit writing sessions, where 
a possessed medium writes messages from the gods. The selection 
of gods may be very eclectic, sometimes including Jesus or 
Mohammed as deities in the pantheon. Unlike popular versions of 
spirit writing, where the illegible characters allow any number of 
possible readings and people come and go freely, these are tightly 
organized sessions with easily legible characters. Wealthier sects 
often publish the results of their sessions, and often have study 
groups that propagate unified interpretations. Many of them also 
evangelize actively. 
One sect I visited in Kaohsiung in 1978 received patronage from 
several very wealthy businessmen and politicians. Like Weberian 
Protestants, they emphasized especially the importance of actual 
accomplishments in the secular world. The group itself met about 
every third day. One man, an employee of the largest patron, led 
each session. 65 Dressed in a white robe, he lectured about a dozen 
followers on the meaning of the most recent spirit writing session. 
These Sunday school equivalents have no parallel at all in popular 
religious practice, and neither does the magazine (Raozhi, 1978) the 
group published to disseminate its ideas. This tight congregational 
order allowed a kind of unity in interpretation that is impossible for 
most Chinese religion. 
After the lecture, everyone put on robes to worship at their altar 
and begin the spirit writing. Men stood on the left and women on 
the right. We bowed as a group to the altar, and four representatives 
offered incense, fruit, and tea. This neatly organized regimen 
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contrasted sharply with popular practice, but resembled the officia-
lized Confucian rituals a little in feeling. The medium went easily 
into trance, when the god immediately asked that foreigners not 
take photographs. The leader later explained that, although this 
particular sect was legal, they worried about government disappro-
val. The god then wrote the continuation of his ongoing commen-
tary on the Daoist classic, the Daodejing. From the neatly organized 
ritual, to the study sessions, to the magazine, this group had created 
a social organization that could effectively disseminate and enforce 
an interpretation based in spirit mediumship. The mechanism was 
not as powerful as the Taiping, which could enforce its precipitated 
version through legal and punitive means because it had arrogated 
the full powers of the state. Instead, these sects tend to fission over 
differences of interpretation, much like their Protestant equiva-
lents.66 For both the Taiping and the sects, however, novel forms 
of social organization allowed successful control over interpretation. 
The largest of these sects, the Way of Unity (Yiguan Dao) was 
illegal for many years in Taiwan, and only came above ground with 
the general loosening up in the late 1980s. Chinese governments had 
always disliked spirit mediumship in all forms, because it tends to 
foment "chaos." In other words, they understood that possessed 
revelations are inherently difficult to control, regardless of what the 
medium may actually say. The state reserved most of its wrath and 
power, however, for just such sects as the Way of Unity, which 
successfully managed to unify and control an alternative interpreta-
tion. When new sources of meaning became organized and united, 
they moved from chaos to heterodoxy (xie), and the state's reaction 
moved up an order of magnitude. While such sects did occasionally 
rebel, the Taiwanese versions as a group were politically conserva-
tive and morally upright by official standards. The problem lay in 
their sources of legitimacy rather than their messages, in their 
implications rather than their actions. The government disliked 
the chaos of indeterminate ritual, but mostly tolerated it. Organized 
interpretive alternatives, however, had to be crushed if possible-
until recently even in a secular state like Taiwan. 
There is safety in overloaded meaning exactly because the multi- / 
plicity of possibilities always includes a potential reading as 
accommodation, as when the Eighteen Lords appear as nationalist 
heroes on television. Leaving meaning saturated discourages poli-
tical organization, but also makes repression difficult - no clear 
target exposes itself for attack. Organized and explicitly worked out 
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systems outside the state, however, lose their multivocal defenses 
and invite repression. In China, just the act of creating such an 
explicit system could be seen as a political challenge, no matter how 
innocuous the actual content. 
THE STATE AND INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 
In twentieth-century Taiwan, many of the social institutions of 
religious interpretation had weakened even further than the usual 
low level in China. Daoists had been cut off from the sources of 
orthodoxy in mainland monasteries, and other means of religious 
transmission like itinerant storytellers gradually died out. Most 
important, though, has been the gradual retirement of the state 
from the business of religious interpretation. From the founding of 
the Republic of China, its Nationalist Party leaders had been 
dedicated modernizers, as much in the cultural as in the economic 
sense. Part of that effort meant a dedication to rationality and 
science instead of "superstition," even as their Western-style 
constitution guaranteed civil liberties like freedom of religion. 
The result was an awkward compromise, where organized, 
textual traditions like Buddhism gained approval as religion, while 
the bulk of popular practice became unpalatabl~ superstition 
(Duara, 1991). In a series of laws created between 1928 and 1930, 
the Nationalists "spoke of religious authority as being obsolete in 
the age of popular sovereignty, of 'superstition ~ an obstacle to 
progress,' and of the superstitious nation becoming 'the laughing 
stock of the scientific world'" (Duara, 1991:79). They retained only 
the institutionally controlled traditions, plus a thin version of certain 
inspirational deities like Confucius or Guan Gong. As Duara argues, 
this flattening of religion did more than just reflect their modernist 
values; it also attempted to expand the power of the state by 
removing alternate sources of ideas (Duara, 1991:80--81). Like the 
other attempts at cultural domination I have been discussing, 
however, this one transformed nothing at the popular level because 
it failed to remake local social relations of religious interpretation. 
The official attitude favoring religious freedom but against 
"irrational" ideas helps to explain the halting and ineffectual 
attempts at religious control in Taiwan since the Japanese occupa-
tion ended. With the real increase in civil liberties in Taiwan in the 
1980s, the dedication to religious freedom has further undercut 
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attempts at control. This culminated most publicly in the legaliza-
tion of all the pietistic sects, and the sudden appearance of the entire 
movement from underground. By renouncing a religious stand of its 
own, a modernizing state like Taiwan finds it very difficult even to 
attempt to influence religious interpretation. 
Unlike education, the media, or politics, the government has very 
little direct institutional control over religion. There is no priestly 
hierarchy that can be forced into particular interpretations, nor is 
there any real platform for preaching revised interpretations. At the 
same time, the political costs of repressing popular ritual altogether 
are too great, especially because the current secular government 
does not really see religion as much of a threat. Unable to speak 
from within a religious context, the state must choose between 
ignoring religion or simply repressing it. Taiwan has mostly 
ignored it, spiked with irregular and ineffective episodes of mild 
repression. As long as religious practice always left open acquies-
cent interpretations and never organized into open resistance, it 
remained a safe and free space. 
The weakness of state control over religion is ironic. After all, 
Taiwan has had a powerful, authoritarian state with only a single 
ruling party (which learned its political organizing at the hands of 
the Comintern), a powerfully ideological education system, strong 
control over all the media, and few qualms (until recently) about 
crushing dissent. A stern sedition law allowed the government to 
silence voices of opposition, and the state of military emergency 
stemming from the Communist insurrection ended only in 1987. 
The tightly controlled media censored itself before the government 
could step in. When I first went to Taiwan in 1976, the television 
stations interspersed commercials with quotes from Jiang Jieshi 
[Chiang I<ai-shek], and walls conveyed patriotic slogans about 
retaking the mainland. Magazines that spoke too freely quickly 
found themselves shut down, and the foreign press showed up 
heavily censored or not at all until the relaxation of the 1980s. 
Patriotism was a constant theme; people were expected to stand 
when the flag appeared, even if only at the closing moments of the 
day's television broadcast. School children had to refer to Jiang 
Jieshi as Lord Jiang (Jiang Gong) after his death, and were punished 
for speaking the local dialect in school. 
At the same time, the government attempted to inculcate a 
revived Confucianism that would both replace the Japanese influ-
ence in Taiwan and challenge the Communist ideas across the 
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Taiwan Strait. From the schools to the legislature, one heard 
attempts to enforce a value system of filial piety writ large, where 
the proper respect of children for parents and wives for husbands 
paralleled a filial respect of citizens for the state. Each had his or her 
proper place in society. They were attempting to create a shared 
ideology based on patriotism, loyalty, and a kind of Confucianism 
read through modern eyes, stressing the family as a root metaphor 
for broader benevolent political control and obedience. 
People learned to speak this language in appropriate contexts, 
and its fit with some aspects of daily experience made it more 
convincing. Yet it remained only one fairly clear thread in a knotted 
skein, and never replaced the competing moralities lurking in 
corners of popular religion. The government too slipped on 
Taiwan's uncontrolled and open-ended religion, in spite of all their 
attempts at unifying morality. The Weberian religious revolution, 
where new national, civic values would replace religion (e.g., 
Geertz, 1973a, Bellah, 1%5:202-203), never took place in Taiwan. 
While government power successfully prevented the formulation of 
strong alternatives to its values, even such a strong state could not 
fully penetrate saturated space to create its own singular cultural 
world. As evidence for this, a chorus of competing voices quickly 
replaced the old monotone with the remarkable relaxation of state 
control over mental life in the last few years. 
Intellectuals have quickly discovered Marx (although not as 
quickly as East European intellectuals have abandoned him), 
whose works had been forbidden until recently. Businessmen have 
discovered cheap labor in the mainland, politicians have discovered 
an opposition party, and popular religion has discovered the 
Eighteen Lords. All speak to the alternative values that lay just 
below the surface until recently, drowned out by the more speakable 
political orthodoxy. Public revelations of corruption and abuse of 
power by the Jiang family and other leaders have increased the new 
political and cultural freedoms. Most notorious were political 
scandals like the alleged involvement of the government in the 
murder of Jiang Nan, a Chinese-American scholar working on a 
biography of Jiang Jingguo that politically powerful members of the 
Jiang family found threatening. Financial scandals have also hurt 
credibility and helped speed the stripping of the old veneer. 
The Everybody's Happy lottery provides a minor example of this. 
In addition to getting winning numbers through popular ritual, 
rumor held that there was also a secular alternative for those who 
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knew how to get it. Members of the Bamboo Gang, a kind of 
Taiwanese Mafia, had allegedly carried out the murder of Jiang 
Nan at government request. When publicity about the case blew up, 
according to the story, members of the government paid off the mob 
for its silence by publishing in the newspaper a coded indication of 
the last two digits of the winning lottery number, in advance of the 
drawing. Those who knew how to read the code could make a 
fortune. This "newspaper method" of getting lottery numbers 
rivaled religious methods in popularity. It indicated a total lack of 
confidence in the honesty of the government, especially because the 
lottery drawings were televised and clearly random (Qu, 1987:30-
31). 
No state can fully control values. Any set interpretation faces the 
possibility of reinterpretation, placing fundamental limitations on 
conscious mystification and cultural domination. Taiwan faces the 
paradox of a modem, powerful state which has seen the resurgence 
of religious values that it does not fully share. Max Weber suggested 
one possible explanation for this modem combination of a strong 
state with growing religious ideologies. His description of the 
modern, rational, bureaucratic type of authority relies least on any 
kind of shared values beyond an acquiescence to the rule of law 
(Weber, 1978:217-225). In contrast, legitimacy in traditional author-
ity rests on a shared system of custom and traditional values, and in 
charismatic authority rests on belief in the sanctity or special 
character of the individual leader (Weber, 1978:215). Only bureau-
cratic authority gains its legitimacy from what claims to be an 
abstract system, created by human intention for pragmatic ends. 
Values certainly continue to exist, and to an extent underlie the 
system of law, but they occupy a far less central position in creating 
an ideology of bureaucratic legitimacy than for the other types of 
authority. 
The new religious growth in Taiwan and other modern states 
reflects a need for meaning that these states cannot meet, in large 
part because their legitimacy no longer explicitly rests on a shared 
set of traditional values. Implicitly, many values continue to be 
shared, but these are less the product of the active interference of the 
state than of the entire social formation. The problem is especially 
serious for religion, because the secular government can make no 
case for legitimate interference, nor does the decentralized nature of 
the religious organization allow for much direct intervention. 
Religion, especially under the very loose political and clerical 
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control it has typically had in China, is inherently open to multiple 
interpretations. This is even more true for Carnivalesque religion 
like the Eighteen Lords, where no one has clear authority to impose 
an interpretation and the ritual itseH is filled with innovative and 
complex possibilities. 
The Eighteen Lords in action affirmed the lack of fully shared 
values in Taiwan, certainly a lack of consistent Confucian values. H 
the lack stemmed from the rapid social transformations of the last 
few decades, and especially the last few years, it has not been 
remedied by the government, in spite of repeated attempts. While 
decades of firm control over information and education helped 
eliminate alternative political voices, they also helped rob the 
government itseH of legitimacy. People may not have heard other 
versions of the world, but they knew that the one version they were 
receiving was bent to particular purposes. The political relaxation of 
the last few years, the opening to new voices, has thus created a 
babble of competing interpretation. 
Contrary to some predictions, then, this evidence suggests that 
the advent of modernizing states has actually increased free space 
for religion by removing the state's right to create religious 
interpretations of its own. Even more unexpectedly, the Taiwan 
case suggests that even authoritarian states have only ineffective 
and partial control over culture, in spite of extensive campaigns. 
Crushing alternative explicit interpretations leaves the ironies and 
ambiguities of uncontrolled space untouched, and even encourages 
their spread. As long as no challenging, organized interpretations 
ever come openly to the front, areas like popular religion can remain 
a safe haven for all kinds of meaning, like a desert waiting to bloom 
at the first hint of rain. At the same time, the thin and ideological 
alternatives that the state offers in exchange have little inherent 
power to convince. I will take these issues up again in Chapters 11 
and 12. 
SATURATION AND RESISTANCE 
This look at nineteenth-century Guangxi and twentieth-century 
Taiwan suggests some broad patterns in the relationships between 
saturation and precipitation. Far from confirming the inevitability of 
rationalization, the evidence suggests that the teeming overgrowth 
of unclarified meaning remains an important aspect even of modem 
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societies. Guangxi disintegrated Hong Xiuquan' s more rationalized 
ideology, and the Taiping finally retook interpretive control only by 
a wrenching transformation of their entire social organization. 
Taiwan has fostered a thriving, expanding indeterminate world in 
popular religion, in the face of both a successfully modernizing 
economy and a disapproving authoritarian state. 
One reason these Carnivalesque areas survived so robustly is 
their easy response to social change. With no dogma to defend and 
no sacred canon, with few technicians of the sacred and no powerful 
social institutions of interpretation, little stood in the way of new 
developments. The inconsistent multivocality of these heaps of 
meaning also provides them with a prior fund of new directions 
for adaptation to new circumstances, just as a genetically diverse 
species will adapt more easily to a changed environment than a 
species of clones. The Eighteen Lords sprouted from just such a 
process. Based on standard ghosts, they patched together elements 
that had been there all along, but that suddenly became prominent 
with the economic and political changes of the 1980s. 
Much the same process explains how disorganized interpretation 
(or no interpretation at all) defuses attempts at cultural domination. 
In a world of multiple and inconsistent possibilities, suggestions of 
explicit and organized interpretations just get thrown into the pot 
along with the rest of the stew. They may complicate the mix a little, 
but generally induce no major changes. Nearly every attempt to 
control interpretation that I have discussed failed, from the moder-
nizing frowns at popular religion to the television version of the 
Eighteen Lords. The only exceptions invented new social organiza-
tions: the Taiping took control over spirit possession as they took up 
arms, and the sects developed congregations centered on explicit 
interpretation. 
This surfeit of possibilities makes overloaded interpretive space a 
home for irony and ambiguity, where meaning seems to shift, like 
the Tristan chord, with the first effort to pin it down. Attempts to 
impose an interpretation thus face the jeopardy of ironic readings. 
This has been the fate of the carefully documented genealogical 
claims of the Lian family about the Eighteen Lords, and of the 
equally carefully performed ritual justification for the fake Eighteen 
Lords temple. Both versions suffered rereadings as greedy claims on 
temple income. Authoritarian control promotes this kind of shifty 
meaning even further, as explicit statements become dangerous and 
people seek safety in ambiguity. Worse still, cultural domination can 
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further · hone an ear for irony and cynicism, as the denial of 
alternative voices undercuts the credibility of the government itself. 
Is this resistance? Only in the sense that its pool of possibilities 
includes all kinds of alternatives -resistance, accommodation, and a 
great deal with no direct political implications at all. Resisting 
nothing directly is one of the keys to its survival. The temptation 
to label all complexly indeterminate meaning as cultural resistance 
risks losing sight of the process through which it might become 
active resistance, where one interpretation overtakes all the others. It 
matters, after all, that the Taiping became a huge rebellion while the 
Eighteen Lords seem to be fading away, in spite of their equally 
messy and multivocal beginnings, packed with alternative inter-
pretations. Nevertheless, the existence of such alternatives is crucial; 
they provide the seeds around which new movements may develop. 
I have thus preferred to talk about potentials for resistance, and 
reserve the term "resistance" proper for movements born when a 
single understanding as resistance crystallizes out. 
The core of realized resistance lies in that critical moment of 
rationalization, and the new social relations of interpretation that 
must accompany it. Even though a resaturation of the Taiping began 
almost immediately, the central social and ideological innovations 
of 1850 shaped everything that was to come. While the focus on a 
surfeit of meaning clarified the important similarities between the 
early Taiping and the Eighteen Lords, the differences between the 
two cases have demanded a clearer look at when and how unified 
interpretations develop. The last few chapters have argued that 
disorganized interpretation, which typifies Chinese popular reli-
gion, has a robust elasticity that allows it to soak up attempts at 
uniting people in an explicit interpretation. What allowed the 
Taiping to succeed where the Taiwanese ghosts failed? 
Important differences in the social relations of interpretation gave 
the early Taiping a much stronger potential to resist than the 
Eighteen Lords. First, the Taiping concentration on God and gods 
gave it an immediate focus on the heart of politics- the community. 
When the Taiping destroyed temples or worshiped God, they 
implicitly offered new definitions of community and gained the 
possibility of organizing large groups of people. The Eighteen 
Lords, on the other hand, systematically abandoned community 
for personal concerns, celebrating competition and individuality at 
the expense of any form of solidarity. It is difficult to see how such 
ideas could support strong political organization. 
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In addition, although both states were weak in their ability to 
control religious interpretation, the imperial state in 1840s Guangxi 
was generally feeble in ways that the 1980s Taiwan government was 
not. The broad breakdown of social order in Guangxi both created a 
need for effective new social organization and removed major 
obstacles to innovators. New forms of Taiping social and ideologi-
cal organization thus found many followers, but brought down only 
ineffective repression from the weak state. The combination of new 
and appropriate ideas with the possibility of new forms of social 
organization to control interpretation (among other things) laid the 
groundwork for the Taiping transition to resistance. In spite of the 
sense of crisis in Taiwan in the 1980s, there was no comparable 
breakdown of social order nor any abdication of the state's power to 
challenge alternative political organizations. The Eighteen Lords 
thus offered neither ideas compatible with political organizing nor 
the possibility of forging new social relations of interpretation with 
little interference. 
In contrast, the pietistic sects in Taiwan have managed to 
construct new religious and social forms. Like the Taiping, they 
also deal in gods rather than ghosts, and they have created new 
institutions to preserve their interpretations. They managed this, 
however, only by avoiding any possible reading as resistance, and 
thus avoiding the wrath of the state. Even so, they could only come 
above ground with the increase of civil liberties in the last decade. 
Taken together with the Taiping, they reinforce the intimate 
relationships between symbols and the social organization of 
interpretation. Yet these are also the exceptions; the vast majority 
of explicit interpretations simply dissolve back into the whole, 
unable to construct new institutions of meaning. Looking to the 
social organization of interpretation clarifies just how difficult and 
fragile precipitation really is. 
Part IV 
CONCLUSION : TIANANMEN 
AND BEYOND 
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Institutions of Control, 
Institutions Beyond Control 
While both the cases I have discussed so far involve Chinese 
religion, the general processes are neither necessarily Chinese nor 
necessarily religious. Under the right circumstances anywhere, 
meaning develops a life cycle of its own. Tumultuous times 
encourage a profusion of new and complex possibilities that elbow 
their way in among the old taken-for-granted ideas. Both the early 
God Worshipers and the Taiwanese ghost cult took part in this 
process, as did the many cases of non-Chinese spirit possession I 
have already discussed. So did the Virgin of Guadalupe, symbol of 
Mexican independence, with her Aztec moon and cloak of roses 
(Wolf, 1958). And so did Yankee Doodle, who changed from the 
boorish object of British jeering to a revolutionary symbol. The 
resulting intertwined profusion of meaning has a strong potential 
to resist - to foster an interpretation that opposes the status quo -
but also harbors many other possible developments. 
Occasionally, as the Taiping rebels showed, powerful institutions 
may be able to squeeze order from such chaos, creating a new form 
of meaning where interpretations claim to be clear and unified. That 
transformation can spark social movements, and form the seed for 
new mechanisms of social control. In some sense, every revolu-
tionary ideology crystallizes out of the mixed ideas that preceded it. 
Yet every new order itself immediately becomes vulnerable to 
processes of accumulating meaning that help to undermine its 
control and sap its power. The successful Taiping seizure of control 
over meaning in 1850 became riddled with new interpretations (and 
remnants of old ones) as soon as the rebels left home. Similarly, 
Taiwan's political loosening of the 1980s showed just how much the 
official ideology had been built on a foundation of shifting cultural 
sand. And as I will discuss here, even the great socialist ideologies 
have far less effective control than initially appears, as cycles of 
saturation, precipitation and new saturation occur there too. 
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The evidence from Taiping rebels and Taiwanese ghosts implies 
that official interpretations everywhere are necessarily thin and 
fragile, no matter whether they come from the established state or 
a rebellious movement. Modern states (both socialist and capitalist) 
face this problem with particular pressure, because they have given 
up most claims to a legitimacy based on transcendent values of 
tradition or religion. Any attempt to enliven their authority with 
thicker symbols may offer more convincing power, but immediately 
opens the door to alternative interpretations. Just as importantly, 
most people, in their daily lives, remain content with implicit 
meanings and independent from institutionalized meaning, always 
leaving room for alternative interpretations by not pushing any 
explicit interpretation too far. These cases show the grave difficulties 
of creating interpretive unity, either to cement an official hegemony 
or to foment resistance. 
The People's Republic of China should provide an acid test for 
this approach. Rarely has any state developed such powerful 
institutions to impose and foster unified interpretations. Theorists 
of socialism as totalitarianism have especially clarified how the 
attempt to institutionalize and universalize interpretation works. 
Such theories paint an extreme picture of an end never realized in 
practice, and they have grown less popular lately. Yet they also 
describe how strongly controlled interpretations might be main-
tained over the long run, and why cultural domination is so 
important. As Hannah Arendt put it in one of the earliest such 
studies: ''Totalitarianism is never content to rule by external means, 
namely, through the state and a machinery of violence; thanks to 
its peculiar ideology and the role assigned to it in this apparatus 
of coercion, totalitarianism has discovered a means of dominating 
and terrorizing human beings from within. In this sense it 
eliminates the distance between the rulers and the ruled" (Arendt, 
1958:325). 
The central techniques such theories describe atomize and homo-
genize individuals. People lose social contact with each other apart 
from the state, while also denying any divisions among themselves. 
The only division is between the single People and their external 
enemy (Lefort, 1986:297). The politics of competing organizations 
comes to an end, yet everything becomes politicized, explicit and 
ideological. There are no bystanders, as everything that happens in 
the world must be interpreted to support doctrine (Zinoviev, 
1984:221). All interpretation must be made fully explicit, thinned 
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down to a single layer, and enforced through an institutional 
apparatus that extends from the mass organizations, to small group 
discussion meetings, to the details of daily life. At least in theory, no 
room remains for ambiguities as the state systematically strips away 
alternative sources of meaning. 
Language itself can come to reflect the thin official ideology in an 
impoverished syntax and lexicon, where even the very means to 
express alternative meaning may disappear (e.g., Thorn, 1989:17-59; 
Blazek, 1991). "A power of discourse as such is constituted, a power 
which subjugates its agents, passes through them rather than 
developing within them, inscribes them in an impersonal know-
ledge which cuts them off from the experience of others and of 
things" (Lefort, 1986:316). 
Mass criticism meetings during the Cultural Revolution under-
went just such a ritualization and formalization of language and 
structure. The meetings invariably began and ended with one of a 
small number of acceptable revolutionary songs (where syntax, 
semantics, and even tone and rhythm are frozen). Between the 
songs, the audience shouted formulaic threatening slogans while 
the object of criticism was brought on. After a period of criticism, the 
victim would be led off, and the audience shouted positive slogans 
of homage to Mao (Ji, Kuiper and Shu, 1990; Madsen, 1984:80-82). 
Every stage followed a rigid pattern, where acceptable language 
allowed for only a few variations on set structures. Such potent 
restrictions on syntactic and semantic flexibility typify languages of 
power everywhere (Bloch, 1975), and they attempt to dominate all 
discourse in totalizing regimes. 
No actual societies carry this project out with full success, but one 
can at least see these processes at work in China and elsewhere. 
Especially in the realm of culture and ideology, many commentators 
have seen the mechaniSins of control as quite successful. Yet the 
analysis of the Taiping rebels and Taiwanese ghosts strongly 
suggests inherent limits on the power of any such official inter-
pretation, and thus limits on totalitarian theory. Indeed, the Chinese 
government clearly lost control of meaning in the spring of 1989, in 
spite of their potent and compelling domination of institution and 
int~rpretation. Still more significantly, though, the aftermath of 
Tiananmen showed the frailty of official interpretations even in 
the midst of a major campaign where all the old political machinery 
has been brought to bear in a vain attempt to unify China around a 
single shared interpretation. 
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This chapter and the next will follow the life cycle of the meaning 
of those demonstrations in Tiananmen, bringing conclusions based 
on the Taiping rebels and Taiwanese ghosts to a radically different 
social situation. Even in the People's Republic, the demonstrations 
saw a great flood of unorganized interpretation, followed by a 
powerfully enforced official interpretation of the events, which in 
turn was undermined with a new and more subtle accretion of 
uncontrolled meaning. 
The events of that spring had been building for some years, with 
occasional outbursts, especially from students, that died down again 
fairly quicldy.67 The economic reforms were about a decade old in 
1989, and the problems of adding capitalist markets to socialist 
planning began to grow as clear as the benefits had been a few years 
earlier. Widespread inflation hurt everyone on a fixed salary, and 
the government began to backpedal quickly on the reforms, 
threatening the new entrepreneurs. At the same time, new opportu-
nities and dangers had led to ballooning corruption among govern-
ment officials and their privileged children. Finally, a relative 
opening of social relations accompanied by lukewarm campaigns 
for political orthodoxy encouraged students to push harder at the 
boundaries that still held them. 
This round of protests began when Hu Yaobang, who had been a 
supporter of intellectual reform before being purged from his post 
as general secretary of the Party, died on 15 April 1989. Several 
thousand students in Beijing took to the streets to mourn him, and 
quickly came up with a list of demands for rehabilitating Hu's 
reputation, increasing aid to education, and promoting greater 
political openness. The movement intensified over the next few 
days, especially after police violently stopped about a thousand 
noisy students from presenting a wreath at central government 
offices (Zhongnanhai). By the end of April the movement had 
escalated dramatically to perhaps a hundred thousand students, 
with significant involvement from workers and local residents. 
Several demonstrations brought a million people into Tiananmen 
Square, in the heart of the capital, and many tens of thousands 
occupied the square constantly. Comparable movements began to 
spring up in cities across China. 
May brought two obvious opportunities to further invigorate the 
movement. The first was the anniversary of the May Fourth Move-
ment, the grandfather of the modem student movement in China. 
That movement had shaken China in 1919, with its strong support 
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for modernization, science and democracy. Science and democracy 
again became watchwords for the students in 1989. Worried about 
the possibilities, the government began well publicized meetings 
with the demonstrators on 3 May. 
The media peak came just after the second big opportunity of the 
month - Gorbachev' s visit to China. A large number of students 
began a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square, capturing the attention 
of the entire nation. Rejuvenated by the fasting martyrs, the move-
ment brought a million people to the square again on 18 May. 
Premier Li Peng met with starving student leaders for one last 
fruitless but riveting round of talks (carried on national television). 
Zhao Ziyang, the general secretary of the Party, visited the hunger 
strikers with tears in his eyes. Zhao's sympathetic performance 
marked the end of government patience (and the end of his own 
political power before long); Li Peng declared martial law shortly 
afterward. 
The demonstrations began to lose momentum after that, and 
many students left. Yet even the depleted ranks remaining in the 
Square constituted a large group, and local crowds always turned 
back the army's tentative forays toward them. The remaining radical 
core, and others who had come in recently from the provinces, got 
new life on 29 May: the Goddess of Democracy, a thirty-foot 
creation of some Beijing art students, joined them at Tiananmen. 
At this point, however, both the government and the student leaders 
were beyond negotiating, and the tragic conclusion on 4 June is well 
known. 
I take up this case more briefly than the other two partly because 
the details will be much better known to most readers, but also 
because I intend it primarily to illustrate that the processes I have 
been discussing thrive even in a very different and apparently 
unfavorable environment. Culture and meaning under socialism 
have more complex and mixed roles than appears at first glance, 
with processes of interpretive integration and disintegration inher-
ent in the structure of the system itself. 
DEATII AND REVOLUTION 
For almost the entire time I was living in Nanjing in 1984--1985, the 
prestigious Nanjing Museum was closed. A sign in front explained 
that the museum was undergoing renovations, but no one could 
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give a date for the re-opening, and no construction work was visible. 
As so often happened, the flourishing Chinese grapevine offered a 
hidden alternative explanation. People explained that the director of 
the museum, an old cadre from the revolutionary period, had 
committed suicide after a media campaign accusing him of plagiar-
ism. This was a period when many old cadres felt intense pressure 
from more educated people with less political background, and the 
Communist Party was strongly promoting education and skills. The 
director was a victim of such a struggle, as his well-placed friends 
apparently could not stop others from making an example of him. 
Some early and macabre versions told how he had hanged 
himself from the museum rafters, and his wife refused to let the 
body be cut down. Later, the stories settled into a single version. The 
coffin had been placed in the museum for a final viewing, but the 
director's family refused to let the body be moved until his name 
was cleared and he could be buried honorably. The government was 
embarrassed, but also trapped by having allowed the right to mourn 
the dead. They resolved the stalemate only after nine months of 
bickering, with a triumph for the director and his supporters in the 
government (see also Davenport and Larocque, 1986). 
This case of how people can so easily usurp sanctioned mourning 
offers a minor example of a widespread pattern in China. The most 
famous case was the large outpouring at Zhou Enlai's death in 1976, 
where public demonstrations in Tiananmen Square overwhelmed 
the official funeral plans, and marked the beginning of the end of 
the Cultural Revolution. Another case occurred in 1988, when 
demonstrations mourning the murder of a university student at 
the hands of a street criminal took a political tum. Funerals in China 
have been subject to much government pressure, and official 
mourning for fallen cadres is highly formalized in action and 
explicitly interpreted in eulogies (Whyte, 1988). Yet mourning 
nevertheless offers a free space, where people have sometimes 
succeeded in piling new meanings on top of the official version. 
Recognizing the right to mourn has created a symbolic arena that 
threatens to escape government control. Indeed, granting the right 
to mourn often leads to the same accretion of meanings elsewhere. 
From South Africa to South Korea, funerals have allowed mass 
demonstrations otherwise impossible. 
The 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen began exactly as such an 
overenthusiastic funeral that swamped the bounds of government 
control over interpretation (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990:839-
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840). By the morning after Hu Yaobang's death on 15 April, students 
were already stacking new meanings onto the mourning with their 
own outpouring of wreaths, eulogies and poems of praise (Ming Pao 
News, 1989:4). Both the large white banners they displayed, often 
featuring the character dum ("mourning offering"), and their 
eulogies fell squarely within accepted funeral traditions. Yet by . 
going beyond the carefully drawn lines of the official ceremony, 
they also constituted a political usurpation. 
Student demands escalated over the next few days, and the 
movement began to organize. Their guerrilla saturation of the 
funeral forced the government to upgrade the level of official 
ceremonies, with a silent tribute by the Central Committee on 
17 April, Premier Li Peng's visit to Hu's widow the next day, and 
a memorial service finally scheduled for 22 April (Ming Pao News, 
1989:5-7). Yet no amount of official ritual could hold off the 
students' flinging new meanings onto the thin scaffolding of the 
government funeral. In attempting to offer an officially approved 
and politically useful memorial, the state inevitably opened the door 
to new interpretations. Like any performance large and complex 
enough to make a powerful statement, official funerals cannot fully 
control interpretation. 
While the issue of Hu Yaobang gradually faded from the scene, 
the funerary symbolism continued to provide one of the primary 
stylistic themes throughout the demonstrations. Mourning symbol-
ism in fact extends across East Asian protests, easily recognized by 
the use of white, the traditional color of death ritual. The theme 
occurs everywhere, from Japanese anti-nuclear protesters wearing 
white headbands (a kind of minimal mourning dress) promising 
death before giving up their cause, to Taiwanese marchers carrying 
the coffin of slain Democracy, to South Korean students mourning 
their martyrs. This theme of death began at Tiananmen with the 
wreaths and funeral eulogies for Hu, and continued with the typical 
white headbands and white banners of protest later on. The white 
theme of death and mourning finally culminated in the massive 
hunger strikes that so ignited both Chinese and foreign audiences. 
With haggard faces, the hunger strikers wore white headbands and 
usually white clothes, both mourning for lost ideals and warning of 
their own impending deaths. When the student leader Wu' er Kaixi 
appeared on television in pajamas, with an oxygen tube in his nose 
and almost too weak to stand, the image of a hospital death bed was 
palpable. Funerals make powerful demonstrations because they 
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easily carry many levels of meaning, always including the official 
line but never limited to it. 
A quite different theme - this one red - also flowed through the 
demonstrations alongside the white theme. Red in China has always 
been the color of joy and luck: newborns and brides wear red, red 
verses are pasted over the door at New Year's, and cash gifts come 
in red envelopes. In addition, of course, red in the People's Republic 
of China is also the color of the revolution. The large marches where 
various work units paraded together under red banners in the 
spring of 1989 have a history that goes back through the revolution 
to the May Fourth movement of 1919 (Strand, 1990). Students also 
picked up a great deal of other Communist and patriotic symbolism. 
They waved red national flags in Tiananmen Square, held portraits 
of Mao as they marched, and sang the Internationale as_they waited 
for tanks. One telling incident occurred on 23 May, when three men 
defaced the gigantic portrait of Mao that hangs in the square by 
throwing paint and eggs on it. The demonstrators were reportedly 
furious about this, caught the hooligans, and turned them in to the 
police (New York Times, 24 May 1989: A10).68 
Both the white and red themes pose typical problems of inter-
pretation. Was Hu's death simply a cover for a purely political 
confrontation? Were all the declarations of patriotism just a dis-
guise? How, for example, should we understand the Beijing 
University protest banner that read, 'We firmly support the correct 
leadership of the Communist Party" (New York Times, 7 May 1989: 
115)? When the correspondent asked students what they meant, he 
got a combination of tactics and sincerity. When he asked whether 
they preferred capitalism to socialism, he found little thought had 
been given to the question. The implications suggest a genuine 
ambiguity of interpretation, a typically overloaded situation where 
many meanings are available and no mechanism yet exists to foster 
a single, unified version. While the government would later claim a 
shared hidden agenda among the protesters (as they claimed that 
religion was a mere disguise for Hong Xiuquan's revolutionary 
agenda), and while some people may well have had such thoughts, 
their actual actions and statements were inherently multivocalic. 
Making wreaths and waving flags genuinely show mourning and 
patriotism, whatever lies in the heart of the actor. 
Both the white and red themes held many meanings, and their 
close cohabitation in Tiananmen Square further mixed the pile of 
possible interpretations. These demonstrations began and lasted as 
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long as they did because they included politically acceptable mean-
ings along with all their others. The Goddess of Democracy statue 
that the students erected toward the end further mixed the 
irresolvable blend of possible interpretations. Oearly referring to 
the American Statue of Liberty (as the government would emphatic-
ally point out), in the Chinese context the statue also evoked images 
both of socialist realist sculpture and of Guanyin, the popular 
Bodhisattva of Mercy (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990:841). She 
combined the pro-Western possibilities of an American symbol, the 
typical socialist labor iconography of muscular women holding 
torches, and a mothering Chinese goddess. As with most of its 
symbols, the movement itself would never sort out these various 
possibilities, and much of its appeal rested on the multiplicity of 
available meaning. _ 
Even the explicitly stated goals of the movement formed an 
inconsistent mix. ''Democracy'' came up over and over, but the 
concept remained very difficult to pin down in practice. The vague 
generalities typically floated allowed for much more freedom of 
interpretation than specific policies would have. In some cases 
actions spoke louder than words, as the student leaders undercut 
their own discussions of democracy by emulating the vanguard 
privileges of the Communist Party. Access to the leadership rested 
on the same kinds of personal networks that characterized the 
official bureaucracy; they created a standing committee, liaison 
offices and a propaganda department; and they surrounded their 
offices with their own guards (Lubman, 1989). 
Even after the tragedy of 4 June, the exile movement recreated 
many of the same contradictions. Acting just like a vanguard party, 
the leadership answered accusations of crony-based elitism with the 
claim that creating an elite group of leaders was more crucial than 
developing a mass membership organization (Chan and Kwong, 
1990:560). The reformist World Economic Herald similarly showed a 
powerful technocratic elitism underlying broader claims (Li and 
White, 1991). Indeed, student attitudes as traditional Chinese 
intellectuals bred a sense of their moral duty and privileged right 
to speak to the state, a special position placing them above the rest 
of society. Such attitudes greatly limited the possible development 
of the movement (Perry, 1991). 
Quite different issues also rose to the surface as a broader range of 
people joined the protests. While democracy remained the fuzzy but 
predominant rallying cry of the students, official corruption and the 
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unaccustomed inflation of the period loomed much larger for the 
rest of the city's population. Corruption was a very general 
complaint, greatly exacerbated by the economic half-reforms of 
the past few years (Meaney, 1991; Oi, 1991). Yet a number of the 
student participants were themselves children of high cadres, and 
all at these elite universities had hopes of living lives of relative 
privilege. The inflation issue was even worse. Even though it clearly 
rankled anyone on a fixed salary, the students hesitated to bring it 
up for fear of jeopardizing the reforms themselves. They also 
thought of themselves occupying the moral high ground, above 
simple pocketbook issues, as opposed to the strictly materialistic 
hopes of the workers (Perry, 1991:135). 
While more detailed studies of these demonstrations continue, 
even the short sketch here strongly indicates that Tiananmen in 1989 
fits the broad pattern I have been discussing for the Taiping and 
Taiwan. Far from sharing a unified agenda, the participants piled all 
kinds of interpretations on a few core symbols - democracy and 
corruption, death and revolution. They left a mass of unresolved 
ambiguities and inconsistencies, with plenty of room for alternatives 
or for no explicit interpretation at all.69 While some commentators 
have seen this as a failing of the movement, the multivocality of the 
symbols was in fact as central to the initial success in Tiananmen as 
it had been to the early organization of the God Worshipers or to the 
Eighteen Lords. Indeterminate meaning makes long-term organiza-
tion very difficult, but provides a powerful core for potential social 
movements. No "true meaning" could be agreed upon until a 
means to control interpretation developed. In the end, only the 
government would develop such an institutionalized interpretation. 
TRUE MEANING REVEALED AND ENFORCED 
I have argued for the Taiping that precipitating and institutionaliz-
ing a new interpretation can be a key catalyst for resistance. The 
brutal and tragic ending in Tiananmen on 4 June 1989 meant that the 
demonstrators would never manage such a transformation to a 
more stable organization. Yet the state itself eagerly played the 
same role by revealing a single, rationalized, explicit and very thin 
interpretation of the events in Tiananmen. Unlike the Taiping, they 
had no need to create new institutions to impose their reading. At 
least since their revolutionary days in Yen'an, the Communists had 
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developed a sophisticated and pervasive set of institutions to ensure 
unity around official interpretations. Rarely has an ideology formed 
on a better prepared social ground. 
The initial move occurred in the People's Daily on 26 April, where a 
major editorial hit the themes that would characterize the govern-
ment line throughout: 
An extremely small number of people were not involved in 
mourning Comrade Hu Yaobang, were not trying to promote 
socialist democracy in China, and were not just a bit unhappy 
and letting off steam. Under the banner of democracy, they 
were trying to destroy the democratic legal system. Their goal 
was to poison people's minds, to create chaos throughout the 
country, to destroy political stability and unity. This was a 
planned conspiracy, a riot (Renmin Ribao, 26 April 1989; 
translation revised from Han, 1990:84). 
These themes would remain at the core of the official precipitation 
from then on. A tiny group of ''black hands" had misled the 
students in a vain attempt to destroy the country. The conspiracy 
theory offers a hidden meaning beneath everything that was said, a 
meaning that fooled the common people. Only the state was able to 
pierce the disguise and reveal the true interpretation.70 
In addition, consistent use of the word luan ("chaos") brought up 
all the old official battles against uncontrollable public events that I 
have already discussed for Taiwan. The events in Tiananmen were 
''hot and noisy'' by any popular standard, with the constant flood of 
parades, speeches, hunger strikes, photographers, and occasional 
musical interludes. The People's Republic strongly echoed both the 
Republican and imperial states by damning all this as chaos, in the 
standard official condemnation of popular saturation. 
At the time, this was only one voice among many, although it was 
a very powerful one. The state was still using only one means to 
propagate its message - the tightly controlled news media. Even 
official reporting, however, still seemed to hold a mixed message, as 
extensive coverage of the hunger strike and the students' interviews 
with top leaders surprised everyone. The People's Daily version only 
fully monopolized discourse after 4 June. Deng Xiaoping finalized 
the official version in a speech on 9 June that reiterated the People's 
Daily themes. Within a few days, all the media began systematically 
blasting the so-called counter-revolutionary conspirators in a uni-
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vocal drone that still continues (New York Times, 15 June 1989; A16). 
All the thick possibilities of the spring had been reduced to the 
simple themes of chaos and conspiracy. 
As the literature on totalitarianism implied, mechanisms to 
enforce an interpretation in China go far beyond incessant media 
campaigns. The entire population is organized into small political 
study groups, whose primary purpose is to settle on a unified and 
rationalized mass line (often dictated from above in practice), and 
then to enforce commitment to it (Whyte, 1974:18--35). In regular 
meetings at their workplaces, these small groups discuss current 
events and important policies. During campaigns, people are 
expected to criticize both their own failings and those of others, 
ostensibly leading everyone to see the light. In principle, at least, the 
goal is enthusiastic devotion, and not just simple obedience. By mid-
June, all of this machinery had been focussed on the official 
interpretation of the demonstrations. Many of the old Cultural 
Revolution techniques were also revived, as the state pulled out all 
the stops. Public humiliation met all accused wrong-doers, who often 
appeared on television with heads bowed, hair shaved, and wearing 
placards describing their crimes (New York Times, 18 June 1989: IV1). 
The initial campaigns hit college campuses especially hard. Small 
group meetings became much more frequent, with Deng's speech as 
one of the major texts for study. Students and faculty were also 
expected to make full confessions of their errors, and to turn each 
other in. Beijing University freshmen took military training instead 
of starting school. While this was partially a punishment, and 
partially an attempt at more controlled indoctrination, it also fit 
with a powerful pro-military theme that dominated the first few 
months of the campaign. 
The top leaders held an enormous congratulatory meeting for the 
military on 29 June, under the banner "The People's Army is 
Faithful to the Party'' (Renmin Ribao, 30 June 1989). Through much 
of July, the campaign centered on learning from the lives of ten 
soldiers, whom Deng had apotheosized as martyred "Guardians of 
the Republic'' (Renmin Ribao, 6 July 1989; 19 July 1989). Shanghai 
residents found themselves celebrating the fortieth anniversary of 
the People's Liberation Army entering the city, and an officially 
sanctioned slogan for China's independence day celebrated the 
glorious victory over counter-revolution (Renmin Ribao, 23 July 
1989; 10 September 1989). 
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The campaign broadened in the months that followed, as the 
government pushed people to "sweep away the yellow." Yellow 
refers to pornography and other sources of spiritual pollution, and 
the concept clearly extended to any undesired cultural influences, 
including especially bourgeois values. Going far beyond a glorifica-
tion of the military, this new direction brought inner thoughts under 
scrutiny, and allowed the apparatus for promoting official inter-
pretations its full play in the widest public sphere. Small groups 
took initial responsibility for identifying and sweeping away yellow 
wherever it appeared. Here the campaign went well beyond 
justifying the repression of the demonstrations and trying to restore 
the reputation of the military. It had expanded into all aspects of 
daily life and thought. 
At the same time, the government began to promote a campaign 
of nostalgia for old revolutionary heroes and values. While Jiang 
Zemin urged China to remember the Yen' an spirit and continue to 
rely on it, the thoughts of Mao Zedong gained new life in the media 
and even in military study groups (Renmin Ribao, 15 September 1989; 
Shijie Ribao, 26 June 1991). Grizzled revolutionary veterans were 
trotted out to share their spirit with students (Renmin Ribao overseas 
edition, 24 June 1991). Newspapers explained the need for proper 
respect of the flag, and the 150th anniversary of the Opium War saw 
a campaign for patriotic education (Renmin Ribao, 23 September 
1989; 31 March 1990). Capping off the patriotism theme, a proper 
socialist statue of a worker, a peasant, a soldier and an intellectual 
working together rose up on the spot where the Goddess of 
Democracy had once stood (New York Times, 22 September 1989: 
A4). The officially true interpretation of Tiananmen was clear to 
everyone. 
Most strikingly of all, the government urged everyone to emulate 
various heroes who had given their young lives in their dedication 
to a true socialist life. The sudden reemergence of the ghost of Lei 
Feng at the end of 1989 surprised many observers. Lei Feng was a 
young soldier who had died in 1962, a sort of super Boy Scout, 
whose gleaming socialist spirit caused him to help people every-
where. He had been one of the ideological underpinnings of 
Cultural Revolution campaigns, and his return during a period 
that generally defined itself in contrast to the Cultural Revolution 
spoke both to the urgency of this campaign and to the dominance of 
nostalgia as a theme. 
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A more contemporary, but very similar, hero named Lai Ning has 
become a core model to emulate for middle and elementary school 
students. Lai Ning was "a classic example of the new man of the 
'four haves' [have ideals, morals, civilization, and discipline]" 
(Renmin Ribao, 14 October 1990). These martyrs' heartfelt dedication 
to socialist ideals far outweighed their particular actions in most 
standard descriptions. They always appear as prototypes for a new 
kind of human being. The point of such a campaign is to remake 
people down to the smallest details of their daily lives, rather than to 
promote any specific behaviors. Identity itself is at stake. Discussion 
meetings of such models would thus ideally leave no comer of the 
human soul unswept, brin~g every aspect of thought and beha-
vior under official scrutiny. 
SOCIAUST FREE SPACE 
While the Taiping had to change heaven and earth to institutiona-
lize, rationalize and control its ideology, the entire mechanism 
already stood ready to use in the People's Republic. Yet just like 
the other attempts to precipitate I have discussed, even this most 
powerful effort left enormous space for resaturation. While unam-
biguous resistance occurred only rarely after 4 June, a combination 
of irony, cynicism and anomie has undermined any straightforward 
loyalty to the official line. 
Evidence from other socialist societies, especially now that the 
changes in Eastern Europe have led to a flood of new literature, 
clarifies how certain areas manage to divert the power of officially 
institutionalized meaning. While by no means discarding theories of 
totalitarianism, these studies add a view of how socialist mechan-
isms of control, in an ironic dialectic, create their own contradic-
tions. Both the theoretical and empirical evidence supports authors 
arguing for the fundamental internal weakness of what had 
appeared to be strong socialist states (e.g., Verdery, 1991). 
The rest of this chapter addresses how socialist institutions of 
control everywhere have created as a byproduct social relations 
beyond their control. These free spaces defuse thin official inter-
pretations into many alternative sources of meaning, even though 
they remain firmly embedded in the system itself. The alternative 
interpretations are themselves weakly organized and inconsistent, 
but such complex and ambiguous features allow them to survive 
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and to coopt official discourse. They resemble Daoist parables of 
water: hit it and it moves away unscathed; pull your hand back and 
it returns immediately, placid as ever. 
The impossibility of controlling every single institutional context 
forces a crucial limitation on the state's ability to impose an 
interpretation, as socialist systems themselves spawn institutional 
ties outside of their control. This process has been most clearly 
documented for socialist economics. The lack of genuine competi-
tion encourages firms and bureaucrats to hoard resources of all 
kinds, both by amassing more goods and by disguising what they 
already have (e.g., Verdery, 1991:422; Shue, 1988:110). In conse-
quence, shortages characterize all levels of the society, leading both 
consumers and managers to try getting goods outside the official 
economy, in a "second economy'' that may be more or less officially 
sanctioned (Verdery, 1991:422). 
Even when legally sanctioned (as in Hungary in the 1980s or in 
China now), "second economy units simply could not prosper 
without having recourse to illegal means in obtaining the necessary 
inputs. This led to the establishment of an extensive system of 
corruption sanctioned by custom" (Gabor, 1991:6). The term 
"corruption," in fact, limits the concept too severely. What people 
needed above all was a set of personal relationships (guanxi in 
Chinese) on which they could call. Such ties allowed consumers to 
learn when the first tomatoes of the season would hit the stands, just 
as they allowed large enterprise managers to get cement when 
official channels had dried up. While the system can easily 
deteriorate into bribe-taking, it rests just as much on a kind of 
generalized reciprocity, where long-term mutual back-scratching 
combines friendship and utility. With the legal expansion of 
China's second economy during the reforms of the last decade, 
such ties have become even more important. One study of recipro-
city in a rural village of Heilongjiang estimated that the average 
family spent 20 percent of their income on gift-giving to establish 
strong personal networks (Yan, 1991). 
''Millionaire" Chen provided one of the star attractions when I 
joined a group of foreigners taken to visit Fengyang County in 
Anhui Province, a showcase county for China's economic reforms. 
Chen had begun his capital accumulation by contracting a lot of 
land when the new responsibility system first allowed such a retreat 
from communal farming. With several adult sons, he could farm a 
lot of land, and turned a healthy profit for several years running. He 
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made his real fortune, though, by using his capital to buy large mats, 
woven by local peasants out of native reeds. He sold the mats in 
Manchuria to provide temporary grain storage during the bumper 
harvests up there. 
When we asked how he had come to make such a connection, 
involving scarce rail links to a very distant market, he explained 
with a series of particularistic, completely unofficial ties. Chen 
himself was a low-level Party member, who had gone to visit his 
son in Manchuria. When he learned that Manchuria needed just the 
kind of mats he could supply, he used his Party and personal 
connections to make contact with appropriate cadres. He had sold 
an entire boxcar full of mats before he left for home. While he 
showed keen entrepreneurial instinct, someone without his personal 
network could never have done the same thing. No one considered 
this illegal or corrupt; he told it to us proudly and openly. He had 
simply tapped the informal network that anyone must develop to 
thrive in such a society. Going through the back door, as the Chinese 
idiom runs, is a way of life. 
The increasing commodity economy of the last decade has 
encouraged the instrumental side of personal connections (Gold, 
1985). Nevertheless, the element of apparent reciprocity has always 
been critical. These are not simply financial transactions, but long-
term personal relationships. The goal is to create mutual social debt, 
rather than to repay a monetary debt. Underneath the anonymous 
bureaucracy of official society, China is riddled with personal 
· networks, constantly reinforced in daily interactions. While the 
socialist system unconsciously creates such ties against its own 
will, so to speak, those ties in tum create alternatives to the 
system. They substitute a relational ethic for the universalism of 
official language; they evade the atomization of individuals by 
creating new ties; and they may challenge official hierarchy as gifts 
from below leave superiors in debt to underlings (Yang, 1989:50-51). 
Huang Shu-min's study of a village near Xiamen City offers many 
examples of the local brigade leader's reliance on personal ties to 
fulfill his responsibilities (Huang, 1989:143-150). This leader clearly 
saw his personal network, with roots especially in the Four 
Cleanups campaign on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, as his 
greatest political asset. On one occasion, for example, he approached 
an old friend in the Xiamen Traffic Control Office to try to get his 
brigade a contract for constructing steel fences. In the course of their 
discussions0he brigade head learned that the Traffic Control Office 
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wanted better access to imported cigarettes. He then drew on 
another connection to the manager of the import store in the Special 
Economic Zone, who could get cigarettes with low customs duties. 
By orchestrating a deal between his two friends, the brigade leader 
won the contract (Huang, 1989:145). These are hardly the mechan-
isms of economic order that the socialist system strives for, but they 
are prerequisites to success. No graft took place here, as each party 
to the deal worked for the benefit of his larger unit. Yet the entire 
system of reciprocity cross-cut and undermined the neat lines of 
socialist bureaucratic authority. 
None of this constitutes direct resistance, but it guarantees that 
alternative sources of meaning lurk just below the official order on 
the surface. Official institutions of interpretation have no control 
over these areas, which themselves develop as a reflex of the system. 
''Rather than being merely official corruption bolstering official 
power, the tactics and ethics of the gift provide, at the same time, 
a challenge to the principle of state distribution" (Yang, 1989:52).72 
The family provides another free space where full control remains 
impossible. Outside of a few short-lived experiments, China has 
never challenged the primary role of the family in socialization, 
consumption, and old age care. With the economic reforms of the 
1980s, families have also grown increasingly important as produc-
tive units, just as they had been before collectivization. The state, of 
course, still tries to penetrate the family in its campaigns. The Lei 
Feng and Lai Ning education program in elementary schools 
partially intends to invade the family through the children. The 
well publicized case of the sister who allegedly turned in her 
brother for his part in the Tiananmen demonstrations showed the 
family as the government would like it to work. Yet for the vast 
majority of families, the powerful personal ties of socialization, 
mutual care, and joint economies overwhelm the direct ties be-
tween individual and state. 
Even political study small groups, a primary mechanism of direct 
ideological control in the front line of any campaign, may them-
selves foster alternative institutions. The intensive social interaction 
they encourage among classmates and co-workers intends to bring 
the campaign down to the level of daily life. Yet it also creates a 
group whose solidarity may outweigh the campaign. Chen Jo-hsi 
offers a poignant fictional account of such an interaction during the 
Cultural Revolution, when a mother hears that her little son has said 
"Chairman Mao is a rotten egg" to a playmate (Chen, 1978). After 
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spending several days in petrified fear that the story will spread 
beyond the playmate's mother, she finally learns that the other little 
boy appears to be the guilty party instead. Yet neither mother 
turned in the other, in spite of the enormous pressures at the 
time, and both ended up as fast friends. The system of control 
created a solidarity beyond its control.73 
Similar kinds of interactions appeared frequently during the post-
Tiananmen campaigns. One cadre reported that in political study 
sessions he visited in Guangdong, ''No one says a word; they just 
read the [required] newspaper articles out loud, and count that as 
having studied" (Shi, 1990:19). Nicholas Kristof documented several 
more such cases in the New York Times. For example, co-workers at a 
hospital stymied police attempts to find who had raised a banner 
praising the Rumanian uprising of 1989. Everyone knew the guilty 
party, but no one would inform. In another incident, an official at a 
cadre school protected participants in the Tiananmen demonstra-
tions because he himself had taken part. Like the mothers of the 
children who spoke too freely, his particularistic connections out-
weighed his official duty. In one final example, a Beijing University 
professor would not write a self-criticism about Tiananmen, even 
though the local Party branch secretary kept pushing him. Somehow 
gaining access to his file and expecting the worst, the professor 
discovered the secretary had put a note in the file saying the case 
was closed and the professor was appropriately contrite (New York 
Times, 24 January 1990). 
If everyone in the small group cooperates, they can easily defuse 
the campaign by going through the motions without the substance -
mutual self-criticism with a wink. The existence of social and 
economic networks beyond direct government control ensures that 
alternative interpretations, or at least free space to escape official 
interpretation, will always thrive. The official institutions of control 
breed reactions inherently beyond their control. 
12 
Irony, Cynicism, and 
Potential Resistance 
Both recent theories of socialism and the evidence from China thus 
suggest that totalizing institutions never have complete control. The 
resulting free space has always been there, but has grown increas-
ingly obvious in China over the last decade, as the reforms have 
encouraged departures from strict state control. Such alternative 
social relations guarantee that cultural domination can never be 
total, because the institutions of official interpretation themselves 
have inherent limits. This chapter will follow how the space created 
by reciprocal ties, family life, and even political small groups has 
fostered ambiguous interpretations and refusals to interpret that 
deflect and deform the campaign for a unified, official reading of 
Tiananmen. 
LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL OOMINATION 
Official socialist language rests on claims of science; it is impersonal, 
passive, universalizing and explicit. It offers History, not histories 
(Lefort, 1986:222). Such thin interpretation is far easier to control 
than overloaded symbolism, but it is also far less powerful. In 
addition, it leaves itself open to question in ways that messier 
meaning does not. As any real bureaucrat knows, there is safety 
in ambiguity, no matter what the Weberian pressures to rationalize. 
Clear statements allow for clear criticisms. 
Thin, official language immediately generates its own problems. 
Real social experience, after all, creates many histories that can 
never fully match History. The anonymous and universal truth of 
science also contradicts the real divisions in the society, especially 
between the leadership and the masses. Individuals thus experience 
an abstract discourse about the identity of all the People, yet also 
place the origins of such language in the centers of real power that 
the discourse itself denies (Lefort, 1986:220-222).74 In practice, the 
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system has created a deep distrust of official language, and a 
reaction that undercuts the goals of official interpretation. The 
reaction does not directly oppose the line - censorship largely 
prevents alternative precipitations that would constitute open 
resistance. Instead, it overloads meaning in a constant search for 
alternative messages, or a refusal to see any explicit message. As 
people themselves feel the need to communicate between the lines, 
they begin to read all language the same way, with a cynical view 
toward the hidden significances. Seeing ostensibly scientific dis-
course as allegory immediately vitiates its power. 
Distrust of the thin discourse of control, for example, leads people 
to personalize all information according to the trustworthiness of 
the source, and thus undercuts its claimed anonymity (Schopflin, 
1991:13). Schopflin argues further that eastern European samizdat 
literature developed techniques of inference and allegory to the 
point that genuine communication suffered: '1ntended to side-step 
the problem of censorship and self-censorship in the Kadar period, 
the language of the Hungarian opposition was as convoluted as that 
of officialdom. Czech and Polish patterns were not that different'' 
(Schopflin, 1991:8). These convolutions were crucially important, 
because they pushed all reading toward the search for multiple 
meanings, sapping the strength of any official language. 
In Poland in the 1980s, where the split between people and state 
had tom wide apart, official language underwent a systematic but 
subtle transformation in unofficial talk, forming what Wierzbicka 
calls an anti-totalitarian language (Wierzbicka, 1990). Uninflected 
acronyms in official language grew inflections and sometimes 
changed gender in popular discourse. Bits of Russian - a language 
that everyone studied but no one learned - also appeared in 
ironically altered forms in daily speech (Wierzbicka, 1990:6). No-
thing directly resisted, but the added nuances undermined the 
dominating simplicity of official, controlled discourse. 
Thorn sees a similar process leading to a refusal of all interpreta-
tion in the Soviet Union. What she calls the "wooden language" of 
Soviet officialdom provoked a general distrust of all language. "This 
instinctive rejection of the deceitful word is the origin of what one 
might call 'lyrical consciousness.' The search for a reality beyond 
words involves an act of empathy towards things, especially 
towards nature. Often it takes the form of a longing for friendly 
speechless human contacts" (Thorn, 1989:144). Here the reaction 
repudiates all explicit interpretation. 
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This process typifies repressive language anywhere; it responds 
to cultural domination generally, rather than to socialism in 
particular. Such uses of irony and allegory simply carry to an 
extreme the fate of the official language in Taiwan that I have 
already discussed. Studies of non-socialist authoritarian or Fascist 
regimes show very similar developments. In Fascist Italy, "One can 
detect, in the absence of freedom of expression, an increased 
propensity to grasp double meanings. One need only scan the 
newspapers of the Fascist period to note the recurrence of so-called 
puns - plainly silly and almost meaningless remarks which suggest 
that the general repression had turned everything into a laughing 
matter" (Passerini, 1987:86). 
Two retired textile workers related a comparable story from 
Portugal under Salazar, where the Minister of Education had been 
speaking to a crowd of workers. As he was promising all the 
wonders that the government would do for the workers, someone 
loudly sighed in the back, "Oh, if only it were so!" The offender was 
hustled out of the meeting, but not before his comment had brought 
the entire ceremony to a grinding end (Ingerson, 1984:7). Typical 
irony, the statement allowed multiple interpretations. Even many 
years after the fact, the two old workers still could not agree on an 
interpretation. One insisted on a reading as sarcasm, but the other 
felt it could have been sympathy (Ingerson, 1984:7-8). Multivocality 
is key to surviving censorship. While the inherent ambiguities of 
saturation make for only ambiguous resistance, they also perform 
the crucial function of forcing all official language to be read for its 
own ambiguities, ironies, and multiple meanings. As irony becomes 
the way of writing, cynicism becomes the way of reading. The 
dominating power of thin, official, "rational" discourse thus finds 
itself undercut from the beginning, even in the absence of any direct 
resistance. 
Anthropologists dedicated to fieldwork tend to scoff at China 
watchers who read entire political movements out of which official 
stands where in photographs of a public ceremony. My attitude 
toward such data changed, however, when I lived in China and 
realized that many Chinese were staring at those same photographs 
and drawing the same kinds of conclusions from them. China had 
always valued messages delivered between the lines, but life under 
the current regime has perfected the art. All official language claims 
to be transparently thin, yet all of it is combed for hidden 
possibilities. Perhaps only in China could a historical play (Hai 
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Rui Dismissed from Office) have touched off the Cultural Revolution, 
with arguments raging over its proper allegorical reading as a 
possible criticism of Mao. 75 
More than forty years of Chinese experience With mercurially 
changing political winds have deepened the cynicism greeting any 
new campaign. Especially after the Cultural Revolution, people 
have perfected strategies for survival. They know exactly how to 
manipulate small group sessions to minimize damage?6 The result 
has been an array of irony, cynicism and anomie that has powerfully 
deflected the current campaign without ever resisting it directly. 
The transparence and frailty of official Chinese language, like all 
very controlled discourse, make it vulnerable to the accretion of new 
meanings where institutional domination is weaker. 
The very nature of this process, however, makes evidence 
problematic and difficult to interpret. Successful irony, like sighing 
"if only it were so,'' always leaves one unsure of actual intention. 
After so many decades of campaigns, Chinese are quick studies of 
the new line, and will speak it immediately. People certainly offer a 
great deal of surface cooperation to the current post-Tiananmen 
campaigns. Suggestions of alternatives come primarily in the 
dissident and foreign press, which generally promote readings as 
resistance whenever possible. Nevertheless, a great deal of evidence 
suggests the very marginal success of this campaign, in spite of 
superficial appearances. Unofficial levels of meaning chum beneath 
the surface, although very little actually boils up as identifiable 
resistance. 
In the least successful such cases, a hidden alternative meaning 
clearly constitutes resistance. The best known example in China 
recently was the poem that appeared in the overseas edition of the 
People's Daily (20 March 1991). It appeared to be a wistful and 
sentimental bit of patriotic nostalgia> penned by an overseas 
student longing for his homeland. Word quickly spread, however, 
that the Chinese characters could also be read along the diagonal to 
render up a denunciation of Li Peng. Such secret messages are 
neither ironic nor really saturated. For those who know the trick, the 
true meaning can be identified in a moment. The government, of 
course, could also identify the true meaning, and fired the respons-
ible editor (New York Times, 30 April 1991). 
A more subtle attempt at subversion occurred on national 
television during the demonstrations themselves. The official news 
readers on ccrv read the announcement of martial law dressed in 
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black, and spoke as if delivering a funeral eulogy for a fallen leader 
(Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990:841). Here again the death symbol-
ism allowed many strands of interpretation, from mourning for Hu 
Yaobang, to sympathy for the students, to protest against martial 
law. Or perhaps it was just a coincidence that they wore black that 
day. Yet once again, the government found the irony not subtle 
enough. Apparently feeling that the performance veiled a hidden 
message of protest, the government fired the two news readers (New 
York Times, 18 November 1990: A23). 
More successful attempts would have to be more difficult to'-
interpret. Newspaper headlines, even in the ultimately official 
People's Daily, offered several good examples. For instance, on 
22 May 1989, just two days after martial law had been declared, 
the paper carried a front page report on the prime minister of 
Hungary, who said troops should never be used to solve a political 
crisis, and criticized Stalin for using troops for internal political 
suppression (Yi and Thompson, 1989:139). A few days after the 
bloody end of the demonstrations, the overseas edition of the 
People's Daily reported Kim Dae-jung's comments on the Kwangju 
uprising in Korea under the headline, ''Punish by Law the Arch-
Criminals Who Have Suppressed the People's Uprising'' (Yi and 
Thompson, 1989:140). A few days later, the national edition simi-
larly carried a headline reading ''The North Korea Labor News 
Criticizes Roh Tai Woo's Fascist Regime, Which Indiscriminately 
Kills Innocent Students and Bystanders" (New York Times, 22 June 
1989: A10). These are perfectly correct, politically acceptable stories 
for the official press, and I know of no heads that rolled on their 
account. Yet given the timing, no one needed secret instructions 
about diagonal readings to wonder if extra meanings might lie 
beneath the surface. The ambiguity was total; no one will ever 
determine the "true" meaning of these headlines. 
Even apparently clear acts of resistance could grow muddled 
enough to avoid retribution. An old peasant in a suburban Beijing 
commune disabled a tank that got stuck in the mud. When security 
officers later tracked him down, villagers claimed the man was 
somewhat mentally retarded, and he was finally released (Chance 
and Engst, 1991:181). Stupidity has always been a good veil for 
passive workplace resistance, and served its function just as well 
here. Perhaps, after all, he really was retarded. 
Music and the other arts provided ample opportunities for 
multiple interpretations, not always intended by the artist. In 
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Kunming, for example, the audience was watching a historical 
movie about the revolutionary period, which fit the campaign of 
nostalgia for old cadres. Yet the first time Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-
shek], the old arch-enemy, appeared on the screen, the crowd broke 
into spontaneous applause (New York Times, 22 September 1989: A4). 
In quite another use of film, a large group of students at a Fuzhou 
university tramped around their campus late one night in 1990, 
banging on pots and pans and singing a lyric from the film Red 
Sorghum at the top of their lungs: ''Little sister, boldly go forward, go 
forward! Don't turn back!" (Shang, 1990:104). This performance left 
several interpretations open. Perhaps the students were just singing 
a song they liked. The lyrics sounded officially acceptable, but 
perhaps they referred to the Tiananmen demonstrators. The Carni-
valesque fanfare overwhelmed official performance, but no proper 
interpretation was clear. 
Another musical case centered on a Beijing man who played 
funeral dirges - the sort of thing heard on the radio when a top 
leader dies - as loud as his stereo could manage. The neighbors 
yelled out the windows, asking who died, and the man answered 
''Not Deng Xiaoping, and not Li Peng either! Just a distant grand-
uncle." The police came to investigate, and the man insisted he just 
liked dirges the way other people like pop music. He kept playing 
his record, every day (Yu, 1991). Here was still more overloaded 
funeral saturation. Like the other cases, it contained too many 
possible meanings, which the government found impossible to sort 
out. 
The most famous musical case is Cui Jian, a sort of unofficial poet 
of the student movement. His song "The Last Gunshot" never 
mentions the events of 4 June, but audiences draw their own 
conclusions. During a performance of the song in Guangzhou, 
many members of the audience lit and waved cigarette lighters. 
Audiences also wave red cloth during another song, "A Piece of Red 
Cloth" (Xian, 1991), reminiscent of the tangled possibilities of the 
red flags at Tiananmen. While most of his audiences might argue 
that the interpretation as protest is dear in context, enough official 
meaning still remains for Cui Jian's lyrics consistently to evade the 
censors as he releases new recordings (Peters, 1991). 
Rather than proposing alternative meanings, people can denature 
official meanings through too much enthusiasm. This has been a 
problem for the current nostalgia campaign, as a recent T-shirt craze 
showed. Some T-shirts bore radical Maoist slogans from the 
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Cultural Revolution days. Quotes from Mao included "Never 
forget class struggle," "A single spark can start a prairie fire," 
and "Sweep away all vermin" (South China Morning Post, 2 July 
1991; Barone, 1991). Strongly recalling the days when Lei Feng first 
became an official campaign, the sudden resurgence of Mao seems 
meekly appropriate. Yet both the unorthodox medium and the 
current context encourage alternative readings as either ridicule of 
the campaign or as calls to resistance. Again, the students wearing 
these shirts may intend protest, but the explicit form always allows 
them to deny any such intent. 
In a similarly two-edged memory of the Cultural Revolution, 
middle-aged urban workers and cadres have been returning in 
droves to the rural villages they lived in when they were sent 
down to the countryside during the campaigns of twenty years 
ago (Ouyang, 1990). At the same time, cassettes of Cultural 
Revolution songs set to a pop beat have become runaway best-
sellers (New York Times, 2 June 1992). Nothing here indicates 
resistance to the government, yet the shirts, the village visits, and 
the music entail entirely too much cooperation in nostalgia, 
commemorating the wrong things. By using the exact language of 
previous campaigns, the T -shirts especially called all slogans and all 
campaigns into question. 
Rather than smothering the campaign with too much cooperative 
meaning, one can also suffocate it with a lack of any interpretation. 
Like a work-to-rule labor action, where minimal compliance to the 
absolute letter of the law disrupts work, campaigns can be met with 
great ennui underneath a surface of minimal cooperation. Other T-
shirts show this pattern, with a kind of celebration of apathy: 
''Really exhausted," '1'm depressed! Leave me alone!", "Bored" 
(South China Morning Post, 2 July 1991). In a hopeless attempt to stop 
this sort of thing, the government has made "unhealthy'' slogans on 
T-shirts illegal (New York Times, 29 July 1991: A4). In practice, 
however, they simply cannot control every medium for expressing 
inappropriate messages. A similar craze for signs on dormitory 
doors swept college campuses at the same time. They ranged from 
"Love Nest'' to "Hall of Boredom" to "Small Appliances Repaired" 
(Wang, 1991). 
This is less irony than a refusal to engage in the first place. 
Anomie, in fact, seems to be the most widespread response to the 
entire situation. Purely pro forma mutual self-criticism now makes 
political study groups a matter of bored routine, even in the military 
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(e.g., Shi, 1990:19; li, 1990). A questionnaire administered by Beijing 
University's graduate student association to their members showed 
a consistent depressed boredom with everything. When asked what 
feelings were on campus, a plurality answered that no one felt like 
doing anything; the next most popular answer described everyone 
as depressed. The plurality said the greatest current interest on 
campus was fun, without regard to the consequences. The only 
enthusiasm at all was for finding a way to go abroad. A majority 
even claimed that they just would not care if a new student 
movement began ("Beijing ... ", 1990). 
Such an attitude refuses to embrace any kind of interpretation. It 
poses no alternatives to the official version of things, but it makes 
equally clear that acceptance of the official version is only for 
convenience. The dissident press, from which many of these 
examples come, often sees them as evidence of resistance. Beneath 
the ennui or the nostalgic returns to the countryside, they imply, lies 
a counter-ideology awaiting its opportunity to come above ground. 
Yet such a view, like seeing Taiwanese pigs as champions of 
ethnicity, forces an explicit interpretation where none exists for 
most people. 
Aside from the rare acrostic poem or actual act of sabotage, the 
official campaign falters not against a rock of resistance, but by 
drowning in a sea of wider meanings. People accept the campaign, 
conduct their political study, and perform self-criticisms. Yet they 
also manipulate the system for their own survival, and sit quietly by 
as others do the same. By recycling bits of old campaigns in T-shirt 
slogans, trips to the old Cultural Revolution countryside, and loud 
funeral music, people also add a questioning subtext to the claims of 
the new campaign. The universal socialist truths claimed in the 
latest campaign stumble across the detritus of old ones, never quite 
sufficiently forgotten. Anomie itself undercuts official meaning, 
which requires enthusiastic participation from everyone, not just 
passive acceptance. None of this constitutes an explicit oppositional 
ideology. If such a reading ever becomes clear enough, it will be 
crushed, as happened to the fired newspaper editor and news 
readers. The anomie is real; so is the nostalgia, and so, for that 
matter, is the obedient following of the campaign. 
The language of official meaning is always explicit, orderly and 
rationalized. Yet every time language approaches such a stiff 
monotone, a new process of accretion adds meaning outside the 
institutions of control. The very transparency of official language 
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encourages questioning its motives and claims of universality. Just 
such a process transformed many Taiping leaders' view of Yang 
Xiuqing from the voice of God, who had to be followed, to a self-
aggrandizing fake, who had to be killed. Yang's monopoly on 
power at the end allowed new interpretations to undermine his 
claim to divine inspiration. Similarly, official ideology in Taiwan 
faded fast after the political relaxation of the mid-1980s. Exactly the 
same disintegration of meaning is occurring with the current 
campaign in the People's Republic, in spite of the powerful 
institutions of interpretation. The form of official language itself 
creates its own reaction. 
IDENTITY AND THE SELFLESS SELF 
The system of campaigns and small group political study in part 
tries to accomplish the atomization of individuals that totalitarian 
theory expects, linking each unit directly to the state as a cog in the 
machine of the People as a whole. Campaigns starring heroes like 
Lei Feng and Lai Ning particularly aim to create a proper sense of 
the selfless self, dedicated to the common good over any personal or 
personalistic interests. The People as state leave no room for 
separate institutions of civil society, at least in principle. Yet in 
practice, as we have seen, socialist society leaves enormous territor-
ies of free space, and issues of identity become especially proble-
matic. 
Several studies of socialist and fascist states have shown how the 
effort to atomize individuals and to create institutions of control 
can rebound against its intended purposes. Istvan Rev, for exam-
ple, wrote about the advantages of being atomized in socialist 
Hungary: 
Since complete coercion can be maintained only by granting 
power to individuals at all points of the system, the individuals 
are not completely powerless ... Although the individual's 
power is but part of the structure of the system - it was 
delegated to him in order to guard the existing power relations 
- and there is no other ground of resistance but the ground 
created by the same system, still, resistance even on the terms of 
the system may be fateful for the political structure (Rev, 
1987:347). 
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Writing two years before the velvet revolution, he would soon be 
proved right. An analysis of Italian fascism similarly concluded that 
the very organizations intended to suppress class conflict forced the 
regime to respond to public opinion (DeGrazia, 1981:226, 233). 
The challenge to socialist identity shows up clearly in images of 
the body. Lefort describes the totalitarian body as a series of 
synecdoches where the head represents and merges with the body 
as a whole. The proletariat is the head of the whole people and 
stands for the people as a whole. In just the same way, the Party 
heads the proletariat, the leadership heads the Party, and the 
"egocrat'' heads the leadership as the ultimate embodiment of the 
people (Lefort, 1986:299). Every individual both reproduces and 
constitutes the body of the People, each contributing to its health 
anonymously and identically. This kind of attempt in China peaked 
during the Cultural Revolution, when Mao embodied the People. 
Presentation of self became a monotone, not because a uniform was 
required, but because socialist workers have a certain look. Their 
clothes are cheap but durable, their haircuts are practical, and their 
eyes shine with enthusiasm. They have no interest in creating 
themselves as unique individuals or members of other groups 
through makeup or unique dress; they are dedicated to the 
common cause of the People. The Lei Feng campaign tried to 
epitomize and enforce this selfless self during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. His revitalization now indicates how far the state feels identity 
in practice has escaped from its control. 
Even during the Cultural Revolution, none of this fully worked. 
One heard, for example, that looking at the feet let you distinguish 
rank even when cadres wore the same workers' clothes as everyone 
else. The quality of the shoes indicated the importance of the wearer. 
While alternative versions of identity always snuck through the 
cracks, the economic reforms of the 1980s consciously brought a 
great relaxation in direct attempts to control personal identity, as 
long as no clear threats to the state appeared. Household decoration 
in the 1980s, for example, increasingly abandoned state symbolism 
like portraits of Mao in favor of the traces of family history. The 
furnishings reflected family structure and interests, and the domi-
nant decorations were photographs of children, important family 
occasions, and recent ancestors (Davis, 1989:95-96). 
Dress and personal decoration have emphasized the new freedom 
to express a self apart from the body of the whole People. Dress had 
become strikingly more varied by 1985 than it had been in 1980. Far 
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more than just a reaction to more easily available consumer goods, 
dress has become a vehicle to show a self beyond Lei Feng. Young 
women now often prefer frilly dresses and curled hair. The image of 
the proletarian is gone, even for actual workers. Many women now 
transform their faces through a cosmetics fad (New York Times, 6 
May 1990, 1:16); young men do the same with sunglasses. Raised 
heels, equally popular with men and women, change how people 
move. Oothing for children particularly expresses both individual-
ity and conspicuous consumption. They gleam with bright colors 
and cute hats; children still unable to walk often wear leather shoes 
that their parents cannot afford for themselves. Clothing and 
personal decoration have opened up an enormous new range for 
the expression of new kinds of identity, from eccentric individuality 
to affiliation with new kinds of groups. All depart from the 
uniformity of the totalitarian body. 
Names and titles form another quick marker of identity that has 
been in flux. In naming babies, for example, the old politically 
correct names have given way to new kinds of identity. Names in 
the People's Republic have typically denoted the baby as a carrier of 
socialist political value; for instance, the most common character in 
Cultural Revolution names was Hong (red). In the last decade, 
however, names have grown far less political, often speaking to 
values of wealth or cultural sophistication (New York Times, 30 
November 1990: At). Names no longer mark dedication to the 
shared ideals of the single People. 
Titles of address have undergone an even clearer transformation. 
Since the Revolution, "comrade" has supported the official leveling 
of everyone: the term is anonymous, egalitarian, and appropriate to 
everyone on any occasion. In the early years, other terms clearly 
marked workers (the true "people") from the less desirable 
bourgeoisie. Shifu (master craftsman) marked even more respect 
than "comrade," but could only be used for workers and peasants 
(Ju, 1991). The bourgeoisie were stuck with the old terms, suddenly 
seen as embarrassing in the first years after the revolution: xiansheng 
(literally, first-born) for men and xiaojie (literally, little elder sister) 
for women. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, the division had 
become less relevant; anyone could be a "master craftsman" and no 
one had to be a xiansheng. 
By the time I lived in China in the mid-1980s, however, all of this 
was in flux. "Comrade" had become a slightly rude way of getting 
attention from a stranger on the street. Its only other regular use was 
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the formulaic address of top leaders, like calling Deng "Comrade 
Xiaoping." Its slow death has continued since, as any sense of the 
totalitarian body it really addressed has decreased. By 1990, even 
official television newscasters had abandoned the standard opening 
of "comrades, hello" for "viewers, hello" (New York Times, 18 
November 1990: A23). While "master craftsman" still holds its 
own as a more polite alternative to "comrade," especially for 
people like servants or janitors, the strongest trend has been toward 
a revival of the prerevolutionary usage still thriving in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. Xiansheng and xiaojie, along with other terms for older 
people, distinguish gender, age and rank in ways that "comrade" 
had attempted to dissolve. Of course, those distinctions had 
continued to exist all along - socialist China is very hierarchical 
under the surface. Yet the change in address terms indicates an 
undermining of that official ideology of the totalitarian body. 
Without ever denying the official line, all of these changes in 
identity created a host of new possibilities. 
The current qigong exercise craze offers a striking alternative to the 
totalitarian body. Qigong develops techniques for manipulating the 
body's flow of qi, the vital force that motivates the entire world. Qi 
flows through everything in its various forms. We can see it most 
easily flowing in the sinuous mountain ranges and sudden peaks 
that Chinese landscape artists love, and in the old, twisted trees and 
rocks that may become objects of popular worship. Daoist medita-
tion manipulated qi within the body to form a healthy balance, and 
the soft forms of martial arts relied on qi to create power. Qigong 
exercise routines resemble the slow movements of taijiquan, but 
without the martial aspects. Groups typically exercise under the 
guidance of a master, sometimes filling large sports stadiums every 
morning. 
Chinese authorities estimate about 60 million regular followers 
now (New York Times, 4 September 1990; Ouyang, 1990). Adepts can 
direct their flow of qi through the hands to accomplish feats like 
lighting light bulbs or emitting heat rays. Beyond general exercise 
and health, the most important function is curing by laying on of 
hands. The sessions can become quite dramatic. When the exercises 
begin to take effect and the flow of qi in the body suddenly changes, 
new adepts may fa qi (release qi), writhing or shaking in uncontrol-
lable fits strongly reminiscent of spirit possession. Here a sort of 
Daoist body has replaced the totalitarian body, overwhelming it 
with its tangible demonstration of power in curing and released qi, 
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much as the initial God Worshiper curings and mass possessions 
had demonstrated their power. This body is a microcosm of the 
forces that make up the entire universe, not just the body politic. It 
also allows the possibility of tremendous individual power to 
anyone, inherent in their own bodies, and very different from the 
single body of the People. Qigong challenges the state' ~wer to 
mold identity, and the state has moved to discourage it. 
The enormous resurgence of religion in the last decade also 
suggests a relocation of identity. While the great interest in Christ-
ianity still affects only a small portion of the population, the 
revitalization of Chinese popular religion strikes one everywhere. 
I arrived in Guiping County to work on the Taiping on Guanyin's 
birthday. A major local temple to Guanyin, rebuilt after the Cultural 
Revolution, stood on a hill near the county seat. Worshipers covered 
the hill, and incense and paper money adorned every tree and rock 
on the path up to the temple. I have already mentioned the local 
cadres' tales of powerful spirit mediums. Even more striking were 
the numbers of newly constructed neighborhood Earth God (She 
Gong, called Tudi Gong in other areas) temples everywhere. Such 
temples are by far the most common new religious construction 
throughout south China. As I rode the bus through the countryside 
on the annual grave-sweeping day (Qingming), I could see people 
everywhere taking care of their ancestors. Ancestor worship at 
home has also again grown commonplace. The fastest growing 
sides of popular ritual thus appear to be the most local (Earth 
Gods) and the most family-oriented. Worship of higher gods, with 
their implied bureaucratic hierarchy and national loyalties, lags 
behind. The revival of religion not only slaps at official scientific 
socialism, but it highlights strictly local and family loyalties at the 
expense of the state. The revival clearly ties most closely to those 
economic, social, and kinship institutions that avoid total control 
(Anagnost, 1987). 
Mao himself has been one of the liveliest figures in the renewal of 
popular ritual. Areas of central China flooded in 1991 suddenly sold 
out of more than 100,000 copies of Mao's portrait just before the 
lunar new year in 1992. People were pasting him to their front 
doors, just as they used to put up a new image of the Wealth God 
each year in the old days (South China Morning Post, 7 February 
1992). Little Maos also hang from rear-view mirrors in cars all over, 
China, much as amulets from the Eighteen Lords temple do in 
Taiwan (New York Times, 2 June 1992). This usurpation of the rights 
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to Mao's legacy forms part of the new revival of religion, and also 
part of the nostalgia craze that both follows and abuses the 
government's official campaigns. 
While I have argued that all of these reactions lie inherent in the 
nature of cultural control in China, the state has also allowed them 
to become far more openly expressed in the last decade by 
promising people more personal space. Yet the government has 
also been surprised and dismayed by the result. Even before the 
Tiananmen events, the government had been trying to reassert 
cultural control through a campaign against spiritual pollution, a 
socialist education campaign, and less systematic attacks on parti-
cularly upsetting changes. Along the same lines, they have banned 
"unhealthy" T-shirts, placed limits on qigong assemblies and 
accused some masters of just taking money from the gullible 
(identical to their attacks on spirit mediums), and lobbied for the 
use of "comrade" (New York Times, 4 September 1990, 18 November 
1990). A self-proclaimed Buddha of the future in central Guangxi, 
leading his followers to the new age, had been executed for 
fomenting rebellion shortly before I got to Guangxi.78 Yet none of 
this has had much effect, because too many institutions out of their 
control provide a free space for alternatives to the old drone of Lei 
Feng and his selfless self, and their ambiguous messages never resist 
explicitly. 
ORGANIZATION AND RESISTANCE 
Let me again pose my usual question: in what sense is any of this 
resistance? The actual demonstrations and demands in Tiananmen 
in 1989 clearly constituted the beginnings of resistance. For a few 
weeks, at least, the head ceased to stand for the entire body, and 
instead stood opposed to the body. In spite of their ambiguities and 
inconsistencies, the demonstrators still shared a demand for change. 
The general saturation left the type of change completely unclear -
some implied revolution, others evolution, and others simply 
patchwork reforms. The broad symbolism of white mourning and 
red revolution left room for all kinds of interpretation. Like the early 
God Worshipers, the very messiness of interpretation widened and 
empowered the appeal of the movement. Unlike the Taiping, 
however, they were crushed before they could develop the lasting 
institutions that might have created long-term pressure to change. 
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The situation is far less clear for the kinds of ironic language and 
shifting identity that characterized the period after that eventful 
spring. The literature on socialism tends to show the usual splits 
between people who see mostly cultural domination and those who 
instead see mostly cultural resistance, just as I have discussed for 
other contexts. Some emphasize the absolute hegemony of the 
official discourse, and treat the messy ambiguities of anything else 
as evidence for the success of cultural control (e.g., Thorn, 1989; 
Schopflin, 1991). Others instead find a hidden but fully fledged 
discourse of resistance in such language (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1990). 
Much the same argument has taken place over the religious revival 
in China. Some emphasize religion as anti-hegemonic resistance, 
while others see the revival primarily as "new interpretations of 
tradition under the powerful influence of the Marxist state" (Siu, 
1989a:11; see also Anagnost, 1987; Siu, 1989b:135 no.3). 
The arguments, as usual, have no resolution because they stem 
from an insistence on reading a single, clear interpretation as 
resistance or acquiescence where none need exist. The potential to 
develop organized and explicit .resistance clearly lies within the 
multiple possibilities of these ironies, ambiguities, and refusals to 
interpret. The key questions for resistance lie less in finding some 
deeper level of meaning, than in understanding the chances for 
forging that critical combination of institution and interpretation 
that might support an active movement. The Taiping succeeded in 
this project, Taiwanese ghosts will probably never manage it, and 
Tiananmen was crushed before the process went very far. 
Classic totalitarian theory was very pessimistic about the possi-
bilities for internal change of such systems. They saw the mechan-
isms of cultural control as ultimately effective: "the population of a 
Communist country is on balance inclined to fight for its unfreedom 
against those who wish to free it'' (Zinoviev, 1984:257). Hannah 
Arendt wrote in a largely similar tone about totalitarianism, 
although she left a small opening for external change in the anti-
social nature of such regimes (Arendt, 1958:478). Yet the obvious 
evidence from eastern Europe in 1989 clarified just how shallow 
totalizing control can be. External changes in the. Soviet Union may 
have been a necessary precursor to the east European changes, but 
they can never explain the speed and power of the ffight from 
socialism. 
I have argued that the totalizing project never succeeds complete-
ly. Through its own action it creates personal networks, family ties, 
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and social organizations that lie outside of its direct power. The 
question for internal resistance centers on how much these institu-
tions can organize new kinds of interpretations as opposition. In 
some cases, religion has been the natural organ, where states 
allowed it to continue for tactical reasons. The Catholic Church 
played such a role in Poland, and the Protestant churches to a lesser 
extent in East Germany. Islam under the tightly controlling (but not 
at all socialist) regime of the Shah of Iran played a similar role, 
offering a free space for alternative interpretations which eventually 
crystallized into direct opposition. The union movement also took 
on such a role in Poland, against all odds. In many non-socialist 
regimes that nevertheless exerted powerful pressures toward 
cultural domination, the relative independence of the economic 
sector has allowed organization toward reform to thrive - the 
recent examples of Argentina, Chile and Taiwan come to mind, 
along with many others. 
Yet China resembles Czechoslovakia or Hungary much more than 
it does Poland. It has neither a Solidarity nor an independently 
organized Church. Unlike Christianity in Europe, Chinese popular 
religion has never had nation-wide or even regional organization 
that could make it an obvious political actor. China has been 
scrupulous in crushing or coopting every kind of competing 
organization on any large scale. Only the very local and weakly 
organized phenomena I have been discussing remain - neighbor-
hood and family religion, unofficial linguistic usage, overly solidary 
small groups, new signs of personal identity, and so on. Yet these 
mini-institutions in fact riddle the apparently omnipotent structure 
of control with holes lying beyond its control. The denial of histories 
for History, the hiding of real distinctions as shared identity, the 
empowerment of individuals and small groups by setting them to 
watch each other, and even the very transparency of official 
language conspire to create these gaps. The bits of alternative social 
structure deflect cultural domination by offering free spaces away 
from official interpretation. 
The Chinese state has successfully inhibited any developments 
that might have fostered the precipitation of an organized ideology 
of resistance. The initial shock of the Tiananmen demonstrations, 
after all, was that the government allowed them to develop as far as 
they did. Yet far from cementing their ideological dominance, the 
system of control has instead created an overloaded quicksand. The 
omnipresent pockets of free space nourish all kinds of alternative 
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interpretations, and also protect the possibility of no interpretation, 
which so many people express through the growing anomie. The 
state prevents any newly organized alternative interpretation from 
thriving, but the same mechanisms prevent it from successfully 
propagating its own. 
The disorganized indeterminacy of these areas beyond direct 
control determines both their greatest weakness and their greatest 
strength. Their ambiguous interpretation and organizational weak-
ness make it very difficult to imagine how they could develop the 
institutional base to become straightforward resistance. In addition, 
if the opportunity to develop something new ever comes, they will 
find it very difficult to come to any quick agreement on what to do. 
The events in Tiananmen showed the dangers, as unanimous 
positions became increasingly untenable. Much of the current 
political crisis in east Europe similarly rests on the impossibility of 
developing any unity, beyond a shared sense of opposition, under 
the old regime. 
Yet these areas also manage both to defuse attempts at official 
control and to breed a bounty of new possibilities. As in Czechoslo-
vakia or Hungary, they make the cultural base of the regime far 
weaker than at first appears. Their disorganization and ambiguity 
prevent them from becoming targets; irony survives censorship 
precisely because meaning cannot be pinned down. They form 
islands of potential creativity, ready to yield up their treasures 
when the opportunity comes. 
CONCLUSION 
Post-structuralist theory has honed the tools to deconstruct sys-
tematic structures of interpretation, shaking them to bits along 
hidden . fault lines, and leaving behind tangled scraps of inconsis-
tent meaning. Its vision of surplus meaning hiding everywhere in 
the cracks of ideology, ready to burst things asunder, has allowed 
important reconsideration of canons of all sorts (including post-
structuralism itself, at least in more sophisticated hands). By 
challenging the right of both internal authorities and external 
analysts to claim a true and final reading, it has also sparked the 
questions of resistance and interpretation that inform this book. 
Yet by tearing meaning from its social contexts, such an approach 
risks losing sight of the real social power of interpretation. Meaning 
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,- in actual social life is not homogeneously messy, in spite of our 
facile ability to deconstruct any claim of systematic meaning. In 
practice, some areas of life indeed allow people to revel in multiple, 
inconsistent, half-interpreted meanings. Other areas, however, are 
dominated by strict rationality and explicit control over a single 
truth. Most crucially, real institutions back up these claims, creating 
the social mechanisms to propagate and enforce them. Under 
certain social relations of interpretation people thus do, in fact, 
share single meanings. It matters very little that an intellectual 
somewhere can yank the facade away, exposing the hidden illu-
sions and blemishes of the ideas. The institutional structure of 
power itself has to be challenged before such an exposure makes 
much difference. 
A broad tension between claims to a single true interpretation and 
the uncontrolled multiplication of interpretive possibility character-
izes each of the cases I have discussed, and surely runs through 
much of social life anywhere. Organizations like the state work to 
consolidate their areas of interpretive control, and even individuals 
at times feel a push to rationalize. Hong Xiuquan was clearly such a 
thinker, and much of Max Weber's work on the beginnings of 
capitalism concerns the point at which large groups felt an internal 
drive to precipitate new sets of explicit meanings, ranging from how 
they dealt with God to how they kept track of their money. Yet at 
the same time, other areas rest in a free space away from institu-
tional attempts to control interpretation, and may actively push on 
official meaning, deflecting its thin interpretations and adding fresh 
complications. 
The interaction between these two ways of making meaning bears 
crucial consequences for resistance movements. Saturation allows a 
potential to resist, but only along with many other potential 
interpretations. The mass spirit possessions of the early God 
Worshipers, the complicated possibilities of the Eighteen Lords, 
and the refusal of interpretation in China's current epidemic of 
anomie allowed for many kinds of interpretation. Just as those 
Taiwanese pigs that started this book could suddenly become 
patriotic icons, collaborative interpretations sit alongside the possi-
bilities for explicit resistance. Of the cases I have discussed here, 
only the Taiping, at least so far, managed to unify and institution-
alize an ideology of resistance. 
The rich ambiguities of meaning in these free spaces resist only in 
the sense that they skew and divert official interpretation. Analysis 
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that reduces all such space either to clear cultural resistance or to a 
mere restatement of dominant culture, misses both the power and 
weakness of indeterminate meaning. It guarantees a creative fund of 
possible innovation and change, resilient against even thorough 
attempts at control. Yet it also undercuts any form of organization 
that might actively promote change. The chaotic mass spirit 
possessions of the God Worshipers nearly destroyed the movement 
before it began, just as the multivocality of the Eighteen Lords and 
the ironies and apathies of the People's Republic pose serious 
obstacles to organized movements for change. 
Resistance in the stronger sense of self-consciously trying to 
change the system must be wrenched from the hoard of potential 
interpretations. That act in itself creates a new, increasingly 
systematic set of ideas, realized through a new social organization 
of meaning. The Taiping genius was in achieving that transforma-
tion around 1850. The depth and difficulty of their social meta-
morphosis, along with the failure to achieve anything similar in the 
other two cases I have discussed, indicates just how challenging the 
process is. In an irony of its own, saturated space becomes explicit 
resistance only by losing its indeterminacy, and the free spaces that 
so effectively evaded official institutional control must . themselves 
try to impose an interpretation. The Taiping thus recreated many 
features of the state they fought against, and the Tiananmen 
demonstrators had taken steps in the same direction. 
The genesis of the Taiping Rebellion after 1849, like the creation of 
socialist institutions of interpretation a century later, expanded the 
explicitly and officially organized realm of Chinese society. Yet no 
case of interpretive domination completely succeeds. Taiping ideas 
were increasingly compromised as the movement wore on, and 
none of the attempts to unify a meaning of Taiwanese ghosts ever 
made much headway. Even the totalizing institutions of the 
People's Republic leave enormous gaps, as they create alternative 
social organizations of meaning through their own action. The 
drone of the thin and repressive discourse of control breeds 
resentment, cynicism and irony, as people always have other 
sources of meaning. Saturated space alone will overthrow no 
oppression, but it also keeps oppression from succeeding entirely. 
Attempts at control everywhere have engendered their own 
reactions. In early modern Europe, for example, state suppression 
of alternate intetpretation created a system of dissimulation "so 
extensive that it was like a submerged continent in ... religious, 
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intellectual and social life" (Zagorin, 1990:14). The interplay be-
tween saturation and precipitation never allows the final victory of 
one form of interpretation over the other. 
It is tempting to concentrate analysis on explicit meaning, where a 
clear underlying interpretation can unite the complexities of actual 
speech and symbol. We tend to belittle the chaotic excesses of the 
possessed God Worshipers, to dismiss the apparently frivolous 
incoherence of Taiwanese ghosts in the face of real change, and to 
deplore the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the students demon-
strating in Tiananmen Square. The process of what Weber called 
"rationalization" indeed vitalizes change, as ideas become explicitly 
worked out calls to action. Yet it also demands a social organization 
of interpretation that can maintain such a precipitated meaning. 
Both active resistance movements and institutions of control must 
rely on similar mobilizations of power over meaning. 
At the same time, the opposite process of complicating and 
confusing meaning continues to play a crucial role. The God 
Worshipers expanded so quickly because Hong's original ideas 
disintegrated into the local mix, making them both innovative and 
locally intelligible, instead of just crazy. Both Taiwanese ghosts and 
Tiananmen democracy benefited from a similar multiplicity of 
meaning. Above all, that free space that always presses against 
rationalized meaning harbors a cache of po5sible alternatives that 
may someday come to light. While it undercuts organization of any 
type, that messy pile of inconsistent meanings holds a well of 
creativity, sapping any form of interpretive domination and control 
without resisting any official interpretation directly. 
Notes 
1. "Taiwanese" here refers to the majority population in Taiwan, 
primarily ethnic Hakka and Hokkien Chinese, most of whose ances-
tors emigrated to the island in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. "Mainlanders" are people who came after the end of the Japanese 
occupation in 1945, and especially after the Communist victory on the 
mainland in 1949. The mainlanders controlled the bulk of military and 
political power, and relations betWeen the two groups were still uneasy 
in the 1970s. 
2. See Cohen (1982) for a critique of theories that totalize the underlying 
system. 
3. The idea comes originally from Raymond Williams (1977:133-134). 
4. Ingerson (1984:2~) includes a fuller discussion on the role of 
potentials. 
5. I take the term 'free space' very loosely from David Martin (personal 
communication), who uses it to describe how evangelical Protestantism 
in Latin America shields followers from many of the usual demands · 
and expectations of their social world. 
6. Most secondary sources refer to the God Worshiping Society before. the 
Taiping was declared, but the movement itself apparently never 
organized as a formal association of any kind, and just spoke of 
themselves as people who worshiped God (Mao, 1981:727-729). 
7. The Taiping described the system in detail in the ''Tianchao Tianmu 
Zhidu" (Michael, 1966-1971, ll:309-320). Where possible, I cite Taiping 
documents in the Michael translation. Volume I of the work also 
provides the best English language summary of the movement. 
8. Clarke and Gregory (1982) reprint many such examples from con-
temporary Western reports. 
9. The account matches in many .details Hong Rengan's confession after 
the rebellion (in Michael, 1966-1971, III:1511-1530) and probably 
accurately reflects Hong Rengan's version of events. 
10. For more information on Hong's early life see Hamberg (1854:3--8) and 
Zhong (1984b:1-9). 
11. Wagner (1982:17-21) pieces together various versions of the vision. The 
most extended Taiping version is in the Taiping Tillnri (in Michael, 
1~1971, ll:52-76). Wagner gives the most detailed analysis of the 
dream, seeing much of the rebellion as a playing out of its hermeneu-
tics, in contrast to my emphasis on reinterpretation and institution. The 
various Taiping versions of the dream show the historical reworking of 
Hong's vision, not just the hermeneutic working through of what is 
already there. Most striking (but not yet available when Wagner was 
writing) are spirit possession transcripts of Hong asking Jesus to 
remind him of what actually happened in the dream as the Taiping 
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prepared the text of the Taiping Tianri, showing how the content of the 
dream itself could change (Wang, 1985:213). 
12. This argument that the motives of Hong and the early God Worshipers 
were primarily religious remains controversial, going against what had 
been a standard argument among Chinese scholars of the Taiping in the 
1950s and 1960s. I follow instead more recent scholars who argue for a 
fundamentally religious orientation until at least 1847 or 1848, after the 
movement was already well established in Guangxi (Li, 1981; Wang, 
1981). Part of the argument centers around the dating of some 
rebellious poems; Li Feiran (1981:134-135) makes a strong argument 
for a much later date than the standard 1837 (Hamberg, 1854:12-13). 
13. ''Elderhood" in Cantonese parts of China is a recognized male status 
marked by a rite of passage. 
14. This is a fairly new village. The original settlement from the Taiping 
period was flooded when the river was dammed at Jintian, and the 
inhabitants were resettled at a new site. 
15. I have been tentative in phrasing these events because the evidence is 
not really adequate. Much of the case comes from oral histories 
conducted over a century after the fact, at a time when peasants were 
rehearsing their own histories of exploitation by landlords, and when 
local historians were looking for just such evidence. Nevertheless, the 
evidence is there and seems to fit broader trends. Other evidence for 
institutional breakdown is much clearer. 
16. There is some further evidence for increased land concentration in the 
oral histories conducted in the 1950s. A single landlord, for example, 
owned most of the land around Thistle Mountain by 1850 (Guangxi ... , 
1962:1-2). 
17. Su Fengwen (1889a) gives extensive lists of bandit gangs, later 
compiled by Xie (1950). 
18. Buddhist-based groups like the White Lotus, organizationally and 
ideologically quite different from the Triads, began to appear com-
monly in Guangxi only slightly after the Taiping. 
19. Hamberg calls him "Fall large head," apparently misreading a near 
homophone. 
20. I will discuss this in more detail in the following chapter. 
21. See Seaman (1978:114) for a Taiwanese example. 
22. The usual term for Earth Gods in Taiwan is Tho Te Kong. The term also 
appears in Guangxi, but only for a very low deity who usually guards 
bridges, crossroads and other dangerous areas. In spite of the different 
terms, the functions of Guangxi's She Gong and Taiwan's Tho Te Kong 
temples appear identical. 
23. Both Daoist and Buddhist clergy included long and preaching texts in 
their rituals, but these were usually sung in a way that made them 
incomprehensible to onlookers, and often performed with the public 
banned. In addition, local worthies sometimes lectured villagers on 
upright behavior, although these were not religious occasions and they 
certainly did not expound on ritual detail. 
24. The state cult had other intents too, as a religion for bureaucrats 
themselves, and as a way of ensuring cosmic harmony. 
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25. The Thistle Mountain region temples they remembered were at 
Daxuanxu, Sanjiang (the largest), Caicun, Anzhong in Jintian, Mu-
shan, and Pingtian. 
26. The name of the temple, however, does suggest an alternate reading. 
Sanjie can also be translated as the Three Worlds, a common religious 
term referring to Heaven, Earth, and Man. On such a reading, the 
temple does fit a very standard bit of national religious culture. Like so 
much, it left many interpretations open. 
27. This information is based on interviews at Thistle Mountain, 9 April . 
1985. 
28. The texts were Panwt~ng Uuluo Shu and Panwt~ng Dajilw. 
29. Personal communication, Zhong Wendian, Department of History, 
Guangxi Normal University. 
30. Both temples were described by informants at Thistle Mountain. 
31. Hamberg does not specifically date the poem, but seems to imply a 
later date of 1847, in contrast to the 1844 in other documents. I use 1844 
here, since it is generally agreed upon and the exact date does not affect 
my argument. 1847, however, would fit far better with other activities 
of the group, since temple attacks were very rare in 1844-1845, and 
really only became common in 1847. 
32. This was a possessed healer at an outdoor meeting of the Cihui Tang. 
33. The mention of sorceroni with flowers and swords refers to Maoshan 
Daoism, which is frequently cited as part of the problem. Maoshan 
Daoists dressed in female clothes and specialized in exorcistic ritual. 
34. Yang Qingxiu is only known from this one case; some indirect evidence 
suggests he may have been related to Yang Xiuqing (Michael, 1966-
1971:5n.). There is no way to find a sure date for the episode, but Hong 
Rengan mentions it while discussing some other events of 1847 (in 
Michael, 1966-1971:4-5). It is the only possession event he describes in 
the document, which might also imply its particular importance as the 
first of its kind. This is rather thin evidence, but Yang Qingxiu's case 
probably typified the early possessions, even if it was not the first. 
35. Wang Qingcheng (1985) describes two important new sources he 
discovered in British archives: a volume of Tillnfu Shengzhi (Imperial 
Decrees of the Heavenly Father) and two volumes of Tillnxiong Shengzhi 
(Imperial Decrees of the Heavenly Older Brother). These report many 
more possessions of Yang Xiuqing as GOd and Xiao Chaogui as Jesus 
than were previously known. The other major sources are well known 
(Tillnfu Xillfan Zluwshu in two parts, and Tillnming Zhaozhi Shu, in 
Michael, 1966-1971:~110, 197-220). 
36. Emily Martin [Ahem] describes a nearly identical form of mediumship 
in Taiwan (Ahern, 1973:228-235). Such performances, however, are 
nearly unknown now in Taiwan, and she had to make special 
arrangements to have it done for her. 
37. The ceremony appears to be a combination of Yao Daoism with an 
earlier tradition of possession (see also Strickmann, 1982:24--45). 
38. There could also have been other Gods and other Christs at the time. 
Taiping records do not mention any, but they do frequently speak of 
possession by imps and devils. Defeated claimants to the voices of God 
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and Jesus would most likely have been branded in just such language, 
although the imps and devils could equally well be more traditional 
spirits who might have possessed people before the God Worshipers 
arrived. 
39. See Overmyer (1974) for a description of the cult. 
40. Some, however, were more equal than others. We are all children of 
God, but later in the Taiping, in Hong's annotations to the New 
Testament, we learn that only a select few are children of God's first 
wife: ''The Elder Brother ijesus] and myself and the Eastern King [Yang 
Xiuqing]- we were originally born out of the belly of God's first wife," 
that is, the Heavenly Mother, before heaven and earth existed (in 
Michael, 1966-1971:236). 
41. Xing Fenglin (personal communication) has suggested that Xiao 
Chaogui may have been Yao. Xiao had his mother's natal surname, 
which is consistent with occasional Yao uxorilocal agreements, 
although it can occur with Han Chinese as well. His mother's name 
(Xiao Panshi) also implies a Yao connection with the inclusion of the 
character Pan (as in Pangu), and a tablet to his father has been found in 
a Yao area. Chinese and other ethnic groups could also be assimilated 
to the Yao, and Yao (at least in Thailand) frequently purchased children 
from other groups, bringing them up to be Yao (Kandre, 1976). Quite 
plausibly, ethnic distinctions were simply not so strongly drawn then 
as they are now that the government has so strongly marked ethnic 
group membership. 
42. The only evidence for these flag-raising ceremonies is oral history 
gathered in the 1950s (Guangxi ... , 1962:61,70,77). 
43. Many other cults underwent very similar developments where too 
many cooks had spoiled the broth. The New Guinea Taro Cult, for 
instance, which I have already cited, quickly tore into a number of 
separate sects, especially as alternate leaders constantly founded 
competing sects based on new possessing spirits (Worsley, 1968:68-74). 
44. These include, to give just a few examples, the Kalahari of Nigeria 
(Horton, 1969:26-27), the Korekore Shona of the Zambesi valley 
(Garbett, 1969; Lewis, 1971:136-139), and the Tikopia (Firth, 1967:309). 
45. This was the man named Wang, whom I mentioned in the preceding 
chapter. 
46. This incident also reinforces other references to star spirits. After Jesus 
announced the names of the three generals, he said: ''Hong Xiuquan, 
my blood brother, you are the sun and your wife is the moon. Feng 
Yunshan is made of three stars, and Yang Xiuqing also has three stars; 
Xiao Chaogui has two stars. Yang Xiuqing and Xiao Chaogui are the 
twin breezes facing the sun. The foreign nations also have a general." 
Hong asked the name of this foreign general and learned that his 
surname was Cai and he was still in foreign lands (Wang, 1985:193). 
47. I will pursue this point further for socialist control in the final chapters. 
48. While both Buddhism and Daoism share in this growth, quite a 
different pattern prevails for Christian sects, which grew most rapidly 
immediately after 1945, and have slowed in the last few decades, 
especially among the Han Chinese (see Qu and Yao, 1986). 
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49. In addition, Ann Anagnost has provided sophisticated analyses of 
religion as popular resistance in the People's Republic of China (e.g., 
Anagnost, 1989). 
50. The Co Su Kong temple in Sanxia, which I discuss in most detail here, 
has closed off the central hall with an ornate wooden fence. They did 
this primarily to protect the delicate carvings inside, but it also has the 
effect of marking the center as more of a sacred space than most 
temples. 
51. See Weller (1987c:107-108) for more detail on charms. 
52. The introductory essays of Watson and Rawski's Death Ritual in Late 
Imperilll and Modern China provide contrasting views about the impor-
tance of orthodoxy versus orthopraxis in Chinese religion (Watson and 
Rawski, 1988:3-34). Individuals, of course, may develop an intense 
interest in interpretation, sometimes by apprenticing themselves to 
masters or sometimes by working through their own interpretations. 
53. Workers often refuse to destroy temples, and one of the government's 
difficulties in controlling illegal temples is trying to find work crews 
willing to dismantle them. 
54. This is the right side of the temple from the spirits' point of view, but 
the left as you face the temple. Taiwanese always use the spirits' 
viewpoint out of respect to them. 
55. See Weller (1987c:60-74) for a fuller analysis. On other occasions; 
including worship at small ghost shrines, individual worshipers do 
use a combined incense pot. 
56. I am grateful to Meir Shahar for pointing this out to me. The three 
temples are the Eighteen Lords temple in Kaohsiung (no relation to this 
one), Huaizhong Ci in Changhua, and the Nineteen Lords of Loyalty 
and Justice in Peikang. The Nineteen Lords include eighteen dead 
people and a dog (Qiu, 1979:323). 
57. See Seaman (1981) for a discussion of the funeral ritual that can save 
mothers from this fate. 
58. Cigarettes may take on other connotations elsewhere, as in their use at 
formal banquets for gods in Penghu (James Wilkerson, personal 
communication). 
59. Personal communication, Meir Shahar. 
60. Personal communication, James L. Watson. 
61. There are a great many variations on the theme. For details, see Qu 
(1987:21-31). 
62. A fourth, public television network recently began broadcasting, but 
still has no station of its own, and takes time from the other three. 
63. I have not seen the soap opera. This account is based on what other 
people told me, plus description in the weekly viewers' magazine 
published by CTS, Huashi Zonghe Zhoulazn (Nos. 712-716). 
64. The explanation is arguable even for his own cases, where the people 
had been colonized for centuries and the contrast between use-value 
and exchange-value tends to simplify and idealize the contrast between 
wage labor and other labor processes. Nevertheless, Taussig clearly has 
a case of close ties between economic and cultural change. Crain (1991) 
traces similar devil imagery back more historically. 
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65. He also went around giving an inspirational public talk called "How to 
Have a Beautiful Life.'' 
66. Jordan and Overmyer document several cases of factionalism and 
fission (e.g., Jordan and Overmyer, 1986:79--88, 89-91, 131-134, 218-
221). 
67. Ming Pao News (1989) has a detailed chronology. 
68. There have been suggestions that the incident was manufactured by the 
authorities to discredit the students (e.g., Ming Pao News 1989:112). 
69. My analysis clearly owes a debt to culturally informed approaches to 
Tiananmen like Esherick and Wasserstrom (1990) and Strand (1990). 
Both those essays emphasize how the demonstrations followed a kind 
of cultural script. This is an important point, but should not disguise 
either the improvization and innovation in any such demonstration, or 
the inherent ambiguities. See also Wassertrom's discussion of state (and 
other) narratives of Tiananmen as myth (Wasserstrom, 1992:259-261). 
70. The claim of hidden agendas of a few leaders who maneuver the blind 
masses at will typifies a common view of history in the People's 
Republic, in spite of their socialist commitment to people's history. 
Studies of the Taiping, for instance, usually see Hong's religion as only 
a trick he used to create a following, not something he actually believed 
(see Weller, 1987a). 
71. For examples see Renmin Ribao, 22 December 1989; 30 December 1989; 
27 February 1990; 5 March 1990; 6 March 1990; also New York Times, 
27 February 1990: A4. 
72. Localist interests may similarly provide an institutional space relatively 
sheltered from official manipulation. Vivienne Shue, for example, 
argues that collectivism may have strengthened some forms of tradi-
tional particularism, and that local cadres had to protect their local 
domains to survive (Shue, 1988:65,139). 
73. Similar effects may occur within schools. Perry Link (1989) shows how 
hand-copied entertainment fiction flooded through high schools even 
during the most repressive periods of the Cultural Revolution. Cam-
paigns against it could never uncover any leaders, as the material 
diffused too formlessly and quickly to stamp out. 
74. See Anagnost (1989) for an important analysis of China that similarly 
uses Lefort to show the internal contradictions created by the totalizing 
project of the state. 
75. I have discussed comparable allegorical readings in Taiping historio-
graphy elsewhere (Weller, 1987a). 
76. Whyte (1974) has many examples of this, as does Chen (1980) in a 
fictionalized autobiography that roots this sort of cynical manipulation 
in the early days of the People's Republic. 
77. "Qigong deviation" even became an official psychiatric disorder in 1989 
(Chen, 1992). 
78. See Anagnost (1987, 1989) for more cases of government campaigns 
against religion. 
Character List 
Note: Mandarin and Hokkien terms appear together here. I assume 
readers who know Chinese will feel no confusion. 
Bai Shangdi Ren 'f-f..t'r%A. 
biao che ~$ 
bu :fl\ 
Budai Heshang :ffi~~~ 
Cihui Tang ~~~ 
CoSuKong t13. 9i!l0 
Dai Wansheng ~7]~ 
dajia le 
*** Daxuanxu j;;:§~ 
dian ~ 
dian xue ,~7\ 
die xian li11Hw 
fa qi :&~ 
Feng Yunshan ~~~w 
fu m 
fumu guan )(ffj'§ 
Gan Wang tt-=r 
Guan Gong :te0 
Guangxi }g§ 
guanxi * ~ 
Guanyin ~~ 
Gui 
--
~ 
Guiping ;ff~ 
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guipo !l~ 
guniang ~~ 
Guomindang ~R3't 
guqin tl~ 
hoat-su ~~ffi 
Hong Rengan ~tff 
Hong Xiuquan ~~i: 
hu-a r;Jff 
Huang Ermei ~=~ 
Hu Yiguang ~!:),&£ 
Iu !eng Kong ffi§Z0 
iu kiu pit ieng ff;Jt£.J§Z 
Jiang Gong 3ftt0 
jiao ft 
Jintian ~H3 
jitong oLm 
kanluan jieyue ~-HLiH"J 
kui ~ 
lai 
* Lang eJ=J 
Langguang eJ=Jr 
lauziat f\jij~ 
Lei gong 'm0 
Lian §* 
Liang A-fa ~rrnr~ 
Liao Tianding ~~T 
ling ~ 
Lin Shuangwen :f,f~ )( 
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Liu Dagupo }IJ*~~ 
Liuwu /\~ 
luan tL 
luanyen tL~ 
Luo Dagang ~*~ 
luotong mil 
mayou ji Jffrm~ 
Mazu Y.!1l!l 
mifan zhu *tK± 
Pangu f!l5 
Panhu ~~ 
Pan wang f!.:E 
Panwang Daji.ao f!.:EHB 
Panwang Liuluo Shu .a .:E rm m .:p; 
piancai fi!illt 
Pingnan ~m 
qi ~ 
Qiansa !}H~ 
qigong ~!}] 
Qing ¥~ 
Qingming r~sli 
Quanshi Liangyen }j]t!t~ ~ 
renao ~1\jij 
Sanjie =w 
Sanxia =~ 
She Gong t±0 
sheng ku ¥1$ 
Shi Dakai E:ittf 
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Shiba Wanggong + J\.I0 
shifu 1Ji!HW: 
Sigu WT-tt 
siu hun !&~ 
taijiquan ::t:~.!H~ 
Taiping ::t::SV: 
Taiping Tianguo ::t::SV:7(~ 
tang-ki D!J!iL 
Tho Te Kong ± !th0 
Tiananmen 7(1X. i'l 
Tiandi Hui 7( !th~ 
Tian Hou 7(f§ 
Tianjing 7(~ 
tianwai you tian 7()'~ f:f7( 
tiao w~ 
tiao gui W~* 
tu ± 
Tudi Gong ± !th0 
Wang Zuoxin I f'F*!f 
wansui 7557 
Wei Changhui ~~~ 
Wenchang )(~ 
Xiangzhou ~311 
Character List 235 
xiansheng Jfe~ 
Xiao Chaogui mU~ffl" 
xiaojie /J\~ 
Xiao Panshi mt:Cil:~ 
xie ~ 
Xinxu ~Jf;l:f 
xiucai ~:t 
Xunzhou i~ Jii 
yang ~B 
Yang Qingxiu 1%~ frt 
Yang Xiuqing 1%~1~ 
Yao fffi 
Yaochi Jinmu fffiilli~m 
Yiguan Dao -ffl:~ 
yin ~i'l 
Yiquan ':J..fr. 
Yongan fk'ti: 
Zhuang fi 
Zijing Shan ~tfU LlJ 
zutou ffi~ 
Bibliography 
Abu-Lughod, Lila, 1990 "The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transform-
ations of Power Through Bedouin Women," Amerialn Ethnologist, 17(1): 
41-55. 
Adas, Michael, 1979 Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements 
Against the European Colonilal Order, Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press. 
Ahern, Emily M., 1973 The Cult of the Dead in a Chinese Villllge, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
---1975 ''The Power and Pollution of Chinese Women," in Margery 
Wolf and Roxane Witke (eds), Women in Chinese Society: 193-214, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
---1981a Chinese Ritual and Politics, New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
---1981b ''The Thai Ti Kong Festival," in Emily Martin Ahem and 
Hill Gates (eds), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society: 397-425, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Anagnost, Ann S., 1987 ''Politics and Magic in Contemporary China," 
Modern China 13(1): 40-61. 
---1989 '1magining Community: The 'Civilized Village' Campaign 
and the 'Return' of Popular Religion in Post-Mao China," paper pre-
sented at the Conference on "Communities in Question: Religion and 
Authority in East and Southeast Asia," Hoa Hin, Thailand. 
Arendt, Hannah, 1958 The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd edn, Cleveland: 
World Publishing Company, Meridian. 
Aron, Raymond, 1977 [1957] The Opium of the Intellectuals, trans. Terence 
Kilmartin, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 1984 [1965] Rabelllis and His World, trans. Hetime lswolsky, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Banwo Jushi, 1874 Yuekou Qishi Jishi [Record of the Cantonese Bandit 
Uprising]. 
Barone, Michael, 1991 ''Washington Whispers," US News and World Report, 8 
July: 14. 
Barthes, Roland, 1975 [1973] The Pletzsure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller, 
New York: Noonday Press. 
''Beijing Daxue Xuesheng Sixiang Diaocha Baogao [Report on a Study of the 
Thought of Beijing University Students)," 1990, Kllifang Zazhi, September: 
55. 
Bellah, Robert N., 1965 ''Epilogue: Religion and Progress in Modem Asia," 
in Robert N. Bellah (ed.), Religion and Progress in Modern Asila: 168-229, 
New York: Free Press. 
Berger, Peter L., 1988 "An East Asian Development Model?" in Peter L. 
Berger and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (eds), In Search of an East Asilan 
Development Model: 3-11, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. 
Blazek, Bohuslav, 1991 ''In lieu of Marxism: Black Hole," paper presented 
at the Conference on "Obstacles to the Transformation of Soviet-type 
Societies in Eastern Europe," Vienna, photocopy. 
236 
Bibliography 237 
Bloch, Maurice, 1975 ''Introduction," in Maurice Bloch (ed.), Political 
l.Angwtge and Oratory in Traditional Society: 1-28, London: Academic Press. 
Bodde, Derk, 1961 "Myths of Ancient China," in Samuel N. Kramer (ed.), 
Mythologies oft~ Ancient World, New York: Doubleday. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, 1977 Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice, 
Cambridge Studies in Socilll Anthropology, Vol. 16, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bradbury, R. E., 1966 "Father, Elders, and Ghosts in Edo Religion," in 
Michael Banton (ed.), Anthropological Approaches to t~ Study of Religion: 
127-153, London: Tavistock. 
Brandes, Stanley, 1988, Power and Persuasion: Fiestas and Socilll Control in 
Rural Mexico, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
"Brief Introduction to the Tsu Shih Temple," 1990, n.p., photocopy. 
Cai Fang and Xiao Tian, 1985 "Shiba Wanggong Daojile [The Eighteen 
Lords Have Arrived]," Huashi Zong~ Zhoukan, No. 714,24 June: 34-36. 
Cai Shaoqing, 1987 Zhongguo Jindai Huidangshi Yanjiu [Research Into the 
History of Chinese Secret Societies], Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. 
Chan Yuen Ying, and Kwong, Peter, 1990 "Trashing the Hopes of Tianan-
men," The Nation, 23 April1990: 545, 560-64. 
Chance, Norman A. and Engst, Fred, 1991 "A Decade of Change," in 
Norman A. Chance, China's Urban Villagers, 2l}.d edn: 161-87, Fort 
Worth: Holt, Rinehart &: Winston. ' 
Chang, K. C., 1983 Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in 
Ancient China, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Chen Jo-hsi, 1978 "'Chairman Mao is a Rotten Egg"' in The Execution of 
Milyor Yin and Other Stories from t~ Gre~~t Proletarian Cultural Revolution: 
37-66, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Chen, Nancy N., 1992 "Deviation and the State: Psychiatry and Popular 
Practice in Contemporary Urban China," paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, DC. 
Chen Tianhui, 1985 "Shiba Wanggong Shi Yingxiong [The Eighteen Lords 
Are Heros]," Huashi Zong~ Zhoukan, No. 713, 17 June: 3{}-31. 
Chen Yuan-tsung, 1980 The Dragon's Village, New York: Penguin. 
Clarke, Prescott and Gregory, J. S., 1982 Western Reports on t~ Taiping: A 
Selection of Documents, Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii. 
Cohefi, Jean L., 1982 Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical 
Theory, Amherst University of Massachusetts Press. 
Cohn, Norman, 1957 The Pursuit of the Millennium, London: Seeker & 
Warburg. 
Comaroff, Jean, 1985 Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and 
History of a South African People, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Crain, Mary M., 1991 "Poetics and Politics in the Ecuadorean Andes: 
Women's Narratives of Death and Devil Possession," American Ethnolo-
gist, 18(1): 67-89. 
Davenport, Alice and Larocque, Alain, 1986 "The Fall and Rise of an Errant 
Museum Curator," Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 February: 43-45. 
Davis, Deborah, 1989 "My Mother's House," in Perry Link, Richard 
Madsen, and Paul Pickowicz (eds), Unofficial China: Popular Culture and 
Thought in t~ People's Republic: 88-100, Boulder: Westview. 
238 Bibliography 
Davis, Winston, 1980 Dojo: MRgic and Exorcism in Modern Japan, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
DeGrazia, Victoria, 1981 The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure 
in Fascist Italy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Desroche, Henri, 1971 The Amerialn Shakers: From Neo-Christillnity to Pre-
, socilllism, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 
Dodds, E. R., 1951 The Greelcs and the Irrational, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Douglas, Mary, 1978 [1969] Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of 
Pollution and Taboo, London: Routledge &: Kegan Paul. 
Duara, Prasenjit, 1991 ''Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Moder-
nity: The Campaigns Against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-
century China," Journal of Asian Studies, 50(1): 67-83. 
Dumont, Louis, 1980 Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications, 
trans. Mark Sainsbury, Louis Dumont and Baisa Gulati, Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. 
Eco, Umberto, 1984 ''The Frames of Comic 'Freedom'" in Thomas A. Sebeok 
(ed.), Carnival!: 1-9, ApprOtlChes to Semiotics, No. 64, Berlin: Mouton. 
Elliott, Peter, 1990 "Call for Hard Work," Financial Times, 10 October: 15. 
Esherick, Joseph W. and Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N., 1990 "Acting Out 
Democracy: Political Theater in Modem China," Journal of Asian Studies, 
49(4): 835-865. 
Feuchtwang, Stephan, 1974 ''Domestic and Communal Worship in Tai-
wan," in Arthur P. Wolf (ed.), Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society: 105-
129, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
--- 1977 "School-temple and City God," in G. William Skinner (ed.), 
The City in Late Imperial China: 581-608, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
--- 1992 The Imperial Metaphor: Popular Religion in China, London: 
Routledge. 
Fields, Karen E., 1982 "Charismatic Religion as Popular Protest: The 
Ordinary and Extraordinary in Social Movements," Theory and Society, 
11: 321-361. 
Firth, Raymond, 1967 Tilwpia Ritual and Belief, Boston: Beacon. 
Fish, Stanley, 1980 Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Freedman, Maurice, 1966 Chinese Lineoge and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung, 
London School of Economics Monographs in Social Anthropology, No. 33, 
London: Athlone. 
Friedland, Jonathan and Kaye, Lincoln, 1990 "Pennies from Heaven," Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 25, January: 54-56. 
Gabor, Istvan R., 1991 ''Modernity or a New Kind of Duality? Second 
Thoughts on the 'Second Economy'," paper presented at Conference on 
the "Obstacles to the Transforation of Soviet-type Societies in Eastern 
Europe," Vienna, photocopy. 
Garbett, G. Kingsley, 1969 "Spirit Mediums as Mediators in Valley Korekore 
Society," in John Beattie and John Middleton (eds), Spirit Mediumship and 
Society in Afrial, New York: Africana. 
Gates, Hill, 1987 ''Money for the Gods," Modern China, 13: 259-277. 
Bibliography 239 
Geertz, Clifford, 1913a [1963) ''The Integrative Revolution: Primordial 
Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in The Interpretation of 
Cultures: 255-310, New York: Basic. 
--- 1973b The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected ES51lYs, New York: 
Basic. 
Gilmore, David D., 1984 Aggression and Community: Paradoxes of Andlllusian 
Culture, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Ginzburg, Carlo, 1980 [1976] The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a 
Sixteenth-century Miller, trans. John Tedeschi arid Anne Tedeschi, Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Gluckman, Max, 1960 ''Rituals of Rebellion in South-east Africa," in Max 
Gluckman (ed.), Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa: 11{}-136, Glencoe, IL: 
Free Press. 
Gold, Thomas B., 1985 "After Comradeship: Personal Relations in China 
Since the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, No. 104, December: 657-
675. 
Goodman, Felicitas D., 1973 "Apostolics of Yucatan: A Case Study of a 
Religious Movement," in Erika Bourguignon (ed.), Religion, Altered States 
of Consciousness, and Social Change, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University 
Press. 
Gould-Martin, Katherine, 1976 Women Asking Women: An Ethnography of 
He~~lth Care in Rural Taiwan, dissertation submitted to Rutgers University. 
Gramsci, Antonio, 1971 Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowel Smith, London: Lawrence &: 
Wishart. 
Guangxi Shifan Xueyuan Shidixi 72 Ji, 1981 ''Taiping Tianguo Qiyi Jige 
Wenti de Diaocha [Investigation Into Several Questions Concerning the 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Uprising]," in Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiu 
Wenxuan [Selected Research on the History of the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom], ed. Guangxi Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiuhui: 271-290, Nan-
ning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe. 
Guangxi Tongzhi [Complete Gazetteer of Guangxi], 1891 Local Gazetteer, Hu 
Qian (ed.). 
Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu Tongzhiguan, comp., 1962 Taiping Tianguo 
Geming Zlli Guangxi Diaocha Ziliao Huipian [Compiled Materials from the 
Investigation of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Revolution in Guangxi], 
Nanning: Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu Renmin Chubanshe. 
Guangxisheng Taiping Tianguo Wenshi Diaochatuan (ed.), 1956 Taiping 
Tianguo Qiyi Diaocha Baogao [Report on Investigations into the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom Uprising], Beijing: Sanlian Shudian. 
Guiping Xianzhi [Guiping County Gazetteer], 1920 Local Gazetteer. 
Guixian Zhi [Gui County Gazetteer], 1893 Local Gazetteer, comp. Liang 
Jixiang. 
Hamberg, Theodore, 1854 The Visions of Hung-siu-tshuen and the Origin of the 
Kwt~ng-si Insurrection, Hong Kong: China Mail. 
Han Minzhu (ed.), 1990 Cries fur Democracy: Writing and Speeches from the 
1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hansen, Valerie, 1990 Changing Gods in Medieval China, 1127-1276, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
240 Bibliography 
Harrell, C. Stevan, 1974 ''When a Ghost Becomes a God," in Arthur P. Wolf 
(ed.), Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society: 193-206, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Horton, Robin, 1969 ''Types of Spirit Possession in I<alabari Religion," in 
John Beattie and John Middleton (eds), Spirit Mediumship and Society in 
A{rial: 14-49, New York: Africana. 
Hsu Wen-hsiung, 1980 ''Frontier Social Organization and Social Disorder in 
Ch'ing Taiwan," in Ronald G. Knapp (ed.), China's Island Frontier: Studies 
in the Historiall Geogrt~phy of Taiwan: 87-105, Honolulu: University Press of 
Hawaii. 
Hu T'ai-li, 1986 "Shen, Gui yu Dutu: Dajia Le Duxi Fanying zhi Minsu 
Xinyang [Gods, Ghosts and Gamblers: The Influence of Popular Beliefs on 
the Everybody's Happy Lottery]," paper presented at the Second 
International Conference on Sinology, Academia Sinica, Taipei. 
Huang, Philip C. C., 1990 The Petwmt Fmnily and Rural Deuelopment in the 
Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Huang Shu-min, 1989 The Spiral Road: Change in a Chinese Village Through the 
Eyes of a Communist Party Letuler, Boulder: Westview. 
Ingerson, Alice E., 1984 Corporatism and Class Consciousness in North-
western Portugal, Ph.D dissertation submitted to the Johns Hopkins 
University. 
Ji Feng Yuan, Kuiper, Koenraad and Shu Shaogu, 1990 ''Language and 
Revolution: Formulae of the Cultural Revolution," lAnguage in Society 19: 
61-79. 
Jian Youwen ijen Yu-wen], 1958 Taiping Tuznguo Dianzhi Tonghw [Research 
into the Institutions of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], Hong Kong: 
Mengjin Shuwu. 
--- 1973 The Taiping Revolutionary Movement, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Jiang Renxiu, 1987 Dajia Le Dubuo Zhi Yanjiu [Research Into Everybody's 
Happy Gambling], Taichung: Taiwan Taizhong Difang Fayuan Jiancha-
chu. 
Jordan, David K., 1972 Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors: The Folk Religion of a 
Taiwanese Village, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Jordan, David K. and Overmyer, DanielL., 1986 The Flying Phoenix: Aspects 
of Chinese Sectarianism in Taiwan, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ju Zhucheng, 1991 ''The 'Depreciation' and 'Appreciation' of Some Address 
Terms in China," lAnguage in Society, 20: 87-90. 
Kaminsky, Howard, 1962 ''The Free Spirit in the Hussite Revolution," in 
Sylvia L. Thrupp (ed.), Millenial Dreams in Action: ESSil1JS in Comparative 
Study, The Hague: Mouton. 
Kandre, Peter K., 1976 ''Yao (lu Mien) Supernaturalism, Language, and 
Ethnicity," in David J. Banks (ed.), Changing Identities in Modern Southeast 
Asia: 171-197, The Hague: Mouton. 
Kojima Shinji, 1983 "Shilun Baishangdijiao, Baishangdihui yu Kejiaren de 
Guanxi [On the Relation Between the God Worshiping Religion, the God 
Worshiping Society and Hakkas]," in Taiping Tianguoshi Yizong [Selections 
on the History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], Vol. 2, ed. Taiping 
Tianguo Lishi Yanjiuhui, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. 
Bibliography 241 
Kuhn, Philip A., 1977 "Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross-cultural 
Dimensions of a Chinese Rebellion," Compt~rlllif¥ Studies in Society 11nd 
History, 19: 350-366. 
Lefort, Oaude, 1986 The Politiall Forms of Modern Society: BuretlUCTilCY, 
DemocrllCY, Totlllitmillnism, ed. John B. Thompson, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Leonard, Anne P., 1973 "Spirit Mediums in Palau: Transformations in a 
Traditional System," in Erika Bourguignon (ed.), Religion, Altered St11tes of 
Consciousness, 11nd Socilll Chllnge, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University 
Press; 
LeRoy Ladurie, Emmanuel, 19'79 CllrniVId in Rcmums, trans. Mary Feeney, 
New York: G. Brazillier. 
Levi-Strauss, Claude, 1970 Introduction to 11 Science of Mythology, trans. John 
Weightman and Doreen Weightman, Vol. 1, The RmD and the Cooked, New 
York: Harper &tRow, Harper Torchbooks. 
Lewis, loan M., 1971 Ecstlltic Religion: An Anthropologiall Study of Spirit 
Possession 11nd Shllmanism, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Li Cheng and White, Lynn T. ill, 1991 "China's Technocratic Movement and 
the World Economic Herllld," Modern Chin~~, 17(3): 342-388. 
Li Da, 1990 "Qingnian Junguan Dizhi Yang Bobing [Young Officers Oppose 
Yang Bobing]," Dtmgdtli Shishi Zhoulam, 20 October: 14. 
Li Feiran, 1981 ''Hong Xiuquan Zaoqi Sixiang Pouxi [Analysis of Hong 
Xiuquan's Early Thought]," in T11iping Tillnguoshi Y11njiu Wenxu11n 
[Selected Research Articles on the History of the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom], ed. Guangxi Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiuhui: 120-146, Nan-
ning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe. 
Li Feiran, Deng Jiezhang, Zhu Zhefang and Peng Dayong, 1982 ''Taiping 
Tianguo Qiyi de Guangxi Shehui [Guangxi Society in the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom Uprising]," in T11iping Tillnguoshi Xintlln [New 
Analysis of the History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], Nanjing 
Daxue Lishixi Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiushi: 147-173, Suzhou: Jiangsu 
Renmin Chubanshe. 
Li Wenhai and LiuYangdong, 1989 T11iping Titmguo Shehui Fengqing [Social 
Customs of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin 
Daxue Chubanshe. 
Li Yih-yuan, 1988 ''Taiwan Minjian Zongjiao de Xiandai Qushi: Dui Peter 
Berger Jiaoshou Dongya Fazhan Wenhua Yinsu Lun de Huiying [The 
Modem Tendencies of Taiwan's Popular Religion: A Response to 
Professor Peter Berger's Theory of Cultural Factors in East Asian 
Development]," unpublished paper, photocopy. 
Lian Shilun and Lian Huijin, 1985 Shibll W11nggong de Youllli (shllng) [The 
Origin of the Eighteen Lords (part 1)], Tanshui: privately printed. 
Liang Renbao, 1981 [1957] ''Taiping Tianguo he Kuanggong [The Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom and Miners)," in T11iping Tillnguoshi Yllnjiu Wenxlllln 
[Selected Research on the History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], ed. 
Guangxi Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiuhui: 50-64, Nanning: Guangxi Re-
nmin Chub~he. 
Limon, Jose, 1989 "Cilrne, CllTnllles, and the Carnivalesque: Bakhtinian Blltos, 
Disorder, and Narrative Discourses," Ameriam Ethnologist, 16(3): 471-486. 
242 Bibliography 
Link, Perry, 1989 ''Hand-copied Entertainment Fiction from the Cultural 
Revolution," in Perry Link, Richard Madsen, and Paul Pickowicz (eds), 
Unofficial Chinll: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic: 17-36, 
Boulder: Westview. 
Liu Jie, 1963 "Taiping Tianguo zai Guangxi Qiyi de Zhuyao Yuanyin [Major 
Causes of the Guangxi Uprising of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom]," 
Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu Lishi Xuehui Yuekan, 1963(1). 
Lii Simian, 1982 LU Simian Dushi Zhaji [Lii Simian's Notes on Reading 
History], Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe. 
Lu Yangyuan, 1982 ''Taiping Tianguo Qiyi Qian de Tudi Wenti [Land 
Problems Before the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Uprising]," Guangxi 
Shehuikexueyuan Lunwenxuan Lishi Zhuanji 1982: 1-11. 
Luhman, Sarah, 1989 ''The Myth of Tiananmen Square: The Students Talked 
Democracy But They Didn't Practice It," Washington Post, 30 July: CS. 
Madsen, Richard, 1984 Morality and Power in a Chinese Village, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Malinowski, Bronislaw, 1935 Coral Gardens and Their Magic, Vol. 2, London: 
George Allen &: Unwin. 
Mao Jiaqi, 1981 ''Taiping Tianguo Lishishang Jige Wenti de Zhiyi [Doubts 
About Several Questions Concerning the History of the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom]," in Taiping Tianguo Shixueshu Taolunhui Lunwen Xuanji 
[Collected Essays from the Symposium on Historical Studies of the 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], ed. Zhonghua Shuju Jindaishi Bianjishi, 
Vol. 3: 727-746, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. 
--- 1989 "'Tianxiong Xiafan Shengzhi' He Taiping Tianguo Zaoqi 
Lishi de Jige Wenti [Several Problems Concerning the 'Sacred Orders of 
the Heavenly Elder Brother on Earth' and the Early History of the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom]," in Taiping Tianguo Shi Yanjiu, Erji [Research into the 
History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, Vol. 2], ed. Mao Jiaqi: 23-39, 
Nanjing: Nanjing University Press. 
Mao Jiaqi, Fang Zhiguang and Dong Guanghua (eds), 1980 Taiping Tianguo 
Xingwangshi [History of the Rise and Fall of the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom], Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe. 
Martin, David, 1990 Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin 
America, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Martin, Emily, 1988 "Gender and Ideological Differences in Representations 
of Life and Death," in James L. Watson and Evelyn S. Rawski (eds), Death 
Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern Chinll: 164-179, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Meaney, Connie Squires, 1991 "Market Reform and Disintegrative Corrup-
tion in Urban China," in Richard Baum (ed.), Reform and Reaction in Post-
Mao Chinll: The Road to Tiananmen: 124-142, New York: Routledge. 
Meskill, Johanna Menzel, 1979 A Chinese Pioneer Family: The Lins of Wu-feng, 
Taiwan, 1729-1895, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Michael, Franz, 1966-1971 The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents, in 
collaboration with Chang Chung-li, Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 3 vols. 
Migdal, Joel S. 1982 "Capitalist Penetration in the Nineteenth Century: 
Creating Conditions for New Patterns of Social Control," in Robert P. 
Bibliography 243 
Weller and Scott E. Guggenheim (eds), Puwer and Protest in the Countryside: 
Studies in Rural Unrest in Asia, Europe and Ultin .America: 57-74, Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
Ming Pao News Staff, 1989 June Four: .A Chronicle of the Chinese Democratic 
Uprising, trans. Zi Jin and Qin Zhou, Fayetteville: University of Arkansas 
Press. 
Myers, Ramon H., 1980 The Chinese Economy: Past and Present, Belmont, 
California: Wadsworth. 
New York Times, New York, newspaper; articles by Nicholas Kristof and 
Sheryl WuDunn. 
Oi, Jean, 1991 ''Partial Market Reform and Corruption in Rural China," in 
Richard Baum (ed.), kfonn and Retlction in Post-Mao China: The Road to 
Tiananmen: 143-161, New York: Routledge. 
Ouyang Ming, 1990 ''Ni Re Wo Ye Re [Your Fads and Mine]," Kllifang Zazhi, 
September: 21. 
Overmyer, DanielL., 1974 ''The Tz'u-hui T'ang: A Contemporary Religious 
Sect on Taiwan," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian 
Society for Asian Studies, Toronto. 
---1989 "Attitudes Toward Popular Religion in Ritual Texts of the 
Chinese State: The Collected Statutes of the Great Ming," unpublished paper, 
n.p., photocopy. 
Paige, Jeffrey M., 1975 .Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export 
.Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World, New York: Free Press. 
Passerini, Luisa, 1987 Fascism in Populllr Memory: The Cultural Experience of 
the Turin Working Clllss, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Perry, Elizabeth J., 1991 '1ntellectuals and Tiananmen: Historical Perspec-
tive on an Aborted Revolution," in Daniel Chirot (ed.), The Crisis of 
Leninism and the D«line of the Left: The Revolutions of 1989: 129-146, 
Seattle: University of Washington. 
Peters, Matt, 1991 "Rock 'n' Revolt," Far 'EIIstern Economic R.euiew, 28 March: 
30-31. 
Pingnan Xianzhi [Pingnan County Gazetteer], 1883 Local Gazetteer, comp. 
Qiu Bin. 
Polanyi, Karl, 1944 The Great Transformation, New York: Rinehart. 
Qiu Dezai, 1979 Taiwan Miaoshen Zhlllln [The Story ofTaiwan's Temples and 
Gods], Taipei: Xintong Shuju. 
Qu Haiyuan, 1987 "Dajia Le" Xianxiang zhi Chengyin yu Yingxiang zhi 
Yanjiu [Research Into the Origins and Influence of the ''Everybody's 
Happy'' Phenomenon], Taipei: Xingzhengyuan Yanjiu Fazhan Kaohe-
hui. 
Qu Haiyuan and Yao Lixiang, 1986 ''Taiwan Diqu Zongjiao Bianqia~ zhi 
Tantao [Discussion of Religious Changes in the Taiwan Area),'' Bulletin of 
the Institute of Ethnology, .Academia Sinica, 75: 655-685. 
Rabelais, Fran~is, 1955 Garganfllll and Pantagruel, ed. J. M. Cohen, Har-
mondsworth: Penguin. 
Raozhi [Stopping the Cycle), 1978 Kaohsiung: Raozhi Zazhishe. 
Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], Beijing, newspaper. 
Rev, Istvan, 1987 ''The Advantages of Being Atomized: How Hungarian 
Peasants Coped with Collectivization," Dissent, 34(3): ~350. 
244 Bibliography 
Rohsenow, Hill Gates, 1973 Prosperity Settlement: The Politics of Paipai in 
Taipei, Taiurln, dissertation submitted to the University of Michigan. 
Sangren, P. Steven, 1987 History and Magiad Por.oer in 11 Chinese Community, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
SchOpflin, George, 1991"Conservative Politics and Factors of Conservatism 
in Post-Communist Polities," paper presented to the Conference on the 
"Obstacles to the Transformation of Soviet-Type Societies in Eastern 
Europe," Vienna, photocopy. 
Scott, James C., 1976 The Moral Economy of the PeaSilnt: Rebellion and 
Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
---1985 Wtt~pons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of PttiSilnt Resistance, New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Seaman, Gary, 1978 Temple Organization in a Chinese Village. Asian Folkore and 
Social Life Monographs, Vol. 101, Taipei: Orient Cultural Service. 
---1981 ''The Sexual Politics of Karmic Retribution," in Emily Martin 
Ahern and Hill Gates (eds), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society: 381-396, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Shahar, Meir, 1991 "Lucky Dog," Free China Review, July: 64-69. 
Shang Tong, 1990 "Yi Ge Nande de Xiqing Jieri: Fuzhou Laiqu Jianwen 
[A Rare Holiday: A Trip to Fuzhou]," ]iushi Niandai Yuekan, February: 
104-105. 
Shepherd, John, 1984 "Sinicized Siraya Worship of A-li-tsu," Bulletin of the 
Institute of Ethnology, Aaukmia Sinial, 58: 1-81. 
Shi Ming, 1990 ''Dalu Mimi Xing [A Secret Visit to the Mainland]," Minzhu 
Zhongguo Yuekan, February: 17-23. 
Shiba Wanggong Chwmqi [The Strange Tale of the Eighteen Lords], 1985, 
television series, Director Song Wenzhong, Zhonghua Dianshitai. 
Shiba Wanggong [The Eighteen Lords], 1985, film, Yonghuai Gongsi. 
Shijie Ribao, Hong Kong, newspaper. 
Shue, Vivienne, 1988 The Rttlch of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Siu, Helen F., 1989a Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural 
Revolution, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
--- 1989b ''Recycling Rituals: Politics and Popular Culture in Con-
temporary Rural China," in Perry Link, Richard Madsen, and Paul 
Pickowicz (eds), Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the 
People's Republic: 121-137, Boulder: Westview. 
Skocpol, Theda, 1979 States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of 
France, Russia, and China, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, newspaper. 
Speidel, William M., 1976 ''The Administrative and Fiscal Reforms of Liu 
Ming-ch'uan in Taiwan, 1884-1891: Foundations of Self-strengthening," 
Journal of Asian Studies, 35(3): 441-459. 
Strand, David, 1990 '"Civil Society' and 'Public Sphere' in Modern China: A 
Perspective on Popular Movements in Beijing, 1919-1989," Duke Working 
Papers in Asian/Pacific Studies, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Strickmann, Michel, 1982 ''The Tao Among the Yao: Taoism and the Sinific-
ation of South China," in Rekishi Ni Okeru Minshu to Bunka, 23-30, Toky9. 
Bibliography 245 
Su Fengwen, 1889a "Gufei Zonglu [Compilation of Sectarian Bandits]," in 
GURngxi Tongzhi Jiyao [Summary of Guangxi Gazetteers], ed. Su Zongjing, 
rev. Yang Full. 
--- 1889b ''Pinggui Jilue [Record of Pacifying Guangxi]," in GURngxi 
Tongzhi Jiyao [Summary of Guangxi Gazetteers], ed. Su Zongjing, rev. 
Yang Full. 
TaiWQnsheng Tongzhi [Gazetteer of Taiwan Province], 1980 comp. Taiwan-
sheng Wenxian Weiyuanhui, Taipei: Zhongwen. 
Tambiah, S. J., 1970 Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-east Thailand, 
Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, No. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Taussig, Michael T., 1980 The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Thorn, Fran~ise, 1989 Newspeak: The LangURge of Soviet Communism, trans. 
Ken Connelly, London: Claridge Press. 
Thompson, E. P., 1971 "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 
Eighteenth Century," Past and Present, 50: 76-136. 
Thrupp, Sylvia L., 1962 "Millennial Dreams in Action: A Report on the 
Conference Discussion," in Sylvia L. Thrupp (ed.), Millennia! Dreams in 
Action, The Hague: Mouton. 
Tilly, Charles, 1982 ''Routine Conflicts and Peasant Rebellions in Seven-
teenth-century France," in Robert P. Weller and Scott E. Guggenheim 
(eds), Power and Protest in the Countryside: Rural Unrest in Asia, Europe, and 
Latin America: 13-41, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Topley, Marjorie, 1975 ''Marriage Resistance in Rural Kwangtung," in 
Margery Wolf and Roxane Witke (eds), Women in Chinese Society: 67--88, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Turner, Victor, 1967 Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu RitURl, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
---1969 The RitUJll Process: Structure and Anti-structure. Symbol, Myth, 
and Ritual Series, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
--- 1974 Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human 
Society, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Verdery, Katherine, 1991 ''Theorizing Socialism: A Prologue to the 'Transi-
tion'," American Ethnologist 18(3): 419-439. 
Wagner, Rudolf G., 1982 Reenacting the Heavenly Vision: The Role of Religion in 
the Taiping Rebellion. China Research MonogrAph, No. 25, Berkeley: Institute 
of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. 
Wakeman, Frederic, 1966 Strangers At the C.te: Social Disorder in South China, 
1839-1861, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Wallace, Anthony F. C., 1956 "Revitalization Movements," AmericAn 
Anthropologist, 58: 264-281. 
Wang Qingcheng, 1981 ''Lun Hong Xiuquan de Zaoqi Sixiang ji Qi Fazhan 
[On the Early Thought of Hong Xiuquan and Its Development]," in 
TAiping Tianguoshi Xueshu Taolunhui Lunwen XUilnji [Selected Articles · 
from the Conference on the History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], 
ed. Zhonghua Shuju Jindaishi Bianjiwu: 243-280, Beijing: Zhonghua 
Shuju. 
246 Bibliography 
--- 1985 " 'Tianfu Shengzhi,' 'Tianxiong Shengzhi' he Taiping 
Tianguo Lishi ('Holy Writs of the Heavenly Father,' 'Holy Writs of the 
Heavenly Elder Brother' and the History of the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom]," ]indllishi Yanjiu: 191-239. 
Wang Shilang, 1980 Riben Zhimindi Tizhi Xia de Taiwan (Taiwan Under the 
Japanese Colonial System], Taipei: Zhongwen Tushu Gongsi. 
Wang Xiyou, 1991 ''Beijing Dangan (Beijing File]," ]iushi Niandlli Yuekan, 
July: 52-53. 
Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N., 1992 "Afterword: History, Myth, and the Tales of 
Tiananmen," in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds), 
Popular Protest and Politiall Culture in Modern China: 244-280, Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
Watson, James L., 1985 "Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T'ien 
Hou ('Empress of Heaven') Along the South China Coast, 960-1960," in 
David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan, and Evelyn S. Rawski (eds), Popular 
Culture in lAte Imperial China: 292-324, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Watson, James L. and Rawski, Evelyn S. eds, 1988, Death Ritual in lAte 
Imperial and Modern China, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Weber, Max, 1946 "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," in H. 
H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology: 
302-322, New York: Oxford University Press. . 
---1958 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott 
Parsons, Foreword by R. H. Tawney, New York: Scribner's. 
---1978 (1956] Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 
eds Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Weller, Robert P., 1984 '1deology, Organization and Rebellion in Chinese 
Sectarian Religion," in Janos M. Bak and Gerhard Benecke (eds), 
Religion and Rural Revolt: 390-406, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
---1985 ''Bandits, Beggars and Ghosts: The Failure of State Control 
Over Religious Interpretation in Taiwan," Amerialn Ethnologist 12(1): 46-
61. 
---1987a ''Historians and Consciousness: The Modem Politics of the 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom," Social Research, 54(4): 731-755. 
--- 1987b ''The Politics of Ritual Disguise: Repression and Response 
in Taiwanese Religion," Modern China, 13: 17-39. 
---1987c Unities and Diversities in Chinese Religion, Seattle: University 
of Washington. 
Whyte, Martin K., 1974 Small Groups and Political Rituals in China, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
--- 1988 "Death in the People's Republic of China," in James L. 
Watson and Evelyn S. Rawski (eds), Death Ritual in Late Imperial and 
Modern China: 289-316, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
> Wierzbicka, Anna, 1990 "Antitotalitarian Language in Poland: Some 
Mechanisms of Linguistic Self-defense," Language in Society, 19: 1-59. 
Williams, Raymond, 1977 Marxism and Literature, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. ' 
Bibliography 247 
Winn, Jane Kaufman, 1991 "Banking and Finance in Taiwan: The Prospects 
for Internationalization in the 19908,'' unpublished paper. 
Wolf, Arthur P. 1974 "Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors," in Arthur P. Wolf 
(ed.), Religion and Rihull in Chinese Society: 131-82, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Wolf, Eric R., 1958 "The V.argin of Guadalupe: A Mexican National Symbol,'' 
Juunull qf .Amerialn Folklort, 71: 34-39. 
---1969 Peasant Wars qf t~ Twentieth Century, New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Worsley, Peter, 1968 The Trumpet Shall Suund: A Study qf "Cilrgo" Cults in 
Mellznesitl, 2nd edn, New York: Schocken. 
WUXURn Xianzhi [Wuxuan County Gazetteer], 1914 Local Gazetteer, Tang 
Chaosheng (ed.). 
Xian Xiang, 1991 "Zai Guangzhou Kan Cui Jian Yanchanghui [Watching 
Cui Jian's Concert in Guangzhou]," Jiushi Niandlli Yuekan, March: 60-61. 
Xie Xingyao, 1950 Taiping Tianguo Qianhou GWlngxi de Fan Qing Yundong 
[Anti-Qing Movements in Guangxi Around the Taiping Heavenly King-
dom], Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe. 
Xing Fenglin, 1981 "Guanyu Yang Xiuqing Jiatuo Tianfu Fushen Chuanyan 
de Ruogan Wenti [On Several Questions Concerning Yang Xiuqing's 
False Possessions by the Heavenly Father]," in Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiu 
Wenxuan [Selected Research on the History of the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom], ed. Guangxi Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiuhui. Nanning: Guang-
xi Renmin Chubanshe. 
Xinsheng &o [New Life], Newspaper, Taipei. 
Xunzhuu Fuzhi [Xunzhou Prefecture Gazetteer), 1897 Local Gazetteer, comp. 
Xia Jingyi. 
Yan, Yunxiang, 1991 ''Factors of Stability and Instability in Rural China: A 
View from a Heilongjiang Village," paper presented at Fairbank Center 
for East Asian Research, Harvard University. 
Yan Zhengji, 1962 [1854] ''Lun Yuexi Zei Qingbing Shi Shimo [All About the 
Guangxi Bandits and the Qing Army]," in Taiping Tianguo Shiliao Zongpian 
Jianji, Vol. 2 [Selected Historical Sources on the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom], comp. Taiping Tianguo Lishi Bowuguan, Beijing: Zhonghua 
Shuju. 
Yang, Mayfair Mei-Hui, 1989 "The Gift Economy and State Power in 
China," Compamtiw Studies in Society and History 31(1): 25-54. 
Yao Ying, 1867 Zhongfuttmg QIUlnji [Collected Works from the Zhongfu 
Hall], Nanjing University Library, microfilm. 
--- 1957, Dongclul Jilue [Sketch of My Assignment to Taiwan], Taipei: 
Taiwan Yinhang. 
Yi Mu, and Thompson, Mark V., 1989 Crisis at Tiananmen: Reform and Reality 
in Modern China, San Francisco: China Books. 
Yu Gan, 1991 "'Wo Ai Ting Aiyue' ['I Like Listening to Dirges')," 
Zhengming, May: 21. 
Yu Kuang-hong, 1990 "Making a Malefactor a Benefactor: Ghost Worship in 
Taiwan," Bulletin qf t~ Institute qf Ethnology, Aclldemia Sinica, 70: 39-66. 
''Yueni Jiliie [Record of the Cantonese Rebels]," n.d., in Taiping Tianguo 
Shiliao Zongpian [Collected Historical Sources on the Taiping Heavenly 
248 Bibliography · 
Kingdom], ed. Taiping Tianguo Ushi Bowuguan, Vol. 2, Beijing: Zhon-
ghua Shuju, 1962. 
Zagorin, Perez, 1990 Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Omfurmity 
in Early Modem Europe, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Zhang Zongrong, 1985 Shiba Wanggong Chuanqi [The Sb'ange Tale of the 
Eighteen Lords], in collaboration with Li Liqing, Taipei: Yiqun. 
Zhong Wendian, 1984a "'Mifan Zhu' Sanlun [Some Thoughts on 'Rice 
Lords']," paper presented at Jindai Zhongguo Huitang Wenti Xueshu 
Taolunhui. 
--- 1984b Taiping Tilmguo Renwu [Personalities of the Taiping Hea-
venly Kingdom], Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe. 
Zinoviev, Alexander, 1984 The Retllity of Communism, ed. Charles Janson, 
New York: Schocken. 
Index 
Note: Most references are to China, unless otherwise stated. 
accommodation: and 
resistance 116-17, 167-8 
address, titles of 215-16 
Ahem, Emily 7, 52, 116 
ambiguity 181-2 
amoral marginal cults 87-8 
ancestor worship 217 
Ang Gong 171-2 
anomie 211-12 
Apollonian cult (Greece) 87 
Apostolics (Yucatan) 89-90 
architecture 
Eighteen Lords temple 132-4 
Taiwanese temples 119-22 
Arendt, Hannah 188, 219 
arts: and subversion 209-10 
Asia, Southeast: class culture 10 
Bakhtin, Mikhail 11, 17-18, 22 
bandits 43-5, 58, 98-9 
recruitment to Taiping 44-5 
baptism: of money 11, 166 
Barthes, Roland 18-19, 22 
Beijing: Forbidden City 119 
Berger, Peter 152 
Big-head Goat (Zhang Zhao) 44, 
45 
boundaries, social: and spirit 
possession 79-82 
Bourdieu, Pierre 20 
Brandes,Stanley 12 
Budai Heshang (Ooth-bag 
Monk) 1~9 
campaigns, government, post-
Tiananmen 198-200, 204, 208, 
21~11, 212, 217-18 
capitalism 
and rural unrest 41-3 
and Taiwanese religion 148-52, 
166-7 
Carnival 11, 12-13, 25 
Catholic Church 90 
chaos 12-13, 197 
and control 169-76 
charcoal 42 
chemistry: saturation 23 
Chen Jo-hsi 203-4 
Chen. Millionaire 201-2 
Christianity 
and Hong Xiuquan 36-40, 72 
and Taiping 34-5,50-1, 60-4 
chromaticism 16 
cigarettes: as offerings 136, 
137-9 
class: tacit resistance 9-15 
Ooth-bag Monk (Budai 
Heshang) 1~9 
Co Su Kong 171 
ritual 7, 172-3 
temples 120, 121 
collecting the souls (siu hun) 156-7 
Colombia 144 
baptism of money 11, 166 
devil worship 3, 149-:50, 166 
communitas 26 
Confucius 
birthday ritual 172 
desb'Uction of tablets ~9, 61 
control 
and institutions 187-204 
and language 2~13 
limits of 169-83 
religious: by elites ~' 172-4; 
by government 54-5, 
169-72, 176-80; in 
sects 174-6 
· of saturation 26-7 
of spirit possession 72, 90-4, 
175 
of Taiping 94--110, 182-3 
corruption: and Tiananmen 195-6 
criminals: exposure by 
mediums 98-9 
see also bandits; pirates 
Cui Jian 210 
249 
250 Index 
cults 
amoral marginal 87-8 
official state 54-5 
organization of 87-94 
see also possession, spirit; Taiping 
Cultural Revolution 207-8 
and identity 214 
mass criticism meetings 189 
nostalgia campaign 199, 210-11, 
217-18 
curing, magical 87, 106 
and Taiping 64-8 
Daoism 
magical curing 65 
ritual 122-3 
Daoist Association 156 
death: and revolution 191-5 
see also funerals; mourning 
decoration: Taiwanese 
temples 120-1 
Delphic oracle (Greece) 91-2 
democracy: and Tiananmen 195 
Deng Xiaoping 197 
die ::rian (bowl spirit) 137 
difference: and resistance 25--6 
Dionysian cult (Greece) 87 
dog worship 47, 58-9 
in Eighteen Lords temple 134-5 
domination see control 
doxa 20 
dress: and identity 214-15 
Earth Gods 52-3 
She Gong temples 217 
temple destruction 62 
Tho Te Kong 5, 131, 132-3 
Eco, Umberto 12 
economy 
commodity 11, 202; and 
ghosts 144-5 
and rural unrest 41-3 
second 201-2 
and Taiwanese religion 148-52, 
166-7 
Edo (West Africa) 143 
education: exam system 36 
Eighteen Lords temple 
academic readings 165-8 
anomalies of 131-9 
booklet 164-5 
copies of 1~7 
failed precipitations 154-68 
and lotteries 139-42 
movie 150, 157-61 
rise in popularity 124-8 
television soap opera 161-4 
elites: religious control 55-6, 
172-4 
England: class culture 10 
ethnic boundaries: and spirit 
possession 79-81 
ethnic composition 
of Taiping 79-80 
of Xunzhou Prefecture 46-8 
Everybody's Happy 
(dajillle) 139-42, 178-9 
examination system 36 
families 
free space 203 
Taiping on 99-100 
fascism: and identity 213-18 
Feng family 56-7 
Feng Yunshan 37, 79, 82, 98 
in Guangxi 50 
imprisonment 64, 95 
temple destruction 61, 62 
Fish, Stanley 21-2 
free space 26-8 
mourning as 191-3 
religious 51-6 
and rural unrest 40-9 
socialist 200-4 
and Taiping 40-9, 51-60 
funerals 144-5, 191-4 
Gan Wang 57-8, 63 
Gates, H. 116 
Geertz, Clifford 6 
gender relations: Taiping 33 
Germany, East 220 
ghost(s) 
festivals 170-1 
and lotteries 141-2 
worship 3-4, 28, 129-31, 147-8; 
and financial 
rewards 143-5 
Index 251 
ghost(s) (cont.) 
see lllso Eighteen Lords temple 
Ginzburg, Carlo 1~11 
God Worshipers (Bai Shangdi Ren) 
see Taiping 
gods 
Chinese 51-6; and 
Taiping 60-4 
magical curing 65 
in Taiwan 146-7 
of Xunzhou Prefecture 56-60 
see lllso under specific nmnes 
Good Words to Admonish the Age 36, 
37,38 
government 
and control 1~204 
and identity 213-18 
and interpretative 
communities 176-80 
officiallanguage 205-13 
and religious control 54-5, 
169-72, 176-80 
and saturation 26-7 
and spirit possession 72, 175 
use of mediums 92 
Gramsci, Antonio 9, 10 
Grandaunt Uu (Uu Dagupuo) 59 
Guan Gong 51 
Guangxi 34 
free space 40-9, ~1, 56-60 
magical curing 65-7 
spirit possession ?0-2, 103-4 
gtmnxi (personal networks) 201-3 
Guanyin 82-3, 217 
Guiping 59,70-1,217 
gunilmg temples 59 
Guoyu 92 
Hakkas 
in Taiping 79--80 
in Xunzhou Prefecture 46, 47, 
48 
Hamberg, Theodore 34, 39, 45, 63, 
72-3,74 
Hansen, v. 54 
heat and noise (lszuzitd) 
control of 169-76 
in Eighteen Lords temple 127-8 
in Taiwanese temples 118-24 
heterodoxy 20 
Hong Rengan 34, 37, 38, 66, 69 
HongXiuquan 34, 35, 50, 79, 105 
ideology ~ 1, 60-4, 82-3, 84 
magical curing 64, 65-6 
move to politics 96-7 
spirit possession 73, 94-5 
vision 36-40, 72 
Hu T'ai-li 141, 142 
Hu Yaobang: funeral 190, 192-3 
Hu Yiguang 46 
Hua County: Hong Xiuquan 
in 36-9 
Huang Ermei 97 
Huang Shu-min 202-3 
Hungary 213 
identity: in totalitarian 
states 213-18 
ideology 
state control of 187-204 
Taiping 33-5 
illness see curing, magical 
incense 5-6 
cigarettes as substitute for 136, 
137-9 
indigo 42-3 
institutions: and control 187-204 
see lllso government 
intellectuals: as leaders 40 
interpretation 
and control 181-3 
of Eighteen Lords temple 152-3 
and language 205-13 
of religion 5-9, 19-20, 117-18, 
123-4 
of resistance 3-15 
and saturation 16-29 
social power of 221-4 
and spirit possession 75-6 
and Taiping 86-7, 94-110 
of Tiananmen 192-6; by 
state 196-200 
interpretative communities 21-2 
and government 176-80 
in Hua County 38-9 
in religion 53-6 
in Xunzhou Prefecture 84 
Iran 220 
252 Index 
Italy 
class consciousness 9 
officiallanguage 2C17 
Iu Ieng Kong temples 131 
see also Eighteen Lords temple; 
ghost worship 
Japan: occupation of Taiwan 114 
Jiang Jingguo 115, 178 
Jiang Nan 178, 179 
jilw 53, 58 
journeys, spirit 71-2 
jumping (tilw) 77 
Kalahari (Nigeria) 87 
King Gan (Gan Wang) 57-8, 63 
Kristof, Nicholas 204 
Lai Ning 200, 203 
land reform: Taiping 33 
Lang temple 59 
language 
anti-totalitarian 206 
and cultural domination 181-2, 
189, 205-13 
saturation of meaning 16-29 
wooden 206 
language games 69-70 
Lee, Ann 92-3 
Lefort, Oaude 214 
Lei Feng 199, 203 
Le Roy Ladurie, E. 25 
Levi-Strauss, Oaude: 
mediators 16-17 
Li Meishu 121, 172-3 
Li Peng 191 
Lian family 164-5 
Liang A-fa 36, 38 
Liao Tianding temple 137, 147 
television soap opera 162-3 
literature: post-structural 
theory 20-2 
Liuwu temple, Sigu 47, 59, 61-2 
lotteries 139-42, 178-9 
Luo Dagang 82 
Ma Co (Mazu) temples 120 
see also Tian Hou 
Mao Zedong 217-18 
Martin, E. see Ahem 
Mazu see Ma Co; Tian Hou 
meaning 
multiplicity of 221-4 
of rituals 5-9, 19-20 
saturation of 16-29 
see also interpretation; language 
media 
censorship in Taiwan 177 
and Eighteen Lords temple 150, 
151, 157-65 
interpretation of 
Tiananmen 197-8 
and subversion 208-11 
mediators 16-17 
mediums 71-3, 77 
authority in Taiping 73-5 
and cult organization 91-2 
exposure of criminals 9s-9 
spirit writing 174-5 
in Taiwan 146 
see also possession, spirit 
military: after Tiananmen 198 
miners, silver 43 
mothers, new: and 
pollution 136-7 
Mountainstreet village 171-2 
mourning 
as free space 191-3 
symbolism 193-4 
movements, new: leaders 39-40 
movies 
Eighteen Lords temple 150, 
157-61 
and subversion 209-10 
music 
and subversion 209-10 
in Taiwanese rituals 122 
Tristan chord 16-17 
names: and identity 215 
Nanjing: Taiping in 104-5 
Nanjing Museum 191-2 
networks, personal (gwnm) 201-3 
newspapers: and subversion 209 
nostalgia campaign 199, 210-11, 
217-18 
Index 253 
offerings: in Eighteen Lords 
temple 135-9 
officials see government 
Opium War (1839-42) 43 
opossums 16 
orthodoxy 20, 117 
Overmyer, D. L. 169-70 
Palau Modekngei 81, 90 
Pangu 47, 58-9 
peasant culture 10-12 
see also working class 
People's Daily 197, 208, 209 
piancJli 148-9 
pigs: in rituals 6, 7-8, 19 
pirates, river 43, 44 
Poland 220 
officiallanguage 206 
Polanyi, K. 149 
pollution: of new mothers 136-7 
Portugal: official language 207 
possession, spirit 34 
emotional power of 75-9 
faking 105 
mass 77, 89-90 
and organization of cults 87-94 
power of 72-85 
problems of 103-4 
and social boundaries 79-82 
of Taiping 69-75, 78-81, 82-5, 
97-8, 103-4 
in Taiwan 141, 146 
in Xunzhou Prefecture 69-72 
post-structuralism 221 
and meaning 20-2 
precipitation 26-9 
in Eighteen Lords 
temple 154-68 
and saturation 180-3 
of Taiping 35, 86-110 
priests, Daoist 123 
publications 
Eighteen Lords booklet 164-5 
of Taiping 100-1 
Qiansa temple 59 
qigong exercise 216-17 
Rabelais, Fran~ois 11, 17-18 
rainbows 16 
rationalization 22-3, 106-7 
reciprocity: in socialist 
systems 201-3 
religion 
and capitalism 148-52, 166-7 
in China 51-6 
control of 54-6,,}69-80 
and government ~ -169-72, 
176-80 
and Hong Xiuquan 36-40, 72 
and lotteries 139-42 
and resistance 220 
resurgence of 217; in 
Taiwan 115-16, 146-8 
and Taiping 34-5, 50-1, 60-4 
in Xunzhou Prefecture 47-8, 
56-60 
see also ghost worship; 
possession, spirit; ritl_lals; 
temples 
Religion of Compassion (Cihui 
Tang) 77-8, 82 
resistance 180-3 
concepts of 3-13 
and Eighteen Lords 
temple 166-8 
and interpretation 13-15, 16-29 
and official language 208-13 
and organization 21s-21 
religious activity as 116-18 
Rev, Istvan 213-14 
reversals: of dominant 
order 12-13 
revolution: and death 191-5 
rice lords (miftzn zhu) 45-6 
Righteous Dog (Yiquan) 
temples 135 
rituals 76 
control of 54-6, 172-4 
in Eighteen Lords temple 127, 
135-9 
meanings of 5-9, 19-20 
and possession cults 81-5 
and Taiping 63-4 
in Taiwanese temples 122-3 
see also ghost worship 
Roberts, Issachar 50, 64, 94 
Rohsenow, H. 116 
254 
romance of resistance 13 
rural unrest 
and free space 40-9 
theories of 41-2 
Sangren, Steven 117 
Sanjiang 57, 58, 59 
Sanxia (Taiwan) 
ghost festival 171 
meanings of rituals 7, 8, 19 
temples 55-6, 119, 121 
saturation 1~ 
of meaning 16-29 
in spirit possession 75-6, 83-4 
in Taiping 35, 51-68 
in Taiwanese ghost 
WOrShip 129-53 
in Taiwanese ritual 118-28 
Schopflin, G. 206 
Scott, James 10, 11, 14 
second economy 201-2 
sects 174-6 . 
see also under specific names 
sesame oil chicken: as 
offering 136-7 
sexuality 
female, threat of 136-7 
unclean 135 
Shakers (American) 92-3 
Shang oracles 92 
Shi Dakai 47, 66, 80, 98 
signs 76 
silver mines 43 
singing, paired 47, 57, 59, 61-2 
socialist states 
free space 200-4 
and identity 213-18 
official language 2()5..6 
Soviet Union: official 
language 206 
spirits: corrupt 74-5 
see also journeys; possession; 
writing 
state see government 
strongmen 45-6 
structuralism: and mediators 17 
students 
in Tiananmen 
demonstrations 190-6 
Index 
after Tiananmen 
demonstrations 198 
study groups 211-12 
alternative institutions 203-4 
interpretation of 
Tiananmen 198 
subversion 13, 208-13 
superstition 176 
symbolism: in Tiananmen 193-4 
T-shirts: as subversion 210-11 
Taborite heresy 90-1 
Taiping (formerly God 
Worshipers) 3, 13, 28 
background 33-49 
bandit recruitment 44-5 
ethnic composition 79-80 
free space for 40-9, 51-60 
ideology 33-5; religious 
belief 34-5, 50-1, 60-4 
magical curing 64-8 
mediums 73-5 
political organization 86-110 
publications 100-1 
resistance 167-8 
and saturation 50-68 
spirit possession 69-85 
transformation 86-7, 97-103 
women in 82-3 
Taiwan 
ghost worship 3-4, 28; and 
cultural domination 169-
83; precipitations 154-68; 
saturated ritual 129-53 
guniang temples 59 
lotteries 139-42, 178-9 
religion: background 113-28; 
and capital 148-52, 166-7; 
control of 176-80; 
resurgence of 11~16, 146-8 
Religion of Compassion 77-8, 
82 
rituals ~9, 19, 118-24 
Taro Cult (New Guinea) 79, 81 
Taussig, Michael 3, 11, 149, 166 
television 
Eighteen Lords temple soap 
opera 161-4 
subversion 208-9 
Index 255 
temples 52-3 
control of ritual 55-6 
destruction by Taiping 61, 62, 
100, 106 
multiple 120 
three wall 131 
in Taiwan ttS-16; 
architecture 119-22 
in Xunzhou Prefecture 47-8, 
56-60 
see also Eighteen Lords temple 
Thailand: ghosts 143-4 
Thistle Mountain (Zijing Shan) 41, 
43,50,57,58,59 
Thom, F. 206 
Thompson, E. P. 10 
Three Generations temples 56-7, 
58, 62, 100 
Tian Hou (Mazu) 51, 54, 173-4 
see also Ma Co 
Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations 4, ~9 
background 189-91 
interpretations of 192-6; by 
state 196-200 
and resistance 218-21 
television news 208-9 
totalitarianism 
and control 188-204 
and identity 213-18 
and resistance 219-21 
traitors: exposure by 
mediums 98-9 
Triads 44-5,70,114 
Tristan chord 1~17 
Turner, Victor 6 
communitas 26 
visions 76 
of Hong Xiuquan 36-40, 72 
Wagner, Richard: Tristan and 
Isolde 1~17 
Wallace, Anthony 40 
Wang Qingcheng lot 
Wang Zuoxin 95 
Watchtower movement 
(Rhodesia) 88-9 
Watson, J. L 54, 55, 173 
Way of Unity (Yiguan Dao) 175 
Weber, Max 179 
rationalization 22-3, 106-7 
Wei Changhui 80, 97, 98 
Wierzbicka, A. 206 
women 
new mothers and 
pollution 1~7 
and spirit possession 81-3 
in Taiping 82-3 
working class: tacit 
resistance 9-15 
writing, spirit 174-5 
Xiangzhou 57, 63 
Xiao Chaogui 80, 82-3 
as Jesus 94, 96, 97-8, 99-100, 
104 
status in Taiping 73-4 
Xunzhou Prefecture 
magical curing 6S-7 
religion in ~ 
rural unrest 40-9 
spirit possession 70-2 
Yang Qingxiu 69 
status in Taiping 73, 74 
Yang Xiuqing 80, 82 
downfall 104-5, 108 
as God 94, 98-100, 103 
magical curing 66-7 
Yao 80 
Pangu god 47, 58-9 
spirit journeys 72, 73 
in Xunghou Prefecture 46, 48 
Yao Ying 99, 170 
Zhang Zhao (Big-head Goat) 44, 
45 
Zhao Ziyang 191 
Zhou Enlai 192 
Zhou Xineng 99 
Zhuang 80 
in Xunzhou Prefecture 46, 47 
......... r-----------------
Robert P Weller is a research associate at the 
Institute for the Study of Economic Culture, and 
associate professor of anthropology at Boston 
University. 
University of Washington Press 
Seattle 
Printed in Hong Kong 
llflflil~fl~ll11111~1i~ 6 
8-~82L6-~62-0 N8SI 
